How Syria Opposition’s Stars Aligned for Assad’s Ouster

People celebrate holding a large Syrian opposition flag at Umayyad Square in Damascus on December 9, 2024. (AFP)
People celebrate holding a large Syrian opposition flag at Umayyad Square in Damascus on December 9, 2024. (AFP)
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How Syria Opposition’s Stars Aligned for Assad’s Ouster

People celebrate holding a large Syrian opposition flag at Umayyad Square in Damascus on December 9, 2024. (AFP)
People celebrate holding a large Syrian opposition flag at Umayyad Square in Damascus on December 9, 2024. (AFP)

After 13 years of civil war, Syria's opposition militias sensed an opportunity to loosen President Bashar al-Assad's grip on power when, about six months ago, they communicated to Türkiye plans for a major offensive and felt they had received its tacit approval, two sources with knowledge of the planning said.

Launched barely two weeks ago, the operation's speedy success in achieving its initial goal - seizing Syria's second city, Aleppo - took almost everybody by surprise. From there, in a little more than a week, the opposition alliance reached Damascus and on Sunday put an end to five decades of Assad family rule.

The lightning advance relied on an almost perfect alignment of stars for the forces opposed to Assad: his army was demoralized and exhausted; his main allies, Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah, were severely weakened by conflict with Israel; and his other key military supporter, Russia, was distracted and losing interest.

There was no way the anti-government fighters could go ahead without first notifying Türkiye, which has been a main backer of the Syrian opposition from the war's earliest days, said the sources, a diplomat in the region and a member of the Syrian opposition.

Türkiye has troops on the ground in northwest Syria, and provides support to some of the opposition who were intending to take part, including the Syrian National Army (SNA) - though it considers the main faction in the alliance, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to be a terror group. The opposition’s bold plan was the brainchild of HTS and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the diplomat said.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, which struck a deal with Russia in 2020 to de-escalate fighting in northwestern Syria, has long opposed such a major opposition offensive, fearing it would lead to a new wave of refugees crossing its border.

An opposition fighter sits on a truck mounted with a weapon, after the opposition seized the capital and ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, December 9, 2024. (Reuters)

However, the opposition sensed a stiffening of Ankara's stance towards Assad earlier this year, the sources said, after he rebuffed repeated overtures from Erdogan aimed at advancing a political solution to the military stalemate, which has left Syria divided between the regime and a patchwork of opposition groups with an array of foreign backers.

The Syrian opposition source said the opposition had shown Türkiye details of the planning, after Ankara's attempts to engage Assad had failed.

The message was: "That other path hasn't worked for years - so try ours. You don't have to do anything, just don't intervene." Reuters was unable to determine the exact nature of the communications.

Hadi Al-Bahra, head of the internationally-recognized Syrian opposition abroad, told Reuters last week that HTS and SNA had had "limited" planning together ahead of the operation and agreed to "achieve cooperation and not clash with each other". He added that Türkiye's military saw what the armed groups were doing and discussing.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, speaking in Doha on Sunday, said Erdogan’s effort in recent months to reach out to Assad failed and Ankara "knew something was coming".

However, Türkiye's deputy minister for foreign affairs, Nuh Yilmaz, told a conference on Middle Eastern affairs in Bahrain on Sunday that Ankara was not behind the offensive, and did not provide its consent, saying it was concerned about instability.

Türkiye's foreign and defense ministries did not respond directly to Reuters questions about an HTS-Ankara understanding about the Aleppo operation. In reply to questions about Türkiye's awareness of battlefield preparations, a Turkish official told Reuters that the HTS "does not receive orders or direction from us (and) does not coordinate its operations with us either."

The official said that "in that sense" it would not be correct to say that the operation in Aleppo was carried out with Türkiye approval or green light. Turkish intelligence agency MIT did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Reuters was unable to reach a representative for HTS.

VULNERABLE

The opposition fighters struck when Assad was at his most vulnerable.

Distracted by wars elsewhere, his military allies Russia, Iran, and Lebanon's Hezbollah failed to mobilize the kind of decisive firepower that had propped him up for years.

Syria's weak armed forces were unable to resist. A regime source told Reuters that tanks and planes were left with no fuel because of corruption and looting - an illustration of just how hollowed out the Syrian state had become.

Over the past two years morale had severely eroded in the army, said the source, who requested anonymity because of fear of retribution.

Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International, a Middle-East focused think-tank, said the HTS-led coalition was stronger and more coherent than any previous opposition force during the war, "and a lot of that is Abu Mohammed al-Golani’s doing". But, he said, the regime's weakness was the deciding factor.

"After they lost Aleppo like that, regime forces never recovered and the more the opposition advanced, the weaker Assad’s army got," he said.

The pace of the opposition advances, with Hama being captured on Dec. 5 and Homs falling on or around Sunday at the same time government forces lost Damascus, exceeded expectations.

"There was a window of opportunity but no one expected the regime to crumble this fast. Everyone expected some fight," said Bassam Al-Kuwatli, president of the Syrian Liberal Party, a small opposition group, who is based outside Syria.

A US official said on condition of anonymity that while Washington had been aware of Türkiye's overall support for the opposition, it was not informed of any tacit Turkish approval for the Aleppo offensive. The White House National Security Council did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Türkiye's role.

US President-elect Donald Trump on Sunday said that Russia's abandonment of Assad led to his downfall, adding that Moscow never should have protected him in the first place and then lost interest because of a war in Ukraine that never should have started.

Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday noted his country's role in weakening Hezbollah, which sources told Reuters withdrew its remaining troops from Syria on Saturday.

A defaced portrait of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stands in a ransacked government security facility, in Damascus, on December 8, 2024. (AFP)

GAZA FALLOUT

Sources familiar with Hezbollah deployments said the Iran-backed group, which propped up Assad early in the war, had already withdrawn many of its elite fighters from Syria over the last year to support the group as it waged hostilities with Israel - a conflict that spilled over from the Gaza war.

Israel dealt Hezbollah heavy blows, particularly after launching an offensive in September, killing the group's leader Hassan Nasrallah and many of its commanders and fighters.

The opposition offensive in Syria began the same day as a ceasefire came into effect in the Lebanon conflict on Nov. 27. The sources familiar with Hezbollah said it did not want to engage in big battles in Syria as the group focused on starting a long road to recovery from the heavy blows.

For the opposition alliance, the withdrawal of Hezbollah presented a valuable opportunity. "We just wanted a fair fight between us and the regime," the Syrian opposition source said.

Assad's fall marks a major blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East, coming so swiftly after the killing of Nasrallah and the damage done by Israel to Hezbollah.

Türkiye, on the other hand, now appears to be Syria's most powerful external player, with troops on the ground and access to the opposition leaders.

In addition to securing the return of Syrian refugees, Türkiye's objectives include curbing the power of Syrian Kurdish groups that control wide areas of northeast Syria and are backed by the United States. Ankara deems them to be terrorists.

As part of the initial offensive, the Türkiye-backed SNA seized swathes of territory, including the city of Tel Refaat, from US-backed Kurdish forces. On Sunday, a Turkish security source said the opposition entered the northern city of Manbij after pushing the Kurds back again.

"Türkiye is the biggest outside winner here. Erdogan turned out to be on the right - or at least winning - side of history here because his proxies in Syria won the day," said Birol Baskan, Türkiye-based political scientist and former non-resident scholar at Middle East Institute.



Syrians in Libya Struggle to Escape ‘Exile in Limbo’

A photo shows young Syrian men who drowned after their boat capsized off the coast of Libya. Credit: Rights activist Tarek Lamloum
A photo shows young Syrian men who drowned after their boat capsized off the coast of Libya. Credit: Rights activist Tarek Lamloum
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Syrians in Libya Struggle to Escape ‘Exile in Limbo’

A photo shows young Syrian men who drowned after their boat capsized off the coast of Libya. Credit: Rights activist Tarek Lamloum
A photo shows young Syrian men who drowned after their boat capsized off the coast of Libya. Credit: Rights activist Tarek Lamloum

About seven months ago, a group of 25 Syrian youths, including minors, set off from Libya on an irregular migration journey toward Europe. Only four made it back alive. The rest drowned in the Mediterranean.

The tragedy, which left a deep mark on Syrian communities both in Libya and abroad, has drawn renewed attention to the large and diverse Syrian population now living in the North African country, some fleeing the war in Syria under former President Bashar al-Assad, others settled there long before.

Syria’s presence in Libya is far from monolithic. It spans businessmen, migrant laborers, families who settled during the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, and former fighters now working as mercenaries. Many also see Libya as a temporary stop on the perilous path to Europe.

