عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
TT
TT

SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pose the main challenge to Syria’s new administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, as it seeks to move past the conflict and rebuild the state.

While efforts focus on forming a unified army under state control, most factions have agreed to join the Defense Ministry. However, the SDF insists on keeping its independent military structure and refuses to disband or integrate its fighters individually. Instead, it wants to remain a single unit within the new army.
This stance contradicts the administration’s position, which rejects any military force outside the new national army.

Syrian Administration’s Stance on the SDF

The new Syrian administration has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations remain its primary approach to resolving its dispute with the SDF, with several rounds of talks held in recent months.

Syrian government sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “negotiations are still the main option, and preparations are underway for new rounds in an effort to reach a comprehensive solution that eliminates any risk of future conflict.”

They added that the government’s policy is based on “unifying the country and preventing any military factions from operating outside the Defense Ministry’s authority.”

The sources also stressed that “the Kurdish issue is an internal Syrian matter and should not rely on external actors for a resolution.

Competing Agendas

Khaled al-Shuayti, one of the few Arab military commanders within the SDF in Deir Ezzor, said Arab tribes involved in the SDF through alliances and fighters “will not engage in a confrontation with the new Syrian state.”

Given the geography in which the SDF operates, it has forged alliances with local Arab communities and tribes in surrounding areas. Arab fighters number around 2,000 or slightly more, but they have little influence over the SDF’s internal and external policies.

“If the Kurdish leadership insists on pursuing non-Syrian agendas, Arab fighters will break away from the SDF,” al-Shuayti told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A faction within the SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi, supports talks with Damascus but faces opposition from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, which refuses to disarm before securing key demands.

These include keeping the SDF as a single unit within Syria’s Defense Ministry and granting Kurds some form of autonomy.

Abdi, born Ferhad Abdi Sahin in Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in 1967, fought alongside the PKK and is a close associate of its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He helped establish the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which later became the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

Abdi’s push for negotiations with Damascus coincides with expectations that Ocalan may soon call for disarmament and an end to military action.

Al-Shuayti believes Abdi is stalling to ease pressure while securing political gains for Syria’s Kurds, including a role in governance and constitutional guarantees.

Researcher Firas Faham from the Abaad Center for Strategic Studies told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new Syrian administration prefers diplomacy with the SDF, using Türkiye’s military threats as leverage to push the group into talks with Damascus.

However, the SDF is unlikely to make major decisions until US President Donald Trump clarifies his stance on withdrawing American troops from Syria.

“The SDF wants to retain its military structure within the Syrian army and maintain special administrative control over its territories,” Faham said.

“Damascus, on the other hand, may be open to granting Kurdish local councils some autonomy and recognizing certain cultural rights. But when it comes to military control, the Syrian government remains firm on maintaining a unified command,” he added.

Possible Scenarios

According to Faham, the future of relations between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces hinges largely on whether Trump decides to keep or withdraw American troops from Syria.

The first scenario is a negotiated agreement in which the SDF drops what Damascus considers unrealistic demands, including maintaining its forces as a unified bloc within the Syrian army and abandoning its push for federal autonomy in areas under its control.

The second scenario is military confrontation if the SDF refuses to reach an agreement with Damascus. In this case, Türkiye could intervene alongside the new Syrian army, leading to a likely military defeat for the SDF without securing any gains.

The third scenario is maintaining the status quo, with the SDF retaining control over its forces and continuing to govern areas east of the Euphrates separately from the new Syrian administration. Currently, the SDF operates like a state within a state, with its own military and security forces and territory beyond Damascus’ control.

Internal divisions within the SDF further complicate the situation. One faction, led by Abdi, aligns with the West, while another, the Qandil faction—considered the most powerful—maintains close ties with Iran. This faction is dominated by PKK leaders from both Syria and Türkiye.

Faham noted that Iran is strengthening its alliance with the Qandil faction within the SDF, viewing it as a tool to maintain influence in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Kurds within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Kurdish activist Kurdi Ayubi, an Islamist who opposes the nationalist ideology represented by the SDF and who previously fought with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), estimates that only a few hundred Kurds share his views.

