عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

Who is Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar?

(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)
(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)
TT
TT

Who is Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar?

(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)
(FILES) Yahya Sinwar attends the opening of a new mosque in Rafah town in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24, 2017. (Photo by SAID KHATIB / AFP)

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel that triggered the war in Gaza, has been killed in a military operation.
His death would be a significant moment in Israel's yearlong offensive against the militant group and could complicate efforts to release dozens of hostages held in Gaza.
Sinwar became the head of Hamas after the killing of the previous leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in an explosion in Iran in July that was widely blamed on Israel.
Some things to know about Sinwar:
From refugee camp to Hamas militant Sinwar was born in 1962 in a refugee camp in the Gaza town of Khan Younis. He was an early member of Hamas, which was formed in 1987. He eventually led the group's security arm, which worked to purge it of informants for Israel.
Israel arrested him in the late 1980s and he admitted to killing 12 suspected collaborators, a role that earned him the nickname “The Butcher of Khan Younis.” He was sentenced to four life terms for offenses that included the killing of two Israeli soldiers, The Associated Press reported.
A prison leader Sinwar organized strikes in prison to improve working conditions. He also studied Hebrew and Israeli society.
He survived brain cancer in 2008 after being treated by Israeli doctors.
Sinwar was among more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released in 2011 by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as part of an exchange for an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in a cross-border raid.
When Sinwar returned to Gaza, he quickly rose through Hamas' leadership ranks with a reputation for ruthlessness. He is widely believed to be behind the 2016 killing of another top Hamas commander, Mahmoud Ishtewi, in an internal power struggle.
Sinwar became head of Hamas in Gaza, effectively putting him in control of the territory, and worked with Haniyeh to align the group with Iran and its proxies around the region while also building the group's military capabilities.
There is widespread evidence that Sinwar, along with Mohammed Deif, the head of Hamas’ armed wing, engineered the surprise Oct. 7 attack on Israel.
The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor sought arrest warrants in May for Sinwar, Deif and Haniyeh for their alleged roles in the attack.
Israel said it killed Deif in a strike in July, while Hamas says he is still alive.
Where would this leave Hamas? Sinwar has been in hiding since the attack, and cease-fire negotiators have said it can take several days to send and receive messages from him.
Even before becoming Hamas' top leader, Sinwar was believed to have the final word on any deal to release hostages held by the militant group. Some 100 hostages remain in Gaza, around a third of whom are believed to be dead.
It's unclear who would replace Sinwar, and what that might mean for the cease-fire efforts, which sputtered to a halt in August after months of negotiations brokered by the United States, Egypt and Qatar.

Most Viewed

 
 
Features

Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
TT
TT

Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)

The UN nuclear agency has confirmed that Iran plans to install around 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to a report seen by AFP on Friday.

“Iran informed the Agency that it intended to feed” around 6,000 centrifuges at its sites in Fordo and Natanz to enrich uranium to up to five percent, higher than the 3.67 percent limit Tehran had agreed to in 2015.

The Iranian decision came in response to a resolution adopted on November 21 by the UN nuclear watchdog that censures Tehran for what the agency called lack of cooperation.

On Thursday, Iran had threatened to end its ban on acquiring nuclear weapons if Western sanctions are reimposed.

The country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said in an interview that the nuclear debate inside Iran is likely to shift towards the possession of its own weapons if the west goes ahead with a threat to reimpose all UN sanctions,

What are centrifuges?

They are precise devices with cylinders that rotate much faster than the speed of sound, to collect enriched uranium atoms.

To explain how centrifugation works, rotating cylinders are much like medical laboratory equipment used to test blood.

The high rotation speeds exert a rotational force that separates the various components of blood as a function of their density and quantity in the sample.

In the case of uranium, the centrifuge operates using the familiar principle of centrifugal force. This force separates two gases of unequal masses in a spinning cylinder or tube. The heavier uranium-238 isotope collects at the outer edges of the cylinder while the lighter uranium-235 collects near the axis of rotation at the center.

Around 20 kg of uranium enriched to a 90% purity level would be needed for a single nuclear weapon. It would take about 1,500 SWU to produce a weapon-equivalent of 90 percent-enriched uranium from this enriched uranium.

At Fordo, Iran is currently using the two only operating cascades of IR-6 centrifuges there to enrich to 60% from 20%.

There are 1,044 centrifuges active at the Fordo uranium enrichment plant, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian said.

He had earlier asked the Iran Atomic Energy Agency to begin inserting uranium gas into newly activated advanced centrifuges.

Early this month, a spokesperson for the US State Department said Iran's expansion of uranium enrichment activities in defiance of key nuclear commitments is "a big step in the wrong direction”.

His statement came after Tehran announced it would start injecting uranium gas into centrifuges at Fordo.

Dispute

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 2015 between Tehran and Western countries, says advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment could operate until January 2027.

The difference between the first generation of centrifuges (IR-1) and the other generations is speed. The latest generation, IR-6, could enrich uranium up to 10 times faster than the first-generation IR-1, according to Iranian officials.

During the heyday of its nuclear program, Iran operated a total of 10,204 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordo facilities. But under the deal, Iran's commitments included operating no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for a period of 10 years.

Although the centrifuges that Iran installed before the 2015 nuclear deal were of the first generation, Tehran’s recent uranium enrichment activity at nuclear sites has reached disturbingly advanced levels, potentially increasing the nuclear proliferation risk.

Major centrifuge activities in Iran

May 2008: Iran installed several centrifuges including more modern models.

March 2012: Iranian media announced 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz.

August 2012: The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had installed large parts of the centrifuges at Fordo.

November 2012: An IAEA report confirmed that all advanced centrifuges had been installed at Fordo, although there were only four working centrifuges, and another four fully equipped, vacuum tested, and ready to go.

February 2013: IAEA says Iran has operated 12,699 IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz site.

June 2018: Iran’s supreme leader revealed Tuesday that it ultimately wants 190,000 nuclear centrifuges — a figure 30 times higher than world powers allowed under the 2015 deal.

September 2019: Iran mounted 22 IR-4, one IR-5, 30 IR-6, and three IR-6 for testing, outside the treaty boundaries.

September 2019: Iran announced it started operating advanced and fast centrifuges to enrich uranium.

November 2024: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announces that his country will operate several thousand advanced centrifuges.

November 2024: Iranian state television broadcasts AEOI Chief Mohammad Eslami announcing that “gasification of a few thousands of new generation centrifuges has been started.”