South Lebanon Front: Military or Political Solution?
The funeral of Qassem Bazzi, Mohammed Hashem and Abbas Hammoud, the three paramedics who were killed last Saturday in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon (Reuters)
South Lebanon Front: Military or Political Solution?
The funeral of Qassem Bazzi, Mohammed Hashem and Abbas Hammoud, the three paramedics who were killed last Saturday in an Israeli airstrike in southern Lebanon (Reuters)
Israeli threats against Lebanon have intensified along with renewed military tensions with Hezbollah. This escalation comes amid failed ceasefire negotiations for Gaza, which Hezbollah links to restoring calm on the southern front—a condition reportedly not accepted by Tel Aviv, according to multiple Israeli officials.
Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Bou Habib has conveyed through intermediaries that Tel Aviv is not interested in a ceasefire in Lebanon, even if a truce in Gaza is achieved. This message was communicated by US envoy Amos Hochstein a few months ago, raising concerns about whether a military solution will prevail over a political one.
While some analysts believe that a de-escalation in Gaza might lead to heightened tensions in the South, given Israeli officials’ readiness for a northern conflict following the Gaza conflict, others argue that escalation is unlikely and that both fronts will face a similar fate.
Retired Brigadier General Dr. Khalil Helou and Professor of Political Science and International Relations Dr. Imad Salameh agree that the current situation is unlikely to change, predicting that the status quo will persist with “no ceasefire and no expansion of the war.”
In contrast, Riad Kahwaji, Head of the Middle East and Gulf Military Analysis Center – Enigma, sees an increased likelihood of war expansion in Lebanon due to the failed Gaza ceasefire negotiations.
In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Kahwaji said: “With the failure of negotiations in Gaza, attention is now shifting to the southern front of Lebanon, which remains in the eye of the storm and within the danger zone.”
For his part, Helou stated: “For 11 months, Tel Aviv has been threatening escalation and will continue to do so. However, the likelihood of war has decreased compared to previous months due to internal and external political factors related to Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to take actions that would harm US interests, especially before the American elections.”
Helou noted that Israel continues to systematically destroy areas in the South, over five kilometers from the border, to prevent attacks on northern regions. Despite this, ongoing shelling and rockets from Hezbollah targeting northern towns suggest that the situation will remain unchanged.
Salameh agreed, describing the current situation as a media and psychological war with fluctuating intensity.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Tel Aviv’s renewed threats are part of this ongoing conflict and do not indicate an imminent large-scale invasion of Lebanon or a major conflict with uncertain regional and domestic consequences.”
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has recently announced shifting military focus northward in preparation for a comprehensive ground operation.
On Tuesday, during a tour of the border area with Lebanon, he stated: “We are shifting the focus of military operations northward in preparation for completing tasks in the South.”
He urged military personnel to “prepare for a comprehensive ground operation at all levels to change the security situation and return residents to their homes.”
Gallant’s statement followed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s instruction for the army to prepare for “changing the situation in the North.”
In contrast, Hezbollah continues to link the southern front with the developments in Gaza.
“The enemy will not be able to return settlers to their homes except through one way: stopping the aggression on Gaza,” Deputy Chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council Sheikh Ali Damoush said.
He added: “The resistance will not accept changes to the rules of engagement or breaking existing equations. The more the enemy persists in its aggression and expands its attacks, the more the resistance will respond and escalate its operations... Escalation will be met with escalation, and we are not afraid of threats or intimidation."
Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasionhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5059553-bin-laden-met-saddam%E2%80%99s-envoy-linking-911-iraq-invasion
Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
What’s the most dangerous mission someone could take on? A meeting between Saddam Hussein’s envoy and Osama bin Laden in Sudan. US intelligence under President George W. Bush soon found out about it.
This meeting became a key justification used by Washington to invade Iraq, taking advantage of the post-9/11 atmosphere in the US after al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, attacked New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.
In truth, there was no reason for bin Laden to influence Saddam Hussein’s future. The two men came from very different worlds. Saddam was the president of a major country in the region, not a faction leader.
He belonged to a secular party, choosing a Christian, Tariq Aziz, as foreign minister—a rare decision in the Middle East. Saddam also wasn’t known for playing along in decisions where he wasn’t in control.
But the decision to meet in Khartoum still cost Saddam, even though the meeting was a failure. A former Iraqi intelligence officer said US forces later seized a document showing that the Iraqi envoy advised against working with bin Laden, advice that was followed.
The 1990s in Sudan were extremely risky. During this time, President Omar al-Bashir’s regime made three major blunders: hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, sheltering international fugitive Carlos the Jackal, and involving Ali Osman Taha, the regime’s second-in-command, in an assassination attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.
A rare photo shows Omar al-Bashir and Osama bin Laden in Sudan.
Bin Laden didn’t dwell much on the events in Khartoum in August 1994, when French commandos arrested Carlos and took him to France, where he still sits in prison.
Moreover, the al-Qaeda leader couldn’t foresee Sudan’s regime forcing him out of the country.
The regime, however, had no option but to reduce the risks. Bashir dismissed top security officials and decided to expel the “Arab Afghans.”
One day, Bashir and his deputy informed Hassan al-Turabi that bin Laden’s departure had been arranged. They then visited bin Laden, and a military plane flew him to Afghanistan.
The Taliban then gave bin Laden a safe haven, though Mullah Omar never imagined this would lead to his regime's downfall. In the late 1990s, questions about bin Laden were common when speaking with Sudanese officials.