He argues that the real power in SDF-controlled areas remains in the hands of the PKK.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayubi explained that “cadres” — fighters who initially served with the PKK and later joined the SDF after the Syrian revolution began — became involved in fighting with the start of the battle of Kobani against ISIS.

These cadres come from various nationalities, including Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds.

“The Syrian cadres work almost openly, as seen with figures like Abdi, Farhad Shami, and Bulat Jan, alongside prominent women leaders such as Ilham Ahmed, who was a key fighter in the PKK,” added Ayubi.

Ayubi said any agreement with the Syrian government would need approval from Qandil, with the final solution depending on the relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan.

He suggested the best approach for Damascus is to follow two paths: one, direct talks with the Qandil faction, and two, engaging with Kurdish tribal leaders in Kobani, Qamishli, and nearby areas.

Ayubi said: “Qandil wants a normal relationship with Damascus, as long as it remains discreet.”

He added that reaching an agreement with Qandil would allow Damascus to enter the region peacefully.

Most Viewed

 
 
Features

Lebanon Enters Conflict Management Phase as End Remains Elusive

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
TT
TT

Lebanon Enters Conflict Management Phase as End Remains Elusive

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)

Negotiations to cement the ceasefire in southern Lebanon, alongside talks on the future of the south, the role of the Lebanese army and international guarantees, are raising a central question: Is Lebanon heading toward a repeat of the model that followed the July 2006 war, or has the latest conflict pushed it into a wholly different phase?

Nearly two decades after the 2006 war led to UN Resolution 1701, the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River and a long effort to regulate the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, today’s conditions look starkly different. The scale of destruction in the south is deeper, and the international approach to what comes next appears more forceful.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, university professor and lawyer Ali Mourad said the reality on the ground, away from “point-scoring speeches and declarations of victory,” demands a new reading of the war and the future of the south.

The south, he said, remains occupied, devastated on an unprecedented scale, and trapped in a displacement crisis likely to drag on.

Israel targets Tyre (Reuters)

 

“Talk of ending the conflict in Lebanon can only be achieved through a set of basic goals: ending the war definitively, withdrawing Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory, returning prisoners, launching reconstruction and securing the safe and sustainable return of displaced people to their areas,” Mourad said.

Mourad, who comes from the southern border town of Aitaroun, said the main fear was “Iran’s attempt to take hold of the Lebanese file.” Such a move, he said, could prolong the management of the conflict rather than end it, keeping the roots of tension alive and blocking a final, stable settlement.

Hezbollah’s weapons at the heart of the deadlock

Mourad said there would be “no real end to this conflict without a clear and decisive handling of Hezbollah’s weapons.”

Leaving the issue unresolved, he said, would place Lebanon before a model entirely unlike the one that followed the 2006 war. Comparing the two phases is no longer realistic, he added, given the changes now in place.

“The south today is destroyed on an unprecedented scale, while the battlefield and military realities clearly show that the existing equations are difficult to overturn in the foreseeable future,” he said.

That reality, Mourad said, requires sustainable political solutions that address the roots of the crisis, rather than simply managing it. Ending the conflict, he added, depends on resolving the core unresolved issues, not merely halting military operations or containing current tensions.

“Any approach that does not address the causes of the crisis will lead to its reproduction in one form or another,” he said.

 

Israel targets Tyre (AFP)

 

The post-2006 phase is over

Retired Maj. Gen. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies, said the situation in southern Lebanon “differs radically from the phase that followed the July 2006 war.”

Talk of returning to the formulas of Resolution 1701 as applied then is no longer realistic, he said, given the military and political changes produced by the latest war.

“What happened after 2006 is completely different from what is happening today,” Jaber told Asharq Al-Awsat. “At that time, Israel quickly withdrew from the Lebanese territory it had occupied, and political and diplomatic tracks were launched with broad Arab and international support. Today, Israel is holding on to the areas it occupies and does not seem ready to give them up easily.”

 

A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese region of Marjayoun shows smoke rising following an Israeli airstrike on the village of Choukine on June 19, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

 

Jaber said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces domestic pressure that pushes him to keep the war going and avoid concessions.

“Netanyahu cannot appear as someone who fought a long war that ended without clear gains,” he said. “Continuing military pressure is therefore a way for him to improve negotiating terms and force the Lebanese position into submission.”

