Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
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Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)

The UN nuclear agency has confirmed that Iran plans to install around 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to a report seen by AFP on Friday.

“Iran informed the Agency that it intended to feed” around 6,000 centrifuges at its sites in Fordo and Natanz to enrich uranium to up to five percent, higher than the 3.67 percent limit Tehran had agreed to in 2015.

The Iranian decision came in response to a resolution adopted on November 21 by the UN nuclear watchdog that censures Tehran for what the agency called lack of cooperation.

On Thursday, Iran had threatened to end its ban on acquiring nuclear weapons if Western sanctions are reimposed.

The country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said in an interview that the nuclear debate inside Iran is likely to shift towards the possession of its own weapons if the west goes ahead with a threat to reimpose all UN sanctions,

What are centrifuges?

They are precise devices with cylinders that rotate much faster than the speed of sound, to collect enriched uranium atoms.

To explain how centrifugation works, rotating cylinders are much like medical laboratory equipment used to test blood.

The high rotation speeds exert a rotational force that separates the various components of blood as a function of their density and quantity in the sample.

In the case of uranium, the centrifuge operates using the familiar principle of centrifugal force. This force separates two gases of unequal masses in a spinning cylinder or tube. The heavier uranium-238 isotope collects at the outer edges of the cylinder while the lighter uranium-235 collects near the axis of rotation at the center.

Around 20 kg of uranium enriched to a 90% purity level would be needed for a single nuclear weapon. It would take about 1,500 SWU to produce a weapon-equivalent of 90 percent-enriched uranium from this enriched uranium.

At Fordo, Iran is currently using the two only operating cascades of IR-6 centrifuges there to enrich to 60% from 20%.

There are 1,044 centrifuges active at the Fordo uranium enrichment plant, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian said.

He had earlier asked the Iran Atomic Energy Agency to begin inserting uranium gas into newly activated advanced centrifuges.

Early this month, a spokesperson for the US State Department said Iran's expansion of uranium enrichment activities in defiance of key nuclear commitments is "a big step in the wrong direction”.

His statement came after Tehran announced it would start injecting uranium gas into centrifuges at Fordo.

Dispute

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 2015 between Tehran and Western countries, says advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment could operate until January 2027.

The difference between the first generation of centrifuges (IR-1) and the other generations is speed. The latest generation, IR-6, could enrich uranium up to 10 times faster than the first-generation IR-1, according to Iranian officials.

During the heyday of its nuclear program, Iran operated a total of 10,204 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordo facilities. But under the deal, Iran's commitments included operating no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for a period of 10 years.

Although the centrifuges that Iran installed before the 2015 nuclear deal were of the first generation, Tehran’s recent uranium enrichment activity at nuclear sites has reached disturbingly advanced levels, potentially increasing the nuclear proliferation risk.

Major centrifuge activities in Iran

May 2008: Iran installed several centrifuges including more modern models.

March 2012: Iranian media announced 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz.

August 2012: The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had installed large parts of the centrifuges at Fordo.

November 2012: An IAEA report confirmed that all advanced centrifuges had been installed at Fordo, although there were only four working centrifuges, and another four fully equipped, vacuum tested, and ready to go.

February 2013: IAEA says Iran has operated 12,699 IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz site.

June 2018: Iran’s supreme leader revealed Tuesday that it ultimately wants 190,000 nuclear centrifuges — a figure 30 times higher than world powers allowed under the 2015 deal.

September 2019: Iran mounted 22 IR-4, one IR-5, 30 IR-6, and three IR-6 for testing, outside the treaty boundaries.

September 2019: Iran announced it started operating advanced and fast centrifuges to enrich uranium.

November 2024: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announces that his country will operate several thousand advanced centrifuges.

November 2024: Iranian state television broadcasts AEOI Chief Mohammad Eslami announcing that “gasification of a few thousands of new generation centrifuges has been started.”



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.