Rafik Hariri after First Meeting with Bashar Assad: I Became More Afraid for Syria, Not Lebanon

In a new book, former MP Bassem al-Sabeh recalls the thorny relationship between the slain ex-PM and ruling elite in Syria.

Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)
Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)
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Rafik Hariri after First Meeting with Bashar Assad: I Became More Afraid for Syria, Not Lebanon

Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)
Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)

Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing a series of excerpts from a new book by former Lebanese MP Bassem al-Sabeh in which he recalls the thorny relationship between slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and members of the ruling elite in Syria. “Lebanon in the Shadows of Hell: from the Taif Accord to Hariri’s Assassination” is published by All Prints Distributors & Publishers.

Sabeh worked as an aide to Hariri until his killing in February 2005. He served as lawmaker from 1992 to 2009. He was also appointed information minister in Hariri’s government between 1996 and 1998. Sabeh is a member of Hariri’s Mustaqbal Movement and a pillar of the March 14 movement that opposed Syria’s political and security hegemony over Lebanon.

Hariri’s ties with the Syrian leadership extended to around 25 years. In the early 1980s, he acted as an envoy to Saudi King Fahad bin Abdulaziz and accompanied Prince Badr bin Sultan’s diplomatic visits when it came to Arab efforts to end the Lebanese civil war.

MP Bassem al-Sabeh with PM Hariri. (AFP)

At the time, Lebanon and Syria’s relationship revolved around interests and political and personal calculations of Syrian officials, whom Syrian President Hafze al-Assad had given permission to interfere in Lebanese affairs. Hariri had to maneuver around these interests as he attempted to forge ties with the Syrian leadership.

Hariri was in direct contact with Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, army commander Hikmat al-Shehabi, head of Syria's security apparatus in Lebanon Ghazi Kanaan, and military intelligence officer Rustom Ghazaleh. Bashar al-Assad would join the list in the final years of his father, Hafez’s, life.

Other notable Syrian figures at the time included Bassel al-Assad, Bashar’s older brother, who died in a car crash in 1994. He was being groomed to succeed his father as president. Other figures included Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, military officer Assef Shawkat, intelligence officer Ali Mamlouk, Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, foreign minister Walid al-Muallem and his predecessor Farouk al-Sharaa.

Hariri’s ties with Hafez emerged and developed and were tested under the umbrella of Saudi-Syrian relations. They were ruled by conditions that bolstered mutual trust and respect between them. The good relations did not extend to any of Hafez’s three sons. Rather, they were marked by a lot of mistrust and suspicion that ultimately left grave damage to Lebanese-Syrian ties that culminated in United Nations Security Council resolution 1559 and left Lebanon and Syria revolving in a cycle of mutual spite.

Bassel al-Assad.

Before Bashar entered the picture, Hafez was grooming his eldest son, Bassel, to become president. He was the undisputed heir to the presidency. He was Syria’s number one equestrian champion and excelled at his studies at the Soviet Military Academies. He rose up the ranks to become commander of the republican guard.

Bashar, meanwhile, earned his medical degree from Syria before heading to London for postgraduate training in ophthalmology. He was summoned back to Damascus in 1994 after Bassel’s death. He was groomed to become Hafez’s heir. Maher was seen as too hardline to succeed Bassel. He nevertheless is part of the ruling elite, and has been the number two in the regime after he took over the republican guard and Fourth Brigade.

I attended Bassel’s funeral in Syria’s al-Qardaha. In attendance were Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, senior Syrian officials and others. Unlike other officials, Hariri cried at the funeral. I asked him about it later, knowing that he had never met Bassel and shared no ties with him. He replied: “At that moment, I recalled my son Hussam [who passed away in a car accident in the US in the late 1980s]. There is no harder experience than that for a father. God help President Assad.”

Bassel, Bashar and Maher played various roles in influencing Hariri’s political role. Other Syrian officials who also played a similar part included Kanaan, in his capacity as head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Mohammed Nassif, who is known for his loyalty to the Assad family, and Shawkat, Hafez’s son-in-law who rose to prominence after Bassel’s death.

