‘Caesar’s’ Partner ‘Sami’ to Asharq Al-Awsat: ‘Coalition’ Support Helped Extend Assad’s Time in Power

A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)
A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)
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‘Caesar’s’ Partner ‘Sami’ to Asharq Al-Awsat: ‘Coalition’ Support Helped Extend Assad’s Time in Power

A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)
A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Osama Othman, who smuggled files of torture that took place in the Syrian regime’s jails, recalled how he and his partner “Caesar” were shocked at how dismissive leader of the opposition “Syrian national coalition” government was of their case.

Othman, known by his codename “Sami”, said that with this attitude, the coalition helped extend the term of now ousted President Bashar al-Assad. “His reckless attitude cost us tens of thousands of lives,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

*We last stopped at the issuance of the “Caesar Act”. What happened next?

The Act was issued when the world was least interested in the Syrian revolution and the plight of the people. So, we established in the United States and later in Paris organizations that have now become the Caesar Files for Justice. The platform is now following up on the legal proceedings related to the Caesar file and others.

I can’t reveal what some of those files are yet, but of course, they are about the Syrian regime’s human rights violations. Some are also related to the impact its practices have had on the economy through its systematic destruction and demographic change it was imposing on the people. We believe that everyone who committed violations in Syria must be held to account.

Some of the violations include the illegal naturalization of people so that Assad could establish what he once called the “beneficial Syria” and a “homogeneous society”. These statements were backed by action on the ground, but whose details I can’t disclose yet because I don’t want to expose people involved in the file.

*The media had spoken of Iranians and Shiite Iraqis who were naturalized. Is this issue covered in the file?

Yes, it is. When you learn that your neighbor speaks a foreign language and acts as though he has been living in Syria for decades, you have to wonder where they came from and who brought them here. Every Syrian used to wonder who these people were. The people handling this file are Syrians who want to protect their country from this systematic and non-systematic demographic change.

This leads us to what I call the massacre that was committed against the evidence, documents and archives, not just at the security branches and prisons, but at other institutions. We all saw how the passports directorate was bombed. These places are very important because they held a lot of evidence and information. When places that important are bombed, it is to hide evidence and documents. The strikes that took place after Assad fled the country are just more crimes added to his list of violations against Syria.

*Are you saying that Assad’s agencies and Israel were working together?

I can’t make such accusations. All I am saying is that such incidents became more frequent after he fled, and you can draw your own conclusions.

Anti-government fighters gather in front of the Kuweires military airfield and academy in the eastern part of Aleppo province on December 1, 2024. (AFP)

Hezbollah Saved Assad

*Who turned the tables in Syria and extended Assad and the regime’s time in power? Do you believe the Russians were involved in the violations? What about the Iranian militias and Hezbollah?

We nearly hung posters of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in our homes in 2006. We used to weep when we learned about the martyrdom of its members. In 2006, I hosted a Lebanese family in my home in Wadi Barada in northern Damascus.

Hezbollah had openly declared that if it weren’t for its intervention, Assad would have fallen within months. That’s enough. Nasrallah said it himself and Hezbollah’s actions on the ground back his statements. So, certainly Hezbollah’s intervention in the early years of the conflict was decisive for the regime.

Other militias came pouring through soon after and we started to notice foreigners in our country. We used to hear gunmen speak in foreign languages as they roamed our streets. Right in front of my house were several people who didn’t speak a word of Arabic. They observed a peaceful rally that was mourning a martyr killed by regime shelling on the city. I never dared ask the strangers where they came from and what they were doing here. You could easily spot the foreigners in our city of al-Tall in the Damascus countryside.

They came in months after Hezbollah’s intervention. Then came Russia’s intervention in 2015 which was the most decisive. This led the rebels to become constrained to specific regions and losing territories they had captured from the regime. Iran, Russia and the militias were partners with the regime in killing the Syrian people and destroying their country. It doesn’t take much effort to prove this.

Close Calls

*Did the regime ever come close to discovering the Caesar files?

My family’s house in al-Tall was once raided by the regime. They were searching for my youngest brother because he had taken part in a peaceful demonstration or some normal everyday thing which we all did. The members of the “political security” branch raided our home. This was at the beginning of the revolution and the officer in charge still showed some decency and respect.

He came into the house and carried out his search. He took the computers that I used for my work as a civil engineer. He had found it in my brother’s room. He took everything related to the computer. I remember the officer’s name was Mohammed Jomaa. When he learned that I was a civil engineer, he lectured me about patriotism and how the nation had spared no expense so that we could earn an education – slogans that regime members are forced to memorize during indoctrination sessions.

