Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded
TT

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

“Do we complete our mission, make some money and return to Syria? Or will we be captured by Haftar’s forces and get killed? What if his forces seize Tripoli, which we came here to defend? What then?”

These are the thoughts that plagued a Syria fighter who took part in the Libyan war (2019-20) as part of a group of mercenaries brought by the former Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj.

These groups are backed Türkiye and militias in western Libya and fought the forces of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who had captured the eastern parts of the country and some regions in the South. Haftar also enjoys the support of several tribes in the east and is backed by Russia’s Wagner mercenary group.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with “Rami Abou Mohammed”, who hails from Syria’s northern Aleppo countryside, about the journey he started from Türkiye at the beginning of 2020. On board a Libyan Afriqiyah Airways flight, he was flown with hundreds of Syrian mercenaries from Istanbul to Mitiga International Airport in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

At that time, Tripoli had been fighting a nine-month offensive by Haftar’s Wagner-backed forces to seize the capital. Ankara brought in mercenaries from Syrian opposition factions, most notably the Sultan Murad Division that was formed in 2013 with a majority of Syrian Turkmen members.

After 14 months of fighting, Sarraj’s GNA fighters forced the LNA to withdraw from the outskirts of Tripoli.

Amid a rapidly changing international scene and the opening of new war fronts in Africa, alliances and priorities changed and Russia soon formed the so-called Africa Corps as an alternative to the Wagner group with the aim to expand its influence in five African countries, starting with Libya.

With its attention focused on countering western influence in Africa, the mercenaries brought in by both warring parties in Libya were left behind, either in camps, bases or tasked with carrying out special missions for militias in western Libya.

Initially, efforts were made by official military authorities to remove the mercenaries from Libya. The warring parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Geneva in October 2023 that called for their withdrawal, but that never happened. In early February 2021, the United Nations mission in Libya acknowledged that 20,000 foreign fighters were “occupying” several military bases in Libya. No official figures are available over their exact numbers, but it is likely that the number has dropped with the intensity of the conflict.

In this report, Asharq Al-Awsat traced how fighters from a number countries became embroiled in a war that is not their own for a various ideological and financial reasons and how several ended up detained in Libyan military bases, losing whatever power they had when at one point in the conflict they were instrumental in determining the battle.

Rami recalled how - at just 23 years of age - he embarked on a “terrifying” journey from Syria to Libya. He said he was “forced by difficult economic conditions” to fly to Libya despite knowing that he may end up being killed in the fighting. “The situation in Syria is very difficult and death is everywhere,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

From Hawar Kalas to the Abou Salim front

Mercenaries had flooded LNA- and GNA-controlled regions. Mercenaries were seen as a mighty force that local and foreign powers could rely on as they vied for control in Libya. Some of the mercenaries came from security companies and irregular armies.

Rami, who had never joined an armed faction before, recalled the journey from Syria to Libya. He said: “We were brought in from several regions in Syria. They recorded our names and then transported us from the town of Hawar Kalas to Türkiye's Gaziantep airport.” They were then flown to Istanbul on board a military plane and later taken to Mitiga airport on board an Afriqiyah Airways flight.

Sarraj had turned to military assistance from Türkiye during a visit to Ankara on December 26, 2019, as the LNA closed in on Tripoli. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan scrambled to send military experts, fighters and military gear, most notably drones.

“Before being sent to Tripoli, the Turkish forces sent us to camps on the border with Syria where we received training,” said Rami. He believed that the training was provided by the Turkish SADAT Defense company. They were flown to Tripoli upon completing the training.

SADAT Defense “is the first and the only Private Military Company in Türkiye, that internationally provides consultancy, military training and logistics services at the international defense and interior security sector,” reads its website.

It was founded, under the presidency of Brigadier General (Retired) Adnan Tanriverdi, by 23 officers and NCOs retired from various units of Turkish Armed Forces and began its activities by February2012.

It denies that it was still operating in Libya despite acknowledging that it had carried out projects there in 2013. To avoid legal sanctions, it had recently established services companies to act as a front for its activities in Libya. It also recruited on occasion military leaders of armed Syrian factions.

Two UN reports from 2021 and 2023 revealed that SADAT Defense had recruited 5,000 mercenaries in Syria to fight in Tripoli. It also accused Ankara of violating the arms embargo on Libya.

The reports sparked outrage after being published by Turkish journalist Saygi Ozturk in the opposition Sozcu newspaper. SADAT Defense asserted that the report findings were baseless.

