Hamas’ Management of the Hostage Crisis: Time Works Against the Deal

A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
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Hamas’ Management of the Hostage Crisis: Time Works Against the Deal

A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN

After more than 420 days of the most devastating war in Palestinian history, the people of Gaza, who have lost their land, lives, homes, and loved ones, still struggle to understand what exactly happened. What did Hamas aim to achieve with its surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023? The offensive reshaped the region and opened the gates to war and sweeping changes.

The only clear outcome so far is that Gaza has become unlivable. The survivors, who have lost nearly 50,000 people in the ongoing war and seen over 100,000 wounded, are left with indescribable pain.

If the residents of Gaza—and perhaps those in the West Bank, Lebanon, and other areas—are uncertain about Hamas’ intentions, they at least hope that the results, no matter how delayed, will be proportional to the losses. The only compensation for such sacrifices, they believe, would be the establishment of a state. But did Hamas genuinely seek statehood?

Hamas claims the attack marked the start of a liberation campaign. However, it focused on certain key issues: addressing the “stagnation” in the Israeli prisoner file, protesting repeated Israeli security force violations against Palestinian detainees, and countering increased aggression in Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as escalating settlement activity.

Hamas has also stated it aimed to preemptively strike to deny Israel the chance to surprise Gaza and to bring the Palestinian cause back to global attention.

A Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat: “These were valid and sufficient reasons for the movement to launch the attack, but the plan spiraled out of control.”

“The primary goal was to capture Israeli soldiers and broker a historic prisoner exchange deal. The other reasons were secondary. Even the main planners did not expect the Israeli forces to collapse so quickly, which allowed more resistance fighters to push into other areas within a short period. This expanded the scope of the operation beyond what was originally planned,” the source added.

Since its establishment in the late 1980s, Hamas has been fixated on liberating Palestinian prisoners through force.

In the early 1990s, shortly after its founding, Hamas managed to kidnap soldiers in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, killing them without negotiation. In 1994, Hamas operatives abducted a soldier in Ramallah, broadcasted images and messages, and demanded a prisoner swap before Israeli forces raided the location, killing everyone inside.

Over the past few decades, Hamas has persistently pursued this goal, culminating in the 2006 abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit near Gaza. Shalit was held until 2011 when a major exchange deal freed him in return for 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including Yahya Sinwar, who later spearheaded the October 7 attack to secure the release of remaining prisoners.

Hamas remains the only group to have successfully kidnapped Israelis inside Palestinian territories, unlike others who managed such operations abroad.

A Hamas source stated: “The movement’s leadership, particularly its political bureau chief Yahya Sinwar, has always prioritized the prisoner issue, seizing every opportunity to release as many as possible.”

“Sinwar had promised his comrades upon his release in the Shalit deal to secure their freedom,” the source added.

Indeed, Sinwar had sought a deal for four captives held by Hamas: soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, captured in 2014, along with Avraham Mengistu, who crossed the Gaza border that same year, and Hisham al-Sayed, who also infiltrated from the border.

Hamas’ Tactics Before and After

Between 2014 and 2023, Hamas tried every strategy, proposing comprehensive deals and humanitarian exchanges and pressuring Israel by releasing videos of captives. Before the war, Hamas released a video of Mengistu, in which he said: “I am Avera Mengistu, the prisoner. How long will I remain in captivity with my friends? Where are the state of Israel and its people regarding our fate?”

Hamas has consistently used video releases to pressure Israel into prisoner swaps, a tactic it amplified during the current war. Over the past year, the group released multiple videos of Israeli captives to exert pressure on both the Israeli government and the families of detainees.

Most recently, Hamas released footage of dual US-Israeli citizen Aidan Alexander, who appealed to President-elect Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to negotiate his release and that of others in a prisoner exchange deal. Alexander warned that his Hamas captors had received new instructions if Israeli forces reached them, implying the possibility of his execution. He urged Israelis to protest daily to pressure their government to agree to a deal and end the war in Gaza.

Hamas’ latest video claims that 33 captives were killed and others went missing due to decisions made by Netanyahu and the Israeli army. It warned that continuing the war might lead to the permanent loss of captives.

A movement insider remarked: “When efforts for a deal failed, Hamas resorted to military action on October 7 to revive the issue.” However, the results were far from what Hamas had hoped for.

Most observers believe Hamas initially planned to capture a limited number of Israelis, forcing Israel into a short conflict that would result in a prisoner exchange, similar to the Shalit operation.

But the flood Hamas unleashed instead brought catastrophe upon Gaza, which has been devastated and paid an exorbitant price far exceeding its intended objectives.

A Growing Debate

Voices in Gaza are increasingly questioning whether the release of prisoners justifies the immense destruction. Many argue that the number of casualties now far exceeds the number of prisoners—around 6,000 before the war.

Fared Abu Habl, a displaced Palestinian from Jabalia now in Khan Yunis, said: “All we want is for this war to stop. Nothing can compensate for the enormous price we’ve paid—not even the release of all prisoners can restore our dignity as we languish in tents with nothing to feed our children.”

He added: “Who is responsible for this? If the prisoners themselves were asked, they might sacrifice their freedom to end this bloodshed.”

