Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
TT

Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).

After the 1973 war, former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad realized that reclaiming the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights through military means was impossible. His frustration grew when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took a different approach, negotiating to regain the Sinai Peninsula. As a leader from a minority sect, Assad feared a similar path would leave his successor inheriting an Israeli flag in Damascus. With limited options, he turned to Lebanon, a country he had never forgotten was once part of Greater Syria.

Lebanon became Assad’s strategic battleground, defensive shield, and political bargaining chip. His regime never tolerated any attempt to “steal Lebanon” from its grasp, whether the perceived threat came from Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, René Moawad, or Rafik Hariri. Jumblatt’s defiance was particularly intolerable—he was a close ally of Yasser Arafat and resisted Assad’s efforts to dominate Palestinian decision-making.

Toufic Sultan, a key political figure and close associate of Kamal Jumblatt, witnessed these events firsthand. As Jumblatt’s deputy in both the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese National Movement (a coalition supporting Palestinian and leftist causes), Sultan recalls:

“I attended multiple meetings between President Assad, Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, and Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt, always polite yet direct, spoke candidly. In 1976, he established a structured relationship with Assad, who insisted that meetings occur regularly. He frequently told Hikmat Shihabi (Syrian Army Chief of Staff) that these discussions should be ongoing—and they were.”

Jumblatt Refused to Praise Assad

During one visit to Damascus, Jumblatt met with Baath Party leaders, including Abdullah al-Ahmar and Palestinian official Zuheir Mohsen. The meeting, like many in Syria, was likely monitored. At one point, a Syrian Baathist asked Jumblatt why he wouldn’t align with them. Jumblatt dismissed the idea, saying, “Because I don’t form alliances with parties that take orders from external powers.”

Later that day, at a lunch hosted by Assad at the Rawda Palace, a joint statement was released. Sultan recalls:

“I saw Jumblatt take out a pen and start crossing out lines. He had completely removed a passage praising Assad’s so-called ‘Corrective Movement.’ He turned to me and said, ‘We never said this. Why should we?’ He did this in front of Assad, who then instructed his aides to remove the phrase.

On the way back to Beirut, Jumblatt had the car radio tuned in to check if Syrian media had inserted any false statements. I asked him, ‘Would it have hurt to flatter Assad with a couple of words, given our daily dealings with him?’ He firmly replied, ‘I don’t flatter anyone.’

That was the moment I realized I could no longer sustain this relationship. He had erased just two words of praise, but that was enough to collapse everything.”

Jumblatt’s Final Meeting with Assad

Tensions escalated as Jumblatt refused to accept Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. Sultan recalls:

“Hikmat Shihabi called me, urging me to bring Jumblatt to Damascus, even if just to talk about philosophy or agriculture—anything to maintain dialogue. But Jumblatt was firm: it was either full agreement or total opposition. He personally oversaw the placement of mines in Bhamdoun to resist Syrian troops. Even President Anwar Sadat advised him to step back, but he refused.”

Jumblatt repeatedly warned Assad:

“If you enter Lebanon militarily, you’ll give Israel an excuse to intervene. Our conflicts with other Lebanese factions can be settled—win, lose, or compromise—but with Israel, there is no such option.”

Assad ignored the warning. Eleven years later, during a meeting with Lebanese warlord-turned-politician Elie Hobeika, Assad lamented, “Pierre Gemayel lied to me.” A Lebanese minister pointed at Hobeika and said, “He’s Gemayel’s disciple.” Hobeika quickly responded, “I had nothing to do with it.”

The Assassination of Kamal Jumblatt

Sultan did not accompany Jumblatt to his last meeting with Assad, despite his insistence. Yasser Arafat urged Jumblatt to go, but Sultan knew there was no hope of reconciliation. When Jumblatt was delayed in returning, Sultan called Hikmat Shihabi, who responded, “How can it be? The atmosphere was terrible.”

The next morning, newspapers carried optimistic headlines about the meeting. When Sultan visited Jumblatt, he dismissed them: “None of it is true. We couldn’t reach an understanding.”

On March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated.

The Druze community was shaken. The Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese National Movement were thrown into uncertainty. Jumblatt had been not just a Druze leader but also a national and leftist figure.

