Here’s What Happens Next During the Ceasefire in Gaza

Palestinian former inmates of the Ofer military prison are welcomed upon arriving to Ramallah after being released as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, in the West Bank city of Ramallah, 25 January 2025. (EPA)
Palestinian former inmates of the Ofer military prison are welcomed upon arriving to Ramallah after being released as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, in the West Bank city of Ramallah, 25 January 2025. (EPA)
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Here’s What Happens Next During the Ceasefire in Gaza

Palestinian former inmates of the Ofer military prison are welcomed upon arriving to Ramallah after being released as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, in the West Bank city of Ramallah, 25 January 2025. (EPA)
Palestinian former inmates of the Ofer military prison are welcomed upon arriving to Ramallah after being released as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, in the West Bank city of Ramallah, 25 January 2025. (EPA)

The first week of the latest ceasefire between Israel and the Hamas group is complete. Hamas has begun to release hostages and Israel has freed nearly 300 Palestinian prisoners.

But the deal has hit its first major complication. Israel on Saturday said a female civilian hostage named Arbel Yahoud was supposed to be released and it has delayed the planned return of hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza.

Here’s a look at what’s ahead in the five remaining weeks of the ceasefire's first phase.

What’s happened so far

This is the second ceasefire in 15 months of the deadliest and most destructive war between Israel and Hamas, which controls Gaza. The first occurred over a year ago and lasted a week. The current ceasefire is longer and holds the potential to end the war, though the steps toward that are vastly more challenging than what’s unfolding now. The mediators are Qatar, Egypt and the United States.

Early this week, the first three Israeli hostages held in Gaza were released and the first 90 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were released several hours later. On Saturday, another four hostages and 200 Palestinian prisoners were released.

Meanwhile, Israeli forces have pulled back to buffer zones inside Gaza, fighting has stopped, hundreds of trucks carrying humanitarian aid have entered the territory and many Palestinians displaced by the war have been returning to what remains of their homes and communities.

What’s next

Saturday was Day 7 of the ceasefire. Starting on Day 14, next Saturday, three hostages should be released every seven days in exchange for more Palestinian prisoners.

By the end of the 42 days, all living women, children and older people held by the fighters should be freed. Eventually, bodies of hostages might be included in the releases, as Israel believes at least a third of the more than 90 captives still inside Gaza were killed in the Oct. 7, 2023 attack that triggered the war or have died in captivity.

By Sunday, Israel was meant to allow Palestinians to return to badly hit northern Gaza. But Israel now says Palestinians will not be able to cross north through the Netzarim corridor that bisects the territory east to west because Yahoud had not been freed.

The deal called for the release of civilian women on Saturday and soldiers were freed instead. It was not immediately clear why Yahoud was not released.

Hamas said it held Israel responsible for “any delay in implementing the agreement and its repercussions.”

A senior Hamas official said the group told mediators that Yahoud will be released next week. An Egyptian official involved in negotiations called the matter a “minor issue” that mediators were working to resolve. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

Already, hundreds of anxious Palestinians were gathering and waiting to cross into northern Gaza, which like much of the rest of the territory has been largely destroyed.

One Palestinian was shot and killed near the Netzarim corridor on Saturday, according to Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir al-Balah. Israel's military didn't immediately comment.

After the first six weeks

In the ceasefire’s second phase, all remaining hostages are to be released in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a “sustainable calm.” Talks about Phase 2 are set to begin on Day 16, Feb. 3.

But a lot remains to be discussed. Israel has said that after the ceasefire's first phase, it will decide how to proceed.

Israel has said it won’t agree to a complete withdrawal from Gaza until Hamas’ military and political capabilities are eliminated. Hamas says it will not hand over the last hostages until Israel removes all troops from the territory.

Both sides will have to agree to a plan for governing Gaza. Hamas has said it would be willing to step aside, but it may still seek a hand in any future government, which Israel has rejected. And Hamas is unlikely to give up its weapons.

If all sides reach the third phase, it is likely to be less contentious. The bodies of remaining hostages would be returned in exchange for a three- to five-year reconstruction plan in Gaza, but who will pay for it remains unclear.



What Remains of Hezbollah’s Military Arsenal?

Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
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What Remains of Hezbollah’s Military Arsenal?

Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)

The rockets that Hezbollah continues to fire, since its decision to join what it calls a support war for Iran, have surprised observers with their intensity and type, particularly in Israel.

Israeli media have expressed astonishment that the group still retains such military capabilities, despite the ongoing war against it since September 2023.

Previous Israeli assessments suggested that a large part of Hezbollah’s arsenal had been eroded during the last war and the bombardment campaigns that followed, which continued for 15 months against its depots and positions.