He took my ID and told me I should head to Damascus to get it and that I should bring my brother too to collect the computer. So, I remained without an ID for some time. I couldn’t even leave my city because showing up at any checkpoint without identification would have gotten me arrested. Had I been arrested, I would have ended up as one of the Caesar file photos.

During another incident, al-Tall was being invaded by the regime after a long battle with the rebels inside the city and the displacement of nearly all its residents. I had taken my parents and siblings to the nearby city of Seydnaya and stayed home. My youngest brother could not leave al-Tall and I wanted to remain with him and to also protect the data we had. My third brother insisted on remaining with us and so we did. We were searched by the security forces on numerous occasions.

The Free Syrian Army soon withdrew from the city and the regime forces swept in, committing several massacres in al-Tall. We were then forced to flee the building we were staying in. We couldn’t stay in our own home because it was located at the entrance of the city where the invasion had begun. So, I hid the camera I had and some equipment under a pile of garbage below the building. I thought to myself: “I’ll be able to find them should I survive because the forces won’t think about searching in the garbage for such things.”

We managed to flee the city and remained away for five or six days before returning to al-Tall. It was a holiday, so security had become a bit lax and phone services were restored. While in hiding, we witnessed how a tank and sniper had taken up position on higher ground. They were ready to attack anyone who passed through the area. The three of us had basically escaped with our lives.

Syria’s seat and the flag of the revolution are seen at an Arab League summit in Doha in 2013. (AFP)

Coalition Gives Assad Indirect Support

*Aside from the regime, did anyone try to undermine, obstruct or exploit your work?

In a way, yes. Our main battle after leaving Syria was aimed at preserving this file and keeping it away from political meddling. This file is about human rights violations. It belongs to all Syrians and it should be kept away from narrow interests. At first, the coalition tried to present itself as the sponsor of the file, which was a normal thing to do.

I approached them with a friend and met with the head of the government. I was in the waiting room for four hours with people drinking tea and coffee as if they were in a cafe. It was unfortunate to listen to conversations that had nothing to do with what was happening in Syria.

After four hours, we sat down for a short meeting with the head of government and explained the file to him. “We need help that would ensure that this file would be kept out of political disputes between the various members of the opposition and others. We need to protect our loved ones who are still in Syria,” we urged him. His response to this was truly shocking. “So you think this file will shake Bashar al-Assad's throne?” he told me.

The response was disappointing and unfortunate because he was someone who was supposed to be speaking on behalf of the Syrian revolution. This revolt is the most significant one since the French Revolution in 1789.

The toppling of the regime and establishment of a state of law and justice in Syria will change the Middle East and in turn, the world. This is what the French Revolution did three centuries ago. And so, for the coalition government to respond to me in such a way was very offensive. I left the meeting feeling dejected and with my thoughts with my family that we were trying to bring from Damascus.

That moment pained me deeply. I had come all this way, put myself and others in danger, only to come across someone who was there to exploit me. It was just such a shocking moment.

*So you were disappointed with the opposition?

Disappointment doesn’t even cut it. I was saddened and dejected. Had the Caesar file been handled properly, Assad wouldn’t have remained on his throne until 2024. Such a lack of responsibility. It is this attitude that extended the life of the Syrian regime and cost tens of thousands of Syrian lives.

So, for example, if you were to hold negotiations with the regime, what cards would you have if the Caesar file wasn’t one of them? What would you even talk about? The opposition spoke at international platforms of everything from the constitution to the color of the flag, language and system of rule. Not once did it bring up the issue of the detainees.

We have long said that the detainee file was above negotiations, meaning we would not negotiate with the regime over anything before we discuss this issue. Some members of the opposition interpreted this as negotiating everything and setting this issue to the side. I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry. This is why I say that the coalition helped extend the regime’s time in power.

People search for their loved ones among corpses of victims of torture at Seydnaya Prison. (AFP)

Seydnaya Prison and the Human Press

*You compared Seydnaya Prison to the Bastille and the Syrian revolution to the French one. What comes to mind when I say “Seydnaya”?

After the world saw what it was like inside Seydnaya, I can’t even imagine what it was like for people to be imprisoned there. For them to turn into numbers, then corpses and rotten bodies that are still living. They are then taken to the human press where they are turned into bones and tissue. Who could even imagine such a thing? Who could even endure such terror?

On the outside, we used to look at the prison as a symbol of oppression and injustice. These words don’t do justice to what the detainees went through for even a few minutes, so what could it even have been like for people who were held there for dozens of years? Perhaps the lucky ones were the detainees who entered the prison and were swiftly taken to the press.