Forty days later, his son Walid Jumblatt visited Hafez Assad, accompanied by some of his father’s closest aides, including Toufic Sultan. Years later, Walid would recall his mother’s advice:

“A Chinese proverb says, ‘Sit by the riverbank and wait for your enemy’s corpse to float by.’”

Decades later, news came of Bashar al-Assad’s flight from Syria and the arrest of General Ibrahim Huweija, accused of orchestrating Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination.

The Story of the Two Assads and Hariri

Hafez al-Assad controlled Lebanon through local proxies, ensuring no political leader could challenge Syrian influence. When Rafik Hariri became prime minister in 1992, Assad initially viewed him as just another politician. However, Hariri was different—he had vast financial resources and international connections that no Lebanese leader before him possessed.

When Hafez al-Assad died, his son Bashar inherited not only power but also the same anxiety about Hariri. He feared Hariri was gradually pulling Lebanon out of Syria’s orbit with international support. On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri was assassinated. Though suspicion immediately fell on the Syrian regime, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon later convicted members of Hezbollah in absentia.

Sultan recalls Hariri’s initial dealings with Hafez al-Assad:

“Hariri built a relationship with Assad, who invited him to Damascus. Hariri and his wife, Nazik, arrived from Paris with gifts. Assad hosted them for dinner and even prepared a place for them to stay overnight. However, Hariri surprised him by saying, ‘I will return tonight.’ Assad asked, ‘How?’ Hariri replied, ‘My plane is like a house; it has a bedroom.’”

Hariri had allies within the Syrian regime, including Abdel Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shihabi. However, Bashar Assad’s inner circle—especially his sister Bushra—strongly opposed him.

“There was an anti-Hariri faction in Syria that had a significant influence on Lebanese politics. But Hariri always found ways to overcome obstacles. Even Rustum Ghazaleh, Syria’s intelligence chief in Lebanon, received financial incentives.”

Warnings of Assassination

Sultan recalls that Hariri was warned multiple times about threats to his life.

“On the Friday before his assassination, a prominent Lebanese figure told me, ‘Hariri and Walid Jumblatt are on a kill list.’ When I relayed this to Hariri, he dismissed it, saying he had guarantees. But as events proved, those guarantees were meaningless.”

Sultan also describes a tense encounter between Hariri and Bashar Assad:

“You, Walid [Jumblatt], and your man Chirac want to bring in a president? I will crush the country over your heads!”

Hariri believed that US assurances would protect him. His assassination proved otherwise.

Bashar Assad: “Weak and Lacking Judgment”

Sultan criticizes Bashar Assad’s leadership:

“It is well known that Bashar is politically weak. Had he been more strategic, he would have realized that UN Resolution 1559 was serious. Instead, he acted recklessly. Syria feared Hariri because he could unite Lebanon’s most powerful factions. They thought eliminating him would solve the problem within 48 hours. Instead, they ignited a crisis that changed Lebanon forever.”

Sultan expressed his regret that the Lebanese had squandered many opportunities, often choosing to concede to external forces rather than compromise with their fellow countrymen. He stated that had an understanding been reached between Kamal Jumblatt and Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese could have spared themselves much suffering. They missed opportunities at other critical junctures as well.

Sultan voiced his hope that the state-building project would see a serious revival with the election of General Joseph Aoun as President and the formation of a government led by Nawaf Salam.

He speaks with the wisdom of those who have witnessed the weaknesses and sensitivities of Lebanon’s political structure. His words carry a sense of nostalgia for the days when Beirut was a key meeting point for Lebanese, Arabs, and the international community. As he approaches his nineties, Sultan still holds on to some hope that the Lebanese have learned from their experiences and will work together to build a state governed by the rule of law, where dialogue is driven by reason rather than power struggles.



Four Ways US Foreign Policy Could Change if Democrats Win in November

 24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)
24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)
TT

Four Ways US Foreign Policy Could Change if Democrats Win in November

 24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)
24 October 2026, US, New York: Lower Manhattan residents cast their ballots at the Borough of Manhattan Community College polling site in Tribeca. (dpa)

Nonpartisan analysts say Democrats stand a good ‌chance of winning the US House of Representatives and possibly the Senate in the November 3 midterm elections, which would give them a slice of power in Washington after two years of Republican control.