However, the pace of launches since the start of the new round of fighting has raised serious questions about the actual size of this arsenal, its sources, how it has been preserved, where the remaining stockpiles are located, and how they are managed and used under these complex conditions.

This comes as the Lebanese army had also seized a considerable portion of these weapons in the area south of the Litani River.

Questions also extend beyond the military stockpile to Hezbollah’s ability to fill leadership vacancies after assassination operations that targeted hundreds of its commanders and fighters, and how large numbers of these fighters have been able to reach and take part in ground combat in border villages and towns.

Secret storage sites

Most military experts believe these fighters have not left their towns and villages during this period, keeping their weapons in private facilities that have not been raided.

Riad Kahwaji, a researcher and writer on security and defense affairs, said Israeli estimates indicate that between 50% and 70% of Hezbollah’s arsenal was destroyed during the previous war and subsequent operations over the past 15 months.

He added that if the group possessed around 100,000 rockets, as prevailing narratives claim, then even if 70% were eliminated, about 30,000 would remain, which is not a small number.

He added that the arsenal in the Bekaa Valley has not yet been used.

On the locations of the rockets and storage sites, Kahwaji told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel had often destroyed the entrances to some tunnels, whether in the south or along the eastern mountain range, but had not been able to destroy them entirely, meaning their contents likely remain intact.

This, he said, explains talk of intentions to reach these tunnels through ground operations to seize them.

Kahwaji also said Hezbollah had not cooperated with the Lebanese army, either south or north of the Litani River. As a result, most army raids targeted sites identified by Israel and the mechanism committee, meaning many other locations remain untouched.

He added that Hezbollah fighters had not left south of the Litani and remained with their weapons in private facilities that the Lebanese army had refused to enter, which had long cast doubt on claims that the area had been fully cleared. Recent developments, he said, showed that this was not the case.

Kahwaji added that Hezbollah also has facilities for manufacturing Katyusha and Grad rockets and assembling drones. He noted that most of the rockets fired recently belong to these types, which the group possesses in large quantities.

By contrast, the number of long-range missiles in its possession is limited, although some have been fired as far as 150 km into Israel. He also pointed to smuggling operations that had taken place via Syria to bolster its arsenal with guided missiles such as the Kornet.

Tunnels and underground centers

Retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou, a lecturer in geopolitics, said it was not surprising that Hezbollah still possesses such an arsenal and capabilities despite what it has faced over the past two years and the closure of the Syrian border.

He noted that from 2006 to 2023, over 17 years, Hezbollah had dug tunnels and underground facilities and stockpiled weapons arriving from Iran via Damascus and Aleppo airports, before being transported by land into Lebanon around the clock.

Israel, he said, had been unable to effectively target these supply lines over the years, intercepting only about 50%, according to Israeli sources.

Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah had made extensive preparations at all levels, not only in terms of weapons, but also logistically and medically.

Although Israel destroyed a large portion of these weapons and facilities during the last war, and supply lines through Syria have since been cut, some capabilities remain intact.

He added that while the Lebanese army in the south had raided sites it was able to identify, other locations likely remain undiscovered.

He said rockets currently being fired are launched either from the Bekaa Valley or areas north of the Litani River, as battlefield developments indicate that much of the area south of the Litani was in fact largely devoid of weapons.


Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
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Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year

Within Iran’s ruling structure in Tehran, the post of intelligence minister is far from a routine cabinet role. The ministry, established after the 1979 revolution, is a central pillar of the security system, overseeing a wide network of intelligence operations at home and abroad.

While the president formally nominates the minister, the appointment is effectively decided with the Supreme Leader's approval, placing the role within a security structure closely tied to his office.

From this position, conservative cleric Esmail Khatib rose to lead Iran’s intelligence apparatus in 2021, after more than four decades in the Islamic Republic’s security and judicial institutions.

His career ended dramatically during the Iran-Israel war. On the 19th day of the conflict, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the Israeli air force had carried out a strike in Tehran that killed Khatib.

The Israeli military said Khatib oversaw an apparatus responsible for espionage and covert operations, and played a role in suppressing protests inside Iran.

The announcement came days after his name surfaced outside Iran, when the US State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on several senior Iranian officials linked to the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader’s office, including Khatib.

For years, Khatib operated largely in the shadows within intelligence institutions. He moved to the center of the Iran-Israel confrontation as the shadow conflict between the two sides escalated in recent years.

The announcement of his death added his name to a list of figures from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council killed in the conflict, including Secretary Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Pakpour, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

From seminary to state institutions

Esmail Khatib was born in 1961 in Qaenat, South Khorasan province, eastern Iran. In the mid-1970s, he moved to the seminary in Qom, where he studied Islamic jurisprudence under senior clerics.