Hariri did try to achieve some rapprochement with Bassel in the early 1990s, but Hafez stood in his war. Hariri would try to again forge ties with his other son, Bashar in the late 1990s.

At the time, relations between the two men were very frosty after Lebanese army commander and later President Emile Lahoud was chosen as Syria’s number one man in Lebanon. Lahoud was elected president in 1998 and was given free rein by Syria in acting out in spite against Hariri and launching defamation campaigns against his policies soon after his term as PM ended.

Hariri sought to break the campaign launched against him by Lahoud - with the backing of Kanaan and Ghazaleh. He believed it was necessary to tackle the situation head-on by heading to the source of the problem and tackling the possible means to rectify the relationship.

President Emile Lahoud and PM Hariri. (AFP)

He made an unannounced visit to Damascus to meet with Hafez. It was 1999 and Hafez would die the following year. Hariri realized during that meeting that Hafez had finished paving the way for Bashar to succeed him.

Hafez advised Hariri to be open with Bashar and speak with him directly about Lebanon and ties with Syria. “Bashar has good relations with Lahoud and he can address the situation,” he quoted Hafez as saying. Hariri agreed to the suggestion without hesitation. In turn, Hafez pledged to arrange a meeting with his son. At that moment, Hariri realized that his friend Khaddam’s role in the regime had been diminished and that he needed to speak directly with Bashar to curry favor with Damascus.

Hariri summoned me to his Qoreitem residence in Beirut in late September 1999. He told me that we were headed to Damascus on an unannounced visit. I was not informed who we will be meeting even as the convoy sped to the border. “Are you going to meet the president?” I asked. “Someone more important than him. I will be meeting with Bashar. This is what the old man [Hafez] wants. There is a need to open a new chapter,” replied Hariri. “The father’s health is declining and the young man will come to power. I am being asked to help him. This is the first time I head to Damascus without meeting Khaddam. At any rate, I don’t want him to know now. I’ll tell him later.”

President Hafez al-Assad and PM Rafik al-Hariri during a meeting. (Getty Images)

In Syria, a convoy escorted us to Mount Qasioun that overlooks Damascus. There, Bassel had built a mini villa that he used as his office. Bashar had inherited it from him.

Bashar welcomed Hariri into his office, while Wissam al-Hassan and Yehya al-Arab - of Hariri’s security entourage - and I remained in the nearby salon. Signaling my companions to remain quiet, I tried to eavesdrop on the conversation going on in the office, but all I heard were murmurings and some laughter. I hoped that any snippet of conversation could break the tension.

The meeting went on for around an hour and a half. Bashar bid farewell to his guest the same way he greeted him. He accorded us with a farewell gesture, but without a handshake or speaking to us.

Hariri and I rode back to Lebanon together in the same car. He remained silent for most of the journey in Syria. “How was the meeting? You’re unusually silent,” I told him. “We’ll talk later” was his reply. When we entered Lebanon, he parked the car just near the border and told me to take the wheel.

He started talking as soon as we got back into the car. “The meeting was necessary and definitely good. Do you want me to be blunt? After this meeting, I am no longer afraid for Lebanon. We can handle our own problems. We are used to falling down and getting back up. I am now afraid for Syria,” he said.

“How so?” I asked. “After Hafez, Syria will be ruled by a child. God help Syria,” replied Hariri after which he reclined his seat and slept.

President Bashar al-Assad receives PM Hariri for a meeting. (Getty Images)

The next day, he told me that Bashar’s main concern now revolved around “arranging the internal house of his party, regime and family to address any emergency related to his father’s health. He sees in my friendship an opening to forge foreign relations which he will need in the coming period.” Hariri said Bashar asked him about his relationship with French President Jacques Chirac, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and the American administration. He asked for cooperation with Lahoud and to monitor the changes that will take place in Syria.

“The young man is awaiting the death of his father without openly saying it. He said his father’s health was concerning and that he was suffering from complications from diabetes,” added Hariri. He seemed reassured that Bashar was being preoccupied with the situation inside Syria.

