‘Caesar’s’ Partner ‘Sami’ to Asharq Al-Awsat: ‘Coalition’ Support Helped Extend Assad’s Time in Power

A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)
A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)
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‘Caesar’s’ Partner ‘Sami’ to Asharq Al-Awsat: ‘Coalition’ Support Helped Extend Assad’s Time in Power

A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)
A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken, in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama, following the capture of the area by anti-government forces, on December 7, 2024. (AFP)

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Osama Othman, who smuggled files of torture that took place in the Syrian regime’s jails, recalled how he and his partner “Caesar” were shocked at how dismissive leader of the opposition “Syrian national coalition” government was of their case.

Othman, known by his codename “Sami”, said that with this attitude, the coalition helped extend the term of now ousted President Bashar al-Assad. “His reckless attitude cost us tens of thousands of lives,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

*We last stopped at the issuance of the “Caesar Act”. What happened next?

The Act was issued when the world was least interested in the Syrian revolution and the plight of the people. So, we established in the United States and later in Paris organizations that have now become the Caesar Files for Justice. The platform is now following up on the legal proceedings related to the Caesar file and others.

I can’t reveal what some of those files are yet, but of course, they are about the Syrian regime’s human rights violations. Some are also related to the impact its practices have had on the economy through its systematic destruction and demographic change it was imposing on the people. We believe that everyone who committed violations in Syria must be held to account.

Some of the violations include the illegal naturalization of people so that Assad could establish what he once called the “beneficial Syria” and a “homogeneous society”. These statements were backed by action on the ground, but whose details I can’t disclose yet because I don’t want to expose people involved in the file.

*The media had spoken of Iranians and Shiite Iraqis who were naturalized. Is this issue covered in the file?

Yes, it is. When you learn that your neighbor speaks a foreign language and acts as though he has been living in Syria for decades, you have to wonder where they came from and who brought them here. Every Syrian used to wonder who these people were. The people handling this file are Syrians who want to protect their country from this systematic and non-systematic demographic change.

This leads us to what I call the massacre that was committed against the evidence, documents and archives, not just at the security branches and prisons, but at other institutions. We all saw how the passports directorate was bombed. These places are very important because they held a lot of evidence and information. When places that important are bombed, it is to hide evidence and documents. The strikes that took place after Assad fled the country are just more crimes added to his list of violations against Syria.

*Are you saying that Assad’s agencies and Israel were working together?

I can’t make such accusations. All I am saying is that such incidents became more frequent after he fled, and you can draw your own conclusions.

Anti-government fighters gather in front of the Kuweires military airfield and academy in the eastern part of Aleppo province on December 1, 2024. (AFP)

Hezbollah Saved Assad

*Who turned the tables in Syria and extended Assad and the regime’s time in power? Do you believe the Russians were involved in the violations? What about the Iranian militias and Hezbollah?

We nearly hung posters of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in our homes in 2006. We used to weep when we learned about the martyrdom of its members. In 2006, I hosted a Lebanese family in my home in Wadi Barada in northern Damascus.

Hezbollah had openly declared that if it weren’t for its intervention, Assad would have fallen within months. That’s enough. Nasrallah said it himself and Hezbollah’s actions on the ground back his statements. So, certainly Hezbollah’s intervention in the early years of the conflict was decisive for the regime.

Other militias came pouring through soon after and we started to notice foreigners in our country. We used to hear gunmen speak in foreign languages as they roamed our streets. Right in front of my house were several people who didn’t speak a word of Arabic. They observed a peaceful rally that was mourning a martyr killed by regime shelling on the city. I never dared ask the strangers where they came from and what they were doing here. You could easily spot the foreigners in our city of al-Tall in the Damascus countryside.

They came in months after Hezbollah’s intervention. Then came Russia’s intervention in 2015 which was the most decisive. This led the rebels to become constrained to specific regions and losing territories they had captured from the regime. Iran, Russia and the militias were partners with the regime in killing the Syrian people and destroying their country. It doesn’t take much effort to prove this.

Close Calls

*Did the regime ever come close to discovering the Caesar files?

My family’s house in al-Tall was once raided by the regime. They were searching for my youngest brother because he had taken part in a peaceful demonstration or some normal everyday thing which we all did. The members of the “political security” branch raided our home. This was at the beginning of the revolution and the officer in charge still showed some decency and respect.

