Exploding Device Attacks Dealt Major but Not Crippling Blow to Hezbollah, Analysts Say

 Hezbollah members carry the coffins of two of their comrades during a funeral procession in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Thursday, Sept. 19, 2024. (AP)
Hezbollah members carry the coffins of two of their comrades during a funeral procession in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Thursday, Sept. 19, 2024. (AP)
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Exploding Device Attacks Dealt Major but Not Crippling Blow to Hezbollah, Analysts Say

 Hezbollah members carry the coffins of two of their comrades during a funeral procession in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Thursday, Sept. 19, 2024. (AP)
Hezbollah members carry the coffins of two of their comrades during a funeral procession in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Thursday, Sept. 19, 2024. (AP)

The waves of remotely triggered explosions that hit pagers and walkie-talkies carried by Hezbollah members in grocery stores, on streets and at a funeral procession this week made for an eerie and shocking spectacle.

Analysts said Hezbollah will be able to regroup militarily and find communications workarounds after the attack, but the psychological effects will likely run deep.

The explosions — widely blamed on Israel, which has neither confirmed nor denied involvement — killed at least 37 people, including two children, wounded more than 3,000 and deeply unsettled even Lebanese who have no Hezbollah affiliation.

The detonating devices hit workers in Hezbollah’s civilian institutions, including its health care and media operations, as well as fighters, dealing a blow to the armed group's operations beyond the battlefield. It is not clear how many civilians with no link to Hezbollah were injured.

The attacks also exposed the weaknesses in the low-tech communications system the group had turned to in an attempt to avoid Israeli surveillance of cellphones.

Retired Lebanese army Gen. Elias Hanna described the attacks as the “Pearl Harbor or 9/11 of Hezbollah.”

Mohanad Hage Ali, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center think tank who researches Hezbollah, said that because the blasts hit people across the group’s institutions, the attack was “like a sword in the guts of the organization.” Hundreds of people were severely wounded, including many who lost eyes or hands.

“It will require time to heal and replace those who were targeted,” he said.

But Hage Ali and other analysts agreed that the loss of manpower is not a crippling blow. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has said the group’s fighting force numbers more than 100,000, meaning that the attack — as dramatic as it was — would have put only a small percentage of its militants out of commission even if all those wounded and killed were fighters.

Qassim Qassir, a Lebanese analyst close to Hezbollah, said the detonating devices actually struck mostly civilian workers within the group and not military or security officials, which has allowed it to contain the impacts on its war effort.

Hezbollah has exchanged fire with Israel’s military almost daily since Oct. 8, the day after a deadly Hamas-led assault in southern Israel triggered a massive Israeli counteroffensive and the ongoing war in Gaza.

Since then, hundreds have been killed in strikes in Lebanon and dozens in Israel, while tens of thousands on each side of the border have been displaced. Hezbollah said its strikes are in support of its ally, Hamas, and that it will halt its attacks if a ceasefire is implemented in Gaza.

Speaking Thursday, Nasrallah acknowledged that the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented a “severe blow,” but he vowed that the group would emerge stronger than before.

Hezbollah continued to launch rockets over the border Wednesday and Thursday after the pager and walkie-talkie attacks, including one that killed two Israeli soldiers.

The impacts on Hezbollah’s communications network are likely to be more disruptive than the human loss.

“Telecommunications is the nerve of military operations and communications,” said retired Lebanese army Gen. Naji Malaeb, an expert on security affairs. A delay in communication could spell disaster, he said.

In February, Nasrallah warned members not to carry cellphones, which he said could be used to track them and monitor their communications.

But long before that, Hezbollah relied on pagers and its own private fiber-optic landline network to avoid the monitoring of its communications.

The pagers that detonated Tuesday were a new model the group recently began using. It appears that small quantities of explosives had been implanted in the devices at some stage in the manufacturing or shipping process and then remotely detonated.

Hanna said the group might rely more heavily on its landline network — which Israel has attempted to tap into on multiple occasions — going forward, or on even lower-tech solutions such as hand-delivered letters.

“Maybe you have to go back to human communication, the postman,” he said. “This is what is really helping (Hamas leader) Yahya Sinwar not to be targeted” in his hiding spot in Gaza.

Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv-based think tank Institute for National Security Studies and former intelligence analyst for the Israeli military and prime minister’s office, said losing the ability to communicate through pagers is a “dramatic blow,” but the group has other communication methods and will rebuild their communication network.

The bigger damage to Hezbollah was psychological, she said.

“It’s the humiliation of having such an operation, it shows how much the organization is exposed to the Israeli intelligence,” she said.

Amal Saad, a lecturer in politics and international relations at Cardiff University in Wales who researches Hezbollah, said much of the attack's impact was the “demoralization and the fear” it sowed.

“It’s not just a security breach against the military," she said. "Hezbollah’s entire society is going to be extremely concerned because everything is liable now to being hacked and rigged.”

The group will “be rethinking many things now, not just the pagers," Saad said.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.