However, Manal Yassin argues that Israel and Netanyahu are primarily to blame for prolonging the war, rejecting every solution Hamas has offered. She believes Hamas has shown considerable flexibility but that Israel remains unwilling to negotiate.

This debate has spilled over to social media, with many voicing frustration. Writer Mahmoud Judeh lamented on Facebook: “The situation defies logic—hunger, fear, and rain-drenched misery in Gaza. This relentless suffering for nothing but humiliation.”

Dr. Fadel Ashour noted: “Hamas’ futile persistence is costing us dearly—our blood and the flesh of our children.”

Such public debates have extended to politicians and religious figures. Sheikh Suleiman Al-Dayeh, a prominent Islamic scholar aligned with Hamas, sparked controversy by criticizing the war’s toll. While defending the October 7 attack, he acknowledged its devastating impact on Gaza and called for reflection.

His comments drew mixed reactions, with some branding him a “defeatist.”

Hamas insiders admitted that the scale of the October 7 operation exceeded expectations, particularly regarding the extent of Israel’s retaliation. They conceded that if the planners had foreseen the consequences, they might have reconsidered the operation.

Negotiating a prisoner swap with Israel now appears more complicated than Hamas anticipated. Meanwhile, Netanyahu seems intent on prolonging the war to secure his political survival. Observers suggest this strategy helps him delay his corruption trials and maintain his coalition.

Many agree that a deal becomes less likely as time drags on, leaving Gaza in ruins and its people in despair.



Who’s in the Frame to Be Lebanon’s Next President?

The Lebanese Parliament building a day before a session to elect the Lebanese president, in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 January 2025. (EPA)
The Lebanese Parliament building a day before a session to elect the Lebanese president, in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 January 2025. (EPA)
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Who’s in the Frame to Be Lebanon’s Next President?

The Lebanese Parliament building a day before a session to elect the Lebanese president, in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 January 2025. (EPA)
The Lebanese Parliament building a day before a session to elect the Lebanese president, in Beirut, Lebanon, 08 January 2025. (EPA)

Lebanon's parliament will attempt to elect a new head of state on Thursday, with officials seeing better odds of success in a political landscape shaken by Israel's assault on Hezbollah and the toppling of the group's ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

The post, reserved for a Maronite Christian in the sectarian power-sharing system, has been vacant since Michel Aoun's term ended in October 2022.

While there are always many Maronite hopefuls, including the leaders of the two largest Christian parties - Samir Geagea and Gebran Bassil - sources say the focus is currently on the following three names:

JOSEPH AOUN

General Joseph Aoun, 60, has been commander of the US-backed Lebanese army since 2017, leading the military through a devastating financial crisis that paralyzed much of the Lebanese state after the banking system collapsed in 2019.

On Aoun's watch, US aid continued to flow to the army, part of a US policy focused on supporting state institutions to curb the influence of the heavily armed, Iran-backed Hezbollah, which Washington deems a terrorist group.

Shortly after his appointment, the army waged an offensive to clear ISIS militants from an enclave at the Syrian border, drawing praise from the US ambassador at the time who said the military had done an "excellent job".

His training has included two infantry officer courses in the United States.

Lebanese politicians have said Aoun's candidacy enjoys US approval. A State Department spokesperson said it was "up to Lebanon to choose its next president, not the United States or any external actor".

Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa has said last week there was "no veto" on Aoun. But sources familiar with Hezbollah thinking say it will not support Aoun.

His candidacy has also been opposed by Lebanon's two largest Christian parties - the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement.

Three other former army chiefs - Emile Lahoud, Michel Suleiman and Michel Aoun - have served as president.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri - a Hezbollah ally - has said the constitution would need to be amended in order for Aoun to take the post. It currently forbids a serving state official from becoming head of state.

JIHAD AZOUR

Azour, 58, served as finance minister in the Western-backed government of former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora between 2005 and 2008, a period of intense political conflict in Lebanon pitting factions backed by Iran and Syria against others supported by the West.

Since 2017, he has served as Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He holds a PhD in International Finance and a post-graduate degree in International Economics and Finance, both from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris.

He first emerged as a presidential candidate in 2023, when factions including both of the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement voted for him. He received 59 votes.

Hezbollah and its closest allies voted for Suleiman Franjieh in that session - the last time parliament attempted to elect a head of state. Franjieh secured 51 votes.

Hezbollah at the time described Azour as a confrontational candidate - a reference to his role in the Siniora cabinet.

Azour said at the time that his candidacy was not intended as a challenge to anyone, but rather "a call for unity, for breaking down alignments and for a search for common ground in order to get out of the crisis".

ELIAS AL-BAYSARI

Major-General Elias Baysari, 60, has been interim head of the General Security directorate since the term of his predecessor, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, ended in 2023 with no consensus among Lebanese factions on who should replace him.

The security agency Baysari runs is Lebanon's most powerful internal security force, running Lebanon's border crossings and domestic intelligence operations.

He was a little-known figure in Lebanese public life until his promotion to the head of General Security.

He holds a PhD in law from the Lebanese University.