Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
TT
20

Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)

What’s the most dangerous mission someone could take on? A meeting between Saddam Hussein’s envoy and Osama bin Laden in Sudan. US intelligence under President George W. Bush soon found out about it.

This meeting became a key justification used by Washington to invade Iraq, taking advantage of the post-9/11 atmosphere in the US after al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, attacked New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

In truth, there was no reason for bin Laden to influence Saddam Hussein’s future. The two men came from very different worlds. Saddam was the president of a major country in the region, not a faction leader.

He belonged to a secular party, choosing a Christian, Tariq Aziz, as foreign minister—a rare decision in the Middle East. Saddam also wasn’t known for playing along in decisions where he wasn’t in control.

But the decision to meet in Khartoum still cost Saddam, even though the meeting was a failure. A former Iraqi intelligence officer said US forces later seized a document showing that the Iraqi envoy advised against working with bin Laden, advice that was followed.

The 1990s in Sudan were extremely risky. During this time, President Omar al-Bashir’s regime made three major blunders: hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, sheltering international fugitive Carlos the Jackal, and involving Ali Osman Taha, the regime’s second-in-command, in an assassination attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

A rare photo shows Omar al-Bashir and Osama bin Laden in Sudan.

Bin Laden didn’t dwell much on the events in Khartoum in August 1994, when French commandos arrested Carlos and took him to France, where he still sits in prison.

Moreover, the al-Qaeda leader couldn’t foresee Sudan’s regime forcing him out of the country.

The regime, however, had no option but to reduce the risks. Bashir dismissed top security officials and decided to expel the “Arab Afghans.”

One day, Bashir and his deputy informed Hassan al-Turabi that bin Laden’s departure had been arranged. They then visited bin Laden, and a military plane flew him to Afghanistan.

The Taliban then gave bin Laden a safe haven, though Mullah Omar never imagined this would lead to his regime's downfall. In the late 1990s, questions about bin Laden were common when speaking with Sudanese officials.

In an interview, Bashir said that bin Laden came to Sudan after the Afghan war to invest in roads, airports, and agriculture—industries his family had been involved in for a long time.

According to Bashir’s statements, bin Laden didn’t have followers or networks in Sudan, just a small group of close aides who stayed out of the public eye.

But the US had made him a global threat, seeing him everywhere, even after he left Sudan, despite knowing he lived in isolation in a distant country.

While Bashir downplayed it, he had met bin Laden several times during his stay in Khartoum, and it's unlikely he was unaware of the ties between bin Laden and Sudanese security officials.

Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi reaffirmed Bashir’s claims of bin Laden having been building roads and airports.

“He wasn’t involved in public or intellectual circles and stayed out of the media. We talked about Afghanistan, and I shared our concerns that after the Soviets left, the fighters would be skilled in destruction but not in building a stable society, much like the French Revolution,” said al-Turabi at the time.

“I told him (bin Laden) Kabul fell before they were ready to establish a Muslim society as they envisioned,” added al-Turabi.

When asked who pushed for Osama bin Laden’s exit from Sudan, he said: “It was the British, acting on behalf of the Americans.”

“Saudi Arabia didn’t apply direct pressure—they’re always polite. Bin Laden felt his presence was straining relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which have very close ties. With about half a million Sudanese working in Saudi Arabia, none were expelled. Bin Laden didn’t want to harm that relationship,” he explained.

Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, entering a dangerous new phase. Soon after, the Taliban took over and welcomed him. Within two years, bombings at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led Washington to blame bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden’s home in Sudan. (Asharq Al-Awsat file)

The accusation was repeated after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. Bin Laden made statements suggesting he was at war with the US, but no one expected him to bring the fight to American soil on September 11, 2001.

When President Bush justified the Iraq invasion, he listed allegations against Saddam, including weapons of mass destruction, repression, and mass graves.

The most controversial claim was that Saddam’s regime was cooperating with al-Qaeda. However, the US administration did not provide evidence for this claim, and no concrete proof of a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was presented.

Curiosity about the contact between Saddam and bin Laden had journalists setting out to find more information.

While answers couldn’t be obtained from Saddam’s opponents or his former colleagues, insights from Iraqi intelligence were available.

Salim al-Jumaili, head of the American Affairs Division in Iraqi intelligence, who was involved in the initial outreach to bin Laden, agreed to talk.

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, marked by a security agreement that limited interference and intelligence activities.