Turkish academic Dr. Muhannad Hafizoglu explained to Asharq Al-Awsat how Ankara does not view the Syrians it sent to Libya as mercenaries. Rather, it believes that everyone sent to Libya through Turkish facilitations was either Turkish or had Turkish roots. Everyone sent to fight for Sarraj held the Turkish nationality, he added.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry rejected repeated requests by Asharq Al-Awsat for comment. The pro-Türkiye Syrian National Army also refused to make any statement.

Ahmed Hamade, a defector of the Syrian Army, said that Syrians who headed to Libya worked as translators, not fighters. The Turkish Foreign Ministry refused to comment on the claim.

Hamade added that several Syrians were lured by money to fight for the Wager Group. Moreover, he said that the dispatch of Syrian fighters to Libya or elsewhere was “inspired” by the arrival of Iranian militias, Russian fighters and Wagner members to prop up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against the revolution. Wagner promptly joined the fight in Libya.

Doubts and fears swirled through Rami’s mind throughout the flight to Mitiga airport. He recalled the warnings of his family, who urged him against embarking on such a journey, but he said he was a bit comforted by being surrounded by hundreds of other Syrians like him. “Whatever happens to them will happen to me,” he added.

He had the opportunity during the flight to get to know the other fighters, estimated at about 200. He learned that some were members of various armed factions, such as the Glory Corps. They were received at Mitiga airport by men in civilian clothing and transported to the Ain Zara area, some 18 kms southeast of Tripoli. Ain Zara witnessed some of the fiercest fighting during the battle between GNA and LNA.

The exchange of mercenaries to and from Libya and Syria never ceased between June 2020 and November 2024, revealed Rami Abdulrahman, Director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that some 2,000 Syrians remain in Libya. SADAT Defense and Turkish intelligence still fly them to Libya and they also return others back to Syria.

In January, the Observatory said that over 7,000 Syrian mercenaries were in Tripoli, but they have since fled to North Africa or Europe. A former military official said that only the military parties in Libya know the real number of mercenaries that were brought in to fight.

At the beginning of the war in 2019, the fighters were paid around 1,500 dollars, while now they earn 500 dollars. A Turkish soldier, meanwhile, barely earned 150 dollars at the time.

Abu Salim front

Rami, the Syrian fighter, said the newly-recruited Syrians in Libya received instructions from the Libyans. They were also trained by officers from SADAT Defense. They received weapons training and learned about the geography of the region where they will be fighting the “enemy”.

“We received training on the use of weapons and limited combat missions for a week at the Ain Zara camp. We were then taken to the Abou Salim front where we fought Haftar’s forces. Several Syrian factions were there, including the Glory Corps and Al-Mutassim group,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He recalled that several of his fellow fighters were captured or killed at the front. However, he spoke of victory, saying: “We managed to liberate the Yarmuk camp from Haftar’s forces.” Members of the Sultan Murad Division took up camp there.

Unofficial sources said some 500 mercenaries were killed. The GNA’s Volcano of Rage Operation against the LNA waged fierce battles to capture the Yarmuk and al-Hamza positions south of Tripoli. They are now the most significant bases where Syrian mercenaries are deployed.

Chaos in Libya

The security chaos in Libya made it easy for several “armed groups” to enter the country. Some took up base on the southern border and others were called up to fight for one of the warring factions when the “battle for Tripoli” erupted.

Chadian National Salvation Movement (MSNT) leader Omar Al-Mahdi Bashara attested to the chaos of fighters as he was a rebel deployed to the Chadian-Libyan border for 20 years before returning to political life.

This partially explains why Chadian, Sudanese and other African fighters joined the conflict in Libya, he said.

Since the end of the war on Tripoli, little was announced about the fate of the mercenaries. One announcement said 300 Sudanese fighters were deported from Libya.

Amid such secrecy, head of the joint 5+5 joint military committee in the western region Ahmed Abou Shahma accused Libyan politicians of obstructing the withdrawal of the mercenaries. “Each party is clinging on to their mercenaries,” he said.

Claudia Gazzini, the International Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Libya, told Asharq Al-Awsat that it is difficult to tally the number of mercenaries in Libya. It is essential to differentiate between special forces that were paid by the various parties and between foreign forces that are deployed there.

Libyan political analyst Ahmed Abu Argoub told Asharq Al-Awsat that the countries that sent their fighters and mercenaries to Libya are keen on maintaining the political vacuum in the country and feeding divisions. “They have no interest in seeing the rise of a Libyan state,” he explained.

