Is There US-Turkish-Russian Coordination to Distance Assad from Iran?

An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).
An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).
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Is There US-Turkish-Russian Coordination to Distance Assad from Iran?

An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).
An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).

There has been widespread speculation on the escalating conflict in Syria, as observers attempt to understand its causes, implications, and the US position. The recent, unexpected offensive launched by Syrian opposition groups—led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is designated a terrorist organization by Washington—has significantly reshaped the Syrian civil war. The timing is particularly noteworthy, as the offensive began just two days after a ceasefire was announced in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah.

While some analysts suggest Türkiye may be behind the opposition’s assault, they also note a perceived laissez-faire attitude from the administration of President Joe Biden. This approach may serve multiple objectives: exerting pressure on Iran and Russia, influencing the incoming Trump administration, ensuring US forces remain in northeastern Syria, and maintaining protection for Kurdish forces against potential Turkish aggression, should political negotiations in Syria fail.

Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, asserts that Syria’s civil war “never truly ended.” It has persisted at a lower intensity, with the Bashar Assad regime continuing its attacks on civilians with support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. However, the renewed fighting complicates the situation for Kurdish fighters, another group opposing Assad, who have controlled parts of Aleppo. Reports indicate that these fighters began evacuating the region by bus on Monday.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Katulis argues that the primary driver of recent developments is internal, as sustainable stability has never been achieved. Opposition forces have exploited systemic weaknesses in the regime—such as corruption, stagnation, and a lack of political legitimacy—to reorganize. He emphasizes that millions of Syrians still aspire to freedom, a desire that remains unchanged despite ongoing challenges.

While external players like Türkiye, Russia, and Iran are significant, Katulis believes the central issue lies in Syria’s internal divisions and the power struggles among competing factions.

The US Position on Assad

Despite the renewed turmoil, the US stance on Assad has remained consistent for over a decade. A State Department spokesperson recently reiterated that while the US acknowledges Assad’s loss of credibility, removing him from power is not a priority. Nor does Washington actively support the opposition factions.

According to The New York Times, US and Gulf states, along with Israel, have previously extended proposals to Assad, urging him to sever his key regional alliances with Hezbollah and Iran. However, the ongoing offensive by opposition factions may derail these efforts. The report suggests that Assad is likely to double down on his reliance on Iran and its allies for survival.

Despite these challenges, sources in Washington have hinted at potential shifts on the ground. They suggest that Assad might now be more receptive to proposals for distancing himself from Iran. Reports indicate preliminary negotiations between Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reportedly brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

According to these sources, recent Russian military support to defend Hama underscores Moscow’s commitment to preserving Assad’s regime. Simultaneously, discussions are underway to secure the withdrawal of armed factions from Aleppo—potentially before or shortly after Trump assumes office. These plans reportedly include neutralizing non-Syrian fighters within opposition factions, integrating Syrian fighters into a Ministry of Defense-controlled corps under Turkish and Russian guarantees, and paving the way for Iran’s eventual exclusion from Syria.

Türkiye’s involvement, whether direct or tacit, aligns with its tactical goals of expanding its influence in the Syrian conflict. Analysts suggest Ankara may be leveraging the transitional period between the Biden and Trump administrations to strike at Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. This follows Israeli efforts to weaken Hezbollah and Iran, coupled with Russia’s distraction due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently highlighted Assad’s refusal to engage in any meaningful political process. He noted that the opposition factions’ advances underscore vulnerabilities among Assad’s backers, including Russia and Iran.

Meanwhile, Kurdish forces—long viewed as adversaries by Türkiye—reportedly had no option but to accept safe passage to northeastern Syria, where they have participated in US-led operations against ISIS over the past decade.

As opposition factions approach Hama, the regime’s response to the Aleppo offensive signals a potential resurgence of civil war. This shift complicates US efforts to turn the page on Syria’s conflict, an initiative that has yet to produce tangible results.



Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot

Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot

Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the first ten years of the current century were disastrous in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak had aged and lost interest in governing the country.

Mubarak and Hereditary Rule

Asked about Mubarak’s ties with former Presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moussa said: “Mubarak believed that what Anwar Sadat had done was right. And he used to love Abdel Nasser a lot.”

Asharq Al-Awsat asked him if the end of Mubarak’s term was painful. Moussa replied: “Yes of course. He wasn’t as bad as pictured. This man was a patriot and knew what he was doing. He wasn’t at all naïve.”

“The issue that his son could become his heir was not accepted by anyone ... Mubarak did not want for his son to rule Egypt, which is not an easy task. It’s a huge and very complicated country, and the presidency requires a lot of experience,” Moussa said.

Mubarak Loved Elegance and Joking

Was Mubarak interested in his personal elegance? Moussa replied: "Yes. He knew what to wear with what, and he valued elegance greatly.”

“He also had a way of looking at people, and he was often right about that.”

"He was Egyptian par excellence. He loved sarcasm and listening to jokes. He would laugh very energetically and loudly when something amused him, surrounded by a group of humorous people. And then, suddenly, the president would return,” said Moussa.

"He used to wake up early and sit in a pleasant little kiosk in the garden, reading the newspapers and the reports sent to him by various agencies, taking his time. After finishing, he would be fully briefed on many different matters."

Policymaker

Moussa had sometimes implied that he was a policymaker, not just an executor of policies. “First of all, the Foreign Minister must be one of the policy makers ... If he is merely an executor, then he will have no role in the history of diplomacy or in politics, nor will he have the influence that a Foreign Minister is supposed to have like taking initiative, thinking, and acting quickly,” said Moussa.

“This, in my opinion, was the case. However, I cannot claim that I was one of the makers of Egyptian policy. But I certainly contributed to many political steps and political thinking. For example, what were the priorities? A priority was to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This was the work of Egyptian diplomacy, which I headed, and I was committed to this issue.”

Advice to Assad on Lebanon Pullout

Asked if Mubarak had advised Syrian President Bashar Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Moussa said: "I don’t know, I was Arab League Secretary General back then. I advised.”

But Moussa said that when he went to Beirut to offer his condolences to the Hariri family, he visited Damascus to meet with Assad. “I asked him if he was ready to withdraw the Syrian army. He said: Yes,” according to Moussa, who also said Assad clearly stated that the Arab League chief can officially announce the Syrian stance to the media.

Yet, as soon as he returned to Cairo, the Syrian government spokesman denied Moussa’s claim that Assad had promised a pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The regime later retracted his statement.

Asked about the reasons for Hariri’s assassination, Moussa said that the former prime minister was “bigger than Lebanon. He was a huge Arab personality that could have met the president of the United States and of France anytime he wanted.”

Moussa confirmed that Hariri had complained to him about Syria’s relationship with him.