Saddam praised Saudi Arabia and King Fahd for their support during the Iran-Iraq War. According to a former Iraqi official, King Fahd tried hard to resolve the situation and return to negotiations after the invasion, but Saddam had gone too far.

The invasion led to the collapse of the security agreement. As news spread about Iraqi opposition groups contacting Saudi Arabia, Iraqi intelligence suggested canceling the agreement, but Saddam refused.

When reports about these contacts continued, Saddam demanded monthly updates.

Eventually, he believed Saudi Arabia was backing efforts to overthrow him and ordered intelligence to “act strongly to undermine the American military presence in Saudi Arabia.”

“When the president issues such an order, all security agencies must try to fulfill it. At that time, I managed the Syria division and had connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, specifically Adnan Okla’s group,” said al-Jumaili.

“Adnan’s brother, Abdul Malik, told us that the Brotherhood had links with bin Laden and could deliver our message. I met Abdul Malik in Baghdad, and he agreed to help. I gave him a message saying we shared a goal of removing US forces from the region and were open to cooperation. We provided about $10,000 for travel expenses,” he revealed.

“The contact returned after a month or so and reported that bin Laden’s stance was very rigid. Bin Laden said the Iraqi regime was infidel and responsible for the presence of US forces in the region, and he was not interested in meeting or cooperating with us. This was in the early 1990s, before al-Qaeda’s actions escalated to the level of September 11.”

“I also heard from Farouk Hijazi, head of external operations, that bin Laden gave a similar response through another channel,” added al-Jumaili.

Al-Jumaili later discovered that Farouk Hijazi had visited Khartoum and met with bin Laden, arranged by al-Turabi.

“Hijazi informed the president that no cooperation with al-Qaeda took place. This is what Bush referred to when he mentioned the president sending an envoy to bin Laden. Bush likely knew there was no real cooperation but didn't mention it to justify the invasion,” al-Jumaili said.

Hassan al-Turabi. (AFP)

Another source, who requested anonymity, said bin Laden showed some flexibility regarding the Iraqi regime during his meeting with Hijazi.

Bin Laden “requested that if there were to be any cooperation, his camps be set up outside Iraqi control and that he have freedom in choosing targets and timing.”

Saddam, after learning of this, was told by Hijazi that cooperating with bin Laden would be complex and risky. Saddam then decided to end the matter entirely.

The consequences of that risky meeting are clear.

Saddam was executed, and Hijazi, who had fled to Syria, was captured at the Syrian-Iraqi border and also executed. Years later, US forces tracked down and killed bin Laden in Pakistan.

Cities sometimes take dangerous risks beyond their means and end up facing harsh realities.

Khartoum paid the price for harboring wanted figures and was punished before it could address the damage.

Some believe that under Bashir, Khartoum aimed to become a center of anti-Western activity, while al-Turabi wanted it to be a hub for political Islam, like Khomeini’s Iran. Both men pushed Sudan beyond its limits.



A Week Into the Fragile Israel-Iran Peace Agreement, Here's What We Still Don't Know

People attend the funeral procession of Iranian military commanders, nuclear scientists and others killed in Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
People attend the funeral procession of Iranian military commanders, nuclear scientists and others killed in Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
TT
20

A Week Into the Fragile Israel-Iran Peace Agreement, Here's What We Still Don't Know

People attend the funeral procession of Iranian military commanders, nuclear scientists and others killed in Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
People attend the funeral procession of Iranian military commanders, nuclear scientists and others killed in Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

It's been a week since the United States pressed Israel and Iran into a truce, ending a bloody, 12-day conflict that had set the Middle East and globe on edge.

The fragile peace, brokered by the US the day after it dropped 30,000-pound "bunker-busting" bombs on three of Iran's key nuclear sites, is holding. But much remains unsettled, The Associated Press reported.

How badly Iran’s nuclear program was set back remains murky. The prospects of renewed US-Iran peace talks are up in the air. And whether US President Donald Trump can leverage the moment to get Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 's government and Hamas focused on a ceasefire and hostage deal that brings about an end to the 20-month war in Gaza remains an open question.

Here is a look at what we still don't know:

How far Iran's nuclear program has been set back Trump says three targets hit by American strikes were “obliterated.” His defense secretary said they were “destroyed.”

A preliminary report issued by the US Defense Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, said the strikes did significant damage to the Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan sites, but did not totally destroy the facilities.

Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said on CBS’ “Face the Nation” on Sunday that the three Iranian sites with “capabilities in terms of treatment, conversion and enrichment of uranium have been destroyed to an important degree.” But, he added, “some is still standing” and that because capabilities remain, “if they so wish, they will be able to start doing this again.” He said assessing the full damage comes down to Iran allowing inspectors access.

What future US-Iran relations might look like

After the ceasefire deal came together, Trump spoke of potentially easing decades of biting sanctions on Tehran and predicted that Iran could become a “great trading nation” if it pulled back once-and-for-all from its nuclear program.

The talk of harmony didn't last long.

Ali Khamenei, in his first public appearance after the ceasefire was announced, claimed Tehran had delivered a “slap to America’s face." Trump responded by suggesting the supreme leader own up to the fact Iran “got beat to hell. The president also said he was backing off reviewing any immediate sanction relief, because of Khamenei's heated comments.

White House officials say the US and Iran are already in early discussions about resuming negotiations that had ended after Israel began launching strikes. But Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says there's no agreement in place to restart talks.

It's unclear if Iran's leadership is ready to come to the table so soon after the fighting has ended — especially if Trump holds to the position that Iran must give up nuclear enrichment for even civilian use. And Trump has offered conflicting statements about his commitment to talks. “We may sign an agreement,” he said Wednesday at a NATO summit press conference. He added, “I don’t think it’s that necessary.”

What role Iran's supreme leader will play

Khamenei's age and recent diminished appearance have raised questions about the scope of his involvement in US-Iran relations and Iran's response to both American and Israeli strikes. But despite having spent the last few weeks in a bunker as threats to his life escalated, there is little indication that Khamenei does not still reign supreme over the country's massive military and governmental operations.

Khamenei has ruled three times longer than his predecessor, the late Ruhollah Khomeini, and has shaped life for the country's more than 90 million people perhaps even more dramatically.

He entrenched the system of rule by the “mullahs,” or Shiite Muslim clerics. That secured his place in the eyes of hard-liners as the unquestionable authority, below only that of God. At the same time, Khamenei built the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard into the dominant force in Iran’s military and internal politics.

How Iran might strike back Iran's retaliatory missile attacks on a US base in Qatar following the American bombardment were sloughed off by the White House as a half-hearted, face-saving measure. The US was forewarned and the salvos were easily fended off.

Yet Iran remains a persistent threat, particularly via cyberwarfare. Hackers backing Tehran have already targeted US banks, defense contractors and oil industry companies — but so far have not caused widespread disruptions to critical infrastructure or the economy.

The US Department of Homeland Security last week issued a public bulletin warning of increased Iranian cyber threats. And the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, is urging organizations that operate critical infrastructure like water systems, pipelines or power plants to stay vigilant.

Whether the Israel-Iran ceasefire will hold It remains a fragile peace.

Immediately following the US strikes, Trump got on the phone with Netanyahu and told the Israeli leader not to expect further US offensive military action, according to a senior White House official who was not authorized to comment publicly about the sensitive diplomatic talks.

But even as he agreed to deal, Netanyahu made clear that Israel will strike again “if anyone in Iran tries to revive this project.”

The ceasefire deal came without any agreement from Tehran on dismantling its nuclear program. Khamenei claims the attacks “did nothing significant” to Iran's nuclear facilities.

Trump expressed confidence that Iran, at the moment, has no interest in getting its nuclear program back up. “The last thing they’re thinking about right now is enriched uranium,” Trump said.

Still, Trump says he expects Iran to open itself to international inspection to verify that it doesn’t restart its nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog, or some other organization "that we respect, including ourselves.”

Whether Trump can now press Netanyahu on Gaza

The president took a big gamble with his decision to order strikes on Iran's nuclear fortress.

As a candidate, he promised to quickly end Russia's brutal war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, but has failed to find a resolution to either. He also vowed to keep the US military out of foreign conflicts.

But after helping Israel with US strikes on Iran, Trump — in conversations with Netanyahu and other world leaders in recent days — has made clear he wants a deal completed soon, according to two people familiar with the private discussions and were not authorized to comment publicly.

On Friday, Trump told reporters, “We think within the next week we’re going to get a ceasefire.”

Trump didn't offer any further explanation for his optimism. But Israeli Minister for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer is expected to be in Washington this week for talks on a Gaza ceasefire, Iran and other matters, according to an official familiar with the matter. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.