He came into the house and carried out his search. He took the computers that I used for my work as a civil engineer. He had found it in my brother’s room. He took everything related to the computer. I remember the officer’s name was Mohammed Jomaa. When he learned that I was a civil engineer, he lectured me about patriotism and how the nation had spared no expense so that we could earn an education – slogans that regime members are forced to memorize during indoctrination sessions.

He took my ID and told me I should head to Damascus to get it and that I should bring my brother too to collect the computer. So, I remained without an ID for some time. I couldn’t even leave my city because showing up at any checkpoint without identification would have gotten me arrested. Had I been arrested, I would have ended up as one of the Caesar file photos.

During another incident, al-Tall was being invaded by the regime after a long battle with the rebels inside the city and the displacement of nearly all its residents. I had taken my parents and siblings to the nearby city of Seydnaya and stayed home. My youngest brother could not leave al-Tall and I wanted to remain with him and to also protect the data we had. My third brother insisted on remaining with us and so we did. We were searched by the security forces on numerous occasions.

The Free Syrian Army soon withdrew from the city and the regime forces swept in, committing several massacres in al-Tall. We were then forced to flee the building we were staying in. We couldn’t stay in our own home because it was located at the entrance of the city where the invasion had begun. So, I hid the camera I had and some equipment under a pile of garbage below the building. I thought to myself: “I’ll be able to find them should I survive because the forces won’t think about searching in the garbage for such things.”

We managed to flee the city and remained away for five or six days before returning to al-Tall. It was a holiday, so security had become a bit lax and phone services were restored. While in hiding, we witnessed how a tank and sniper had taken up position on higher ground. They were ready to attack anyone who passed through the area. The three of us had basically escaped with our lives.

Syria’s seat and the flag of the revolution are seen at an Arab League summit in Doha in 2013. (AFP)

Coalition Gives Assad Indirect Support

*Aside from the regime, did anyone try to undermine, obstruct or exploit your work?

In a way, yes. Our main battle after leaving Syria was aimed at preserving this file and keeping it away from political meddling. This file is about human rights violations. It belongs to all Syrians and it should be kept away from narrow interests. At first, the coalition tried to present itself as the sponsor of the file, which was a normal thing to do.

I approached them with a friend and met with the head of the government. I was in the waiting room for four hours with people drinking tea and coffee as if they were in a cafe. It was unfortunate to listen to conversations that had nothing to do with what was happening in Syria.

After four hours, we sat down for a short meeting with the head of government and explained the file to him. “We need help that would ensure that this file would be kept out of political disputes between the various members of the opposition and others. We need to protect our loved ones who are still in Syria,” we urged him. His response to this was truly shocking. “So you think this file will shake Bashar al-Assad's throne?” he told me.

The response was disappointing and unfortunate because he was someone who was supposed to be speaking on behalf of the Syrian revolution. This revolt is the most significant one since the French Revolution in 1789.

The toppling of the regime and establishment of a state of law and justice in Syria will change the Middle East and in turn, the world. This is what the French Revolution did three centuries ago. And so, for the coalition government to respond to me in such a way was very offensive. I left the meeting feeling dejected and with my thoughts with my family that we were trying to bring from Damascus.

That moment pained me deeply. I had come all this way, put myself and others in danger, only to come across someone who was there to exploit me. It was just such a shocking moment.

*So you were disappointed with the opposition?

Disappointment doesn’t even cut it. I was saddened and dejected. Had the Caesar file been handled properly, Assad wouldn’t have remained on his throne until 2024. Such a lack of responsibility. It is this attitude that extended the life of the Syrian regime and cost tens of thousands of Syrian lives.

So, for example, if you were to hold negotiations with the regime, what cards would you have if the Caesar file wasn’t one of them? What would you even talk about? The opposition spoke at international platforms of everything from the constitution to the color of the flag, language and system of rule. Not once did it bring up the issue of the detainees.

We have long said that the detainee file was above negotiations, meaning we would not negotiate with the regime over anything before we discuss this issue. Some members of the opposition interpreted this as negotiating everything and setting this issue to the side. I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry. This is why I say that the coalition helped extend the regime’s time in power.

People search for their loved ones among corpses of victims of torture at Seydnaya Prison. (AFP)

Seydnaya Prison and the Human Press

*You compared Seydnaya Prison to the Bastille and the Syrian revolution to the French one. What comes to mind when I say “Seydnaya”?

After the world saw what it was like inside Seydnaya, I can’t even imagine what it was like for people to be imprisoned there. For them to turn into numbers, then corpses and rotten bodies that are still living. They are then taken to the human press where they are turned into bones and tissue. Who could even imagine such a thing? Who could even endure such terror?

