Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
TT

Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)

The Palestinian group Hamas’ unprecedented attack against Israel on October 7 turned the spotlight on the movement’s prominent official Yahya al-Sinwar, who is the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

Sinwar was named on Tuesday as Hamas’ new leader, succeeding Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in a presumed Israeli strike in Tehran last week.

Sinwar grew up in Gaza after his family was displaced there from the city of Majdal Aqab following the 1948 Nakba. His endured a difficult childhood and witnessed the 1967 setback, deepening his hatred towards Israel that was only compounded by the harsh and miserable life in Gaza and its camps.

The experience ingrained in him the “pressing need for revenge” that would shape the man he is today. His view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was always marked by his recalling of the Nakba and the suffering endured by his parents and the Palestinians. He often spoke of his need to “create a shock and change the balances of power,” recalled those who know him.

Sinwar earned his education at schools in the Khan Younis camp. He later graduated with a degree in Arabic Studies from the Islamic University. He joined the “Islamic bloc” and eventually rose in prominence to form the “Al-Majd” agency – Hamas' internal security agency – that played a major role in pursuing agents linked to the Israeli security forces.

His security role drew the attention of Israeli forces and he was arrested in the late 1980s. Israel accused him of killing four “collaborators” and sentenced him to four life terms. He was held in various Israeli prisons and spent long periods in solitary confinement.

His imprisonment did not impact his work in Hamas. He led the movement from behind bars, while becoming increasingly paranoid. He learned Hebrew and led prisoner strikes and negotiations, winning some rounds and losing others.

He spent over two decades behind bars as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict witnessed intifadas, wars and periods of peace. It wasn’t until his brother kidnapped an Israeli soldier and Hamas exchanged him for a thousand Palestinian detainees, including Sinwar, that he gained his freedom and started carving the shape of a new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to his colleagues, former inmates and other acquaintances who met Sinwar over the years to learn more about the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that has changed the conflict forever.

Sinwar speaks to the media in Gaza on October 28, 2019. (Reuters)

First meetings

Ismat Mansour, a former prisoner and member of the Democratic Front, spent years in prison where he met Sinwar in the late 1990s. “When you first meet him, you see a normal, simple and religious man,” he said. “But he also has a harsh streak and can be severe in demeanor.”

“He is religious, but not preachy. His religious background helps shape his relations,” he added.

Mansour said Sinwar’s difficult childhood helped shape his grudge and spite against Israel that has shaped his policies. “He is not one for compromise.”

Abdel Fattah al-Dawla, a former prisoner and Fatah member, spent years held in Israeli jails. He met Sinwar once in 2006. By that point, Sinwar’s reputation had already preceded him and Dawla had the impression of a severe and unpromising man.

This impression was confirmed when they met in the Bir al-Saba prison. Dawla remarked that the “social Sinwar is different than the Hamas leader. The Sinwar with whom you can discuss various general affairs is different than the Sinwar with whom you can discuss issues related to Palestinian factions.”

He may be sociable when discussing general issues, and firm and unyielding when discussing conflict. “It is as if he were two different people,” he added.

Salaheddine Taleb, a former prisoner and Hamas member, spent years in jail with Sinwar. He was released along with Sinwar in the exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011.

Recalling his first meeting with Sinwar, he said: “You are struck by his humility and jovial relations with others.” However, his security background and role set him apart from other Hamas leaders. “He isn’t a preacher, but the founder of the al-Majd security apparatus. This greatly impacts who he is as a person,” he went on to say. “Despite his strong social relations, when it came to security affairs, he was very strict and uncompromising.”

Security paranoia

Sinwar remained Hamas’ number one security official inside and outside prison. In the mid-90s, Israel dealt Hamas and its cells in the West Bank and Gaza a series of painful blows, including the assassination of top figures, such as Yahya Ayyash and Imad Aqel, and the arrest of numerous members.

These developments shook Hamas to the core and created a sense of paranoia among its members. Sinwar was the mover and shaker of this period. Taleb recalled this “difficult” phase during which he joined Sinwar in running security affairs from prison.

The paranoia led to investigations and interrogations within Hamas ranks. There were security breaches, assassinations and arrests. Hamas was not prepared or experienced enough to handle such challenges, said Taleb. Accusations of collaboration with Israel were thrown at several members. Some of these accusations turned out to be true, while others fell victim to the paranoia.

“It was a difficult phase and no one came out of it unscathed,” said Taleb.

Dawla revealed that investigations were carried out with anyone even remotely suspected of having ties with Israel, leading to tragic consequences. Sinwar oversaw several of these internal investigations. “Some members were killed under torture and we later learned that they were among the movement’s finest members,” he lamented.

Sinwar and al-Qassam

Sinwar was still in prison when the al-Qassam Brigade, Hamas’ military wing, was established in the early 90s and began carrying out operations against the Israeli army and settlers. Sinwar began to develop his ties with the Qassam from behind bars with the arrest of several of the Brigades’ members.