Hafez realized that his son won’t kick off his term in office securely without the support of the Arab and international fold. He perhaps believed that Hariri could be a major player in paving the way for this support and who better than Hariri could achieve that?

 

*Next excerpt: Sole Article on the Agenda ... Insulting Rafik al-Hariri



Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa: The Emir Who Transformed Qatar

Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa: The Emir Who Transformed Qatar

Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)

With the passing of the Father Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar closes the chapter on one of the Gulf region's most significant political and development success stories of recent decades. His name became synonymous with the most profound transformation in the country's modern history, as Qatar evolved during his reign from a state with a limited international profile into an influential player in regional and global politics, economics, and media.

Sheikh Hamad is widely regarded as one of Qatar's defining leaders and the architect of its modern renaissance. Under his leadership, the country underwent sweeping economic, social, and cultural transformation. During his reign, Qatar's gross domestic product expanded more than twenty-fourfold, while GDP per capita increased nearly sixfold.

Born in Doha in 1952, Sheikh Hamad graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1971. He then joined the armed forces, rising through the military ranks before being appointed Crown Prince and Minister of Defense in 1977. On June 27, 1995, he assumed power, and in June 2013 handed authority to his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in a smooth transfer of power widely regarded as one of the region's rare peaceful successions.

A Strong Economy

Sheikh Hamad's economic strategy centered on harnessing Qatar's vast natural gas wealth to build a strong and diversified economy. During his years in power, the country's GDP grew dramatically, average incomes rose sharply, and exports of liquefied natural gas ushered in a new era in Qatar's history. Following the first LNG shipment in 1996, Qatar became the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas by 2006, generating enormous revenues that financed major investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and public services.

Expanding Qatar's International Role

On the international stage, Qatar adopted a far more active foreign policy, positioning itself as a mediator in a number of regional and international conflicts. Among its most prominent diplomatic efforts were its role in Lebanon during the 2006 war and the country's political crisis in 2008.

Qatar also took a leading role in supporting the Palestinian cause, particularly through economic assistance to the Gaza Strip and by providing a platform for negotiations aimed at ending the conflict there. In 2012, Sheikh Hamad became the first Arab leader to visit Gaza after Hamas took control of the territory.

He also forged close strategic ties with the United States. During his reign, Al Udeid Air Base was established in 1996. Qatar financed almost the entire construction of the base, at a cost exceeding $1 billion, as part of a strategy to strengthen its defense capabilities and deepen military cooperation with the United States following the Gulf War. By 2002, it had become one of the most important US. military bases outside the United States.

Qatar also participated in the international conference supporting post-Gaddafi Libya in Paris. During Sheikh Hamad's rule, Doha became a major supporter of the Syrian cause, providing extensive political and humanitarian backing to the Syrian opposition, an approach that continued in subsequent years.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Qatar pursued a foreign policy built on relative neutrality and open channels with opposing parties, allowing it to serve as a mediator in regional and international disputes. Over time, this approach became one of the country's most effective instruments of soft power, transforming Doha into a permanent venue for negotiations and political dialogue.

Today, the Qatari capital is widely recognized as one of the world's leading hubs for mediation and conflict resolution, a role first established under Sheikh Hamad and later expanded during the reign of Sheikh Tamim.

Soft Power

Just one year after assuming power, Sheikh Hamad launched the Al Jazeera Media Network in 1996. The network quickly became one of the Arab world's most influential media platforms, giving Qatar an outsized voice in regional political discourse. As the Arab world underwent profound political change, Al Jazeera emerged as one of Qatar's most powerful instruments of influence, elevating the country's international profile far beyond its geographic size.

The World Cup

Qatar's hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup was far more than a sporting event. It was a strategic national project and a defining milestone that reshaped the country's standing on the global stage.

By hosting football's biggest tournament, Qatar became both the first Arab nation and the first Middle Eastern country to stage the World Cup, earning unprecedented global visibility across the media, political, and economic spheres while reinforcing its image as a nation capable of organizing events of the highest international caliber.