On the outside, we used to look at the prison as a symbol of oppression and injustice. These words don’t do justice to what the detainees went through for even a few minutes, so what could it even have been like for people who were held there for dozens of years? Perhaps the lucky ones were the detainees who entered the prison and were swiftly taken to the press.

*Were you surprised to learn about the press? Were you expecting to see such a thing?

It never occurred to me that the regime would use a press against humans. We had heard a lot about the different forms of torture and the mass graves, but a human press?! What kind of criminal mind did this regime have?

*What purpose did this press serve?

You and me, we are normal humans who love and feel for our relatives. We think soundly. This is not a question that can be answered by people who think reasonably. What could possibly prompt a criminal regime, which has the whole of Syria, to bring in a press to turn corpses into dust. The prison itself has thousands of meters of territory. Just bury the corpses there. No normal person could have operated the press.

Small Butchers and Senior Officers

*Can you name any of the big butchers who were responsible for the torture?

The list is long. We had filed lawsuits against several people before the German judiciary, including deputy chief of security affairs Ali Mamlouk, deputy director of national security and former head of military intelligence Abdel Fattah Qadsiye, and head of air force intelligence and Mazzeh prison warden Jamil al-Hassan. Hassan was the target of the first arrest warrant issued by the German judiciary.

The heads of security branches are directly responsible for the killing under torture, but they are not the only ones responsible. I have always said that arresting the head of the security branch and charging him with war crimes is not as important as issuing charges against the person who carried out the actual killing and torture in these jails. These are the people who enjoyed the killing. They don’t just kill because they were ordered to do so; they do it because they relish torturing people, and the result are the images that we have seen after the ouster of the regime.

They believe that they will be protected by their superiors and that they won’t be held to account. All the trials that have been held outside of Syria were dedicated to trying top rank officials or people who were proven to have committed murder. This is not enough. We must get the names of the people who carried out the direct killings so that they realize that the regime that they worshipped like God does not protect them.

People look through documents at the Seydnaya prison in Damascus on December 11, 2024. (AFP)

*Are the documents that have been collected enough to indict the smaller employees? Are there any names?

If you mean the Caesar files, which we took out of Syria in 2013, they only have a limited number of photos of regime members. Some names are there through signatures on documents, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they were the ones who tortured and killed the victims. Our files don’t have the names of the butchers in the jails who carried out the killing.

In order to establish a free Syria and a stable society, you must go through a period of transitional justice, which demands accountability. You cannot live in an area knowing that your neighbor still reeks of blood because he used to work for several years in Assad’s jails where he used to torture or kill detainees. So, everyone who committed human rights violations in Syria must be held to account in order for our society to become stable. We mustn't allow the opportunity for individual acts of revenge if relatives come to believe that they have not received justice against those who killed their loved ones.

The violations are not limited to killing and torture. There are so many violations. Everything that undermines human dignity is a violation, and so are attempts to create demographic change. You can’t simply tell people who lived in a tent along the Turkish border, Jordanian desert or in Lebanon for 12 years to return home, the regime is gone. Add to that a whole generation that has never been to school. They have never been given an opportunity to live a normal human life. So, these people must be compensated.

Destruction of Documents

*Do you worry that the fate of the victims of Seydnaya Prison will be the same as those of the Hama massacre?

This leads us to a problem that happened after Damascus’ liberation from the criminal tyrant Assad. The chaos that ensued in the first few days after his ouster led to the loss of a lot of documents and evidence. Of course, I am not blaming relatives who were frantically searching for their loved ones. They are justified for and had every right to feel that way. But I refuse that for you to receive your right, you deny others of theirs. The destruction of documents means that we won’t have evidence that implicates the criminals. So, you just denied relatives of victims their right to see the butcher who killed their son held to account.

Relatives entering the prisons wasn’t the only way these documents were destroyed. Some places were left in bad shape, and some were burned down later by unknown people. So, we know that some people are deliberately doing this with the aim of destroying these documents. Bashar al-Assad and the other criminals are probably very happy to see evidence destroyed this way and prison doors being flung open without documenting who the detainees are. We saw how prisoners walked on foot, naked, from Seydnaya to al-Tall. That’s a 3-km walk in the cold night.

*Do you compare Assad’s downfall to Saddam Hussein’s?

I don’t think you can compare the two. First, Assad was toppled by the Syrian people and by terror. Assad was toppled before the revolutionary forces made it to Damascus. All the conditions for his collapse were there. He was in his weakest state, and he was ousted by heroic Syrians, who entered Damascus after liberating Hama and Homs. Other Syrians had also worked on isolating the regime politically and economically by working with rights groups.