Mansour said: “Sinwar has a security-oriented mind. His security paranoia never leaves him.” The ties Sinwar that would forge with the Qassam would lead to the Shalit deal and his release from prison in 2011.

Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed, was a prominent member of the Qassam. He took part in the operation that led to Shalit’s kidnapping in 2006 and release years later.

Yahya’s release would consolidate his position in Hamas and elevate him among his members. He would take on a leading role in Hamas’ security and military operations, said Mansour.

Qassam Brigades members greet Sinwar in Gaza on April 30, 2022. (AFP)

Shalit and the exchange

Shalit’s kidnapping changed the equation and negotiations over the prisoner swap. Sinwar was at the top of the list of detainees it wanted to be released. In prison, the kidnapping changed Sinwar’s standing and he started to play a greater role in the negotiations.

Sinwar became a major figure after the kidnapping and after Hamas took control of Gaza. The movement was now in control of an entire territory and had an Israeli prisoner, who was being held by Sinwar’s brother, said Mansour.

The kidnapping gave Sinwar “unprecedented power inside prison that no other Hamas official had ever enjoyed safe for Ahmed Yassin and Salah Shehade, who were the first generation of prisoners,” he continued.

Sinwar became the key figure in the prisoner exchange and he used his new power to consolidate his position and influence in making decisions inside and outside prison.

Brain tumor

As the negotiations gained traction, Sinwar suffered a life-threatening brain tumor. The discovery left the Israelis at a loss because Sinwar was the main official in charge of the negotiations. Should they treat him or leave him to die? His death in the middle of the negotiations would prompt accusations that Israel had killed him and abort the prisoner swap. No one was going to believe that he had died from a tumor, regardless of the evidence.

Sinwar, meanwhile, was very adamant about rejecting treatment by the prison administration, said Dawla. Eventually his situation deteriorated, losing consciousness at one point, so he had to receive treatment at the prison. The administration declared an emergency at the prison and a helicopter was flown in to take Sinwar to hospital where he was soon operated on, recalled Dawla.

“It was a very complex and dangerous operation. He could have died,” he added.

In wake of the October 7 attack, Israelis lament that Sinwar was ever operated on, revealed Mansour. Then head of prison intelligence has recently repeatedly said she regrets saving Sinwar’s life.

2011 release

After his release in the 2011 swap, Sinwar went about consolidating his position in Hamas, especially in its military wing. He was elected member of the movement’s politburo in 2012 and immediately focused his attention on the military wing, deepening his ties with its officials.

Sinwar made it his mission to become the number one figure in Hamas as soon as he was released from prison, said Mansour.

His influence kept growing and he defeated Ismail Haniyeh and other prominent figures in the 2017 politburo elections.

The 2021 elections were marred with fraud allegations and the vote was “repeated three or four times” to ensure that Sinwar was the victor. Mansour said this was all part of the buildup to the October 7 attack. “It was clear that Sinwar and the Qassam had their plans,” he stated. Soon after, Sinwar worked tirelessly in developing the military wing.

“Sinwar only aspires to be the number one official in the movement. He is extremely ambitious. That drove him, even when he was in prison, to always be the top official in Hamas,” said Dawla.

“He believes that none of the current leaders have the right to be superiors over him. Not now, not ever,” he added.

Khalil al-Hayyah, Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar visit the Rafah crossing on September 19, 2017. (Reuters)

Early signs of the Aqsa flood

Dawla said Sinwar always wanted “to do something big”. He believed that several Hamas and Qassam figures remained in prison and the Shalit swap was not enough to release them. Several of the remaining detainees sent angry messages to the Hamas leadership over this, leaving Sinwar with a “moral obligation to rectify what the Shalit deal could not achieve,” explained Dawla.

Several factors led to the buildup of the October 7 attack. Sinwar tried reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority and failed. He tried another prisoner swap and failed. He tried to lift the siege on Gaza and also failed, recalled Mansour. So, he had no choice but to carry out the al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

“Had other options been available, the attack may never have happened,” he added.

Symbol of the war

Sinwar has become Israel’s symbol of the Gaza war, stressed Mansour. He has become the biggest catch for its military and political institutions. Israel holds him fully responsible for the October 7 attack and wants the world to associate the war with him, putting him on the same level as Hitler, Saddam, Qaddafi and other dictators in the world, he added.

Israel is trying to lump all the current developments and the entire Palestinian cause in this “diabolical” figure, he said. The Israelis believe that the war will end with Sinwar’s assassination or arrest.

Those who knew Sinwar during his time in prison speak of his pragmatism. Mansour noted: “Some will be surprised to learn that he can strike deals. He has already struck them with the Israelis and can reach middle ground according to his views.”