Meanwhile, advisor at the Libyan Tribal Union (LTU) Khaled al-Ghweil threatened civil disobedience followed by military action should the mercenaries fail to peacefully leave the country. “Any mercenary found in the country would be a legitimate target,” he warned.

Bases on the coast

Alongside Ankara, Moscow is another source of mercenaries in Libya. It has used its presence in Libya to extend its influence in Africa through the Africa Corps.

Russian forces in Libya are nothing new, but Moscow has sought to bolster its presence after moving forces and military gear to eastern Libya, said a report by the All Eyes on Wagner group, raising concerns with the US and Europe.

The Polish Institute of International Affairs released a report, “Africa Corps - a New Iteration of Russia's Old Military Presence in Africa”, that examines how Russia’s presence in Libya shifted to focus on the whole of Africa.

It said that Wagner’s operations in Libya were impacted by the death of the group’s founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and Moscow eventually signed a military agreement with Haftar in September 2023.

The Europeans continue to be worried. Then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell declared on August 25: “We should be worried about what’s happening in Africa. When I first came to Brussels, the French and Italians were in Libya. They weren’t always in harmony, but they were present. Today, there are no Europeans left in Libya – only Turks and Russians.”

“The bases along Libya’s coast are no longer European; they belong to Türkiye and Russia. This is not the Mediterranean order we envisioned,” he added.

Former ambassador and advisor at ESCWA Ibrahim Mousa Grada said the Wagner mercenary presence in Libya is more complicated than any other foreign armed presence in the country.

Their deployment in Libya is seen as a foothold for Russia in Africa from which it expanded its influence in the continent and which has become part of an open struggle for power between Moscow and Washington.

Grada told Asharq Al-Awsat that Wagner’s presence in Libya is connected to major countries that have intersecting interests, especially in the Mediterranean and Africa. Given Russia’s war on Ukraine and the situation in Sudan, their pullout from Libya will definitely come at a price.

The Global Security Review said on August 18 that Russia has expanded its influence in Libya and Africa. The March 2023 edition of the Africa Defense Forum (adf) magazine, issued by AFRICOM, said that some 2,000 Wagner fighters had settled in central Libya since the ceasefire. They continue to train soldiers deployed in the east and guard oilfields in the southeast.

In November, adf said weapons from Libya were being smuggled to “terrorist groups” in Nigeria. It claimed that several of these weapons were made in Russia and that they were brought to Libya by the Wagner group.

The majority of the Wagner fighters are deployed at “sovereign” locations under the control of the LNA. They are tasked with guarding oilfields and ports in the central region known as the “oil crescent”.

Witnesses told Asharq Al-Awsat that Wagner fighters have been noticably active in the vicinity of Sirte city, some 450 kms from Tripoli. They noted their movement between the Ghardabiya Airbase, its naval port and the Al-Jufra Airbase. Members of the group were also spotted at the Brak base, 700 kms south of Tripoli.

Russia's ambassador to Libya Haider Aganin dismissed concerns over the Wagner group. In televised remarks on May 13, he accused western countries of stoking suspicions against the group.

Prisons and drugs

Another Syrian fighter brought in from Aleppo told Asharq Al-Awsat about his “deadly” experience in Libya.

“As soon as we arrived in Tripoli, we were turned over to a military leader who took us to the Sog Al-Khamis camp. No one was allowed to speak out against him or he would be detained,” said “Monzer Abou Khaled”.

Abou Khaled is still in Tripoli and has not been able to return to Syria. “Thousands of fighters are in the Kamis camp,” he added. They don’t allow us to stray far from the camp. We are in a prison. Some fighters have been here for two and three years. They can’t return to Syria and they aren’t receiving their salaries. They are given little food and drink, while the commanders enjoy plenty.”

“They have taken most of our salaries. Before heading to Libya, we reached an agreement to be paid 1,800 dollars a month, but they have only given us 500 dollars,” he revealed.

Asharq Al-Awsat learned that during that time, members of the Sultan Murad faction had arrested some 20 fighters in the Yarmuk camp for “refusing to hand over half of their financial earnings.”

Rami said the fighters were exploited and tempted by money. He spoke of drug smuggling and how their salaries were cut. “The leaders of the factions are profiting off of the fighters. They are trading weapons and smuggling drugs,” he stated.

He explained that the leaders ply the fighters with drugs so that they can be easily manipulated. They also smuggle drugs in Tripoli.

He described 2024 as the worst year for Syrian fighters because thousands of them have been prevented from leaving the city.

