North Korea Boasts of ‘The World’s Strongest’ Missile, but Experts Say It’s Too Big to Use in War

A view shows what they say is a "Hwasong-19" missile being launched at an undisclosed location in this screengrab obtained from a video released on November 1, 2024. (KRT/via Reuters TV/Handout via Reuters)
A view shows what they say is a "Hwasong-19" missile being launched at an undisclosed location in this screengrab obtained from a video released on November 1, 2024. (KRT/via Reuters TV/Handout via Reuters)
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North Korea Boasts of ‘The World’s Strongest’ Missile, but Experts Say It’s Too Big to Use in War

A view shows what they say is a "Hwasong-19" missile being launched at an undisclosed location in this screengrab obtained from a video released on November 1, 2024. (KRT/via Reuters TV/Handout via Reuters)
A view shows what they say is a "Hwasong-19" missile being launched at an undisclosed location in this screengrab obtained from a video released on November 1, 2024. (KRT/via Reuters TV/Handout via Reuters)

North Korea boasted Friday that the new intercontinental ballistic missile it just test-launched is "the world’s strongest," a claim seen as pure propaganda after experts assessed it as being too big to be useful in a war situation.

The ICBM launched Thursday flew higher and for a longer duration than any other weapon North Korea has tested. But foreign experts say the test failed to show North Korea has mastered some of the last remaining technological hurdles to possess functioning ICBMs that can strike the mainland US.

The North’s Korean Central News Agency identified the missile as a Hwasong-19 and called it "the world’s strongest strategic missile" and "the perfected weapon system." The official media outlet said leader Kim Jong Un observed the launch, describing it as an expression of North Korea’s resolve to respond to external threats to North Korea’s security.

The color and shape of the exhaust flames seen in North Korean state media photos of the launch suggest the missile uses preloaded solid fuel, which makes weapons more agile and harder to detect than liquid propellants that in general must be fueled beforehand.

But experts say the photos show the ICBM and its launch vehicle are both oversized, raising a serious question about their wartime mobility and survivability.

"When missiles get bigger, what happens? The vehicles get larger, too. As the transporter-erector launchers get bigger, their mobility decreases," Lee Sangmin, an expert at South Korea’s Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

The Hwasong-19 was estimated to be at least 28 meters long (92 feet) while advanced US and Russian ICBMs are less than 20 meters long (66 feet), said Chang Young-keun, a missile expert at Seoul’s Korea Research Institute for National Strategy. He suggested that the missile's size likely helped South Korean intelligence authorities detect the launch plan in advance.

"In the event of a conflict, such an exposure makes the weapon a target of a preemptive attack by opponents so there would be a big issue of survivability," Chang said.

Lee Illwoo, an expert with the Korea Defense Network in South Korea, said North Korea may have developed a larger missile to carry bigger and more destructive warheads or multi-warheads. If that's the case, Lee said North Korea could have used liquid fuels as they generate higher thrust than solid fuels. He said some advanced liquid propellants can be stored in missiles for a few weeks before liftoffs.

Lee said North Korea may have placed a dummy, empty warhead on the Hwasong-19 to make it fly higher.

In recent years, North Korea has reported steady advancement in its efforts to obtain nuclear-tipped missiles. Many foreign experts believe North Korea likely has missiles that can deliver nuclear strikes on all of South Korea, but it has yet to possess nuclear missiles that can strike the mainland US.

The hurdles it has yet to overcome, according to experts, include ensuring its warheads survive the heat and stress of atmospheric reentry, improving the guidance systems for the missiles, and being able to use multiple warheads on a single missile to defeat missile defenses.

"Acquiring reentry technology is currently the most important goal in North Korea’s missile development, specifically for ICBMs, but they just keep increasing the ranges instead. This possibly suggests they still lack confidence in their reentry technology," Lee Sangmin said.

Chang said Friday's state media dispatch on the launch lacks details on the technological aspects of the Hawsong-19 and focused on publicity.

Other North Korean claims about its weapons capabilities have been met with wide outside skepticism.

In June, North Korea claimed to have tested a multiwarhead missile in the first known launch of such a weapon, but South Korea said the weapon instead blew up. In July, when North Korea said it had test-fired a new tactical ballistic missile capable of carrying "a super-large warhead," South Korea said the claim was an attempt to conceal a botched launch.

North Korea's missile program is still a major regional security concern, with the country openly threatening to use its nuclear missiles against its rivals. In a joint statement Thursday, the foreign ministers of South Korea, the US and Japan condemned the ICBM launch as a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and said they're committed to strengthening their efforts to block North Korea's illicit revenue generation funding its missile and nuclear programs.

South Korea's Foreign Ministry said Friday it has imposed unilateral sanctions on 11 North Korean individuals and four organizations for their alleged roles in procuring missile components and generating foreign currency to fund Pyongyang’s weapons program. The sanctions are largely symbolic given that financial transactions between the Koreas have been suspended for years.

Also Friday, South Korea and the US conducted their first-ever joint live-fire exercise using unmanned aerial vehicles as part of efforts to demonstrate their readiness. South Korea’s RQ-4B "Global Hawk" reconnaissance aircraft and the US MQ-9 Reaper strike drone were mobilized for the training, according to South Korea's air force. South Korea and the US have been expanding their regular military drills to cope with North Korea’s evolving nuclear threats.

Observers say that Thursday's launch, the North's first ICBM test in almost a year, was largely meant to grab American attention days before the US presidential election and respond to international condemnation over North Korea's reported dispatch of troops to Russia to support its war against Ukraine.

North Korea's reported troop dispatch highlights the expanding military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. South Korea. The US and others worry North Korea might seek high-tech, sensitive Russian technology to perfect its nuclear and missile programs in return for joining the Russian-Ukraine war.



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
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Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.