The situation is different now. Israel views Sinwar as a “dead man walking.” It has razed Gaza to the ground searching for him. “The amount of hatred, incitement and accusations that have been thrown his way by Israel and across the globe make it impossible for Israel to take one step back by striking a deal with him,” stressed Mansour.

“Israel will never be at peace knowing that he is alive,” he remarked.

On Sinwar’s end, Taleb stated that after all the destruction, he is unlikely to show any flexibility in negotiations. “I believe that he planned and predicted that the war will continue for the months – if not years – to come.”



Yazidis Fear Returning to Homeland, 10 Years after Massacre

Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily
Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily
TT

Yazidis Fear Returning to Homeland, 10 Years after Massacre

Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily
Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily

Fahad Qassim was just 11 years old when ISIS militants overran his Yazidi community in the Sinjar region of northern Iraq in August 2014, taking him captive.

The attack was the start of what became the systematic slaughter, enslavement, and rape of thousands of Yazidis, shocking the world and displacing most of the 550,000-strong ancient religious minority. Thousands of people were rounded up and killed during the initial assault, which began in the early hours of Aug. 3.
Many more are believed to have died in captivity. Survivors fled up the slopes of Mount Sinjar, where some were trapped for many weeks by an ISIS siege.
The assault on the Yazidis - an ancient religious minority in eastern Syria and northwest Iraq - was part of ISIS' effort to establish a so-called “caliphate.”

At one stage, the group held a third of Iraq and neighboring Syria before being pushed back and collapsing in 2019.

Now 21, Qassim lives in a small apartment on the edge of a refugee camp in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, far from his hometown.

He was trained as a child soldier and fought in grinding battles before being liberated as ISIS collapsed in Syria's Baghuz in 2019, but only after losing the bottom half of his leg to an airstrike by the US-led forces.

"I don't plan for any future in Iraq," he said, waiting for news on a visa application to a Western country.

"Those who go back say they fear the same thing that happened in 2014 will happen again."

Qassim's reluctance to return is shared by many. A decade after what has been recognized as a genocide by many governments and UN agencies, Sinjar district remains largely destroyed.

The old city of Sinjar is a confused heap of grey and brown stone, while villages like Kojo, where hundreds were killed, are crumbling ghost towns.
Limited services, poor electricity and water supply, and what locals say is inadequate government compensation for rebuilding have made resettlement challenging.

POWER STRUGGLE
The security situation further complicates matters. A mosaic of armed groups that fought to free Sinjar have remained in this strategic corner of Iraq, holding de facto power on the ground.
This is despite the 2020 Sinjar Agreement that called for such groups to leave and for the appointment of a mayor with a police force composed of locals.
And from the skies above, frequent Turkish drone strikes target fighters aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Civilians are among those killed in these attacks, adding to the sense of insecurity.

Akhtin Intiqam, a 25-year-old commander in the PKK-aligned Sinjar Protection Units (YBS), one of the armed factions in the area, defends their continued presence:

"We are in control of this area and we are responsible for protecting Sinjar from all external attacks," she said.

Speaking in a room adorned with pictures of fallen comrades, numbering more than 150, Intiqam views the Sinjar Agreement with suspicion.
"We will fight with all our power against anyone who tries to implement this plan. It will never succeed," she said.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
As the stalemate continues, Sinjar remains underdeveloped. Families who do return receive a one-time payment of about $3,000 from the government.

Meanwhile, more than 200,000 Yazidis remain in Kurdistan, many living in shabby tent settlements. The Iraqi government is pushing to break up these camps, insisting it's time for people to go home.

"You can't blame people for having lost hope. The scale of the damage and displacement is very big and for many years extremely little was done to address it," said Khalaf Sinjari, the Iraqi prime minister's advisor for Yazidi affairs.

This government, he said, was taking Sinjar seriously.

It plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars – including all previously unspent budgets since 2014 - on development and infrastructure, including for paying compensation, building two new hospitals and a university and linking Sinjar to the country’s water network for the first time. "There is hope to bring back life," said Sinjari, himself a member of the Yazidi community.

However, the presence of an estimated 50,000 ISIS fighters and their families across the border in Syria in detention centers and camps stokes fears of history repeating itself.

Efforts by some Iraqi lawmakers to pass a general amnesty law that could see the freeing of many ISIS prisoners from Iraqi jails only add to these concerns. And the Yazidi struggle for justice is stalled, with the government this year ending a UN mission that sought to help bring ISIS fighters to trial for international crimes, citing a lack of cooperation between it and the mission.
Despite the challenges, some Yazidis are choosing to return. Farhad Barakat Ali, a Yazidi activist and journalist who was displaced by ISIS, made the decision to go back several years ago.
"I'm not encouraging everyone to return to Sinjar, but I am also not encouraging them to stay at the IDP camps either," he said from his home in Sinjar city, in the stifling heat of a power cut.