A pause, not an end to war

Jaber, who is from Nabatieh, said the current situation does not amount to a comprehensive end to the war. Rather, he called it “a temporary halt to some military operations.”

Israel, he said, still claims the right to strike whenever and wherever it chooses against targets it considers linked to Hezbollah.

“The Israelis say clearly that they retain freedom of military action in Lebanon,” he said. “So we cannot speak of an end to the war as much as we can speak of managing the conflict and controlling the level of confrontation.”

Jaber said the comparison with 2006 no longer stands.

“The post-2006 phase is over,” he said. “We are facing a completely different new reality, and Israel will not accept a return to the previous equations or to the situation that existed before the latest war.”

Washington manages the conflict

Jaber said the United States is managing the conflict more than trying to end it.

“If it wanted to end it completely, it would have applied sufficient pressure to stop the war definitively,” he said. “What we are seeing today is conflict management and an attempt to prevent it from exploding, nothing more.”

Israel, he said, is treating the border strip and destroyed villages as “a buffer security zone.”

“There are dozens of villages that are almost completely destroyed, and their residents cannot return because of the scale of destruction and the absence of reconstruction capacity, making the crisis likely to continue for a long time,” he said.

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of South Lebanon Fronts (AFP)

 

A difficult test for Lebanon’s army

On the Lebanese army’s role, Jaber said the military faces challenges that exceed its current capabilities.

Some proposals under discussion, especially those related to moving Hezbollah fighters away from areas south of the Litani, cannot be carried out without a full Israeli withdrawal and clear security guarantees, he said.

“The army cannot be asked to carry out unilateral measures while Israeli occupation continues and attacks persist,” he said. “This is unrealistic, and the army cannot resolve the problem alone in this way.”

Jaber said the next phase would remain governed by mutual attrition.

“We are facing a phase of managing the conflict, not ending it,” he said. “I do not expect a major breakthrough in the foreseeable future. The war has effectively turned into a low-intensity war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah, but the real price is being paid by the Lebanese people, especially the people of the south, who have been drained by war, displacement and destruction.”

Talks unlike any earlier phase

While Jaber’s view starts from the military and field realities created by the latest war, Brig. Gen. Khaled Hamadeh, a researcher in security and political affairs, links the future of this phase to the negotiations themselves.

He said the talks differ radically from all previous rounds, and that their success remains tied to US-Iranian understandings.

Hamadeh told Asharq Al-Awsat that the current negotiations between Lebanon and Israel are unlike the 2000, 2006 or 2024 arrangements linked to Resolution 1701.

“The military, political and regional circumstances have completely changed, while the outcome remains tied to the path of US-Iranian dialogue,” he said.

“In 2000, indirect negotiations took place between Hezbollah and Israel with German mediation to implement Resolution 425. Israel withdrew without conditions, and the border was demarcated. Today, the scene is completely different because the Lebanese state is conducting the negotiations, not the party.”

After the 2006 war, he said, Resolution 1701 called for UNIFIL to deploy alongside the Lebanese army south of the Litani, with a mechanism to monitor implementation and prevent any armed presence outside the state in that area.

“But this mechanism later proved ineffective, and war returned and fighting resumed,” he said.

Hamadeh said the current process is not a new international resolution, but understandings based on Resolution 1701. The difference, he said, is that they are being built through negotiations led by the Lebanese state, with security responsibility gradually shifting to the state after earlier monitoring mechanisms failed.

“The main difference today is that the negotiations are moving toward ending the conflict,” he said.

The latest US memorandum, he added, speaks for the first time of ending the state of war between Lebanon and Israel and addressing border issues between the two states — points not included in Resolution 1701.

From Resolution 1701 to the armistice agreement

“If we compare the current texts with the 1949 armistice agreement, we find a great similarity,” Hamadeh said.

The armistice agreement, he said, was based on a commitment by Lebanon and Israel not to use regular or irregular forces in military action against the other side. Today, he added, the principle being established is that the Lebanese state alone should assume responsibility for security, and that no weapons should remain outside its framework.

Hamadeh also pointed to a major difference on the ground.