*Were you surprised to learn about the press? Were you expecting to see such a thing?

It never occurred to me that the regime would use a press against humans. We had heard a lot about the different forms of torture and the mass graves, but a human press?! What kind of criminal mind did this regime have?

*What purpose did this press serve?

You and me, we are normal humans who love and feel for our relatives. We think soundly. This is not a question that can be answered by people who think reasonably. What could possibly prompt a criminal regime, which has the whole of Syria, to bring in a press to turn corpses into dust. The prison itself has thousands of meters of territory. Just bury the corpses there. No normal person could have operated the press.

Small Butchers and Senior Officers

*Can you name any of the big butchers who were responsible for the torture?

The list is long. We had filed lawsuits against several people before the German judiciary, including deputy chief of security affairs Ali Mamlouk, deputy director of national security and former head of military intelligence Abdel Fattah Qadsiye, and head of air force intelligence and Mazzeh prison warden Jamil al-Hassan. Hassan was the target of the first arrest warrant issued by the German judiciary.

The heads of security branches are directly responsible for the killing under torture, but they are not the only ones responsible. I have always said that arresting the head of the security branch and charging him with war crimes is not as important as issuing charges against the person who carried out the actual killing and torture in these jails. These are the people who enjoyed the killing. They don’t just kill because they were ordered to do so; they do it because they relish torturing people, and the result are the images that we have seen after the ouster of the regime.

They believe that they will be protected by their superiors and that they won’t be held to account. All the trials that have been held outside of Syria were dedicated to trying top rank officials or people who were proven to have committed murder. This is not enough. We must get the names of the people who carried out the direct killings so that they realize that the regime that they worshipped like God does not protect them.

People look through documents at the Seydnaya prison in Damascus on December 11, 2024. (AFP)

*Are the documents that have been collected enough to indict the smaller employees? Are there any names?

If you mean the Caesar files, which we took out of Syria in 2013, they only have a limited number of photos of regime members. Some names are there through signatures on documents, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they were the ones who tortured and killed the victims. Our files don’t have the names of the butchers in the jails who carried out the killing.

In order to establish a free Syria and a stable society, you must go through a period of transitional justice, which demands accountability. You cannot live in an area knowing that your neighbor still reeks of blood because he used to work for several years in Assad’s jails where he used to torture or kill detainees. So, everyone who committed human rights violations in Syria must be held to account in order for our society to become stable. We mustn't allow the opportunity for individual acts of revenge if relatives come to believe that they have not received justice against those who killed their loved ones.

The violations are not limited to killing and torture. There are so many violations. Everything that undermines human dignity is a violation, and so are attempts to create demographic change. You can’t simply tell people who lived in a tent along the Turkish border, Jordanian desert or in Lebanon for 12 years to return home, the regime is gone. Add to that a whole generation that has never been to school. They have never been given an opportunity to live a normal human life. So, these people must be compensated.

Destruction of Documents

*Do you worry that the fate of the victims of Seydnaya Prison will be the same as those of the Hama massacre?

This leads us to a problem that happened after Damascus’ liberation from the criminal tyrant Assad. The chaos that ensued in the first few days after his ouster led to the loss of a lot of documents and evidence. Of course, I am not blaming relatives who were frantically searching for their loved ones. They are justified for and had every right to feel that way. But I refuse that for you to receive your right, you deny others of theirs. The destruction of documents means that we won’t have evidence that implicates the criminals. So, you just denied relatives of victims their right to see the butcher who killed their son held to account.

Relatives entering the prisons wasn’t the only way these documents were destroyed. Some places were left in bad shape, and some were burned down later by unknown people. So, we know that some people are deliberately doing this with the aim of destroying these documents. Bashar al-Assad and the other criminals are probably very happy to see evidence destroyed this way and prison doors being flung open without documenting who the detainees are. We saw how prisoners walked on foot, naked, from Seydnaya to al-Tall. That’s a 3-km walk in the cold night.

*Do you compare Assad’s downfall to Saddam Hussein’s?

I don’t think you can compare the two. First, Assad was toppled by the Syrian people and by terror. Assad was toppled before the revolutionary forces made it to Damascus. All the conditions for his collapse were there. He was in his weakest state, and he was ousted by heroic Syrians, who entered Damascus after liberating Hama and Homs. Other Syrians had also worked on isolating the regime politically and economically by working with rights groups.

The situation was not like Iraq. A comparison between Assad and any other case from our time or in the past wrongs the other party. I don’t think Nero even deserves to be compared to Assad.