The situation was not like Iraq. A comparison between Assad and any other case from our time or in the past wrongs the other party. I don’t think Nero even deserves to be compared to Assad.

*So, is Nero better?

“Better” or “worse” are not the right words for this. I am saying that Bashar al-Assad was crazier and more criminal than Nero. There’s no room here to use the word “better”.

*The interview concludes on Thursday.



Shadow Battles in Syria: Fighting ISIS, Rebuilding the State 

An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
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Shadow Battles in Syria: Fighting ISIS, Rebuilding the State 

An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)
An aerial photograph shows thousands of people celebrating the first anniversary since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad near The Damascus Sword monument in Umayyad Square, in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025. (AFP)

At the entrances to Damascus branching off the Mezzeh highway, just before Umayyad Square, young men with a quasi-military appearance line both sides of the road, selling flags and banners for “Liberation Day.”

In narrower streets and at intersections leading deeper into the city, they are met by women in long dresses, some with headscarves pulled halfway across their faces. The women drag one or two children behind them and carry loaves of bread for sale, stacking them openly and thrusting them toward passersby and car windows — unwrapped, exposed to diesel fumes and the dust rising from the rubble encircling the capital.

Selling bread in this manner has gradually become a “profession,” largely female, expanding as poverty deepens. Women queue at bakeries to purchase their ration, resell it for a small margin, then return to the lines, repeating the cycle late into the night.

This scene is not confined to Damascus; it recurs across Syrian cities and regions I visited, from Homs and Idlib to Aleppo. Over time, this female presence has become woven into the landscape of a prolonged crisis, a quiet pillar of daily survival.

Widespread destruction

If women’s exhausted faces and roughened hands are the clearest witnesses to a catastrophe now nearing its fifteenth year, the unrelenting destruction bears equally stark testimony. Entire neighborhoods and suburbs, flattened to the ground, ring Damascus, choking it in dust and debris.

The same gray desolation dominates major cities and their surrounding countryside, stretching across vast expanses of the country. Driving more than 350 kilometers without encountering a single intact tree, neighborhood, or home offers a visceral sense of what over a decade of killing, destruction, and vengeance has left behind.

The scale of devastation reflects not only military confrontations or the superiority of one side, but a deliberate effort to annihilate people and livelihoods, to extinguish even the faintest hope of return. What bombs spared was often burned, looted, or rendered uninhabitable. And yet, returns are taking place slowly, haltingly, through sheer individual persistence.

Only a few enclaves have endured in Damascus and its markets, or beyond in certain towns and districts, some even prospering, driven by sectarian calculations or political and commercial interests, most notably those tied to the production and trafficking of captagon.

A view of Damascus, Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Damascus: The polished façade

Damascus was preparing for exceptional celebrations marking the first anniversary of Bashar al-Assad’s ouster. Preparations were extensive: stages erected, loudspeakers installed, traffic rerouted, and banners raised proclaiming national unity, “One people... one nation”, and announcing that “the dark era has ended.”

Programs circulated via text messages urging citizens to participate and “celebrate freedom and hope... and complete the story.” But which story? The question reverberates through streets where bread is sold on bare asphalt while victory celebrations unfold.

Here, narratives multiply and diverge, sometimes to the point of contradiction, like neighboring bubbles that coexist without touching. A sharp vertical divide in perspectives remains, recalling 2011, when Syrians split to the brink between supporters and opponents, even as official discourse insists on projecting a seamless image of a new phase.

Silent security battle

Behind the celebratory façade, another battle is underway, which is quieter and more complex. “ISIS, especially the muhajireen [foreign fighters], poses our most serious challenge,” a senior Syrian security source who requested anonymity told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that arrests and “neutralizations” are carried out regularly.

Another source explained that “security operations are conducted with precision and professionalism. Lists of those affiliated with extremist organizations under the broad ISIS umbrella are already in the hands of the security services.”

He added: “We know them individually. We monitor them closely. The former regime left behind an extremely detailed surveillance system that we continue to rely on.”

I met both sources days before the recent Palmyra incident. When it occurred, it appeared unsurprising; officials and those in sensitive positions had anticipated such scenarios as among several looming security risks, especially after Syria formally joined the counterterrorism coalition.

One source summarized these risks as three simultaneous confrontations: “First, the fight against ISIS and its offshoots, handled with extreme caution because it poses a personal threat to President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Second, the confrontation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which threatens the emerging state and its identity over the long term. Third, a colder, less intense standoff with Israel linked to developments in Sweida.”

