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SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
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SDF Factions: Uncertain Scenarios in Complex Relations with Damascus

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa delivers a speech following the “Declaration of the Syrian Revolution’s Victory” (Syrian Presidency)

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pose the main challenge to Syria’s new administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, as it seeks to move past the conflict and rebuild the state.

While efforts focus on forming a unified army under state control, most factions have agreed to join the Defense Ministry. However, the SDF insists on keeping its independent military structure and refuses to disband or integrate its fighters individually. Instead, it wants to remain a single unit within the new army.
This stance contradicts the administration’s position, which rejects any military force outside the new national army.

Syrian Administration’s Stance on the SDF

The new Syrian administration has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations remain its primary approach to resolving its dispute with the SDF, with several rounds of talks held in recent months.

Syrian government sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “negotiations are still the main option, and preparations are underway for new rounds in an effort to reach a comprehensive solution that eliminates any risk of future conflict.”

They added that the government’s policy is based on “unifying the country and preventing any military factions from operating outside the Defense Ministry’s authority.”

The sources also stressed that “the Kurdish issue is an internal Syrian matter and should not rely on external actors for a resolution.

Competing Agendas

Khaled al-Shuayti, one of the few Arab military commanders within the SDF in Deir Ezzor, said Arab tribes involved in the SDF through alliances and fighters “will not engage in a confrontation with the new Syrian state.”

Given the geography in which the SDF operates, it has forged alliances with local Arab communities and tribes in surrounding areas. Arab fighters number around 2,000 or slightly more, but they have little influence over the SDF’s internal and external policies.

“If the Kurdish leadership insists on pursuing non-Syrian agendas, Arab fighters will break away from the SDF,” al-Shuayti told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A faction within the SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi, supports talks with Damascus but faces opposition from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, which refuses to disarm before securing key demands.

These include keeping the SDF as a single unit within Syria’s Defense Ministry and granting Kurds some form of autonomy.

Abdi, born Ferhad Abdi Sahin in Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in 1967, fought alongside the PKK and is a close associate of its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He helped establish the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which later became the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

Abdi’s push for negotiations with Damascus coincides with expectations that Ocalan may soon call for disarmament and an end to military action.

Al-Shuayti believes Abdi is stalling to ease pressure while securing political gains for Syria’s Kurds, including a role in governance and constitutional guarantees.

Researcher Firas Faham from the Abaad Center for Strategic Studies told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new Syrian administration prefers diplomacy with the SDF, using Türkiye’s military threats as leverage to push the group into talks with Damascus.

However, the SDF is unlikely to make major decisions until US President Donald Trump clarifies his stance on withdrawing American troops from Syria.

“The SDF wants to retain its military structure within the Syrian army and maintain special administrative control over its territories,” Faham said.

“Damascus, on the other hand, may be open to granting Kurdish local councils some autonomy and recognizing certain cultural rights. But when it comes to military control, the Syrian government remains firm on maintaining a unified command,” he added.

Possible Scenarios

According to Faham, the future of relations between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces hinges largely on whether Trump decides to keep or withdraw American troops from Syria.

The first scenario is a negotiated agreement in which the SDF drops what Damascus considers unrealistic demands, including maintaining its forces as a unified bloc within the Syrian army and abandoning its push for federal autonomy in areas under its control.

The second scenario is military confrontation if the SDF refuses to reach an agreement with Damascus. In this case, Türkiye could intervene alongside the new Syrian army, leading to a likely military defeat for the SDF without securing any gains.

The third scenario is maintaining the status quo, with the SDF retaining control over its forces and continuing to govern areas east of the Euphrates separately from the new Syrian administration. Currently, the SDF operates like a state within a state, with its own military and security forces and territory beyond Damascus’ control.

Internal divisions within the SDF further complicate the situation. One faction, led by Abdi, aligns with the West, while another, the Qandil faction—considered the most powerful—maintains close ties with Iran. This faction is dominated by PKK leaders from both Syria and Türkiye.

Faham noted that Iran is strengthening its alliance with the Qandil faction within the SDF, viewing it as a tool to maintain influence in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Kurds within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Kurdish activist Kurdi Ayubi, an Islamist who opposes the nationalist ideology represented by the SDF and who previously fought with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), estimates that only a few hundred Kurds share his views.

He argues that the real power in SDF-controlled areas remains in the hands of the PKK.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayubi explained that “cadres” — fighters who initially served with the PKK and later joined the SDF after the Syrian revolution began — became involved in fighting with the start of the battle of Kobani against ISIS.

These cadres come from various nationalities, including Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds.

“The Syrian cadres work almost openly, as seen with figures like Abdi, Farhad Shami, and Bulat Jan, alongside prominent women leaders such as Ilham Ahmed, who was a key fighter in the PKK,” added Ayubi.

Ayubi said any agreement with the Syrian government would need approval from Qandil, with the final solution depending on the relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan.

He suggested the best approach for Damascus is to follow two paths: one, direct talks with the Qandil faction, and two, engaging with Kurdish tribal leaders in Kobani, Qamishli, and nearby areas.

Ayubi said: “Qandil wants a normal relationship with Damascus, as long as it remains discreet.”

He added that reaching an agreement with Qandil would allow Damascus to enter the region peacefully.

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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)

Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.

That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.

Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.

“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.

“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.

“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”

Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.

“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.

Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant

I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.

“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.

“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”

Stunned, I listened as he went on.

“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”

As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.

A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.

He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.

Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship

Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.

Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.

Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.

Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”

Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.

“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.

He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.

“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”

Crackdown on Palestinian media

Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.

“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”

That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.

“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.

As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.

“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”

Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”

Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.

A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)

Deep-seated mutual hatred

Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.

“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”

He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”

Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”

Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”

The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.

After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.

“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.

Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.

He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”

These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.

Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.

Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.