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What Is the Significance of the Golan Heights?

Israeli military vehicles on their way into the Syrian side of the border, between Israel and Syria, near the Druze village of Majdal Shams, in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, 16 December 2024. (EPA)
Israeli military vehicles on their way into the Syrian side of the border, between Israel and Syria, near the Druze village of Majdal Shams, in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, 16 December 2024. (EPA)
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What Is the Significance of the Golan Heights?

Israeli military vehicles on their way into the Syrian side of the border, between Israel and Syria, near the Druze village of Majdal Shams, in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, 16 December 2024. (EPA)
Israeli military vehicles on their way into the Syrian side of the border, between Israel and Syria, near the Druze village of Majdal Shams, in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, 16 December 2024. (EPA)

The Israeli government decided on Sunday to double its population on the occupied Golan Heights while saying threats from Syria remained despite the moderate tone of opposition leaders who ousted President Bashar al-Assad. Israel captured most of the strategic plateau from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War and annexed it in 1981.

After Assad fled Syria on Dec. 8, Israeli troops moved into a demilitarized zone inside Syria, including the Syrian side of strategic Mount Hermon, which overlooks Damascus, where its forces took over an abandoned Syrian military post.

Israel called the incursion a temporary measure to ensure border security.

Following is a quick guide to the hilly, 1,200-square-kilometre (460 square-mile) Golan Heights, a fertile and strategic plateau that overlooks Israel's Galilee region as well as Lebanon, and borders Jordan.

WHY IS THE AREA CONTENTIOUS?

In 2019 then-President Donald Trump declared US support for Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, but the annexation has not been recognized by most countries. Syria demands Israel withdraw but Israel refuses, citing security concerns.

Syria tried to regain the Golan in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, but was thwarted. Israel and Syria signed an armistice in 1974 and the Golan has been relatively quiet since.

In 2000 Israel and Syria held their highest-level talks over a possible return of the Golan and a peace agreement. But the negotiations collapsed and subsequent talks also failed.

Netanyahu said on Sunday that he spoke on Saturday with Trump, who returns to the White House on Jan. 20. The Israeli leader said his country had no interest in conflict with Syria.

WHY DOES ISRAEL WANT THE GOLAN?

Security. Israel said earlier in Syria's more than decade-long civil war that it demonstrated the need to keep the plateau as a buffer zone between Israeli towns and the instability of its neighbor.

Israel's government also voiced concern that Iran, a longtime ally of the Assad regime, was trying to cement its presence on Syria's side of the border in order to launch attacks on Israel. Israel frequently bombed suspected Iranian military assets in Syria in the years before Assad's fall.

Israel and Syria have both coveted the Golan's water resources and naturally fertile soil.

WHO LIVES ON THE GOLAN?

Some 31,000 Israelis have settled there, said analyst Avraham Levine of the Alma Research and Education Center specializing in Israel's security challenges on its northern border. Many work in farming, including vineyards, and tourism. The Golan is home to 24,000 Druze, an Arab minority, Levine said.

Many of the Druze adherents in Syria were long loyal to the Assad regime. Many families have members on both sides of the demarcation line. After annexing the Golan, Israel gave the Druze the option of citizenship, but most rejected it and still identify as Syrian.

WHO CONTROLS THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE GOLAN?

Before the outbreak of Syria's civil war in 2011, there was an uneasy stand-off between Israeli and Syrian forces.

But in 2014 anti-government factions overran Quneitra province on the Syrian side. The fighters forced Assad's forces to withdraw and also turned on UN forces in the area, forcing them to pull back from some of their positions.

The area remained under opposition control until the summer of 2018, when Assad's forces returned to the largely ruined city of Quneitra and the surrounding area following a Russian-backed offensive and a deal that allowed the opposition to withdraw.

WHAT SEPARATES THE TWO SIDES ON THE GOLAN?

A United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is stationed in camps and observation posts along the Golan, supported by military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Between the Israeli and Syrian armies is a 400-square-km (155-square-mile) "Area of Separation" - often called a demilitarized zone - in which the two countries' armed forces are not permitted under the ceasefire arrangement.

The Separation of Forces Agreement of May 31, 1974, created an Alpha Line to the west of the area of separation, behind which Israeli military forces must remain, and a Bravo Line to the east behind which Syrian military forces must remain.

Extending 25 km (15 miles) beyond the "Area of Separation" on both sides is an "Area of Limitation" in which there are restrictions on the number of troops and number and kinds of weapons that both sides can have there.

There is one crossing point between the Israeli and Syrian sides, which until the Syrian civil war began was used mainly by United Nations forces, a limited number of Druze civilians and for the transport of agricultural produce.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE ASSAD'S OUSTER?

Netanyahu's government unanimously approved a more than 40-million-shekel ($11 million) plan on Sunday to encourage demographic growth in the Golan.

It said Netanyahu submitted the plan to the government "in light of the war and the new front facing Syria, and out of a desire to double the population of the Golan".

Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates condemned Israel's decision, with the UAE - which normalized relations with Israel in 2020 - describing it as a "deliberate effort to expand the occupation".

Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes on Syria's strategic weapons stockpiles and military infrastructure, it says, to prevent them from being used by opposition groups that drove Assad from power, some of which grew from movements linked to al-Qaeda.

Syria's de facto leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, said on Saturday that Israel was using false pretexts to justify its attacks on Syria, but he was not interested in engaging in new conflicts as his country focuses on rebuilding.

Sharaa - better known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani - leads the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group that ousted Assad on Dec. 8, ending the family's five-decade iron-fisted rule.

He said diplomatic solutions were the only way to ensure security and stability and that "uncalculated military adventures" were not wanted.

Israel Defense Minister Israel Katz said in a statement on Sunday that the latest developments in Syria increased the threat to Israel, "despite the moderate image that the rebel leaders claim to present".

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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.