Hamas’ Management of the Hostage Crisis: Time Works Against the Deal

A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
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Hamas’ Management of the Hostage Crisis: Time Works Against the Deal

A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN
A blimp-shaped balloon launched by families and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, flies over the prime minister's office, in Jerusalem, 02 December 2024. EPA/ABIR SULTAN

After more than 420 days of the most devastating war in Palestinian history, the people of Gaza, who have lost their land, lives, homes, and loved ones, still struggle to understand what exactly happened. What did Hamas aim to achieve with its surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023? The offensive reshaped the region and opened the gates to war and sweeping changes.

The only clear outcome so far is that Gaza has become unlivable. The survivors, who have lost nearly 50,000 people in the ongoing war and seen over 100,000 wounded, are left with indescribable pain.

If the residents of Gaza—and perhaps those in the West Bank, Lebanon, and other areas—are uncertain about Hamas’ intentions, they at least hope that the results, no matter how delayed, will be proportional to the losses. The only compensation for such sacrifices, they believe, would be the establishment of a state. But did Hamas genuinely seek statehood?

Hamas claims the attack marked the start of a liberation campaign. However, it focused on certain key issues: addressing the “stagnation” in the Israeli prisoner file, protesting repeated Israeli security force violations against Palestinian detainees, and countering increased aggression in Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as escalating settlement activity.

Hamas has also stated it aimed to preemptively strike to deny Israel the chance to surprise Gaza and to bring the Palestinian cause back to global attention.

A Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat: “These were valid and sufficient reasons for the movement to launch the attack, but the plan spiraled out of control.”

“The primary goal was to capture Israeli soldiers and broker a historic prisoner exchange deal. The other reasons were secondary. Even the main planners did not expect the Israeli forces to collapse so quickly, which allowed more resistance fighters to push into other areas within a short period. This expanded the scope of the operation beyond what was originally planned,” the source added.

Since its establishment in the late 1980s, Hamas has been fixated on liberating Palestinian prisoners through force.

In the early 1990s, shortly after its founding, Hamas managed to kidnap soldiers in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, killing them without negotiation. In 1994, Hamas operatives abducted a soldier in Ramallah, broadcasted images and messages, and demanded a prisoner swap before Israeli forces raided the location, killing everyone inside.

Over the past few decades, Hamas has persistently pursued this goal, culminating in the 2006 abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit near Gaza. Shalit was held until 2011 when a major exchange deal freed him in return for 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including Yahya Sinwar, who later spearheaded the October 7 attack to secure the release of remaining prisoners.

Hamas remains the only group to have successfully kidnapped Israelis inside Palestinian territories, unlike others who managed such operations abroad.

A Hamas source stated: “The movement’s leadership, particularly its political bureau chief Yahya Sinwar, has always prioritized the prisoner issue, seizing every opportunity to release as many as possible.”

“Sinwar had promised his comrades upon his release in the Shalit deal to secure their freedom,” the source added.

Indeed, Sinwar had sought a deal for four captives held by Hamas: soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, captured in 2014, along with Avraham Mengistu, who crossed the Gaza border that same year, and Hisham al-Sayed, who also infiltrated from the border.

Hamas’ Tactics Before and After

Between 2014 and 2023, Hamas tried every strategy, proposing comprehensive deals and humanitarian exchanges and pressuring Israel by releasing videos of captives. Before the war, Hamas released a video of Mengistu, in which he said: “I am Avera Mengistu, the prisoner. How long will I remain in captivity with my friends? Where are the state of Israel and its people regarding our fate?”

Hamas has consistently used video releases to pressure Israel into prisoner swaps, a tactic it amplified during the current war. Over the past year, the group released multiple videos of Israeli captives to exert pressure on both the Israeli government and the families of detainees.

Most recently, Hamas released footage of dual US-Israeli citizen Aidan Alexander, who appealed to President-elect Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to negotiate his release and that of others in a prisoner exchange deal. Alexander warned that his Hamas captors had received new instructions if Israeli forces reached them, implying the possibility of his execution. He urged Israelis to protest daily to pressure their government to agree to a deal and end the war in Gaza.

Hamas’ latest video claims that 33 captives were killed and others went missing due to decisions made by Netanyahu and the Israeli army. It warned that continuing the war might lead to the permanent loss of captives.

A movement insider remarked: “When efforts for a deal failed, Hamas resorted to military action on October 7 to revive the issue.” However, the results were far from what Hamas had hoped for.

Most observers believe Hamas initially planned to capture a limited number of Israelis, forcing Israel into a short conflict that would result in a prisoner exchange, similar to the Shalit operation.

But the flood Hamas unleashed instead brought catastrophe upon Gaza, which has been devastated and paid an exorbitant price far exceeding its intended objectives.

A Growing Debate

Voices in Gaza are increasingly questioning whether the release of prisoners justifies the immense destruction. Many argue that the number of casualties now far exceeds the number of prisoners—around 6,000 before the war.

Fared Abu Habl, a displaced Palestinian from Jabalia now in Khan Yunis, said: “All we want is for this war to stop. Nothing can compensate for the enormous price we’ve paid—not even the release of all prisoners can restore our dignity as we languish in tents with nothing to feed our children.”

