Baghdad After Damascus: Questions About the Day After

 
US helicopters accompany Secretary Antony Blinken as he heads to the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 13, 2024 (Reuters)
US helicopters accompany Secretary Antony Blinken as he heads to the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 13, 2024 (Reuters)
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Baghdad After Damascus: Questions About the Day After

 
US helicopters accompany Secretary Antony Blinken as he heads to the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 13, 2024 (Reuters)
US helicopters accompany Secretary Antony Blinken as he heads to the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 13, 2024 (Reuters)

On November 24, 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed what seemed to be its final attack on Israel. The announcement came two weeks after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, with armed groups declaring “Syria is free.”

The claim, shared on a Telegram channel, marked the end of the “Axis of Resistance” operations before a ceasefire took effect in Lebanon.

On November 27, 2024, Syrian factions advanced in western Aleppo, sparking political alarm in Baghdad.

Rumors spread that “Baghdad could be the next target” after Assad fled to Russia, prompting increased diplomatic talks with Western and Arab capitals.

Iraqi forces have mobilized along the Syrian border, citing concerns over the infiltration of “armed elements” and fears of a broader collapse.

This buildup began earlier, during the Syrian factions’ rapid advance toward Damascus in just 10 days.

Since November 27, Iraqi army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders have visited the border more than six times, the latest on December 13, 2024.

Iraq faces uncertainty after the fall of Assad, Iran’s retreat, and the decline of Hezbollah’s power. Key questions now center on the “new rulers” in Damascus, the “future of Iranian influence,” and the “direction of Iraq’s political process.”

The urgency of these issues grew after UN envoy Mohammed Al-Hassan met with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf on December 12, 2024.

“I briefed Sayyed al-Sistani on recent UN discussions about Iraq,” Al-Hassan said.

“The region is changing rapidly, and Iraq needs bold, urgent decisions. We urge leaders to act quickly and take overdue steps toward reconciliation and unity,” he added.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to representatives of six Iraqi parties about Al-Hassan's remarks.

Many speculated about a “collapse of the political system” or a return to pre-2003 Iraq, with most concerns coming from traditional Shiite parties.

Recent events have revolved around Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. On December 10, 2024, US CENTCOM chief Gen. Michael Kurilla met Kurdish SDF officials in Syria before heading to Baghdad to meet Sudani, who reaffirmed Iraq’s position on “respecting the Syrian people’s choices.”

The following day, Sudani visited Jordan to meet King Abdullah II, who later traveled to Abu Dhabi to meet UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. Sudani returned to Baghdad, received a call from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and met with a US delegation. Meanwhile, Germany’s defense minister visited Baghdad and Erbil.

Talks across the region have focused on “securing borders” with Syria. International discussions, involving US President Joe Biden and other Western officials, highlight a global push to bolster security in Syria’s neighboring states.

Despite these efforts, Shiite leaders in Baghdad remain unclear on Iraq’s future or how to handle mounting regional pressures.

A former government advisor described Iraq’s current situation as the most fragile in years, with Syria’s shifting dynamics raising serious questions for Iraq’s political stability.

Iraq Faces Rising Tensions After Assad’s Fall

Mutual fears are growing across the Iraq-Syria border. In Syria, concerns focus on Iraqi groups alarmed by the new regime, while in Iraq, fears center on potential unrest at the Sayyida Zainab shrine in Damascus, which could destabilize the region.

A senior Shiite figure told Asharq Al-Awsat that Assad had granted Iran full security control over the shrine, but this arrangement ended with his departure.

“Now, everyone is afraid,” the source said, though international assurances suggest Damascus will not unravel as quickly as Assad’s fall.

Since Assad fled to Moscow, Iraqi Shiite communities have voiced concerns over the safety of Shiite shrines in Syria, amplified by a flood of social media posts. However, Iraqi diplomats have engaged regional powers to prevent escalation, warning that even a minor misstep could ignite conflict.

Inside Iraq, fears are mounting among Shiite leaders about losing control over factions or being outmaneuvered by Sunni and Kurdish rivals. These groups might exploit Iran’s retreat, seen by some as a "tactical withdrawal," to shift Iraq’s political balance.

