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Who is Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar?

(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)
(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)
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Who is Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar?

(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)
(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel that triggered the war in Gaza, has been killed in a military operation.
His death would be a significant moment in Israel's yearlong offensive against the militant group and could complicate efforts to release dozens of hostages held in Gaza.
Sinwar became the head of Hamas after the killing of the previous leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in an explosion in Iran in July that was widely blamed on Israel.
Some things to know about Sinwar:
From refugee camp to Hamas militant Sinwar was born in 1962 in a refugee camp in the Gaza town of Khan Younis. He was an early member of Hamas, which was formed in 1987. He eventually led the group's security arm, which worked to purge it of informants for Israel.
Israel arrested him in the late 1980s and he admitted to killing 12 suspected collaborators, a role that earned him the nickname “The Butcher of Khan Younis.” He was sentenced to four life terms for offenses that included the killing of two Israeli soldiers, The Associated Press reported.
A prison leader Sinwar organized strikes in prison to improve working conditions. He also studied Hebrew and Israeli society.
He survived brain cancer in 2008 after being treated by Israeli doctors.
Sinwar was among more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released in 2011 by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as part of an exchange for an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in a cross-border raid.
When Sinwar returned to Gaza, he quickly rose through Hamas' leadership ranks with a reputation for ruthlessness. He is widely believed to be behind the 2016 killing of another top Hamas commander, Mahmoud Ishtewi, in an internal power struggle.
Sinwar became head of Hamas in Gaza, effectively putting him in control of the territory, and worked with Haniyeh to align the group with Iran and its proxies around the region while also building the group's military capabilities.
There is widespread evidence that Sinwar, along with Mohammed Deif, the head of Hamas’ armed wing, engineered the surprise Oct. 7 attack on Israel.
The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor sought arrest warrants in May for Sinwar, Deif and Haniyeh for their alleged roles in the attack.
Israel said it killed Deif in a strike in July, while Hamas says he is still alive.
Where would this leave Hamas? Sinwar has been in hiding since the attack, and cease-fire negotiators have said it can take several days to send and receive messages from him.
Even before becoming Hamas' top leader, Sinwar was believed to have the final word on any deal to release hostages held by the militant group. Some 100 hostages remain in Gaza, around a third of whom are believed to be dead.
It's unclear who would replace Sinwar, and what that might mean for the cease-fire efforts, which sputtered to a halt in August after months of negotiations brokered by the United States, Egypt and Qatar.

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Lessons from Iran Missile Attacks for Defending against China's Advanced Arsenal

A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
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Lessons from Iran Missile Attacks for Defending against China's Advanced Arsenal

A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu
A transport vehicle carrying missiles and various munitions is seen at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan October 14, 2024. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu

Iran's missile barrage this month against Israel, after a similar large-scale attack in April, shows the value, as well as the shortcomings, of US and allied missile defenses in a potential Indo-Pacific conflict with China, analysts say.
Although differences between the two scenarios limit the lessons that can be learnt, the nearly 400 missiles of different types that Iran has fired at Israel this year offer the United States and China some idea of what works and what does not.
For Washington, the main takeaway from Iran's Oct. 1 attacks - the largest sample yet of ballistic missiles fired against modern defenses - could be that Beijing's missiles would be more difficult to intercept than Iran's and that the ability to strike back would be needed to deter a mass attack, said Collin Koh of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
"If we look purely through the lenses of deterrence, no longer can one pin hopes on deterrence by denial only - that is, the hope that effective defenses can blunt the efficacy of missile strikes," Koh said. "Deterrence by punishment might have to become normative going forward."
There is no immediate threat of missile conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. The distances, thousands of kilometers, are greater than in the Middle East. China's weapons are more advanced, including maneuvering warheads and precision guidance. And the target areas are scattered across the region, making a massed attack more difficult.
China's military launched a new round of war games near Taiwan on Monday, saying it was a warning to the "separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces". A Taiwan security source said there were so signs so far of any missile launches.
The United States has developed and deployed new weapons in the region this year to counter China, including the AIM-174B air-to-air missile and the ground-based Typhon missile battery in the Philippines, which can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles.
The US Indo-Pacific Command and China's Ministry of Defense did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
CHINA'S MISSILES LONGER-RANGE, LESS ACCURATE
On the other hand, simply being better informed about how offensive and defensive systems perform after Iran's missile fusillades - many were intercepted - may reduce the chance of conflict, said Ankit Panda of the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"Any military force planning long-range missile strikes will need to plan around the possible effects of missile defenses," Panda said. "Of course, without clarity on how well a given missile defense system might perform, this could lead to massive escalation."
Israel's layered air and missile defenses - from its long-range Arrow systems to the Iron Dome shield meant to handle slower, less complex threats - are tailored to the threats it faces: guided ballistic missiles from powers such as Iran mixed with unguided rockets launched from just over Israel's borders.
The picture is much different in the Indo-Pacific region for the US and its allies, which use the Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Patriot, THAAD and sea-based Aegis systems for missile defense.
The accuracy of China's DF-26, its most numerous conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile, is estimated to be as good as 150 m (500 feet), according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Missile Defense Project. Its DF-21 is shorter-ranged, though some variants have an accuracy of 50 m.
Both can hit most US and allied targets in the region. The DF-26 can reach Guam, the site of major US military facilities. The Pentagon has estimated that China may have several hundred of the missiles.
By contrast, Iran's missiles such as the Fattah-1 are theoretically more accurate - within tens of meters - but are much shorter-ranged. The number of these newer missiles is not public, but US Air Force General Kenneth McKenzie told Congress last year that Iran had more than 3,000 ballistic missiles of all types.
China's capabilities outstrip Iran's in other ways, said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Missile attacks would most likely be coordinated with anti-satellite strikes and cyberwarfare, both designed to complicate defense.
"Western (integrated air and missile defense) systems in the Indo-Pacific would have a much tougher time defeating a large Chinese missile strike, comprising hundreds or even thousands of missiles, compared to what the Iranians are capable of," Davis said.