He added: “Who is responsible for this? If the prisoners themselves were asked, they might sacrifice their freedom to end this bloodshed.”

However, Manal Yassin argues that Israel and Netanyahu are primarily to blame for prolonging the war, rejecting every solution Hamas has offered. She believes Hamas has shown considerable flexibility but that Israel remains unwilling to negotiate.

This debate has spilled over to social media, with many voicing frustration. Writer Mahmoud Judeh lamented on Facebook: “The situation defies logic—hunger, fear, and rain-drenched misery in Gaza. This relentless suffering for nothing but humiliation.”

Dr. Fadel Ashour noted: “Hamas’ futile persistence is costing us dearly—our blood and the flesh of our children.”

Such public debates have extended to politicians and religious figures. Sheikh Suleiman Al-Dayeh, a prominent Islamic scholar aligned with Hamas, sparked controversy by criticizing the war’s toll. While defending the October 7 attack, he acknowledged its devastating impact on Gaza and called for reflection.

His comments drew mixed reactions, with some branding him a “defeatist.”

Hamas insiders admitted that the scale of the October 7 operation exceeded expectations, particularly regarding the extent of Israel’s retaliation. They conceded that if the planners had foreseen the consequences, they might have reconsidered the operation.

Negotiating a prisoner swap with Israel now appears more complicated than Hamas anticipated. Meanwhile, Netanyahu seems intent on prolonging the war to secure his political survival. Observers suggest this strategy helps him delay his corruption trials and maintain his coalition.

Many agree that a deal becomes less likely as time drags on, leaving Gaza in ruins and its people in despair.



What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.


Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

 Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
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Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

 Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)

Earlier this month a group of Palestinian boys turned out to train at their local football pitch in the shadow of the wall separating Israel from the West Bank's Aida refugee camp -- and found a note at the gate.

The children took the ominous message from Israeli authorities to Muhannad Abu Srour, sports director at the Aida Youth Center in the camp near Bethlehem, and the news was not good.

"We were shocked to discover that it was a decision to demolish Aida camp's football field," Abu Srour told AFP, adding that more than 500 children regularly train on the field roughly half the size of a regulation soccer pitch.

"The football field is the only open space we have. If the field is taken away, the children's dream is taken away," Abu Srour said.

The planned destruction of the Aida field is one of many points of contention in the occupied West Bank, but it is a particularly painful one for young Palestinians yearning for a better future.

One of the older members, 18-year-old Abdallah al-Ansurur, hopes to make it into the national Palestinian team, and, like many other youth at Aida camp, took his first steps in the game on the pitch flanked by the eight-meter concrete Israeli wall.

"I started when I was about 13 years old. This field gave me a real opportunity to train," said Ansurur, who was born and raised in Aida camp, one of the smallest in the West Bank.

Ansurur, who trains to be a goalkeeper, calls the astroturf-covered piece of land a "lifeline".

"Without this field, I wouldn't have had this chance. If it didn't exist, we'd be playing in the streets -- or not playing at all," he said.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967 and frequently demolishes Palestinian homes or infrastructure, arguing they were built without permits.

AFP was shown the note from COGAT, the Israeli defense ministry body in charge of Palestinian civilian affairs, which says the field was not authorized.

But Anton Salman, who was mayor of adjacent Bethlehem when the field was built in 2021, told AFP the construction was legal.

Salman said his municipality leased the land from the Armenian Church authorities to whom it belongs, before allowing Aida camp's popular committee to manage it for the benefit of residents.

Saeed al-Azzeh, head of the popular committee, confirmed the information, calling the space, "the only breathing space" for camp residents.

"Today, more than 7,000 people live on the same piece of land. Streets are narrow, alleys are cramped -- there is nowhere else," Azzeh said, referring to the camp.

Like other Palestinian refugee camps, Aida was built to accommodate some of the hundreds of thousands of people who either fled their homes or were forced out during the creation of Israel in 1948.

With time, tents gave way to concrete buildings, with the football field representing one of the few open spaces in the camp's dense patchwork.

Abu Srour is proud of what came out of the field, with youth sports delegations able to travel abroad to play, a welcome escape from the West Bank's myriad restrictions.

This is because checkpoints, a fixture of the West Bank since the start of Israel's occupation, have multiplied since the start of the war in Gaza.

Abu Srour mentioned that bringing a local team to Ramallah, a city 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) away as the crow flies, took six hours recently, instead of one hour in the past.

Restricted mobility is a major issue for most Palestinian athletes as it makes it nearly impossible for athletes of similar levels from different cities to train together.

Waseem Abu Sal, who was the first Palestinian boxer to participate in the Olympics, told AFP he frequently sparred with athletes of different levels or weight categories for lack of mobility.

Taking a short break from running a practice for 50 excited five- to 10-year-old boys, coach Mahmud Jandia told AFP he hoped the field would remain.

"Yes, the wall is there -- it feels like a prison -- but despite that, the most important thing is that the field remains and the children keep playing."

"If the field is demolished, all the children's dreams will be demolished with it."