Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
TT

Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison

Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)

No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.

Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.

Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.

A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.

I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:

Early years

*How was the Fatah movement born?

Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.

Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.

With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.

*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?

I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.

I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.

We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.

The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)

*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?

We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.

The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.

We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.

*What was Arafat’s position during that time?

He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.

*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?

Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.

We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.

The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.

*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?

We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.

That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.

Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)

Ties with Syria

*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.

Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.

Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.

Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.

*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?

The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.

*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.

It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.

Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.

*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?

Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)

Ties with Iraq

*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?

We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.

*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.

Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.

*What about Saddam?

He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.

*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?

The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.



Trump’s Greenland Ambitions Strain MAGA Ties with Europe’s Far-Right

 Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Trump’s Greenland Ambitions Strain MAGA Ties with Europe’s Far-Right

 Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)

Tensions over US President Donald Trump's plans to take control of Greenland have driven a wedge in the once iron-clad link between MAGA and Europe's far-right.

The rift seems to signal that ideological alignment alone may not be enough to temper worries among European nationalists over Trump's interventionism abroad.

Far-right leaders in Germany, Italy and France have strongly criticized Trump's Greenland plans. Even Nigel Farage, a longtime ally of Trump and head of the Reform UK nationalist party, called Trump's Greenland moves “a very hostile act.”

During a debate Tuesday in the European Parliament, far-right lawmakers typically aligned with Trump overwhelmingly supported halting a EU-US trade pact over their uneasiness with his threats, calling them “coercion” and “threats to sovereignty."

MAGA's trans-Atlantic partners

Such a divergence between Trump and his European acolytes came as some surprise.

Far-right parties surged to power in 2024 across the European Union, rattling the traditional powers across the bloc’s 27 nations from Spain to Sweden. Their political groupings now hold 26% of the seats in the European Parliament, according to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Less than a year ago, Europe's far-right parties gathered in Madrid to applauded Trump's election under the banner “Make Europe Great Again,” while Elon Musk, before his fall from Trump’s graces, had boosted European far-right influencers and figures on X, including Germany’s radical right Alternative for Germany party.

US Vice President JD Vance drew scorn from within Germany and across Europe after he met with AfD leader Alice Weidel during elections in February. The party, with which mainstream parties refuse to work, upset German politics by doubling its presence in the Bundestag to become the nation's second-largest party.

Yet deep divisions within MAGA itself over Trump’s approach to foreign affairs has reverberated in Europe, with his actions over Greenland, Venezuela and Iran forcing his political allies to favor their ideological convictions over their deference to the US president.

Sovereignty trumps shared values

France’s far-right National Rally has at times vaunted its ideological closeness to Trump, particularly on immigration.

A year ago, the party sent one of its senior figures, Louis Aliot, to attend Trump’s inauguration. In turn, Trump has staunchly defended party leader Marine Le Pen, describing her conviction for embezzling EU funds as a “witch hunt.”

Jordan Bardella, the 30-year-old National Rally’s president and a MEP, has praised Trump’s nationalist views, saying to the BBC last month that a “wind of freedom, of national pride” was blowing across Western democracies.

In recent days, however, Bardella has appeared to distance himself from the US administration. In his New Year’s address, he criticized US military intervention in Venezuela aimed at capturing then-President Nicolás Maduro, calling it “foreign interference” designed to serve “the economic interests of American oil companies.”

Going further, Bardella on Tuesday denounced Trump’s “commercial blackmail” over Greenland.

“Our subjugation would be a historic mistake,” Bardella said.

Another Trump ally, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, echoed this sentiment. In an interview on Rai television Wednesday, she said that she told Trump during a call that his tariffs threat over Greenland was “a mistake.”

Reluctance to criticize on the EU's eastern flank

Yet the reactions among European right-wing leaders has not been lockstep. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, widely regarded as the trailblazer of Trump’s brand of illiberal populism, has been careful to avoid even the slightest criticism of the US president.

Facing what is likely to be the toughest election of his 16 years in power in April, Orbán has built his political identity around his affinity with Trump, promising voters that his close relationship with the president will pay hefty dividends.

Trump, Orbán has insisted, is Europe’s only hope for peace amid the war in Ukraine and a guarantor of national sovereignty.

Orbán has sought to cast Trump's threats on Greenland and capture of Maduro either as beneficial for Hungary, or none of its business.

“It’s an in-house issue ... It’s a NATO issue,” Orbán said of Trump’s plans for Greenland during a news conference earlier this month, adding that any proposed change to Greenland's sovereignty can be discussed within NATO.

Despite his staunch advocacy of national sovereignty, Orbán also praised the US action in Venezuela, calling the country a “narco state” and suggesting Maduro’s ouster could benefit Hungary through future cheaper oil prices on world markets.

Hungary’s reluctance to push back on Trump’s actions reflected similar positions among far-right leaders in the EU’s eastern flank.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki, seen as an ally of both Orbán and Trump, said in Davos this week that the tensions over Greenland should be solved “in a diplomatic way” between Washington and Copenhagen — not a broader European coalition. He called on Western European leaders to tone down their objections to Trump’s conduct.

In the neighboring Czech Republic, prime minister and Trump ally Andrej Babis has declined to speak out against the US threats to Greenland, and warned against the EU allowing the issue to cause a conflict with Trump.

In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico has remained silent on Trump’s Greenland designs, even as he met with the president in his Mar-a-Lago resort last week.

Still, Trump’s deposing of Maduro led Fico to “unequivocally condemn” the action, calling it a “kidnapping” and the “latest American oil adventure.”

