Rafik Hariri after First Meeting with Bashar Assad: I Became More Afraid for Syria, Not Lebanon

In a new book, former MP Bassem al-Sabeh recalls the thorny relationship between the slain ex-PM and ruling elite in Syria.

Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)
Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)
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Rafik Hariri after First Meeting with Bashar Assad: I Became More Afraid for Syria, Not Lebanon

Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)
Slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. (AFP)

Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing a series of excerpts from a new book by former Lebanese MP Bassem al-Sabeh in which he recalls the thorny relationship between slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and members of the ruling elite in Syria. “Lebanon in the Shadows of Hell: from the Taif Accord to Hariri’s Assassination” is published by All Prints Distributors & Publishers.

Sabeh worked as an aide to Hariri until his killing in February 2005. He served as lawmaker from 1992 to 2009. He was also appointed information minister in Hariri’s government between 1996 and 1998. Sabeh is a member of Hariri’s Mustaqbal Movement and a pillar of the March 14 movement that opposed Syria’s political and security hegemony over Lebanon.

Hariri’s ties with the Syrian leadership extended to around 25 years. In the early 1980s, he acted as an envoy to Saudi King Fahad bin Abdulaziz and accompanied Prince Badr bin Sultan’s diplomatic visits when it came to Arab efforts to end the Lebanese civil war.

MP Bassem al-Sabeh with PM Hariri. (AFP)

At the time, Lebanon and Syria’s relationship revolved around interests and political and personal calculations of Syrian officials, whom Syrian President Hafze al-Assad had given permission to interfere in Lebanese affairs. Hariri had to maneuver around these interests as he attempted to forge ties with the Syrian leadership.

Hariri was in direct contact with Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, army commander Hikmat al-Shehabi, head of Syria's security apparatus in Lebanon Ghazi Kanaan, and military intelligence officer Rustom Ghazaleh. Bashar al-Assad would join the list in the final years of his father, Hafez’s, life.

Other notable Syrian figures at the time included Bassel al-Assad, Bashar’s older brother, who died in a car crash in 1994. He was being groomed to succeed his father as president. Other figures included Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, military officer Assef Shawkat, intelligence officer Ali Mamlouk, Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, foreign minister Walid al-Muallem and his predecessor Farouk al-Sharaa.

Hariri’s ties with Hafez emerged and developed and were tested under the umbrella of Saudi-Syrian relations. They were ruled by conditions that bolstered mutual trust and respect between them. The good relations did not extend to any of Hafez’s three sons. Rather, they were marked by a lot of mistrust and suspicion that ultimately left grave damage to Lebanese-Syrian ties that culminated in United Nations Security Council resolution 1559 and left Lebanon and Syria revolving in a cycle of mutual spite.

Bassel al-Assad.

Before Bashar entered the picture, Hafez was grooming his eldest son, Bassel, to become president. He was the undisputed heir to the presidency. He was Syria’s number one equestrian champion and excelled at his studies at the Soviet Military Academies. He rose up the ranks to become commander of the republican guard.

Bashar, meanwhile, earned his medical degree from Syria before heading to London for postgraduate training in ophthalmology. He was summoned back to Damascus in 1994 after Bassel’s death. He was groomed to become Hafez’s heir. Maher was seen as too hardline to succeed Bassel. He nevertheless is part of the ruling elite, and has been the number two in the regime after he took over the republican guard and Fourth Brigade.

I attended Bassel’s funeral in Syria’s al-Qardaha. In attendance were Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, senior Syrian officials and others. Unlike other officials, Hariri cried at the funeral. I asked him about it later, knowing that he had never met Bassel and shared no ties with him. He replied: “At that moment, I recalled my son Hussam [who passed away in a car accident in the US in the late 1980s]. There is no harder experience than that for a father. God help President Assad.”

Bassel, Bashar and Maher played various roles in influencing Hariri’s political role. Other Syrian officials who also played a similar part included Kanaan, in his capacity as head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Mohammed Nassif, who is known for his loyalty to the Assad family, and Shawkat, Hafez’s son-in-law who rose to prominence after Bassel’s death.

Hariri did try to achieve some rapprochement with Bassel in the early 1990s, but Hafez stood in his war. Hariri would try to again forge ties with his other son, Bashar in the late 1990s.