In an interview, Bashir said that bin Laden came to Sudan after the Afghan war to invest in roads, airports, and agriculture—industries his family had been involved in for a long time.
According to Bashir’s statements, bin Laden didn’t have followers or networks in Sudan, just a small group of close aides who stayed out of the public eye.
But the US had made him a global threat, seeing him everywhere, even after he left Sudan, despite knowing he lived in isolation in a distant country.
While Bashir downplayed it, he had met bin Laden several times during his stay in Khartoum, and it's unlikely he was unaware of the ties between bin Laden and Sudanese security officials.
Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi reaffirmed Bashir’s claims of bin Laden having been building roads and airports.
“He wasn’t involved in public or intellectual circles and stayed out of the media. We talked about Afghanistan, and I shared our concerns that after the Soviets left, the fighters would be skilled in destruction but not in building a stable society, much like the French Revolution,” said al-Turabi at the time.
“I told him (bin Laden) Kabul fell before they were ready to establish a Muslim society as they envisioned,” added al-Turabi.
When asked who pushed for Osama bin Laden’s exit from Sudan, he said: “It was the British, acting on behalf of the Americans.”
“Saudi Arabia didn’t apply direct pressure—they’re always polite. Bin Laden felt his presence was straining relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which have very close ties. With about half a million Sudanese working in Saudi Arabia, none were expelled. Bin Laden didn’t want to harm that relationship,” he explained.
Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, entering a dangerous new phase. Soon after, the Taliban took over and welcomed him. Within two years, bombings at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led Washington to blame bin Laden.
Osama bin Laden’s home in Sudan. (Asharq Al-Awsat file)
The accusation was repeated after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. Bin Laden made statements suggesting he was at war with the US, but no one expected him to bring the fight to American soil on September 11, 2001.
When President Bush justified the Iraq invasion, he listed allegations against Saddam, including weapons of mass destruction, repression, and mass graves.
The most controversial claim was that Saddam’s regime was cooperating with al-Qaeda. However, the US administration did not provide evidence for this claim, and no concrete proof of a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was presented.
Curiosity about the contact between Saddam and bin Laden had journalists setting out to find more information.
While answers couldn’t be obtained from Saddam’s opponents or his former colleagues, insights from Iraqi intelligence were available.
Salim al-Jumaili, head of the American Affairs Division in Iraqi intelligence, who was involved in the initial outreach to bin Laden, agreed to talk.
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, marked by a security agreement that limited interference and intelligence activities.
Saddam praised Saudi Arabia and King Fahd for their support during the Iran-Iraq War. According to a former Iraqi official, King Fahd tried hard to resolve the situation and return to negotiations after the invasion, but Saddam had gone too far.
The invasion led to the collapse of the security agreement. As news spread about Iraqi opposition groups contacting Saudi Arabia, Iraqi intelligence suggested canceling the agreement, but Saddam refused.
When reports about these contacts continued, Saddam demanded monthly updates.
Eventually, he believed Saudi Arabia was backing efforts to overthrow him and ordered intelligence to “act strongly to undermine the American military presence in Saudi Arabia.”
“When the president issues such an order, all security agencies must try to fulfill it. At that time, I managed the Syria division and had connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, specifically Adnan Okla’s group,” said al-Jumaili.
“Adnan’s brother, Abdul Malik, told us that the Brotherhood had links with bin Laden and could deliver our message. I met Abdul Malik in Baghdad, and he agreed to help. I gave him a message saying we shared a goal of removing US forces from the region and were open to cooperation. We provided about $10,000 for travel expenses,” he revealed.
“The contact returned after a month or so and reported that bin Laden’s stance was very rigid. Bin Laden said the Iraqi regime was infidel and responsible for the presence of US forces in the region, and he was not interested in meeting or cooperating with us. This was in the early 1990s, before al-Qaeda’s actions escalated to the level of September 11.”
“I also heard from Farouk Hijazi, head of external operations, that bin Laden gave a similar response through another channel,” added al-Jumaili.
Al-Jumaili later discovered that Farouk Hijazi had visited Khartoum and met with bin Laden, arranged by al-Turabi.
“Hijazi informed the president that no cooperation with al-Qaeda took place. This is what Bush referred to when he mentioned the president sending an envoy to bin Laden. Bush likely knew there was no real cooperation but didn't mention it to justify the invasion,” al-Jumaili said.
Hassan al-Turabi. (AFP)
Another source, who requested anonymity, said bin Laden showed some flexibility regarding the Iraqi regime during his meeting with Hijazi.
Bin Laden “requested that if there were to be any cooperation, his camps be set up outside Iraqi control and that he have freedom in choosing targets and timing.”
Saddam, after learning of this, was told by Hijazi that cooperating with bin Laden would be complex and risky. Saddam then decided to end the matter entirely.
The consequences of that risky meeting are clear.
Saddam was executed, and Hijazi, who had fled to Syria, was captured at the Syrian-Iraqi border and also executed. Years later, US forces tracked down and killed bin Laden in Pakistan.
Cities sometimes take dangerous risks beyond their means and end up facing harsh realities.
Khartoum paid the price for harboring wanted figures and was punished before it could address the damage.
Some believe that under Bashir, Khartoum aimed to become a center of anti-Western activity, while al-Turabi wanted it to be a hub for political Islam, like Khomeini’s Iran. Both men pushed Sudan beyond its limits.