Democrats argue that Republicans have allowed President Donald Trump's administration to declare war and control spending, even though the US Constitution reserves those powers for lawmakers.

Here are some ways a Democratic Congress could hem in Trump's foreign policy.

CURB THE IRAN WAR

Trump did not secure approval from Congress before he launched the war with Iran on February 28, and Democrats have voted repeatedly to end the fighting unless he does so. One of these resolutions passed with support from a handful of Republicans, but Trump's administration ignored it.

With control of the House or ‌the Senate, Democrats ‌could cut defense spending to pressure Trump to obtain permission from Congress ‌to ⁠continue the war. ⁠They could also require administration officials to testify publicly about their plans.

FRESH SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

Trump has largely halted direct US financial and military aid to Ukraine, despite broad support from Democratic and Republican lawmakers as it fights a Russian invasion.

Most recently, he has angered members of Congress, including many Republicans, by lifting sanctions on Russian diesel and waiving sanctions on Russian energy only weeks after signing them into law.

With a victory in both chambers in November, Democrats would be ⁠able to decide what gets voted on and when.

That could allow ‌them to approve new aid to Ukraine, which likely ‌would pass with the two-thirds majorities needed to overcome a Trump veto.

They could also target other ‌Trump activities. For example, Representative Gregory Meeks of New York, who could head the House ‌Foreign Affairs Committee if Democrats win control, has introduced bipartisan legislation to block Trump's plan to bring Russian diesel back into the global market.

END MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL

Support for Israel has plummeted among Democrats over its conduct in the Gaza war, which has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians. The ‌ongoing violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's close alliance with Republicans have also been factors.

Democrats could limit ⁠or end military ⁠aid to Israel, which amounted to $3.8 billion in the most recent fiscal year. That is more than was provided to any other country.

Nearly half of House Democrats voted this summer to cut off aid to Israel. Some of those who voted against that effort, such as Meeks, have backed limits on providing weapons like heavy bombs to Israel.

LIMIT MILITARY SPENDING AND RESTORE FOREIGN AID

Democrats are far more likely than Trump's Republicans to limit military spending. Trump asked for an unprecedented 67% increase in the military budget this year, to $1.5 trillion, but Democrats blocked it in the Senate, citing his refusal to consult Congress about the Iran war and his steep cuts to social programs.

Trump has also withheld or canceled billions of dollars in foreign aid approved by Congress. Many Democrats have been angered by the cuts and say they will try to restore funding.


Beirut’s $13 Chicken Sandwich Becomes Symbol of Lebanon Divide

A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)
A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

Beirut’s $13 Chicken Sandwich Becomes Symbol of Lebanon Divide

A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)
A chef prepares a chicken taouk sandwich at Glow Paradise restaurant in Beirut, Lebanon, October 16, 2026. (Reuters)

Seven years after Lebanon’s devastating financial meltdown, a debate over a chicken sandwich has exposed an increasingly stark divide between those who can still spend freely and those struggling to get by.

A trendy health restaurant wanted to offer its calorie-conscious customers a healthier take on the beloved Levantine wrap known as the shish taouk. So, The Glow Paradise launched the “Chic Taouk,” pricing it at around $13 -- nearly double what an un-chic chicken sandwich typically goes for in Beirut.

The pricey pun proved hard to swallow, with outraged critics accusing the restaurant of overcharging in a country where many households struggle to afford basic necessities.

Yet while the debate raged on social media, customers kept buying. The Glow Paradise sold more than ‌20,000 Chic ‌Taouk sandwiches in just 11 days, according to managing partner Hrag Jeghalian, who described ‌the ⁠online exchanges as "natural marketing".

The ⁠contrasting reactions touched a nerve in Lebanon, where years of financial turmoil, political dysfunction and conflict have reshaped the country's social landscape, hollowing out much of the middle class while leaving a smaller group of consumers able to sustain an affluent lifestyle.

DEBATE PULLS FOCUS AWAY FROM URGENT CRISES

Sami Nader, an economist at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut, said the throngs at The Glow Paradise belied another reality.

“So you see people in the restaurant, but what you don't see is that 22 restaurants closed last month,” Nader told Reuters.