Disruption or division ahead

The ideology linking MAGA and its European allies might survive recent disagreements by doubling down on old, shared grievances, said Daniel Hegedüs, Central Europe director of the German Marshall Fund.

He pointed to recent votes against Brussels’ leadership in European Parliament by far-right European lawmakers on the EU migration pact and halting the massive trade deal with the Mercosur bloc of five South American nations.

“If Trump continues that way, posing a threat to the sovereignty of European countries, then of course that will divide the European radical right,” he said.

“We don’t know whether this division will stay with us or whether they can again unite forces around issues where they can cooperate. Those issues can be damaging enough for the European Union.”


US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
TT

US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

As the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, several destroyers, and fighter aircraft, are expected to arrive in the Middle East in the coming days, a familiar but increasingly pressing question is back in play: Is Washington preparing the ground for another strike on Iran, or orchestrating a calibrated show of force designed to raise the psychological and political cost for Tehran without tipping into war?

The answer is not binary. The same military buildup can serve dual purposes: a defensive deterrent to shield US bases and allies, and a pressure tool that keeps the option of attack alive without formal warning.

According to US officials cited by media outlets, the movement of the force, alongside discussions about deploying additional air defense systems, comes at a sensitive moment following a broad crackdown on protests inside Iran.

President Donald Trump, for his part, has publicly insisted that he would prefer nothing happens militarily. Still, he has tied that preference to two conditions: that Tehran does not resume any nuclear path approaching the weapons threshold, and that it does not proceed with executions of protesters.

Three messages in one buildup

The first message is directed at Iran itself. Washington wants to signal that it can rapidly reposition forces and that it considers the “deterrence window” open. Months ago, the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, and Trump is now reminding Iranians that it will happen again if the same activity resumes.

The second message is aimed at allies and regional adversaries alike. The buildup is not only a threat to Tehran but also an umbrella to protect US interests and bases from potential Iranian retaliation, especially as Iran’s military leadership has openly warned that any attack would make US bases and interests legitimate targets.

Such threats are not new, but they raise the sensitivity of any US decision.

Today’s reinforcements could amount to a preemptive defense aimed at limiting losses if events spiral out of control.

The third message is domestic and political. Trump is also brandishing non-military tools such as “secondary tariffs” on countries that trade with Iran, seeking to combine pressure instruments between sanctions and military deterrence.

In January, he announced a punitive tariff mechanism targeting states that trade with Tehran.

Nuclear ambiguity

The nuclear file adds another layer of uncertainty. The International Atomic Energy Agency has not verified Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium for months. At the same time, estimates circulate of a large quantity enriched to 60 percent, a level technically close to the 90 percent required for a weapon.

This monitoring gap creates two contradictory dilemmas. Hardliners argue that ambiguity implies the possibility of covert rebuilding and therefore justifies tougher pressure.

Advocates of de-escalation counter that the same ambiguity makes any strike a blind gamble that could miss targets or widen the war, without guaranteeing that the program will be halted.

From this perspective, the military buildup could become a language of negotiation: raising the cost for Tehran to accept stricter verification arrangements, or to absorb an internal retreat without appearing defeated.

The Iranian street

If a strike were carried out, what would the Iranian street gain today, after the system has already suppressed protests? Here, limited expectations appear more realistic than grand promises.

Even in Washington, there is a clear debate: any military intervention, particularly a “limited strike” against instruments of repression such as the Revolutionary Guard, may not change the outcome of an internal confrontation if the opposition is fragmented, unarmed, and unorganized.

Analyses in the US press have warned that bombing alone does not “make a revolution.”

It may temporarily halt repression, but it does not dismantle the security apparatus without a lengthy and costly campaign.

Worse, a strike could produce the opposite effect: national mobilization in favor of the system through a narrative of “external aggression,” a hardening of repression under the banner of fighting agents and terrorism, expanded arrests or harsher sentences, and an uncontrolled slide toward internal conflict if some pillars of the state break while others remain intact.

With protest momentum receding after the crackdown, and with continued restrictions on the internet and communications, the “street effect” does not appear to be at its peak in a way that would allow Trump, if he wished, to tie any strike to a quick internal political outcome.

In recent days, there have been signs of debate inside Iran about easing the shutdown. Still, the information environment remains unstable to the point that state television was hacked, and inciting messages were broadcast.

The day after

The question prompting warnings in some Washington circles is this: what if a strike were decisive and weakened the head of the system or paralyzed its center, but the state did not collapse in an orderly way? This is where the specter of “the day after” looms large.

Michael Doran, a researcher at the Hudson Institute, warns that Iran, as a multi-ethnic state with sensitive border regions, could face fragmentation or internal conflict if the center of power collapses suddenly, as in historical cases where “state identity” eroded rapidly after a regime fell.

Doran notes that minorities, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and Turkmen, are concentrated along the periphery and have cross-border extensions, making neighboring states directly invested in Iran’s internal fate.

The most dangerous scenario, in this logic, is not only fragmentation but also the persistence of the system in another form: the Revolutionary Guard and security services retaining control, shedding the religious ideological cover, and adopting a nationalist or military guise.

That would amount to a change of head rather than a change of regime.

He urges avoiding the idea of “appointing a successor” for Iran from outside or presuming the shape of the state in advance, as this could inflame ethnic sensitivities and plant the seeds of early conflicts.

What has changed from previous buildups is that Washington is no longer facing only the question of “do we strike?” but also “what comes after the strike?” inside Iran and across the region. This equation makes the decision harder. A strike may satisfy the logic of deterrence. Still, it could also open doors that cannot be closed if policy is not designed around uncertainty, rather than the illusion of quick stability.


ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
TT

ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.