In a semi-official assessment, the security source did not rule out that those released from al-Hol camp could become “time bombs,” exploited to destabilize internal security and serve the agendas of extremists rejecting the current transition of power.

Such incidents could also signal abroad that stripping the SDF of its “counterterrorism” duties would be futile, potentially “opening the door to packs of lone wolves.”

Destruction from fighting between the regime forces and opposition is seen in the Yarmuk camp on the outskirts of Damascus. (EPA)

Is a security approach enough?

The challenge confronting the state is not purely a security one, and a strictly securitized approach lacks consensus even within governing circles.

Contrary to those who view ISIS and extremism as a “technical problem” solvable through force alone, a figure close to the political leadership argues that “the core issue lies in absorbing a massive human bloc that spent years outside any normal social framework, without education, stable families, or organized structures of life.”

“The real challenge,” he added, “is integrating them into the idea of the state and rehabilitating them accordingly. Just as these adolescents were once pulled toward a specific form of extremism, today we must work to move them toward a middle ground.”

“If the president says we are leaving a factional phase and entering a state-based one, how does that happen at the grassroots level? Is it merely individual and security-driven, or is it societal as well?” he wondered.

In this light, one observer interpreted al-Sharaa’s statement — “Obey me so long as I obey God among you” — delivered from the Umayyad Mosque on the night of the grand celebration and widely criticized by civil and secular circles, as a message aimed at a different audience: a segment the state seeks to reassure through a religious call to obedience and rejection of rebellion.

If words come easily, lived reality does not.

Security is tightly enforced in major cities, such as Damascus and Aleppo, through heavy deployments and modern technologies, including drones, especially during sensitive periods like mass anniversary celebrations.

Beyond the cities, however, vast rural areas remain largely neglected, marked by immense destruction, extreme poverty, and rampant unemployment. Checkpoints line major inter-provincial roads, but side towns and village alleys are often left to fend for themselves.

Idlib, once cited as an exception for its services and administrative capacity, has lost much of that distinction since liberation. Opening to the rest of Syria exposed the city and its devastated countryside to the demands of ordinary life, revealing governance that had amounted largely to crisis management. That legacy persists even in everyday language: soldiers addressing civilians as “sheikh,” or telling them to “seek God’s help” as shorthand for “move along.”

Between Idlib’s countryside and Aleppo, villages and small towns are known for particular loyalties and affiliations — some far removed from the moderation celebrated on Damascus stages. Their reputations lead drivers to take longer routes considered “safer.”

In this belt, young men, especially the youngest, have long served as fuel for armed factions. In recent years, only Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintained dominance on the ground.

After the fall of the regime, thousands joined the general security forces or the army, often for lack of alternatives. Many cannot afford to rebuild destroyed homes or recover looted livelihoods; barracks, offering food and shelter, remain preferable to civilian life.

A fabric of clashing identities

These identities crystallized during years of militarization, particularly after 2013, though their social roots run deeper. Today, anyone associated with the new authority is often labeled “Idlibi,” after Idlib — the stronghold of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for nine years — a term frequently tinged with condescension in Damascus and Aleppo. Understanding the social and economic distinctions among these rural communities helps explain their divergent political and military choices.

Some towns, organized around extended families, land ownership, and later labor migration beginning in the mid-1980s, invested in education and professional paths while maintaining a socially rooted religiosity. These communities had previously experienced nationalist and Arabist currents before Baathist authoritarianism took hold.

Others, smaller towns built around sub-clans, relied on seasonal agriculture and service in the police and security apparatus of the former regime. They welcomed their sons’ joining the Nusra Front when it began recruiting, seeing in it both as an organized military path against Assad and a religious identity long suppressed.

Added to this are vast desert regions governed by tribal structures and shifting systems of mutual aid.

Though all are Arab Sunnis, their behaviors, loyalties, and alignments differed, shaping how radical factions penetrated some communities while failing in others, often setting one group against another.

Syrian security forces detain a suspect during an anti-ISIS operation in the Idlib countryside on December 1. (Syrian Interior Ministry)

Idlib and the keys to Damascus

When security officials say today they know extremists “one by one,” they rely partly on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s security apparatus and its accumulated knowledge of radical factions it fought in recent years, such as Jund al-Aqsa and the al-Qaeda-aligned Hurras al-Din, along with informant networks.

Idlib remains, to a significant extent, a secure stronghold holding key levers of power. Courts, administrative bodies, and civil registries still operate under the “Sharia courts” established in mid-2013, unlike other regions, especially Damascus, where transactions are centralized.

