Will Trump Allow Russia to Set up a Military Base in Sudan?

Senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Cameron Hudson. (Just Security)
Senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Cameron Hudson. (Just Security)
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Will Trump Allow Russia to Set up a Military Base in Sudan?

Senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Cameron Hudson. (Just Security)
Senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Cameron Hudson. (Just Security)

American former diplomat Cameron Hudson said US President Donald Trump’s new administration will show an interest in the war in Sudan because it does not want the country to become a haven for terrorism.

Hudson, who is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told Asharq Al-Awsat from Nairobi that Washington wants to preserve security along the entirety of the Red Sea coast.

This means that Iran and Russia will not be allowed to establish any bases there, he stressed.

Moreover, Hudson revealed that the Trump administration wants to expand the Abraham peace accords in the Middle East. Sudan is a signatory to the accords, he noted, while wondering how it can be implemented there amid the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Peace in the Middle East is essential for there to be peace in Sudan, he remarked.

Noting a previous agreement between Sudan and Russia for the latter to set up a naval base there, Hudson questioned the credibility of the deal.

If it is true, then it will certainly be a major problem for Trump, he added. He will most likely make a strong reaction that will inform Sudan that it made the bad decision.

Trump does not want Russia to threaten his interests in the Red Sea, he went on to say.

The administration has yet to name a team on African affairs, he added, but hoped that it will do so soon because the situation in Sudan is pressing.

He expected Washington to remain abreast the developments and changes in the war in Sudan.

The army appears to be on the way to recapturing the capital Khartoum, but the RSF may seize the city of Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which will in turn allow it to capture the whole of Darfur.

Hudson said he does not know how the Trump administration would respond to such a scenario. As it stands, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has accused the RSF of committing genocide, so it is unlikely that Washington will talk to them should any negotiations take place.

Regardless of what happens, Hudson said he was confident the Trump administration will do better than its predecessor which had viewed both the army and RSF equally.

Moreover, he said former President Joe Biden’s administration was slow in responding to the October 25, 2021, coup that took place in Sudan. The war soon followed.

The administration only hired an envoy to Sudan a year after the war erupted, he noted. It also wavered in how it dealt with the army and RSF, treating them both equally, before later saying it will only talk to the civilian forces.

The forces, however, were not organized and did not have a vision over how to stop the war, Hudson continued.

On sanctions against army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, Hudson said the administration should have done so at the beginning of the war, not the final weeks of its term.

The sanctions are still in place and the Trump administration has an opportunity to use them to determine how thing unfold in Sudan, such as set conditions that could pave the way for lifting them, specifically off Burhan, Hudson explained.

The former diplomat described Burhan as “very wise” and that he is aware of how destructive the war has been on Sudan, its people and economy.

Burhan wants to stop the war, but there should first be a solution to the RSF threats. A sustainable solution is needed in Sudan so that war does not erupt again, he urged.

Furthermore, he added that Trump enjoys good ties with the Arab countries neighboring Sudan. These countries have interests in Sudan and they can be part of a deal that can help end the war.



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.