The tournament also became one of Qatar's most effective soft power tools. Rather than relying solely on traditional forms of influence, Doha used sport to strengthen its international image, showcase its organizational capabilities, and capture the world's attention.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani leaves behind a lasting legacy in Qatar's modern history. His name is inseparable from the country's transformation from an economy largely dependent on natural resources into a state wielding influence through a diverse set of instruments, including economic strength, global investment, media, diplomacy, and sport.

Many of the defining features of Qatar's current policies remain rooted in the foundations he laid during his years in power, making his legacy one of the Gulf region's most significant political and developmental transformations in recent decades.


‘Our Land, Our Sky:’ West Bank Palestinians Fly Kites in Defiance of Israeli Settlers

 A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)
A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)
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‘Our Land, Our Sky:’ West Bank Palestinians Fly Kites in Defiance of Israeli Settlers

 A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)
A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)

As brightly colored kites climb above Burin, a Palestinian village in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, children race across a sun-baked hillside, watching their creations soar into the sky.

Behind them, the red-roofed houses of Har Bracha, an Israeli settlement, overlook the village below.

Established in 1983, the settlement, illegal under international law, is one of several that encircle Burin, a village of a few thousand people.

Every summer since 2009, residents have gathered on this hill for a kite festival, held on land they say has been partly lost after being confiscated by settlers.

"We want to tell the settlers that this is our land, this is our sky. If we can't reach those lands anymore, our kites can," Ghassan Najjar, one of the festival's organizers, told AFP.

While the festival is primarily for children, it also carries a "political message," he says.

In Burin, conversations rarely drift far from settler attacks or the steady spread of Israeli settlements across the Palestinian territory.

As early as 2008, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) had warned of settler attacks in the area, citing shootings targeting Burin residents and the uprooting of their olive trees.

Since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, the United Nations has reported a sharp increase in violence attributed to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, while several Israeli ministers have continued to call for the annexation of all or part of the territory.

Palestinians and solidarity activists fly kites towards the Israeli settlement of Har Bracha from the village of Burin, south of Nablus in the occupied West Bank on July 10, 2026. (AFP)

- 'Our roots' -

For a few hours, however, the hillside takes on the air of a village fair.

A clown paints children's faces, music fills the air, as families spread picnic carpets across the grass.

Kites in the black, white, green and red of the Palestinian flag soar overhead, joined by another in the colors of Egypt, flown in tribute to the Egyptian national football team.

"Our children have the right to play and to have a real and good life," says Najjar.

Yet even this celebration unfolds under the shadow of the conflict.

Before gathering, residents say they first checked that no groups of Israeli settlers were nearby.

"Sometimes we are scared... Last year we didn't come because settlers had attacked the village," says 15-year-old Sanaa Bashar Najjar.

"We stay only half an hour or an hour, just to get a bit of fresh air. With the war and the economic hardship, we're simply trying to breathe."

Another resident, Dalia Zaban, says her parents' home was attacked, its windows smashed and cars vandalized.

"Today, we just hope they don't come down here," she said.

As the afternoon wears on, the wind begins to fade and the kites slowly drift back to earth.

The villagers, however, say they will return next summer, determined to reclaim at least a patch of sky.

Wearing sunglasses and dressed with care, Burin resident Qusai Walid Eid summarizes the feeling, saying he attends the festival every year to strengthen "our roots in this land".


What Does Removing Syria from the US List of State Sponsors of Terrorism Mean for Its Economy?

US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
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What Does Removing Syria from the US List of State Sponsors of Terrorism Mean for Its Economy?

US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

The US administration’s decision to begin the process of removing Syria from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) - where it has remained since 1979 - marks the country’s most significant political and economic shift in decades.

The designation was more than a political label; it served as the legal cornerstone of the extensive US sanctions architecture imposed on Syria. Its removal could reopen the door to trade, investment, and large-scale reconstruction.

The announcement followed what Washington described as “positive changes” by the Syrian government and formal assurances from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa that Syria would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently notified Congress of President Donald Trump’s intention to rescind the designation after the required 45-day congressional notification period, describing the move as “historic” and saying it offers Syria a genuine opportunity to rebuild and open a new chapter for its people.