His teachers included Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Mojtaba Tehrani. He also attended jurisprudence lessons taught by Ali Khamenei before he became the supreme leader. This religious path was common for clerics who entered state institutions after the 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khatib quickly joined the new system. At 19, he enlisted in the Revolutionary Guards and worked in intelligence and operations units during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Reports indicate he was wounded, later placing him among recognized veterans, a status that carries political weight in Iran.

Entry into the intelligence ministry

In the mid-1980s, after the creation of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in 1983, Khatib moved to the new body, which became Iran’s main civilian intelligence agency. He worked in several departments, including foreign affairs and intelligence analysis.

He gained prominence in the 1990s when he was appointed head of intelligence in Qom province.

Qom, a stronghold of the clerical establishment, is among Iran’s most sensitive provinces due to its religious institutions. Managing security there required navigating complex balances among clerics and political factions.

Khatib held the post for more than a decade, during a period marked by political tensions in the city, including developments linked to senior cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, once seen as a potential successor to Ruhollah Khomeini before being sidelined.

Closer to the center of power

Over time, Khatib moved into roles closer to decision-making centers. In 2010, he joined the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a unit responsible for his security and protection, a position reserved for senior intelligence officials.

Two years later, he was appointed head of the judiciary’s protection and intelligence center, tasked with monitoring judicial institutions and ensuring their political loyalty.

He remained in the role until 2019, during the tenure of judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani. With Ebrahim Raisi’s later appointment as head of the judiciary, ties between the two men strengthened.

The Astan Quds phase

In 2019, Khatib moved to Astan Quds Razavi in Mashhad, one of Iran’s largest economic and religious institutions, which oversees the Imam Reza shrine.

He took charge of security and protection within the organization, part of a network of institutions directly linked to the supreme leader’s office. He remained there until 2021, when he returned to the intelligence ministry, this time as its head.

Intelligence minister

In August 2021, after Ebrahim Raisi was elected president, he nominated Khatib as intelligence minister. As is customary, the appointment came after approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had the final say on sensitive security posts.

Khatib became the eighth intelligence minister since the ministry’s establishment. He took office as Iran faced multiple security challenges, including sabotage at nuclear facilities, assassinations of scientists and officials, and an escalating intelligence confrontation with Israel.

Iran’s political landscape shifted after President Ebrahim Raisi died in May 2024 in a helicopter crash in the northwest. After subsequent elections, President Masoud Pezeshkian formed a new government.

Khatib was among the few ministers to retain his post. Pezeshkian renominated him, a move analysts said reflected the sensitivity of the role.

His retention drew criticism from some political and reformist circles that had hoped for changes in the leadership of security agencies.

Rivalry within the security apparatus

At the start of his tenure, Khatib worked to manage a key issue within the security establishment, the complex relationship between the intelligence ministry and its parallel counterpart, the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization.

The two bodies have overlapping mandates and often compete over major security files. Khatib sought to improve coordination, particularly in countering what the system described as foreign infiltration. The balance, however, remained complicated, reflecting ties to different power centers.

Protests and sanctions

Khatib’s tenure saw one of Iran’s largest protest waves in the past decade. In 2022, demonstrations erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini while in the morality police custody.

Security agencies, including the intelligence ministry, played a central role in responding through arrests, investigations and the pursuit of activists.

Khatib echoed the official line, describing the protests as driven by foreign interference and accusing the United States, Britain and Israel of involvement.

In September 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on Khatib and the ministry, accusing it of running cyberattack networks targeting governments and companies in multiple countries, including Albania.

Security failures

Despite repeated announcements of dismantling espionage networks, Iran’s security apparatus faced criticism over several failures.

Among the most notable was a deadly attack in Kerman in 2024 during a ceremony marking the anniversary of Qassem Soleimani’s killing, which left dozens dead.

Assassinations inside Iran, including those targeting figures linked to the so-called resistance axis, also exposed vulnerabilities.

These incidents sparked debate within Iran’s elite over the system’s ability to counter external infiltration.

Criticism intensified after the killing of numerous Iranian officials, including military commanders and nuclear scientists, during the 12-day war in June, amid reports of extensive intelligence breaches.

End of a security career

Throughout his career, Esmail Khatib remained largely out of the spotlight. He was not a mass political figure, but a security official who rose steadily through state institutions.

The Iran-Israel war in 2026, however, thrust him into the center of the confrontation. The Israeli announcement of his killing on the 19th day of the war ended a career spanning more than 40 years in the security services.

Whether seen as a major intelligence blow or another chapter in the regional conflict, Khatib’s trajectory reflects a common path within Iran’s complex security establishment: a cleric who began in the seminary, joined the Revolutionary Guards in the early years of the revolution, and rose through the ranks to one of the most sensitive posts in the Iranian state.