Sources identify three main recruitment pathways used by ISIS and its offshoots: ideological recruitment, the fastest and most effective, especially among youth who embraced extremism and have yet to absorb Syria’s rapid changes; recruitment driven by money and revenge amid pervasive poverty and lost status; and recruitment among foreign fighters, embittered by abandonment and with little left to lose.

The emerging state and the ‘Sahwa’ model

When President al-Sharaa returned from Washington, he carried a daunting mandate: to “confront and dismantle terrorist networks” linked to remnants of ISIS, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Hamas, according to US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack.

While Israel has targeted Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, Syria must contend with their residual networks. Yet the greater challenge remains ISIS and its offshoots, fighters who, until recently, were close “brothers in arms” to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

As observers await the form this confrontation will take, particularly in the absence of a unified army with a clear doctrine, Washington’s earlier experiment in post-Saddam Iraq looms large: the Sunni-on-Sunni “Awakening” (Sahwa).

The Sahwa rested on what an informed Iraqi source described as a “coalition of the harmed” from al-Qaeda, centered in Anbar province with its Sunni Arab identity and traditional religiosity. A similar model could emerge in Syria through an alliance of communities damaged by ISIS in the north and northeast, led by the emerging state that wants to fight extremism.

The Iraqi source, who closely followed the Sahwa’s rise and subsequent decline under then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, noted that tribes around Ramadi, especially al-Bourisha, al-Buallwan, al-Bou Fahd, and to a lesser extent al-Dulaim, formed the backbone of the fight after al-Qaeda devastated their trade and social fabric.

Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, greets people as he attends celebrations marking the first anniversary of the ousting of former President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Dec. 8, 2025. (AP)

Though some were coerced into allegiance, clashes never fully ceased, culminating in atrocities such as the massacre of the al-Bu Nimr tribe, where nearly 2,000 men were executed. A Syrian parallel is the al-Shaitat tribe, which resisted ISIS and suffered one of the largest massacres, with around 1,800 young men killed.

Those who joined the Sahwa were required to publicly renounce al-Qaeda and integrate into security forces coordinated with US troops, in hopes of transforming that tribal bloc into a political actor.

From arms to politics

The Iraqi source highlighted a central lesson: despite the Sahwa’s security successes, it failed to transition into meaningful political participation. When its leaders entered elections, they achieved little representation and failed to build durable popular support.

That failure mirrors Syria’s core dilemma today: the collective transition from a factional, militarized reality confined to limited geography toward a state defined by broader political and administrative principles — and, militarily, by the monopoly of force within a single national army.

Between a woman selling bread on a street corner, a young man dancing in a public square, and institutions struggling to impose order and define the state, Syria appears as a country of overlapping bubbles: a glossy façade prepared for celebration, like a carefully designed postcard, and beneath it a fragile social and security depth whose battles remain unresolved.


Iraq’s Dreams of Wheat Independence Dashed by Water Crisis 

A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
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Iraq’s Dreams of Wheat Independence Dashed by Water Crisis 

A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A drone view shows a circular wheat field in the desert of Basra, Iraq, November 27, 2025. (Reuters)

Iraqi wheat farmer Ma'an al-Fatlawi has long depended on the nearby Euphrates River to feed his fields near the city of Najaf. But this year, those waters, which made the Fertile Crescent a cradle of ancient civilization 10,000 years ago, are drying up, and he sees few options.

"Drilling wells is not successful in our land, because the water is saline," al-Fatlawi said, as he stood by an irrigation canal near his parched fields awaiting the release of his allotted water supply.

A push by Iraq - historically among the Middle East's biggest wheat importers - to guarantee food security by ensuring wheat production covers the country's needs has led to three successive annual surpluses of the staple grain.

But those hard-won advances are now under threat as the driest year in modern history and record-low water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have reduced planting and could slash the harvest by up to 50% this season.

"Iraq is facing one of the most severe droughts that has been observed in decades," the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's Iraq representative Salah El Hajj Hassan told Reuters.

VULNERABLE TO NATURE AND NEIGHBORS

The crisis is laying bare Iraq's vulnerability.

A largely desert nation, Iraq ranks fifth globally for climate risk, according to the UN's Global Environment Outlook. Average temperatures in Iraq have risen nearly half a degree Celsius per decade since 2000 and could climb by up to 5.6 C by the end of the century compared to the period before industrialization, according to the International Energy Agency. Rainfall is projected to decline.

