Strong Iran Ties Emerge as Factor in Hamas Leader Choice, Analysts Say

Former Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal receives condolences at a mourning house for assassinated Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, August 2, 2024. (Reuters)
Former Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal receives condolences at a mourning house for assassinated Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, August 2, 2024. (Reuters)
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Strong Iran Ties Emerge as Factor in Hamas Leader Choice, Analysts Say

Former Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal receives condolences at a mourning house for assassinated Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, August 2, 2024. (Reuters)
Former Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal receives condolences at a mourning house for assassinated Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, August 2, 2024. (Reuters)

In choosing its next leader, Hamas will be looking for a candidate who can safeguard deep ties with Tehran at a time when Iranian support will be more important than ever to help the Palestinian group recover after the Gaza war, analysts say.

The armed group has several potential replacements for Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in Tehran last week. They include former leader, Khaled Meshaal, who led Hamas for 13 years from outside the Palestinian territories until passing the baton to Haniyeh in 2017.

But experts believe his chances could be hurt by past friction with Iran and its regional allies, notably Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meshaal was Hamas leader when the group turned on Damascus during the so-called Arab Spring and declared sympathy with the rebellion against him.

Iran's support will be doubly important to Hamas as it seeks to rebuild once the guns fall silent in Gaza, devastated by Israeli bombardment since the group ignited war by attacking Israel on Oct. 7. While Hamas continues to fight in Gaza, 10 months of pummeling by Israel have hit it hard.

This consideration seems likely to boost the prospects of candidates deemed closer to Tehran, including Khalil al-Hayya, currently serving as Hamas' deputy leader for Gaza though he left the territory some years ago.

"There might have been some retreat in Meshaal's chances of taking the place of Haniyeh, because he doesn't enjoy much support from Iran since he was the one who turned against the Syrian regime and ended the Hamas presence in Damascus," said Ashraf Abouelhoul, a specialist on Palestinian issues and managing editor of the Egyptian state-owned paper Al-Ahram.

"Also, the armed wing, which is keen on the concept of the rebuilding when the war is over, will be thinking of a candidate whose relations with Iran are strong enough to ensure the rebuilding takes place," he said.

One Hamas official told Reuters the succession hadn't been settled yet and the deliberations are under way.

HAYYA SAYS HAMAS LEADERSHIP UNITED

Hayya was known to be very close to Haniyeh. He accompanied him to Tehran for the visit during which he was killed in July.

He led Hamas' negotiating team for ceasefire talks under Haniyeh's supervision and also led reconciliation talks with Hamas' Palestinian rival Fatah in past years.

Like Haniyeh, he maintained strong relations with Iran and in 2022 he led a Hamas delegation to Damascus to mend ties with Assad, declaring it a historic meeting.

Speaking as Hamas received condolences for Haniyeh's death in Qatar, Hayya said the movement's leadership remained united.

"Our will is strong and can't be broken by the martyrdom of one leader or two or three," he said. "God willing within days we will conclude our consultations to choose a new leader."

Hani al-Masri, a Palestinian political analyst, said that in less extraordinary times the group's Gaza leader, Yahya Sinwar, would have been a candidate.

Sinwar was a mastermind of the Oct. 7 attack, in which gunmen killed 1,200 people and abducted another 250, according to Israeli tallies, prompting the Israeli offensive which the Gaza health ministry says has killed 40,000 people.

Sinwar is widely believed to still be running Hamas' war from tunnels under Gaza. Hayya's chances are helped by his good ties to the Lebanese group Hezbollah, the region's most powerful Iran-aligned faction, which has been trading fire with Israel throughout the Gaza war.

Masri noted Meshaal's leadership qualities and experience but said his prospects hinged on healing the rift with Iran: "His weak point is his negative relationships with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah at a time when there is ... a joint war."



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.