Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
TT

Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website

As the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and the Gaza war began, Iran was already dealing with the fallout from protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, making the autumn of 2022 one of the bloodiest in the country’s recent history.

The war in Gaza erupted at a crucial time for Iran’s leadership, which was facing international pressure over its crackdown on protests, its drone supply to Russia, and stalled nuclear talks.

From the start, Tehran described Hamas’ attack as a “natural and spontaneous reaction” to what it called Israel's “provocative war policies” and actions by the far-right Israeli Prime Minister.

Iranian officials denied any role in planning the operation, but their diplomatic moves suggested they were prepared for the conflict’s impact on the region.

Less than a week after the attack, Iran’s late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, began a regional tour, meeting with leaders of countries and groups allied with Iran, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar.

His aim was to coordinate efforts and send regional messages.

Iran also warned Israel that it could face multiple fronts if its military actions in Gaza didn’t stop.

Tehran has since worked to strengthen the image of armed groups in the region, pushing to legitimize its support for these factions amid the ongoing political and regional unrest.

This marked a key moment for Iran, as Tehran claimed it had elevated the “Resistance Axis” groups from a regional to a “global” level, referring to this shift as a move from the “World of Resistance” to the “Global Resistance.”

In doing so, Iran, which had been trying to ease tensions with its neighbors, adopted a more aggressive stance towards groups linked to it. Many saw this as part of Iran’s broader strategy to expand its influence across the region.

Officially, Iran told the international community that these groups act independently, make their own decisions, and produce their own weapons.

However, several Iranian officials have acknowledged the role of Gen. Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards in supplying weapons and technology to these groups.

Iran’s second significant move after the Al-Aqsa Flood came a month into the Gaza war when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for cutting off Israel’s “economic lifelines,” especially oil and energy routes.

Iranian-backed groups, especially the Houthis, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, disrupting shipping for months.

At the same time, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched drone attacks on Israel and US bases in the region.

The US responded after one of its bases in Syria was attacked, striking positions held by these militias.

Politically, Iran insisted that its allied groups’ demands be met for any Gaza ceasefire, and it opposed international peace proposals, especially the “two-state solution.”

In December, Iran’s foreign minister even noted that both Iran and Israel rejected the two-state plan.

In the third phase, Israel ramped up airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria. In December, an Israeli strike killed Razi Mousavi, a key Iranian logistics officer.

A month later, the Revolutionary Guards confirmed the death of their intelligence chief in Syria. The biggest blow came in April, when an Israeli airstrike on a meeting at the Iranian consulate killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahdi, Iran’s top military commander in Syria and Lebanon.

In its fourth major escalation, Iran nearly went to war with Israel after responding to the bombing of its consulate by launching hundreds of missiles and drones directly from its territory.

Israel claimed it intercepted the attack but retaliated by striking a radar system at a military airport in Isfahan, near a key nuclear site.

This clash heightened fears of a shift in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with growing talk in Tehran about developing deterrent weapons and Israel threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The fifth key moment for Iran followed the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijani border. Authorities quickly denied conspiracy theories, ruling out an Israeli attack.

Three months later, Iran’s military confirmed the crash was caused by bad weather, but some questions remained unanswered.

During this period, Iran’s political focus shifted away from the Gaza war due to the presidential election and efforts to form a new government.

Candidates in the election avoided discussing the Gaza conflict or Iran’s support for Hamas, despite criticism over ignoring pressing issues like sanctions and stalled nuclear negotiations.

Most candidates only praised Iran’s missile program and vowed to strengthen deterrence against Israel.

The sixth major event occurred during the inauguration of Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated at a Quds Force facility in northern Tehran, marking a significant turn in the Gaza war.

Khamenei promised to respond to the “violation of Iranian sovereignty” following the assassination of a “guest of Iran.”

Officials and military leaders varied in their tone and language of threats but consistently stressed the need for a response as time passed and doubts about Iran’s actions increased.

Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran raised significant questions about the operation, especially regarding potential security breaches.

The seventh key moment was marked by the “Pager Bombings,” alongside a message of de-escalation from Pezeshkian, particularly towards the US and Israel.

Before traveling to New York, Pezeshkian stated at a press conference that Iran does not want to destabilize the region or export its revolution. He expressed a willingness to engage with the US if it shows it is not hostile, even referring to the US as “brotherly.”

During meetings at the UN General Assembly, he reiterated, “Iran is ready to set aside its weapons if Israel does the same,” according to an audio recording.

Pezeshkian explained that the delay in Iran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination was due to indications that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was imminent, expressing frustration over the lack of progress and ongoing Israeli attacks.

Pezeshkian downplayed Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel independently, challenging the narrative from officials close to Khamenei.

His remarks, along with concerns about possible security breaches during the “Pager Bombings” and the targeting of Hezbollah leaders, raised suspicions in Tehran about vulnerabilities in Iran’s defense and heightened fears of internal security lapses.

The eighth and most critical phase began with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a key figure in Iran’s regional strategy, second only to Gen. Soleimani.

The Israeli airstrike on Nasrallah’s headquarters also led to a significant loss for the Revolutionary Guards.

Nasrallah is highly regarded among Iran’s leaders, especially conservatives. His name has occasionally been mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei, but such a candidacy would likely face opposition from various political factions due to his non-Iranian status.