At the time, relations between the two men were very frosty after Lebanese army commander and later President Emile Lahoud was chosen as Syria’s number one man in Lebanon. Lahoud was elected president in 1998 and was given free rein by Syria in acting out in spite against Hariri and launching defamation campaigns against his policies soon after his term as PM ended.

Hariri sought to break the campaign launched against him by Lahoud - with the backing of Kanaan and Ghazaleh. He believed it was necessary to tackle the situation head-on by heading to the source of the problem and tackling the possible means to rectify the relationship.

President Emile Lahoud and PM Hariri. (AFP)

He made an unannounced visit to Damascus to meet with Hafez. It was 1999 and Hafez would die the following year. Hariri realized during that meeting that Hafez had finished paving the way for Bashar to succeed him.

Hafez advised Hariri to be open with Bashar and speak with him directly about Lebanon and ties with Syria. “Bashar has good relations with Lahoud and he can address the situation,” he quoted Hafez as saying. Hariri agreed to the suggestion without hesitation. In turn, Hafez pledged to arrange a meeting with his son. At that moment, Hariri realized that his friend Khaddam’s role in the regime had been diminished and that he needed to speak directly with Bashar to curry favor with Damascus.

Hariri summoned me to his Qoreitem residence in Beirut in late September 1999. He told me that we were headed to Damascus on an unannounced visit. I was not informed who we will be meeting even as the convoy sped to the border. “Are you going to meet the president?” I asked. “Someone more important than him. I will be meeting with Bashar. This is what the old man [Hafez] wants. There is a need to open a new chapter,” replied Hariri. “The father’s health is declining and the young man will come to power. I am being asked to help him. This is the first time I head to Damascus without meeting Khaddam. At any rate, I don’t want him to know now. I’ll tell him later.”

President Hafez al-Assad and PM Rafik al-Hariri during a meeting. (Getty Images)

In Syria, a convoy escorted us to Mount Qasioun that overlooks Damascus. There, Bassel had built a mini villa that he used as his office. Bashar had inherited it from him.

Bashar welcomed Hariri into his office, while Wissam al-Hassan and Yehya al-Arab - of Hariri’s security entourage - and I remained in the nearby salon. Signaling my companions to remain quiet, I tried to eavesdrop on the conversation going on in the office, but all I heard were murmurings and some laughter. I hoped that any snippet of conversation could break the tension.

The meeting went on for around an hour and a half. Bashar bid farewell to his guest the same way he greeted him. He accorded us with a farewell gesture, but without a handshake or speaking to us.

Hariri and I rode back to Lebanon together in the same car. He remained silent for most of the journey in Syria. “How was the meeting? You’re unusually silent,” I told him. “We’ll talk later” was his reply. When we entered Lebanon, he parked the car just near the border and told me to take the wheel.

He started talking as soon as we got back into the car. “The meeting was necessary and definitely good. Do you want me to be blunt? After this meeting, I am no longer afraid for Lebanon. We can handle our own problems. We are used to falling down and getting back up. I am now afraid for Syria,” he said.

“How so?” I asked. “After Hafez, Syria will be ruled by a child. God help Syria,” replied Hariri after which he reclined his seat and slept.

President Bashar al-Assad receives PM Hariri for a meeting. (Getty Images)

The next day, he told me that Bashar’s main concern now revolved around “arranging the internal house of his party, regime and family to address any emergency related to his father’s health. He sees in my friendship an opening to forge foreign relations which he will need in the coming period.” Hariri said Bashar asked him about his relationship with French President Jacques Chirac, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz and the American administration. He asked for cooperation with Lahoud and to monitor the changes that will take place in Syria.

“The young man is awaiting the death of his father without openly saying it. He said his father’s health was concerning and that he was suffering from complications from diabetes,” added Hariri. He seemed reassured that Bashar was being preoccupied with the situation inside Syria.

Hafez realized that his son won’t kick off his term in office securely without the support of the Arab and international fold. He perhaps believed that Hariri could be a major player in paving the way for this support and who better than Hariri could achieve that?