*So, is Nero better?

“Better” or “worse” are not the right words for this. I am saying that Bashar al-Assad was crazier and more criminal than Nero. There’s no room here to use the word “better”.

*The interview concludes on Thursday.



Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.


Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
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Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)

Tehran stands to gain billions of dollars from a 60-day reprieve from US sanctions announced on Monday, but unwinding more than four decades of restrictions poses legal, political and commercial challenges that could take years.

At issue is whether an interim US deal with Iran can translate into lasting economic relief, given the complexity of dismantling a sanctions regime that spans US law, international measures and private-sector risk concerns.

The United Nations, the US and the European Union have imposed sanctions and trade embargoes and have frozen assets since the late 1970s over Iran's nuclear program, human rights violations and support for armed groups around the region.

Under a 14-point memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran last week, Washington is to start abolishing all types of sanctions using a schedule to be forged in a final deal within 60 days, a period that can be extended.

On Monday, the US Treasury issued a temporary general license allowing the production, delivery and sale of crude oil and petrochemical and petroleum products of Iranian origin through August 21.

Removing the remaining sanctions - if it happens - would represent a stark change in US policy toward the Middle East, which has long focused on curbing ‌Iran's influence and ‌using financial pressure to weaken its theocratic government.

It would also be difficult, requiring executive action for some measures, approval ‌by ⁠Congress for others ⁠and close coordination with the UN and other countries that have imposed their own sanctions. Companies, wary after decades of restrictions, could also blunt the impact.

"You have this tangled nest of sanctions, and it's not just executive orders, it's congressional sanctions," said Juan Zarate, deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under former President George W. Bush.

CONGRESS IS SKEPTICAL

Washington first sanctioned Iran in 1979, after revolutionary students seized the US embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage.

Since then, Congress has passed half a dozen sanctions laws and presidents have issued executive orders over Iran's nuclear program and its support for groups the US deems terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis.

Since early 2025, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on more than 1,000 people, vessels and aircraft, according to Treasury data.

Delisting thousands of entities designated for ⁠sanctions would take OFAC at least a year, said Jeremy Paner, a partner at law firm Hughes Hubbard & Reed ‌and a former US sanctions official.

President Donald Trump can rescind executive orders issued on Iran, but some ‌measures - including sanctions on Hamas and Hezbollah - are mandated by law and will have to be removed or amended by Congress, where the interim deal has already sparked sharp ‌public criticism from his fellow Republican lawmakers.

Undoing 40 years of sanctions would be difficult, added Matt Zweig, managing director of policy at FDD ‌Action, the lobbying arm of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

"Any attempt to comprehensively remove layer upon layer of sanctions will be like peeling back an onion - exposing the administration - not just to legal complexities but political risks," said Zweig, a former aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The license issued on Monday could be worth up to $3 billion for Iran over two months, by some estimates.

That could swell to "at least tens of billions of dollars" if made permanent, erasing a discount on Iranian oil, allowing Tehran to ‌sell to additional buyers beyond China, and increasing exports, said Edward Fishman, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. China now buys about 90% of Iranian oil, despite the sanctions.

The new license is broader than ⁠the one issued in March, calling for ⁠inclusion of not just oil and petroleum products, but also banking, insurance and transportation related to the oil trade, giving Tehran quicker access to its revenues.

"There are a number of thorny issues involved," said Stephanie Connor, a former OFAC official now a partner with law firm Holland & Knight, adding that lifting sanctions could mean funds flowing to groups the US considers a threat.

"Are we really going to let money start flowing to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps?" she asked, referring to the powerful paramilitary force that the US has designated a foreign terrorist organization.

WARY COMPANIES

Banks, oil firms and insurers will face evolving regulations, tougher due diligence and exposure to sanctions-evasion risks tied to Iran links with countries such as China, North Korea and Russia. They also remain subject to separate sanctions from Britain, the UN, the EU and others.

"We've kind of beaten the markets up with the risk of doing business with or through Iran, so you can't just flip a switch and say, 'Oh, now it's okay to do business with Iran,'" Zarate said.

Companies that deal with Iran would still face lawsuits from victims of attacks, who can sue investors and companies for aiding designated groups under the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which aides say is unlikely to be repealed.

Given such risks, companies may steer clear of working with Iran to escape legal and reputational risk as long as the Iranian government remains in power, said Brett Erickson, principal with Obsidian Risk Advisors.

"We're not going to see massive multi-billion-dollar commitments until things are far more cemented and politically stable," he said. "There's just a long way to go."