Gaza Is in Ruins after Israel’s Yearlong Offensive. Rebuilding May Take Decades

This overview shows a destroyed mosque and other buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)
This overview shows a destroyed mosque and other buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)
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Gaza Is in Ruins after Israel’s Yearlong Offensive. Rebuilding May Take Decades

This overview shows a destroyed mosque and other buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)
This overview shows a destroyed mosque and other buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)

The Gaza Strip is in ruins.

There are hills of rubble where apartment blocks stood, and pools of sewage-tainted water spreading disease. City streets have been churned into dirt canyons and, in many places, the air is filled with the stench of unrecovered corpses.

Israel’s yearlong offensive against Hamas, one of the deadliest and most destructive in recent history, has killed more than 41,000 people, a little over half of them women and children, according to local health officials. With no end in sight to the war and no plan for the day after, it is impossible to say when – or even if – anything will be rebuilt.

Even after the fighting stops, hundreds of thousands of people could be stuck living in squalid tent camps for years. Experts say reconstruction could take decades.

“This war is destruction and misery. It would make the stones cry out,” said Shifaa Hejjo, a 60-year-old housewife living in a tent pitched on land where her home once stood. “Whoever sees Gaza ... It will make them cry.”

Israel blames the destruction on Hamas. Its Oct. 7 attack on Israel — in which some 1,200 people were killed and around 250 taken hostage — ignited the war. Israel says Hamas embedded much of its military infrastructure, including hundreds of kilometers (miles) of tunnels, in densely populated areas where some of the heaviest battles were fought.

The fighting left roughly a quarter of all structures in Gaza destroyed or severely damaged, according to a UN assessment in September based on satellite footage. It said around 66% of structures, including more than 227,000 housing units, had sustained at least some damage.

If there's a ceasefire, around half of all families “have nowhere to go back to,” said Alison Ely, a Gaza-based coordinator with the Shelter Cluster, an international coalition of aid providers led by the Norwegian Refugee Council.

The devastation in Gaza rivals front-line towns in Ukraine

Almost as many buildings have been destroyed or damaged in Gaza as in all of Ukraine after its first two years of war with Russia, according to Corey Scher and Jamon Van Den Hoek, US-based researchers who use satellite radar to document the wars' devastation.

To put that into perspective: Gaza is less than half the size of Ukraine's capital, Kyiv.

The amount of destruction in central and southern Gaza alone, Scher said, is roughly equivalent to what was lost in the front-line town of Bakhmut, the scene of one of the deadliest battles in the Ukraine war and where Russian forces destroyed nearly every building in their path to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw. The destruction in northern Gaza is even worse, he said.

Gaza’s water and sanitation system has collapsed. More than 80% of its health facilities — and even more of its roads — are damaged or destroyed.

“I can’t think of any parallel, in terms of the severity of damage, for an enclave or a country or a people,” Scher said.

This overview shows destroyed buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)

At the end of January, the World Bank estimated $18.5 billion of damage — nearly the combined economic output of the West Bank and Gaza in 2022. That was before some intensely destructive Israeli ground operations, including in the southern border city of Rafah.

’I couldn’t tell where people’s homes were’ When Israeli ground forces pushed into the southern city of Khan Younis in January, Shifaa Hejjo and her family fled their four-story home with only the clothes they were wearing.

They spent months in various tent camps before she decided to return – and the sight brought her to tears.

Her entire neighborhood had been destroyed, her former home and the roads leading to it lost in a sea of rubble.

“I didn’t recognize it,” she said. “I couldn’t tell where people’s homes were.”

Around 90% of Gaza’s 2.3 million people have been displaced by the war, often multiple times, according to UN estimates. Hundreds of thousands have crowded into sprawling tent camps near the coast with no electricity, running water or toilets. Hunger is widespread.

Hejjo lived in a tent in the courtyard of a hospital. Before that, she was in Muwasi, the main tent camp in southern Gaza.

“It smelled bad,” she said. “There were diseases spreading.”

She said her husband, who was suffering from liver disease, was broken-hearted when he heard their home had been destroyed and he died shortly thereafter.

She was among the first to return after Israeli forces withdrew in April. Her neighbors stayed away, fearful they would find bodies or unexploded bombs.