 

*Next excerpt: Sole Article on the Agenda ... Insulting Rafik al-Hariri



Netanyahu Might Be Finished but His Policies Toward the Palestinians Will Largely Endure

A view of the Israeli settlement of Itamar from the village of Awarta, south of Nablus in the West Bank, 20 October 2026. (EPA)
A view of the Israeli settlement of Itamar from the village of Awarta, south of Nablus in the West Bank, 20 October 2026. (EPA)
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Netanyahu Might Be Finished but His Policies Toward the Palestinians Will Largely Endure

A view of the Israeli settlement of Itamar from the village of Awarta, south of Nablus in the West Bank, 20 October 2026. (EPA)
A view of the Israeli settlement of Itamar from the village of Awarta, south of Nablus in the West Bank, 20 October 2026. (EPA)

Israel's elections Tuesday could mark the end of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's decades-long political career.

But his legacy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank — of massive settlement expansion, the displacement of tens of thousands of Palestinians and the empowerment of armed settler extremists — will likely endure, even if his opponents seek to rein it in.

Israelis are deeply divided over Netanyahu's leadership and moral character, but they largely support settlement expansion and are opposed to a Palestinian state. So, while Netanyahu's opponents have vowed to crack down on settler violence and remove the most contentious outposts, they are mostly against a two-state solution, seen internationally as the only realistic way to resolve the conflict.

“There shouldn’t be any illusions,” said Mairav Zonszein, senior Israel analyst at the International Crisis Group.

“At best, (a new government) would be able to slow down the extremely crazy acceleration that we’ve seen in the last four years of every aspect of Israel’s aggression in the occupied territories and inside Israel itself.”

An Israeli settler takes photographs of Palestinian farmers and foreign activists gathered to pick olives in the village of Turmus Ayya, northeast of Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on October 21, 2026. (AFP)

The military stands down in the face of settler violence

One legacy of Netanyahu’s nearly unbroken 17-year rule — the longest of any Israeli leader — is that large groups of armed settlers now routinely defy the Israeli military as they rampage through Palestinian communities, drive people from their homes and seize ever larger swaths of their land.

Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack out of Gaza turbocharged the process. Netanyahu's opponents could bring in more troops and authorize stricter measures, but the genie may already be out of the bottle.

Netanyahu's government has distributed thousands of firearms to the settlers, who have allies in the military and security forces. Some extremist settlers have become like sheriffs — making arrests, killing Palestinians they say posed a threat, summoning security forces and driving Palestinian families from their homes.

The Palestinian Tubasi family was forced out in July after settlers besieged their hilltop home in the West Bank village of Jalud for 19 days. The settlers cut off their water access and their electricity, and threatened to “barbecue” them if they didn’t leave, said Mahmoud Tubasi, 60, the patriarch.

An Israeli court ordered the military to bring the family back, but that hasn't happened. Troops aborted their latest mission soon after it began, when a mob of over 150 armed settlers quickly assembled, scaled the walls of the home and set a car on fire.

Troops threw Tubasi and his family into an armored jeep and drove them away as settlers torched the place. They now live in relatives' houses in the valley below their gutted and blackened home, around which settlers still roam.

Israel’s military did not respond to a request for comment.

“If they wanted to evacuate them, of course, 100%, they can do that,” Tubasi said. “This is an army that fights in Lebanon, Gaza and in Iran — they can’t control 150 or 200 settlers?”

Palestinian Hanan Hamayei gestures as she stands near the shattered glass of her home following a reported attack by Israeli settlers, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank village of Turmus Ayya on October 19, 2026. (AFP)

The process is repeated across the West Bank

Under Netanyahu, settlers have established over 250 rustic camps across the territory, focusing particularly on areas where Palestinian herding communities have dwelled for decades.

The outposts allow the settlers to effectively run Palestinians off vast rural areas by attacking shepherds, taking over water resources and grazing their own herds, all under the eye of Israeli troops.

Dror Etkes, a researcher with an Israeli anti-settlement group, says the outposts have allowed the settlers to seize effective control of around a fifth of the West Bank. Israel captured the territory, along with Gaza and east Jerusalem, in the 1967 Middle East war. The Palestinians want all three territories for their future state.

Since 2023, the strategy has forced at least 127 Palestinian herding communities off their land, according to data gathered by Etkes' organization, known as Kerem Navot, and B'Tselem, another Israeli anti-settlement group.

The departures have cleared nearly the entire eastern flank of the West Bank, along the border with Jordan, of Palestinians. The settlers' explicit goal is to prevent the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s opponents say they will go after the most violent settlers and dismantle outposts, which are illegal under Israeli law. But they will not evacuate the over 100 new settlements Netanyahu's government legalized, including 44 that were formerly outposts. Nor will they remove settlements dating back decades, many of which now resemble fully developed suburbs.