“In the 2006 war, Israeli military achievements were limited, and Israeli forces did not penetrate deep into Lebanese territory in the way that has happened today,” he said. “In the latest confrontation, Israeli forces went beyond southern Litani and reached deeper areas, while Hezbollah suffered major field losses, making the balance of power completely different from what it was in 2006.”

US-Iranian understanding remains decisive

Hamadeh said the current agreement is also unfolding “under a US-Iranian understanding,” a factor that was absent in earlier phases. Iran’s role in the Lebanese file, he said, has become deeper and more influential than before.

On the chances of success, Hamadeh said it was “far too early” to speak of definitively ending the conflict, because the Lebanese negotiations cannot be separated from the US-Iranian track.

“We must wait to see where those talks lead, and only then can we judge their repercussions for Lebanon,” he said. “If the US-Iranian negotiations fail, Iran may return to using the Lebanese arena again. Therefore, the most influential element in the scene has not yet stabilized, and no final results can be built before the picture becomes clear.”

Hamadeh said any disruption in implementing the proposed understandings — whether on cementing the ceasefire, full withdrawal, or Hezbollah’s weapons — would lead to another round of fighting.

“Any agreement that is not completed through the implementation of all its stages will not be viable,” he said.

Features

Afghans Come Home But Risk Exclusion Without any ID

Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
TT
TT

Afghans Come Home But Risk Exclusion Without any ID

Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP

Lugging suitcases across the border after packing up in Pakistan, Afghans are returning home with their worldly possessions but often lack one key item to restart their lives: an identity card.

On the Afghan side of the Torkham border crossing, children and adults wheeled their luggage or carried belongings atop their heads, as they moved from desk to desk to log their arrival, reported AFP.

"I don't know how and where to get the ID card; now I'll go and check," said 17-year-old Abdulrehman Sudais, standing beside a crate of chickens he had carried across the border for his mother.

The Pakistan-born teenager had been to Afghanistan just once before, but his cousin had already told him he would need ID to access work or education.

Out of 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023, more than 86 percent are listed as undocumented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

At the crossing point, which still bears the shrapnel marks of this year's war between the neighboring countries, officials and aid workers were taking down everyone's details.

While border officials contact authorities nationwide to verify the identity of those who don't have any form of ID, the process for newly arrived Afghans can be bewildering.

Sardar Khan, 41, was sitting in a large tent at Omari camp near the crossing, where people get a return certificate and are fingerprinted.

"We are blind; we don't know what to do," he told AFP, as his son fell asleep at his side.

"We've never been to Afghanistan before; we'll get to know the importance of ID cards," he said.

As well as a requirement for getting a job or school place, an ID card is essential for Afghans trying to prove they own land or a home, claiming inheritance, accessing state benefits, and travelling through the myriad of checkpoints across the country.

Outside the tent, as the temperature hit 40C, people waiting to be processed huddled in the limited shade available.

Ziad Salih, regional coordinator at IOM, described the ID card as "one of the essential pieces of the puzzle" for Afghans.

"Many returnees are arriving without a valid ID document and this is placing them at risk of administrative and social exclusion," he told AFP at the agency's Torkham transit center.

Afghanistan's Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation Affairs did not respond to AFP's request to comment on the documentation issue.

'Difficult decisions'

Near the Torkham crossing, colorful trucks were piled high with families' furniture and other possessions from Pakistan.

Once Afghans reach their destination -- often the places their relatives fled years ago -- organizations have helplines and projects to support them with their paperwork.

Murat Khan Safi, an octogenarian who returned a few months ago, found rooms to rent on the outskirts of Jalalabad, the closest city to the border crossing.

"We were given a number at Torkham, then we contacted WADAN, and we made the ID cards," he told AFP, referring to the Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan that works with the UN refugee agency (UNHCR).

Surrounded by sons and grandsons under a clattering ceiling fan, Safi showed the tattered identity document he has kept since fleeing the Soviet occupation more than four decades ago.

Processing the new ID cards only took a couple of days, he said, but paying a fee of 500 Afghanis ($7.80) for each relative was hard.

"I made some difficult decisions... I had to sell household belongings," said Safi, his white beard matching the color of his clothes.

The family has been reimbursed for the ID card fees by the Welfare Association, and is due to receive additional support.

In June, the United Nations launched an initiative that aims to help Afghans get 1.5 million identity documents over the next three years.