But Iraq is also at the mercy of its neighbors for 70% of its water supply. And Türkiye and Iran have been using upstream dams to take a greater share of the region's shared resource.

The FAO says the diminishing amount of water that has trickled down to Iraq is the biggest factor behind the current crisis, which has forced Baghdad to introduce rationing.

Iraq's water reserves have plunged from 60 billion cubic meters in 2020 to less than 4 billion today, said El Hajj Hassan, who expects wheat production this season to drop by 30% to 50%.

"Rain-fed and irrigated agriculture are directly affected nationwide," he said.

EFFORTS TO END IMPORT DEPENDENCE UNDER THREAT

To wean the country off its dependence on imports, Iraq's government has in recent years paid for high-yield seeds and inputs, promoted modern irrigation and desert farming to expand cultivation, and subsidized grain purchases to offer farmers more than double global wheat prices.

It is a plan that, though expensive, has boosted strategic wheat reserves to over 6 million metric tons in some seasons, overwhelming Iraq's silo capacity. The government, which purchased around 5.1 million tons of the 2025 harvest, said in September that those reserves could meet up to a year of demand.

Others, however, including Harry Istepanian - a water expert and founder of Iraq Climate Change Center - now expect imports to rise again, putting the country at greater risk of higher food prices with knock-on effects for trade and government budgets.

"Iraq's water and food security crisis is no longer just an environmental problem; it has immediate economic and security spillovers," Istepanian told Reuters.

A preliminary FAO forecast anticipates wheat import needs for the 2025/26 marketing year to increase to about 2.4 million tons.

Global wheat markets are currently oversupplied, offering cheaper options, but Iraq could once again face price volatility.

A person walks along the edge of uncultivated farmland on the outskirts of Najaf, where dry soil stretches across fields left unplanted due to water shortages, in Najaf, Iraq, November 29, 2025. (Reuters)

Iraq's trade ministry did not respond to a request for comment on the likelihood of increased imports.

In response to the crisis, the ministry of agriculture capped river-irrigated wheat at 1 million dunams in the 2025/26 season - half last season's level - and mandated modern irrigation techniques including drip and sprinkler systems to replace flood irrigation through open canals, which loses water through evaporation and seepage.

A dunam is a measurement of area roughly equivalent to a quarter acre.

The ministry is allocating 3.5 million dunams in desert areas using groundwater. That too is contingent on the use of modern irrigation.

"The plan was implemented in two phases," said Mahdi Dhamad al-Qaisi, an advisor to the agriculture minister. "Both require modern irrigation."

Rice cultivation, meanwhile, which is far more water-intensive than wheat, was banned nationwide.

RURAL LIVELIHOODS AT RISK

One ton of wheat production in Iraq requires about 1,100 cubic meters of water, said Ammar Abdul-Khaliq, head of the Wells and Groundwater Authority in southern Iraq. Pivoting to more dependence on wells to replace river water is risky.

"If water extraction continues without scientific study, groundwater reserves will decline," he said.

Basra aquifers, he said, have already fallen by three to five meters.

Groundwater irrigation systems are also expensive due to the required infrastructure like sprinklers and concrete basins. That presents a further economic challenge to rural Iraqis, who make up around 30% of the population.

Some 170,000 people have already been displaced in rural areas due to water scarcity, the FAO's El Hajj Hassan said.

"This is not a matter of only food security," he said. "It's worse when we look at it from the perspective of livelihoods."

At his farm in Najaf, al-Fatlawi is now experiencing that first-hand, having cut his wheat acreage to a fifth of its normal level this season and laid off all but two of his 10 workers.

"We rely on river water," he said.


Report: Assad Returns to Ophthalmology, His Family Lives in Russian Luxury  

Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)
Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)
TT

Report: Assad Returns to Ophthalmology, His Family Lives in Russian Luxury  

Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)
Bashar al-Assad with his wife, Asma, walk with their children in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in 2022. (Former Syrian presidency Facebook page/AFP/Getty Images)

A year after his regime was toppled in Syria, Bashar al-Assad's family is living an isolated, quiet life of luxury in Moscow.

A friend of the family, sources in Russia and Syria, as well as leaked data, helped give rare insight into the lives of the now reclusive family who once ruled over Syria with an iron fist.

Bashar now sits in the classroom, taking ophthalmology lessons, according to a well-placed source.

“He’s studying Russian and brushing up on his ophthalmology again,” a friend of the Assad family, who has kept in touch with them, told The Guardian.