Most of the international community views all Israeli settlements as illegal and an obstacle to a two-state solution. Israel views the West Bank as the biblical and historical heartland of the Jewish people and says its future status should be decided by negotiations, which have not been held in over a decade.

Even if some outposts are removed, many Palestinians seeking to return would find their homes burned and looted, and would continue to face threats from nearby settlers.

“The story is over. There will be no massive dismantlement of settlement,” said Etkes. “It’s now a full and prouder-than-ever apartheid regime.”

Amnesty International and other major rights groups accused Israel of the international crime of apartheid even before the Oct. 7 attack and its aftermath. Israel denies the allegation.

Palestinians harvest their olive trees in the Israeli-occupied West Bank village of Deir Abu Mashal on October 19, 2026. (AFP)

Netanyahu's opponents promise modest change

The politician most likely to replace Netanyahu as prime minister is retired general Gadi Eisenkot, a political centrist. He hopes to form a majority coalition with three other parties spanning Israel's political spectrum and without Arab-led parties advocating a two-state solution.

Beth Oppenheim, an Israel analyst for the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the opposition has “struggled to formulate a convincing alternative" to the right's new security strategy of “aggressively preempting threats, maintaining complete freedom of operation and imposing buffer zones.”

Palestinian attacks, like a shooting on Friday that killed two Israeli soldiers, and efforts on the right to cast the Israeli left as enemy sympathizers, have taken their toll. “The net effect is that talk of ‘peace’ and compromise has become politically toxic,” Oppenheim said.

Eisenkot does not support a Palestinian state, but is open to limited self-rule in the 40% of the West Bank currently administered by the Palestinian Authority under agreements reached in the 1990s. He would allow settlement growth in the other 60% of the territory, which is under direct Israeli military rule.

He has also vowed to empower Israeli troops and paramilitary Border Police to crack down on settler violence.

Eisenkot “is interested in lowering the friction in the West Bank and interested in definitely lowering the sanctions and the intention for sanctions by European countries,” Zonszein said. “He’ll do kind of the minimum necessary to get the maximum effect.”

Eisenkot's prospective allies include left-wing politicians who oppose settlements and have favored a two-state solution, but they have agreed to set those positions aside to form a coalition to oust Netanyahu.

Israeli leaders have long balanced their ambitions in the occupied territories with demands from Washington aimed at resolving the conflict. But they are unlikely to face any significant pressure from US President Donald Trump, who endorsed Netanyahu and has long backed his policies.


Four Ways US Foreign Policy Could Change if Democrats Win in November

 24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)
24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)
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Four Ways US Foreign Policy Could Change if Democrats Win in November

 24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)
24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)

Nonpartisan analysts say Democrats stand a good ‌chance of winning the US House of Representatives and possibly the Senate in the November 3 midterm elections, which would give them a slice of power in Washington after two years of Republican control.

Democrats argue that Republicans have allowed President Donald Trump's administration to declare war and control spending, even though the US Constitution reserves those powers for lawmakers.

Here are some ways a Democratic Congress could hem in Trump's foreign policy.

CURB THE IRAN WAR

Trump did not secure approval from Congress before he launched the war with Iran on February 28, and Democrats have voted repeatedly to end the fighting unless he does so. One of these resolutions passed with support from a handful of Republicans, but Trump's administration ignored it.

With control of the House or ‌the Senate, Democrats ‌could cut defense spending to pressure Trump to obtain permission from Congress ‌to ⁠continue the war. ⁠They could also require administration officials to testify publicly about their plans.

FRESH SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

Trump has largely halted direct US financial and military aid to Ukraine, despite broad support from Democratic and Republican lawmakers as it fights a Russian invasion.

Most recently, he has angered members of Congress, including many Republicans, by lifting sanctions on Russian diesel and waiving sanctions on Russian energy only weeks after signing them into law.

With a victory in both chambers in November, Democrats would be ⁠able to decide what gets voted on and when.

That could allow ‌them to approve new aid to Ukraine, which likely ‌would pass with the two-thirds majorities needed to overcome a Trump veto.

They could also target other ‌Trump activities. For example, Representative Gregory Meeks of New York, who could head the House ‌Foreign Affairs Committee if Democrats win control, has introduced bipartisan legislation to block Trump's plan to bring Russian diesel back into the global market.

END MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL

Support for Israel has plummeted among Democrats over its conduct in the Gaza war, which has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians. The ‌ongoing violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's close alliance with Republicans have also been factors.

Democrats could limit ⁠or end military ⁠aid to Israel, which amounted to $3.8 billion in the most recent fiscal year. That is more than was provided to any other country.

Nearly half of House Democrats voted this summer to cut off aid to Israel. Some of those who voted against that effort, such as Meeks, have backed limits on providing weapons like heavy bombs to Israel.

LIMIT MILITARY SPENDING AND RESTORE FOREIGN AID

Democrats are far more likely than Trump's Republicans to limit military spending. Trump asked for an unprecedented 67% increase in the military budget this year, to $1.5 trillion, but Democrats blocked it in the Senate, citing his refusal to consult Congress about the Iran war and his steep cuts to social programs.

Trump has also withheld or canceled billions of dollars in foreign aid approved by Congress. Many Democrats have been angered by the cuts and say they will try to restore funding.


Beirut’s $13 Chicken Sandwich Becomes Symbol of Lebanon Divide

A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)
A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)
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Beirut’s $13 Chicken Sandwich Becomes Symbol of Lebanon Divide

A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)
A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)

Seven years after Lebanon’s devastating financial meltdown, a debate over a chicken sandwich has exposed an increasingly stark divide between those who can still spend freely and those struggling to get by.

A trendy health restaurant wanted to offer its calorie-conscious customers a healthier take on the beloved Levantine wrap known as the shish taouk. So, The Glow Paradise launched the “Chic Taouk,” pricing it at around $13 -- nearly double what an un-chic chicken sandwich typically goes for in Beirut.

The pricey pun proved hard to swallow, with outraged critics accusing the restaurant of overcharging in a country where many households struggle to afford basic necessities.

Yet while the debate raged on social media, customers kept buying. The Glow Paradise sold more than ‌20,000 Chic ‌Taouk sandwiches in just 11 days, according to managing partner Hrag Jeghalian, who described ‌the ⁠online exchanges as "natural marketing".

The ⁠contrasting reactions touched a nerve in Lebanon, where years of financial turmoil, political dysfunction and conflict have reshaped the country's social landscape, hollowing out much of the middle class while leaving a smaller group of consumers able to sustain an affluent lifestyle.

DEBATE PULLS FOCUS AWAY FROM URGENT CRISES

Sami Nader, an economist at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut, said the throngs at The Glow Paradise belied another reality.

“So you see people in the restaurant, but what you don't see is that 22 restaurants closed last month,” Nader told Reuters.

Lebanon’s ⁠Instagram-active community was split between those accusing the restaurant of theft and others ‌saying the sandwich was intended for those who could afford ‌it.

Some questioned whether the dispute itself reflected misplaced priorities in a country grappling with urgent crises, from Israel’s occupation of ‌large swaths of the country’s south to the endemic electricity and water crises.

Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse ‌was prompted by decades of corruption and profligate spending by the ruling elite, and several rounds of conflict since then have worsened the country’s economic outlook.

GDP has declined by nearly 40% since 2019 and inflation is expected to rise to 17.5% due to rising global energy and shipping prices eating away at people’s purchasing power, according to the ‌World Bank. The figure is more than quadruple the global headline inflation rate flagged by the International Monetary Fund in July.

Four in five households in ⁠Lebanon struggle to afford ⁠basic necessities, the UN children’s agency said in September.

'PEOPLE CAN'T KEEP UP'

The country’s middle class has “disappeared,” Nader said, dismantled by a series of crises including the collapse of the financial system in 2019, the 2020 Beirut Port explosion and two wars in under two years.

Monthly bills from private generator operators, which provide electricity to many homes and businesses during outages on Lebanon's failing national grid, jumped by nearly 20% in August 2026 alone, bringing rates nearly 60% higher than they were in February of this year, according to the kilowatt-hour prices set by Lebanon’s energy ministry.

For many, that means paying for 24/7 electricity now costs several hundred dollars a month, in a country where the minimum wage is set at $400.

“Everything has become expensive, and people can’t keep up,” said Fouad Fakhreddine, a 53-year-old restaurant worker from nearby Hamra. “We are now getting paid, then getting in debt over that just to get by.”

The years of economic instability, he said, have produced “a class that is living, and a class that is not dead and waiting to die from the unbearable situation it is in.”