SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
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SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pose the main challenge to Syria’s new administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, as it seeks to move past the conflict and rebuild the state.

While efforts focus on forming a unified army under state control, most factions have agreed to join the Defense Ministry. However, the SDF insists on keeping its independent military structure and refuses to disband or integrate its fighters individually. Instead, it wants to remain a single unit within the new army.
This stance contradicts the administration’s position, which rejects any military force outside the new national army.

Syrian Administration’s Stance on the SDF

The new Syrian administration has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations remain its primary approach to resolving its dispute with the SDF, with several rounds of talks held in recent months.

Syrian government sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “negotiations are still the main option, and preparations are underway for new rounds in an effort to reach a comprehensive solution that eliminates any risk of future conflict.”

They added that the government’s policy is based on “unifying the country and preventing any military factions from operating outside the Defense Ministry’s authority.”

The sources also stressed that “the Kurdish issue is an internal Syrian matter and should not rely on external actors for a resolution.

Competing Agendas

Khaled al-Shuayti, one of the few Arab military commanders within the SDF in Deir Ezzor, said Arab tribes involved in the SDF through alliances and fighters “will not engage in a confrontation with the new Syrian state.”

Given the geography in which the SDF operates, it has forged alliances with local Arab communities and tribes in surrounding areas. Arab fighters number around 2,000 or slightly more, but they have little influence over the SDF’s internal and external policies.

“If the Kurdish leadership insists on pursuing non-Syrian agendas, Arab fighters will break away from the SDF,” al-Shuayti told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A faction within the SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi, supports talks with Damascus but faces opposition from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, which refuses to disarm before securing key demands.

These include keeping the SDF as a single unit within Syria’s Defense Ministry and granting Kurds some form of autonomy.

Abdi, born Ferhad Abdi Sahin in Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in 1967, fought alongside the PKK and is a close associate of its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He helped establish the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which later became the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

Abdi’s push for negotiations with Damascus coincides with expectations that Ocalan may soon call for disarmament and an end to military action.

Al-Shuayti believes Abdi is stalling to ease pressure while securing political gains for Syria’s Kurds, including a role in governance and constitutional guarantees.

Researcher Firas Faham from the Abaad Center for Strategic Studies told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new Syrian administration prefers diplomacy with the SDF, using Türkiye’s military threats as leverage to push the group into talks with Damascus.

However, the SDF is unlikely to make major decisions until US President Donald Trump clarifies his stance on withdrawing American troops from Syria.

“The SDF wants to retain its military structure within the Syrian army and maintain special administrative control over its territories,” Faham said.

“Damascus, on the other hand, may be open to granting Kurdish local councils some autonomy and recognizing certain cultural rights. But when it comes to military control, the Syrian government remains firm on maintaining a unified command,” he added.

Possible Scenarios

According to Faham, the future of relations between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces hinges largely on whether Trump decides to keep or withdraw American troops from Syria.

The first scenario is a negotiated agreement in which the SDF drops what Damascus considers unrealistic demands, including maintaining its forces as a unified bloc within the Syrian army and abandoning its push for federal autonomy in areas under its control.

The second scenario is military confrontation if the SDF refuses to reach an agreement with Damascus. In this case, Türkiye could intervene alongside the new Syrian army, leading to a likely military defeat for the SDF without securing any gains.

The third scenario is maintaining the status quo, with the SDF retaining control over its forces and continuing to govern areas east of the Euphrates separately from the new Syrian administration. Currently, the SDF operates like a state within a state, with its own military and security forces and territory beyond Damascus’ control.

Internal divisions within the SDF further complicate the situation. One faction, led by Abdi, aligns with the West, while another, the Qandil faction—considered the most powerful—maintains close ties with Iran. This faction is dominated by PKK leaders from both Syria and Türkiye.

Faham noted that Iran is strengthening its alliance with the Qandil faction within the SDF, viewing it as a tool to maintain influence in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Kurds within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Kurdish activist Kurdi Ayubi, an Islamist who opposes the nationalist ideology represented by the SDF and who previously fought with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), estimates that only a few hundred Kurds share his views.

He argues that the real power in SDF-controlled areas remains in the hands of the PKK.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayubi explained that “cadres” — fighters who initially served with the PKK and later joined the SDF after the Syrian revolution began — became involved in fighting with the start of the battle of Kobani against ISIS.

These cadres come from various nationalities, including Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds.

“The Syrian cadres work almost openly, as seen with figures like Abdi, Farhad Shami, and Bulat Jan, alongside prominent women leaders such as Ilham Ahmed, who was a key fighter in the PKK,” added Ayubi.

Ayubi said any agreement with the Syrian government would need approval from Qandil, with the final solution depending on the relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan.

He suggested the best approach for Damascus is to follow two paths: one, direct talks with the Qandil faction, and two, engaging with Kurdish tribal leaders in Kobani, Qamishli, and nearby areas.

Ayubi said: “Qandil wants a normal relationship with Damascus, as long as it remains discreet.”

He added that reaching an agreement with Qandil would allow Damascus to enter the region peacefully.



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.