“It’s a passion of his, he obviously doesn’t need the money. Even before the war in Syria began, he used to regularly practice his ophthalmology in Damascus,” they continued, suggesting the wealthy elite in Moscow could be his target clientele.

The family are likely to reside in the prestigious Rublyovka, a gated community of Moscow’s elite, according to two sources with knowledge of the situation. There they would rub shoulders with the likes of the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who fled Kyiv in 2014 and is believed to live in the area, according to The Guardian.

The Assads are not wanting for money. After being cut off from much of the world’s financial system by western sanctions in 2011 after Assad’s bloody crackdown on protesters, the family put much of their wealth in Moscow, where western regulators could not touch it.

Despite their cushy abode, the family are cut off from the elite Syrian and Russian circles they once enjoyed. Bashar’s 11th-hour flight from Syria left his cronies feeling abandoned and his Russian handlers prevent him from contacting senior regime officials.

Assad fled with his sons out of Damascus in the early hours of December 8, 2024, as Syrian opposition fighters approached the capital from the north and the south. They were met by a Russian military escort and were taken to the Russian Hmeimim airbase, where they were flown out of the country.

Assad did not warn his extended family or close regime allies of the impending collapse, instead leaving them to fend for themselves.

A friend of Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother and a top military official, who knows many former members of the palace said: “Maher had been calling Bashar for days but he wouldn’t pick up.”

“He stayed in the palace until the last second, opposition fighters found his shisha coals still warm. It was Maher, not Bashar, who helped others escape. Bashar only cared about himself.”

“It’s a very quiet life,” said the family friend. “He has very little, if any, contact with the outside world. He’s only in touch with a couple of people who were in his palace, like Mansour Azzam [former Syrian minister of presidency affairs] and Yassar Ibrahim [Assad’s top economic crony].”

‘Irrelevant’ to Putin

A source close to the Kremlin said Assad was also largely “irrelevant” to Putin and Russia’s political elite. “Putin has little patience for leaders who lose their grip on power, and Assad is no longer seen as a figure of influence or even an interesting guest to invite to dinner,” the source said.

In the first months after the Assads’ escape, his former regime allies were not on Bashar’s mind. The family gathered in Moscow to support Asma, the British-born former first lady of Syria, who had had leukemia for years and whose condition had become critical. She had been receiving treatment in Moscow before the fall of the Assad regime.

According to a source familiar with the details of Asma’s health, the former first lady has recovered after experimental therapy under the supervision of Russia’s security services

With Asma’s health stabilized, the former dictator is keen to get his side of the story out. He has lined up interviews with RT and a popular rightwing American podcaster, but is waiting for approval from Russian authorities to make a media appearance.

Russia appears to have blocked Assad from any public appearance. In a rare November interview with Iraqi media about Assad’s life in Moscow, Russia’s ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, confirmed that the toppled dictator was barred from any public activity.

“Assad may live here but cannot engage in political activities ... He has no right to engage in any media or political activity. Have you heard anything from him? You haven’t, because he is not allowed to – but he is safe and alive,” Kutrashev said.

Assad children dazed

Life for the Assad children in contrast seems to continue with relatively little disruption, as they adjust to a new life as Moscow elite.

The family friend, who met some of the children a few months ago, said: “They’re kind of dazed. I think they’re still in a bit of a shock. They’re just kind of getting used to life without being the first family.”

The only time the Assad family – without Bashar – have been seen together in public since the end of their regime was at his daughter Zein al-Assad’s graduation on June 30, where she received a degree in international relations from MGIMO, the elite Moscow university attended by much of Russia’s ruling class.

A photograph on MGIMO’s official website shows the 22-year-old Zein standing with other graduates. In a blurry separate video from the event, members of the Assad family, including Asma and her two sons Hafez, 24, and Karim, 21, can be seen in the audience.

Two of Zein’s classmates who attended the ceremony confirmed that parts of the Assad family were present, but said they kept a low profile. “The family did not stay long and did not take any pictures with Zein on stage like other families,” said one of the former classmates, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Hafez, once groomed as Bashar’s potential successor, has largely withdrawn from public view since posting a Telegram video in February in which he offered his own account of the family’s flight from Damascus, denying they had abandoned their allies and claiming it was Moscow that ordered them to leave Syria.

Syrians quickly geolocated Hafez, who took the video while walking the streets of Moscow.

Hafez has closed most of his social media, instead registering accounts under a pseudonym taken from an American children’s series about a young detective with dyslexia, according to leaked data. The children and their mother spend much of their time shopping, filling their new Russian home with luxury goods, according to the source close to the family.