Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
TT
20

Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)

No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.

Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.

Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.

A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.

I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:

Early years

*How was the Fatah movement born?

Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.

Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.

With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.

*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?

I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.

I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.

We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.

The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)

*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?

We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.

The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.

We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.

*What was Arafat’s position during that time?

He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.

*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?

Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.

We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.

The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.

*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?

We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.

That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.

Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)

Ties with Syria

*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.

Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.

Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.

Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.

*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?

The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.

*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.

It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.

Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.

*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?

Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)

Ties with Iraq

*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?

We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.

*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.

Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.

*What about Saddam?

He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.

*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?

The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.



Report: Trump Opposed Planned Israeli Strike on Iranian Nuclear Sites

In this photo provided by the Israeli army, armed Israeli Air Force planes depart from an unknown location to attack Iran on Oct. 26, 2024. (Israeli Army via AP, File)
In this photo provided by the Israeli army, armed Israeli Air Force planes depart from an unknown location to attack Iran on Oct. 26, 2024. (Israeli Army via AP, File)
TT
20

Report: Trump Opposed Planned Israeli Strike on Iranian Nuclear Sites

In this photo provided by the Israeli army, armed Israeli Air Force planes depart from an unknown location to attack Iran on Oct. 26, 2024. (Israeli Army via AP, File)
In this photo provided by the Israeli army, armed Israeli Air Force planes depart from an unknown location to attack Iran on Oct. 26, 2024. (Israeli Army via AP, File)

Israel had planned to strike Iranian nuclear sites as soon as next month but was waved off by President Trump in recent weeks in favor of negotiating a deal with Tehran to limit its nuclear program, according to administration officials and others briefed on the discussions, reported the New York Times.

Trump made his decision after months of internal debate over whether to pursue diplomacy or support Israel in seeking to set back Iran’s ability to build a bomb, at a time when Iran has been weakened militarily and economically.

The debate highlighted fault lines between historically hawkish American cabinet officials and other aides more skeptical that a military assault on Iran could destroy the country’s nuclear ambitions and avoid a larger war. It resulted in a rough consensus, for now, against military action, with Iran signaling a willingness to negotiate.

Israeli officials had recently developed plans to attack Iranian nuclear sites in May. They were prepared to carry them out, and at times were optimistic that the United States would sign off. The goal of the proposals, according to officials briefed on them, was to set back Tehran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon by a year or more.

Almost all of the plans would have required US help not just to defend Israel from Iranian retaliation, but also to ensure that an Israeli attack was successful, making the United States a central part of the attack itself.

For now, Trump has chosen diplomacy over military action. In his first term, he tore up the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration. But in his second term, eager to avoid being sucked into another war in the Middle East, he has opened negotiations with Tehran, giving it a deadline of just a few months to negotiate a deal over its nuclear program.

Earlier this month, Trump informed Israel of his decision that the United States would not support an attack. He discussed it with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when Netanyahu visited Washington last week, using an Oval Office meeting to announce that the United States was beginning talks with Iran.

In a statement delivered in Hebrew after the meeting, Netanyahu said that an agreement with Iran would only work if it allowed the signatories to “go in, blow up the facilities, dismantle all the equipment, under American supervision with American execution.”

The New York Times based its report on conversations with multiple officials briefed on Israel’s secret miliary plans and confidential discussions inside the Trump administration. Most of the people interviewed spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss military planning.

Israel has long planned to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, rehearsing bombing runs and calculating how much damage it could do with or without American help.

But support within the Israeli government for a strike grew after Iran suffered a string of setbacks last year.

In attacks on Israel in April, most of Iran’s ballistic missiles were unable to penetrate American and Israeli defenses. Hezbollah, Iran’s key ally, was decimated by an Israeli military campaign last year. The subsequent fall of the government of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria eliminated a Hezbollah and Tehran ally and cut off a prime route of weapons smuggling from Iran.

Air defense systems in Iran and Syria were also destroyed, along with the facilities that Iran uses to make missile fuel, crippling the country’s ability to produce new missiles for some time.

Initially, at the behest of Netanyahu, senior Israeli officials updated their American counterparts on a plan that would have combined an Israeli commando raid on underground nuclear sites with a bombing campaign, an effort that the Israelis hoped would involve American aircraft, reported the New York Times.

But Israeli military officials said the commando operation would not be ready until October. Netanyahu wanted it carried out more quickly. Israeli officials began shifting to a proposal for an extended bombing campaign that would have also required American assistance, according to officials briefed on the plan.

Some American officials were at least initially more open to considering the Israeli plans. Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of US Central Command, and Michael Waltz, the national security adviser, both discussed how the United States could potentially support an Israeli attack, if Trump backed the plan, according to officials briefed on the discussions.

With the United States intensifying its war against the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen, Kurilla, with the blessing of the White House, began moving military equipment to the Middle East. A second aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, is now in the Middle East, joining the carrier Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea.

The United States also moved two Patriot missile batteries and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as a THAAD, to the Middle East.

Around a half-dozen B-2 bombers capable of carrying 30,000-pound bombs essential to destroying Iran’s underground nuclear program were dispatched to Diego Garcia, an island base in the Indian Ocean.

Even if the United States decided not to authorize the aircraft to take part in a strike on Iran, Israel would know that the American fighters were available to defend against attacks by an Iranian ally.