Hector: Kingpin of Iran’s Oil Empire

Hossein Shamkhani. (Iranian media)
Hossein Shamkhani. (Iranian media)
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Hector: Kingpin of Iran’s Oil Empire

Hossein Shamkhani. (Iranian media)
Hossein Shamkhani. (Iranian media)

Interviews carried out by Bloomberg shed light on the “global kingpin for Iranian oil”, known as “Hector”.

The kingpin is Hossein Shamkhani, the son of Ali Shamkhani, advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has “raked in billions of dollars in sales from commodities originating out of Iran, Russia and elsewhere, according to more than a dozen people familiar with the matter,” reported Bloomberg.

“Few know Shamkhani’s real identity and he is widely known only as Hector, the people said.”

“Companies in his network also sell oil and petrochemicals from non-sanctioned nations and sometimes mix crude from various jurisdictions, so even buyers who test barrels may not be able to identify the country of origin, the people said,” added the report.

Shamkhani’s rise

His rise to power “offers a glimpse into parts of a sprawling shadow economy of dark oil fleets that have sprung up since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It also shows an increasing cooperation between Tehran and Moscow as global powers ratchet up sanctions against both governments,” said the report.

“Washington faces challenges clamping down on this trade because that risks pushing up prices at the pump in an election year. Meantime, Iran gets an annual windfall of some $35 billion from its oil exports, a boon as it backs proxy groups that have attacked Israeli or Western assets” and it appears that Shamkhani has been tasked with this mission.

Bloomberg said the US has imposed sancstions on ships believed to be operating within Shamkhani’s network, revealed people informed in the matter.

Shamkhani and parts of his trading network that do some business inside the dollar system, are under investigation for possible sanctions violations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Treasury Department, according to the people and documents seen by Bloomberg.

Shamkhani denies everything

In an emailed response to questions, the director of his company said “the firm has no connection with Shamkhani while a lawyer representing the company said it follows all rules and has no links with any Russian or Iranian interests.” He denied owning any oil company, controlling a trading network or having a firm involved in commodities deals with Iran or Russia.

“Shamkhani’s influence is so wide that products supplied by entities in his network have also reached global majors like China’s Sinopec, US-based Chevron Corp. and UK-based BP Plc, according to people familiar with the matter,” continued Bloomberg.

“People familiar with Shamkhani’s empire said he effectively oversees an intertwined web of companies,” it added. “Business ownership, shareholding and control information are easy to obscure, and other executives have been formally registered as the owners and managers, the people said.”

“As one of Iran’s most profitable sectors, oil is top of mind for officials in the US. International restrictions on crude sales have put sharp pressure on the Iranian economy for years. Even so, the Iran helps fund Hezbollah, which has been trading rocket fire with Israel, as well as Houthi militants who have been attacking Western and Israeli ships in the Red Sea. It also backs the Palestinian group Hamas, which has been at war with Israel in Gaza for almost 11 months.”

Moscow and Beirut

“Over the last three decades, Shamkhani’s father Ali served as naval commander for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, defense minister and then Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the country’s top security body.”

“The younger Shamkhani is in his 40s and was born in Tehran, according to people who have worked with him. He attended university in Moscow and Beirut before returning to the Iranian capital to obtain a Master of Business Administration, an archived LinkedIn profile says. Shamkhani’s Russian connections are particularly valuable at a time when Tehran and Moscow, both under Western sanctions, are strengthening their military and economic cooperation,” reported Bloomberg.

“My father never had nor does he have anything to do with my business activities,” Shamkhani said.

During a brief TV appearance in 2008, the elder Shamkhani said he advised his son to go into the private sector rather than follow in his footsteps with a government post.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.