In response to the assassinations of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, Iran launched its second direct missile attack on Israel.

This prompted Israel to threaten retaliation, indicating it could target various facilities, including oil refineries, fuel stations, and nuclear and military sites.

The situation between Israel and Iran remains highly volatile, with the potential for further escalation.



Iran Confrontation Offers Israel's Netanyahu Path to Erase Oct 7 Stigma, at Least at Home

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu grimaces after addressing the 79th United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, US, September 27, 2024.  REUTERS/Mike Segar
Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu grimaces after addressing the 79th United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, US, September 27, 2024. REUTERS/Mike Segar
TT

Iran Confrontation Offers Israel's Netanyahu Path to Erase Oct 7 Stigma, at Least at Home

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu grimaces after addressing the 79th United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, US, September 27, 2024.  REUTERS/Mike Segar
Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu grimaces after addressing the 79th United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York, US, September 27, 2024. REUTERS/Mike Segar

For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, confrontation with Iran and its proxies offers the chance of political redemption at home, even at the risk of a regional war, a year after the Oct 7 attack demolished his reputation as a security hawk.
Many Israelis, demoralized by the catastrophic security failures around the deadly attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas, have regained confidence in their military and intelligence apparatus after a series of stunning blows against the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group in Lebanon in recent weeks.
A hate figure for the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who have joined protests worldwide against Israel's war in Gaza over the past year and a frequent irritant even to his closest ally, the United States, Netanyahu has benefited in his own country.
The death of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah and a top ally of Hamas, in a Sept. 27 Israeli strike in Beirut was greeted with elation in a country still grappling with trauma from Oct. 7 and a year of war in Gaza that has badly dented its reputation abroad, according to Reuters.
Even when a barrage of Iranian missiles sent Israelis piling into bomb shelters last week, Israel's success in intercepting most of the projectiles in coordination with Western allies helped to shore up the country's sense of resilience.
The death of at least nine Israeli soldiers in Lebanon since Israel announced the start of its ground operation on Oct 1 has provided a sobering reminder of the potential dangers ahead.
But Netanyahu, 74, who called Nasrallah's death a "turning point", has led a chorus of statements by Israeli officials in recent days that sought to prepare the population for more war.
"Iran made a big mistake tonight - and it will pay for it," he said at the outset of a political-security meeting after the missile attacks.
According to a survey from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, around 80% of Israelis feel the Lebanon campaign has met or exceeded expectations, although the same survey found disappointment with the campaign in Gaza, with 70% supporting a ceasefire to bring Israeli hostages home.
POLITICAL SURVIVOR
A former member of an elite special forces unit that carried out some of Israel's most daring hostage rescues in the 1970s, Netanyahu has dominated Israeli politics for decades, becoming the country's longest-serving prime minister when he won an unprecedented sixth term in 2022.
His alliance with hard-right national religious parties was key to his victory and he faced some of the biggest protests in Israel's history last year over a package of measures designed to curb the powers of the Supreme Court that drew accusations he was undermining the foundations of the country's democracy. His popularity was further damaged by a trial on corruption charges that he denies.
Since the start of the war, the protests over judicial changes have given way to regular large demonstrations demanding his government do more to bring back the hostages seized by Hamas on Oct. 7, with some protesters suggesting Netanyahu has deliberately kept the war going for his own political ends.
Throughout, Netanyahu has said that only sustained military pressure on Hamas will get the hostages back and he has vowed to continue the war until Hamas is destroyed as a military and governing force in Gaza.
So far, the prime minister has refused to accept personal responsibility for Oct. 7, one of the worst security failures in Israel's history. He has said only that everyone will have to answer difficult questions when the war with Hamas is over, and has dismissed calls to resign and hold early elections.
Outside Israel, he has been the target of protestors outraged by the Israeli military campaign that has laid waste to Gaza and killed nearly 42,000 Palestinians, according to Palestinian health authorities. Foreign governments, including close ally the United States, have been critical of the Gaza campaign and alarmed by the spread of conflict to Lebanon. The International Criminal Court is considering a prosecution request for an arrest warrant against him over alleged war crimes in Gaza, bracketing him with Yahya Sinwar, leader of Hamas, proscribed as a terrorist organization in many Western countries.
At home, while he is one of the most polarizing leaders in Israeli history, such controversies have not hurt his image among his base of right-wing supporters.
Netanyahu himself described the move by the ICC prosecutor as "absurd" and said it was directed against the whole of Israel and antisemitic.
MORTAL ENEMY
Before Israel began its escalated campaign against Hezbollah last month, Netanyahu had already seen his domestic political fortunes recover somewhat during a year of a war against Hamas, a group most Israelis, even on the left, see as a mortal enemy.
Recent opinion polls show his Likud party is once again the strongest party in Israel, even if he might still struggle to form a ruling coalition if an election were held now.
He may not need to however, having brought in former ally-turned-rival Gideon Saar last week into his often fractious government, increasing his majority to a comfortable 68 seats in the 120-seat Knesset.
That may give him some insurance against unruly coalition partners like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, two hardliners from the settler movement who have been consistently unwilling to toe the government line. Having survived being blamed for the worst disaster in Israeli history, he now may even serve out a full term with elections not due until 2026.