Shiite politicians also worry the Iraqi premier could distance himself from Iran-aligned factions and pursue a new political deal, using “protecting Baghdad” as his justification.

“Sudani holds a strong card,” one political adviser noted.

Publicly, Shiite leaders focus on warnings about Syria’s “extremist rule” and the risk of militants crossing into Iraq. Privately, they remain unsettled about Iraq’s next steps as regional dynamics shift.

Recent developments underscore these tensions. Sudani reportedly sent a message to Syrian authorities, pledging non-interference while seeking assurances about the safety of Shiite communities.

Iraq’s stance toward Syria shifted after airstrikes hit convoys carrying Shiite fighters and Syria’s army collapsed. These events freed Sudani from earlier obligations to Iran-backed factions, allowing him to adopt a more flexible position.

Iraq's Political Crossroads: Regional Pressures and US Strategy

A Western diplomat in Baghdad, who spoke anonymously, said that “stability in Iraq is now a top priority for the international community,” but regional pressures are pushing to dismantle the militias that have fueled instability.

This comes as political discussions focus on a question raised by many: Is the fall of regimes in the Resistance Axis moving toward Iraq? Some consider it an unlikely scenario without solid evidence.

An Iraqi politician, who claimed insight into US-Iraq talks, suggested that the US has engaged Israel, which wants to “finish the job of removing the Resistance Axis, with Iraq as the last standing member.”

The theory suggests that Israel sees Baghdad as “Iran's most important asset,” and Tehran might use Iraq’s resources to revive the collapsing axis, meaning the crisis won’t end with Assad.

To counter Israel’s objectives, the US reportedly proposed an “alternative plan” with similar goals.

An Iraqi adviser explained that the new approach involves disarming militias, integrating the PMF into the state, and removing militia offices from Sunni areas.

This adviser also said that the US wants to hold new elections in Iraq and believes “Iran will have to accept this new reality.”

However, figures from Iraq’s Coordination Framework dismissed this as “fantasy,” although they acknowledge that messages reaching Baghdad indicate that “cutting Iraq’s ties to Iran is now seen as essential.”

Sidelining entrenched groups in Iraq’s government is difficult, and some believe this could only be achieved through negotiations with Iran.

A political adviser noted, “It’s hard to remove Iranian influence so easily. They are involved in ongoing discussions in the region, and if Iraq’s political situation changes, Iran will be a part of it.”

The Middle East’s Shifting Landscape and Sudani’s Challenge

In political circles, a simple question is being raised: “Why should Baghdad be targeted when it stayed out of the support war and didn’t intervene to prevent Assad’s fall?” This reflects a desire to avoid the consequences of the post-conflict situation.

But this is not the regional reality. A series of events suggests that Iraq must change to avoid difficult choices ahead.

A Western diplomat told Asharq Al-Awsat, “The region has changed... it’s clear that the dynamics have shifted, and players must adapt.”

For the first time since 2003, excluding the threat from ISIS in 2014, Iraq’s Shiite forces face mounting pressures, forcing them to decide how to adapt politically.

During his visit to Baghdad on December 13, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken didn't wear a bulletproof vest, unlike his November 2023 trip, symbolizing a more relaxed approach.

He joked with Sudani, saying, “It’s wonderful to fly in from the airport and see the vitality of the city.”

However, Blinken’s reassuring words—calling it the right moment for Iraq to strengthen its sovereignty—are met with skepticism in Iraq.

Officials fear these may be just the comments of a diplomat in his final month, with a Republican administration likely to take a harder line on Iran, and Iraq possibly being the last target of “maximum pressure.”

Iraqi politicians are convinced that “something will happen,” but opinions differ on what that might be. There's speculation about a possible Israeli strike, or if Washington plans to protect Iraq through a new deal aimed at limiting Iranian influence.

Sudani’s aides downplay the likelihood of military strikes but hint at necessary political changes, which could soften the impact of a future US administration under Donald Trump.

However, these changes could create risks, as Sudani’s opponents in both Baghdad and Tehran fear unforeseen consequences.



How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.