Return to Aleppo countryside

Rami left Tripoli after two years of fighting in southern Tripoli and time spent in Ain Zara. He returned to the Aleppo countryside, leaving behind colleagues who are still held in camps in western Libya.

He may have “survived death”, but painful memories still haunt him. “Several of our colleagues were killed in fighting. Others were lost at sea after they fled the camps and sought to escape to Europe,” he revealed.

When the war ended, several thousand mercenaries in Tripoli complained about not being paid or about salary cuts, prompting them to protest in the streets as seen in videos circulated on social media.

Observatory Director Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that a “large number” of the mercenaries fled their camps in Tripoli. He did not specify the exact number, but said they escaped to various Libyan regions to seek work and other headed to Europe.

In September 2023, the Observatory said some 3,000 Syrian mercenaries had fled military bases in Libya and headed to Europe.

Expulsion

As alliances and balances changed in the past four years, so did the Libyans’ view of the mercenaries. They are now seen as pariahs and are unwanted in the country.

The hatred against them was on full display when dozens of Libyans protested in front of the military academy in Tripoli in August 2023 to demand the expulsion of the mercenaries who were present in the facility. The protesters managed to storm the academy and set vehicles on fire and chanted slogans demanding the expulsion of the fighters.

Al-Saady Radwan told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We had previously given them a deadline to leave Libya and they did not. Either the military agencies take action or we will take them by surprise and expel them.”

He also accused the Government of National Unity, headed by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, of “giving them funds from the state treasury.”

The Russian mercenaries are viewed with the same hatred.

UN Security Council President Pedro Comissário Afonso had recently urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries from Libya, saying it has become a pressing need.

From Libya to Togo

Libya is not the only place the Syrian mercenaries were recruited to fight. The conflicts across Africa have turned Libya into a “crossing” point for new mercenaries.

A Syrian, who spoke on condition of anonymity, revealed that the Sultan Murad Division had recruited his 17-year-old brother to head to Libya over the summer and from there, he was taken to Togo to fight.

“He spoke to us from a telephone line that appeared to be from Togo. We don’t really know if he is actually there. We don’t know what to do,” the Syrian told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Sudanese on the front

The war may be over, but the tragedies do not end. Every fighter has a story to tell.

Two Sudanese brothers were recruited to join the fight. One fought for the Tripoli forces and the other for the LNA.

In December 2023, Asharq Al-Awsat contacted their family to inquire about them. It learned that the older son’s fate remains unknown, while the other managed to flee Libya through Chad and he is now in El-Fasher in Sudan.

The family fled the war in Sudan to Egypt. Asharq Al-Awsat met with the mother who revealed that the family had not been in contact with the brothers for three years.

At one point they learned that one was in Tripoli. “They abducted one and misled the other. We gained nothing from this,” she lamented.

The older brother didn’t even know that his brother had been recruited to fight for the LNA. The brothers never faced each other in battle and the family never informed them that they had been recruited to fight for the rival parties.

“We informed the younger son when he returned to us from Chad in late 2022,” said the mother, who called herself “Umm Bashir.”

She showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video of her older son in Tripoli. His leg has been amputated, and the Tripoli militias are holding him at an arms depot.

“He is 27 years old now. He told us that his leg was amputated after a bullet lodged in his leg was left untreated for two months,” she said tearfully. The family has since lost contact with him.

The family had contacted several parties in Tripoli, including the former GNA, to inquire about him, without reply.

When the war in Sudan erupted in April 2023, mercenaries who had fought for Haftar and Sarraj returned home. The family rushed to learn anything about their son. They were told that he was last seen in Sabratha city, 70 kms west of Tripoli. He is believed to have drowned while attempting to flee to Europe by boat.



Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.


Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
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Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)

Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.

- Offline navigation -

Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position -- known as an "inertial navigation system".

"GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target," Withington told AFP.

"If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there's a lot of jamming... By not using the GPS, you avoid that."

The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.

"It's not always necessarily very accurate, but it's as accurate as it needs to be," said Withington.

- Anti-jamming mechanisms -

Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used "state-of-art antenna interference suppression" to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.

Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.

"They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has... many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has," Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.

Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.

"The Shaheds have been upgraded," said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.

- Stealth materials -

The Shahed is built from "lightweight radar-absorbing materials", such as plastic and fiberglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.

Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defense systems.

- Other positioning systems? -

Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.

And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.

Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.

LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.

But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.

- Counter-strategies -

Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.

But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can "spoofing", which involves hacking into the drone's navigation system to change its destination.

Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralize 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 -- not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.

Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defenses are often used in tandem against the drones.