Killing of Larijani Complicates Iran’s Decision-Making, Shrinks Its Options

 People gather around the coffin of Iranian security chief Ali Larijani during a funeral for Larijani and victims of the IRIS Dena warship at Enghelab Square, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
People gather around the coffin of Iranian security chief Ali Larijani during a funeral for Larijani and victims of the IRIS Dena warship at Enghelab Square, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
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Killing of Larijani Complicates Iran’s Decision-Making, Shrinks Its Options

 People gather around the coffin of Iranian security chief Ali Larijani during a funeral for Larijani and victims of the IRIS Dena warship at Enghelab Square, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
People gather around the coffin of Iranian security chief Ali Larijani during a funeral for Larijani and victims of the IRIS Dena warship at Enghelab Square, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)

The killing of Iran's most influential powerbroker, Ali Larijani, has pushed the country into a more uncertain phase, complicating decision-making in Tehran and narrowing its options as the war grinds on.

The US-Israeli war on Iran began with the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alongside a group of military commanders, and shows no sign of abating, with several more senior officials now targeted by air strikes.

The deeper challenge for Tehran is increasingly structural. A system built for endurance is being tested by attrition. As experienced officials are picked off in targeted killings, the pool of figures capable of managing both war and statecraft is shrinking.

Four senior Iranian officials said there were few figures in the establishment like Larijani who could translate battlefield realities into political strategy — a gap that could slow decision-making and coordination.

Iran's security chief Larijani combined rare clerical legitimacy, rooted in his prominent religious family, with the stature of a seasoned politician who had deep ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

Those credentials made him a trusted intermediary in a system where power centers — from clerics to the security apparatus — often compete for influence, one of the ‌officials said.

Alex Vatanka, a ‌senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., said Larijani's death and those of many other ‌senior ⁠figures will "obviously upset ⁠the political process in Tehran and might even jeopardize policy continuity or policy flexibility."

The Iranian regime has long been structured to withstand the loss of senior officials, two of the officials said, but they added that replacing Larijani as a powerbroker under wartime conditions will be far more difficult.

Another official said the immediate effect is "not necessarily weakness of the regime, but disarray," because losing someone like Larijani risks making governance more fragmented and reactive.

SURVIVAL TRUMPS IDEOLOGY

Larijani's death is likely to tilt the system further toward its security institutions, tightening control but reducing flexibility — both in prosecuting the war and in shaping any eventual endgame, analysts said.

Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's Iran Project Director, said Larijani's removal would not paralyze the system, but it "would deprive it of yet another ⁠senior figure capable of exercising prudence at a dangerous moment".

"With every assassination, Iran moves further away from democratic ‌opening and closer to either praetorian rule or state collapse," said Vaez.

All the officials who ‌spoke to Reuters said the establishment's main goal was survival.

"The regime as a whole has always been anchored around the Iran of survival and expediency. In ‌that sense, they are ideological radicals who will go a long way in this war or as long as they can but will ‌also look for a way out," said Vatanka.

Analysts have ruled out an imminent collapse of the clerical rule in Iran amid the war or a military coup by the Guards, which have tightened their grip on wartime decision-making despite the loss of top commanders.

Asked about the possibility of a coup, Vaez said: "They do not need to. They’re already in full control." One of the officials said the Guards are committed to the system of velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic ‌jurist.

A senior reformist former official said the core supporters of the clerical establishment number around 12 million people, and "many of them support the regime because they believe in a system run by a ⁠religious figure."

ATTENTION TURNS TO QALIBAF

If ⁠Israel's targeted killing continues, the regime may find that survival is not simply a matter of resilience but of replacement — and that replacing men like Larijani is far harder than the system was built to admit, analysts said.

With several top officials killed, parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf stands out as one of the few remaining figures with both military credentials and political clout.

Qalibaf, a former commander with close ties to the Guards and the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, has long cast himself as a strongman in the mold of a modernizing authoritarian.

Sima Shine, a former chief Mossad analyst and currently a researcher at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, said the emerging power structure appears increasingly concentrated in Qalibaf and the security establishment.

"We assume that the IRGC and Qalibaf are the most important people now ... It will be Qalibaf on the level of a decision, and the IRGC on the practical level of pushing the button,” Shine said.

Even so, Qalibaf lacks Larijani's clerical pedigree and the same depth of relationships within Iran's religious hierarchy. That deficit could complicate efforts to unify the system's competing factions, even if it strengthens alignment with the security forces.

For now, the war may be buying the leadership time, rallying the state even as it weakens it. But that balance may not hold indefinitely. If the leadership begins to see a real risk to its survival, Shine said, it could become more willing to compromise "because the survival of the regime is the most important goal."