But for her it was still home.

“It is better to live in my home, where I lived for 37 years, even though it is destroyed,” she said.

Hejjo and her children dug through the rubble with shovels and their bare hands, going brick by brick and saving whatever could be reused. Torn clothes were used to feed cooking fires.

Rats had crept in, and swarms of mosquitoes hovered over the ruins. There was broken glass everywhere. They set up a tent fortified by corrugated metal sheeting and some bricks salvaged from her destroyed home. A light drizzle wet their clothes as they slept.

UN agencies say unemployment has soared to around 80% — up from nearly 50% before the war — and that almost the entire population is living in poverty. Even those with means would find it nearly impossible to import construction materials because of Israeli restrictions, ongoing fighting and the breakdown of law and order.

A man standing atop a heavily damaged building views other destroyed buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)

There are mountains of rubble, little water and no electricity

The first obstacle to any significant rebuilding is the rubble – mountains of it.

Where houses, shops and office buildings once stood, there are now giant drifts of rubble laced with human remains, hazardous substances and unexploded munitions.

The UN estimates the war has left some 40 million tons of debris and rubble in Gaza, enough to fill New York’s Central Park to a depth of eight meters (about 25 feet). It could take up to 15 years and nearly $650 million to clear it all away, it said.

There’s also the question of where to dispose of it: The UN estimates about five square kilometers (about two square miles) of land would be needed, which will be hard to come by in the small and densely populated territory.

It isn’t just homes that were destroyed, but also critical infrastructure.

The UN estimates nearly 70% of Gaza’s water and sanitation plants have been destroyed or damaged. That includes all five of the territory’s wastewater treatment facilities, plus desalination plants, sewage pumping stations, wells and reservoirs.

The employees who once managed municipal water and waste systems have been displaced, and some killed. And fuel shortages have made it difficult to keep operating facilities that are still intact.

The international charity Oxfam said it applied in December for a permit to bring in desalination units, and pipes to repair water infrastructure. It took three months for Israel to approve the shipment, but it still has not entered Gaza, Oxfam said.

The destruction of sewage networks has left streets flooded with putrid water, hastening the spread of disease.

There has been no central power in Gaza since the opening days of the war, when its sole power plant was forced to shut down for lack of fuel, and more than half of the territory's electrical grid has been destroyed, according to the World Bank.

This overview shows destroyed buildings in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 7, 2024 on the first anniversary of the ongoing war in the Palestinian territory between Israel and Hamas. (AFP)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he won’t allow Hamas or even the Western-backed Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. He has said Israel will maintain open-ended security control and delegate civilian affairs to local Palestinians. But none are known to have volunteered, and Hamas has threatened to kill anyone who aids the occupation.

Rebuilding Gaza would also require the import of massive amounts of construction supplies and heavy equipment, which Israel is unlikely to allow as long as there’s a potential for Hamas to rebuild its militant infrastructure. In any case, Gaza has only a small number of crossings with limited capacity.

The Israeli military body that coordinates civilian affairs in Gaza says it does not restrict the entry of civilian supplies and allows so-called dual-use items that could also be used for military purposes. Israel allowed some construction materials in before the war under what was known as the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, but it was subject to heavy restrictions and delays.

The Shelter Cluster estimates that it would take 40 years to rebuild all of Gaza’s destroyed homes under that setup.

For now, aid providers are struggling just to bring in enough basic tents because of the limited number of trucks going into Gaza and the challenges of delivering aid. Efforts to bring in more robust temporary housing are still in the early stages, and no one has even tried to bring in construction materials, according to Ely.

In September, the Shelter Cluster estimated 900,000 people were still in need of tents, bedding and other items to prepare for the region's typically cold and rainy winters.



Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)

Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.

That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.

Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.

“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.

“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.

“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”

Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.

“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.

Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant

I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.

“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.

“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”

Stunned, I listened as he went on.

“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”

As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.

A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.

He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.

Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship

Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.

Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.

Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.

Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”

Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.

“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.

He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.

“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”

Crackdown on Palestinian media

Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.

“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”

That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.

“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.

As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.

“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”

Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”

Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.

A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)

Deep-seated mutual hatred

Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.

“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”

He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”

Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”

Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”

The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.

After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.

“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.

Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.

He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”

These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.

Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.

Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.