For most, Libya is not the destination but a gateway. The recent drowning of 21 Syrians in the Mediterranean was not an isolated tragedy, but part of a pattern of loss that has haunted the community for years.

Reports from local and international migration watchdogs have documented repeated drownings and arrests of Syrians at sea, with many captured by Libya’s coastguard and detained in overcrowded jails.

Despite the risks, many Syrians have managed to adapt to life in Libya, integrating into local communities and participating in its economy.

Yet numerous challenges persist, particularly for undocumented workers and those living without valid residency papers. Many report facing discrimination, abuse, and difficult working conditions.

As thousands of Syrian refugees across the Middle East prepare to return home amid improving conditions and relaxed restrictions, Syrians in Libya remain stuck, unable to stay, and unable to leave.

“We’re caught in the middle,” said one Syrian resident in Tripoli. “We can’t endure much longer, but we also can’t afford to go back.”

Many Syrians in Libya say they are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation, including passport confiscation and harassment by armed groups and criminal gangs operating with impunity.

Several Syrian residents told Asharq Al-Awsat they are facing rising unemployment, frequent kidnappings, and demands for ransom by militias. For those who now wish to return to Syria, doing so has become financially prohibitive due to hefty fines for visa violations.

Steep Penalties for Overstaying

Under a revised Libyan immigration law enacted on March 14, 2024, foreigners who overstay their visas or residency permits are charged 500 Libyan dinars - around $90 - per month. The regulation adds a significant burden for many Syrians whose legal documents have expired and who lack the resources to renew them or pay the fines required to exit the country legally.

Due to the political division in Libya since 2014, no official statistics exist on the number of foreign residents. However, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) reported in 2020 that approximately 14,500 Syrian refugees and asylum seekers were living in Libya.

Ten years after arriving in Libya, Ahmed Kamal Al-Fakhouri says he is now trapped, unable to afford life in the country or the high costs of leaving it.

“They’ve imposed fines on us that are beyond reason - nearly $1,500 per person,” said Fakhouri, a restaurant worker in Tripoli, echoing a growing outcry among Syrians in Libya burdened by mounting penalties and legal uncertainties. “Sometimes, I can’t even afford a day’s meal.”

Fakhouri fled Derna after the deadly floods of August 2023 and resettled in Tripoli.

“I saw death with my own eyes,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat, describing the trauma of losing his home. “Now we’re living in misery. We want the world to hear our voice - we want to go back to our country.”

Libya hosts thousands of Syrians, including doctors, engineers, university students, and day laborers who fill the country’s markets in search of work to support their families.

Yet many say they now find themselves stuck, facing visa penalties they can’t afford and no clear path home - even as the fall of Assad’s regime renews hopes for return.

“Exit Tax” Burdens Families

While Libya’s labor ministries have issued no formal statement on the matter, members of the Syrian community say they are being charged an "exit tax" calculated based on their overstay period. No official decree has been published, but testimonies suggest the fees are acting as a de facto barrier to departure.

Following Assad’s ouster, many Syrians are reconsidering return, describing exile as a “prison,” but are deterred by the financial burden of settling overstays.

Asharq Al-Awsat reached out to both of Libya’s rival labor ministries to clarify policies affecting Syrians and the reported fines for expired documents, but received no response.

Zekeriya Saadi, another Syrian living in Tripoli, has publicly called on authorities in both eastern and western Libya to cancel the exit tax and allow those wishing to return to Syria to do so.

“In these unbearable conditions, it’s unreasonable to ask refugees to pay such high fees just to leave the country,” he said. “This tax is a major obstacle, it exceeds our capacity, especially given our financial hardships.”

Saadi said most Syrians in Libya are low-income families without stable jobs. “Many are at risk of eviction, kidnapping, or exploitation. Leaving has become a matter of survival,” he said. “How can a displaced person be treated like a tourist or a wealthy expat?”

He urged Syria’s Foreign Ministry to take a clear stance and negotiate with Libyan authorities for fee exemptions and coordinated return efforts, while also working to protect Syrians who remain in the country.

Passport Problems Bar Education

Beyond financial barriers, expired passports are also stranding Syrians in legal limbo. Many have lost access to services, and the issue is now affecting the next generation.

According to Syrian media reports, education officials in Misrata barred at least 100 Syrian children from enrolling in public schools because their parents’ passports had expired, highlighting how bureaucratic obstacles are deepening the crisis for displaced families.