Syrian officials welcomed the decision. Finance Minister Mohammad Yosr Barnieh called it “a historic moment” heralding a new era of prosperity, investment, and economic recovery. He said the move would open a new chapter for the Syrian economy, accelerate recovery, encourage investment, and facilitate Syria’s reintegration into the global economy.

Central Bank Governor Safwat Raslan likewise described the decision as “a positive turning point” that would strengthen confidence, attract investment, and help reintegrate Syria into the global financial system. He reaffirmed the central bank’s commitment to reforms, monetary stability, and long-term economic recovery.

Reconnecting to the Global Financial System

In practical terms, the decision paves the way for Syrian banks to gradually reconnect with the global financial system, correspondent banking networks, and the SWIFT international payments system. The terrorism designation had effectively prevented foreign correspondent banks from dealing with Syrian financial institutions for fear of US legal penalties.

Reintegration could improve access to trade finance and sharply reduce the cost of remittances from Syrians abroad. For years, expatriates have relied on costly informal channels to circumvent sanctions. Easier remittance flows would provide a direct boost to household incomes and financial stability.

Removing Barriers to Investment

For years, US secondary sanctions linked to the terrorism designation discouraged foreign companies from participating in reconstruction projects, fearing hefty fines or exclusion from the US market.

Highlighting the policy shift, the US administration quoted Trump as telling Al-Sharaa: “I promised to remove all the barriers preventing you from rebuilding your country, and very soon you will finally be able to do so.” Trump also said US companies are already interested in investing in Syria.

Removing the designation significantly reduces reputational risk and gives multinational companies greater legal and procedural certainty to invest in infrastructure, real estate, telecommunications, and other sectors.

Reviving Trade and the Energy Sector

Foreign trade is also expected to benefit. Previous restrictions limited imports of advanced industrial equipment and technology classified as “dual-use” goods with potential civilian and military applications. Easing those restrictions would allow Syrian manufacturers to import production lines, agricultural equipment, and medical supplies with far fewer regulatory hurdles.

The energy sector, which has suffered years of severe deterioration, could also benefit. International companies would be able to provide spare parts, technical expertise, and technology needed to rehabilitate damaged oil and gas fields and repair aging power plants, helping ease chronic electricity shortages and support industrial production.

Restoring Access to International Financing

Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism also triggered an effective US veto on loans, grants, technical assistance, and other support from international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

With the designation removed, Damascus could theoretically begin negotiations with these institutions to secure development financing, support economic restructuring, and implement monetary and fiscal reforms.

From Blanket Prohibition to Risk-Based Assessment

Legal experts say the decision fundamentally changes how international companies and financial institutions assess Syria.

Previously, US law effectively imposed a blanket prohibition on doing business with Syria, leaving banks and corporations with virtually no room for discretion. Now, the automatic legal barrier is removed. Banks and companies can independently assess the remaining legal and commercial risks and proceed with transactions that comply with other applicable sanctions. This represents a fundamental shift, giving investors and financial institutions flexibility that has not existed since Syria was added to the terrorism list in 1979.

Why the Economic Crisis Will Not End Overnight

Despite the significance of Rubio’s announcement and the June 30, 2025 executive order easing certain restrictions, the economic impact is unlikely to be immediate.

The biggest constraint is that removing Syria from the terrorism list does not dismantle the broader sanctions regime. Numerous US laws and executive orders targeting key economic sectors, entities, and individuals remain in force.

In addition, Syria is likely to face prolonged caution from international banks — a phenomenon known as “over-compliance.” Many financial institutions are expected to spend months, if not years, conducting extensive legal reviews before reopening accounts or facilitating trade with Syria, seeking to avoid penalties under the sanctions that remain in place.

Ultimately, Syria’s economic recovery will depend not only on the easing of US restrictions but also on its ability to implement deep structural and institutional reforms, improve the business environment, and maintain monetary stability.

Removing Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list is a major step toward reducing reputational risk and reopening international markets. But a full recovery remains a long-term process that will require the gradual dismantling of the remaining sanctions, which continue to pose the greatest obstacle to Syria’s reintegration into the global economy.