Arafat Jamal, UNHCR's representative for Afghanistan, described the lack of documentation as an "almost invisible" phenomenon.

"The absence of documentation is a serious impediment to continuing your lives," he told AFP in the capital Kabul.

The UN appeal comes as global aid cuts hit hard in Afghanistan, with those crossing the border entering a country where jobs are scarce and support has been shrinking.

At Omari camp, Nazamin Baloch didn't know how to get an ID card but knew from other Afghans that it was "important for everything".

"This is the first time I am coming to Afghanistan," said Baloch, in her sixties.

"No one in the family has an ID card... We have not even seen our country before."

Features

What Are the Key Challenges Facing NATO?

National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)
National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)
TT
TT

What Are the Key Challenges Facing NATO?

National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)
National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)

NATO leaders gathering for a summit in Ankara on July ‌7-8 will discuss a host of challenges facing the alliance, from Europe taking on more responsibility for the continent’s security to boosting defense industrial production.

Some officials worry the Iran war could overshadow the gathering, but hope leaders will remain focused on the alliance’s core business: defense and deterrence.

Here is a look at the main challenges facing NATO in the months and years to come:

KEEPING TRUMP IN

NATO officials say one of their primary goals is to maintain unity and keep the US committed to the alliance’s Article 5 clause, which specifies that an attack on one of its members is an attack on all.

The alliance faced two crises this year which have fueled tension in the transatlantic relationship: US President Donald Trump’s demands for ownership of Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO-member Denmark, and his anger at NATO allies over their response to the Iran war.

The US president branded the alliance a "paper tiger" and said he was considering withdrawing from NATO. The alliance's Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, has sought to smooth over tensions, using a ‌mix of flattery ‌and data to persuade Trump that European NATO members are fulfilling their promises.

BURDEN-SHIFTING

The Trump ‌administration ⁠has pushed European ⁠governments to take on primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe as Washington seeks to dedicate more resources to the Indo-Pacific.

Some changes are already under way: Washington has decided to shrink the pool of US military capabilities available to NATO in a crisis, and European NATO members have filled almost all the gaps.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has also announced a new review of America's troop deployments in Europe and threatened to withhold some US dues to NATO if "free-riding" allies did not meet their defense spending commitments.

European officials say they are working to step up on defense. But some have also questioned the US approach, arguing that a transition ⁠requires time and raising concern about the unpredictability of policy coming from Washington.

SPENDING MORE

European ‌NATO members and Canada are under significant pressure to boost defense investment both ‌to improve deterrence and defense against Russia and to demonstrate to Trump that they are taking his demands for burden-shifting seriously.

At a ‌summit in the Hague last year, NATO leaders backed the big increase in defense spending that Trump demanded, pledging to ‌spend 5% of GDP on defense and defense-related measures within a decade. Countries pledged to spend 3.5% of GDP on core defense — such as troops and weapons — and 1.5% on broader defense-related measures.

NATO's European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in 2025 compared with the previous year in real terms, according to alliance data. But not everyone is on a trajectory to meet the new goals, and ‌a number of governments are starting to run into political difficulties with defense spending.

INDUSTRY

With European NATO countries boosting defense investment, a major challenge for the alliance is how to ⁠turn money into new military ⁠capabilities in a short timeframe.

In Ankara, NATO members are expected to announce tens of billions of dollars in new contracts. But some officials have expressed frustration that production has not increased at the pace they had hoped and that it still takes years to get some orders.

NATO's leadership has called on industry to work together, open new production lines and deliver more quickly.

DETERRING RUSSIA

NATO leaders meeting in Ankara are expected to reiterate that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.

While alliance officials say Russia is grappling with significant economic problems and Ukraine has strengthened its position, Rutte has cautioned that nearly half of Russia’s state budget is now dedicated to defense and that the alliance cannot be naive about Moscow.

UKRAINE

European NATO members are continuing to finance aid for Kyiv, more than four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Money is channeled in various ways, including bilateral assistance, a European Union loan and the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List initiative where European countries pay to supply Ukraine with US weapons.

While most European leaders say they are committed to continuing to support Kyiv, sustaining a high level of funding remains a challenge amid other demands on national budgets and concern in some capitals that some European governments are contributing disproportionately more than others.