Lebanon’s ⁠Instagram-active community was split between those accusing the restaurant of theft and others ‌saying the sandwich was intended for those who could afford ‌it.

Some questioned whether the dispute itself reflected misplaced priorities in a country grappling with urgent crises, from Israel’s occupation of ‌large swaths of the country’s south to the endemic electricity and water crises.

Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse ‌was prompted by decades of corruption and profligate spending by the ruling elite, and several rounds of conflict since then have worsened the country’s economic outlook.

GDP has declined by nearly 40% since 2019 and inflation is expected to rise to 17.5% due to rising global energy and shipping prices eating away at people’s purchasing power, according to the ‌World Bank. The figure is more than quadruple the global headline inflation rate flagged by the International Monetary Fund in July.

Four in five households in ⁠Lebanon struggle to afford ⁠basic necessities, the UN children’s agency said in September.

'PEOPLE CAN'T KEEP UP'

The country’s middle class has “disappeared,” Nader said, dismantled by a series of crises including the collapse of the financial system in 2019, the 2020 Beirut Port explosion and two wars in under two years.

Monthly bills from private generator operators, which provide electricity to many homes and businesses during outages on Lebanon's failing national grid, jumped by nearly 20% in August 2026 alone, bringing rates nearly 60% higher than they were in February of this year, according to the kilowatt-hour prices set by Lebanon’s energy ministry.

For many, that means paying for 24/7 electricity now costs several hundred dollars a month, in a country where the minimum wage is set at $400.

“Everything has become expensive, and people can’t keep up,” said Fouad Fakhreddine, a 53-year-old restaurant worker from nearby Hamra. “We are now getting paid, then getting in debt over that just to get by.”

The years of economic instability, he said, have produced “a class that is living, and a class that is not dead and waiting to die from the unbearable situation it is in.”


Netanyahu’s Main Opponents in Israel’s Election

24 October 2026, Israel, Tel Aviv: Israel's Yashar party leader and former military chief Gadi Eisenkot arrives to attend a rally demanding the establishment of an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks and the events leading up to them, ahead of Israel's parliamentary election on October 27. (dpa)
24 October 2026, Israel, Tel Aviv: Israel's Yashar party leader and former military chief Gadi Eisenkot arrives to attend a rally demanding the establishment of an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks and the events leading up to them, ahead of Israel's parliamentary election on October 27. (dpa)
TT

Netanyahu’s Main Opponents in Israel’s Election

24 October 2026, Israel, Tel Aviv: Israel's Yashar party leader and former military chief Gadi Eisenkot arrives to attend a rally demanding the establishment of an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks and the events leading up to them, ahead of Israel's parliamentary election on October 27. (dpa)
24 October 2026, Israel, Tel Aviv: Israel's Yashar party leader and former military chief Gadi Eisenkot arrives to attend a rally demanding the establishment of an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks and the events leading up to them, ahead of Israel's parliamentary election on October 27. (dpa)

Israel will hold a general election on October 27, with veteran Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu locked in a tight race to stay in power.

Here are his main rivals:

- Gadi Eisenkot: The general -

The son of Moroccan immigrants, ex-army chief Gadi Eisenkot, 66, has emerged as Netanyahu's main rival, with polls putting the two neck and neck in the final days before the vote.

While he lacks his opponent's political experience, he enjoys public sympathy following the death in combat of his son Gal and two of his nephews during the Gaza war.

Seen as belonging to the center-right, Eisenkot has expressed some public positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that maintain the current government's tough line -- for instance, vowing to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state and to end Hamas's rule in Gaza within 18 months if elected.

He has also expressed support for Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, but has promised to crack down on settlers who have attacked Palestinians with impunity under Netanyahu's staunchly pro-settlement government.

Eisenkot resigned from Netanyahu's war cabinet in 2024 and has become a scathing critic of the premier's leadership.

He founded his own party Yashar, meaning "Straight", in 2025. He would be the first prime minister of Middle Eastern or North African descent.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett attends an event for the Beyahad party, ahead of Israel’s national election, in Haifa, Israel, October 21, 2026. (Reuters)

- Naftali Bennett: The right-wing alternative -

Former prime minister Naftali Bennett, 54, leads the center-right Beyahad party, which is polling in third place.

The former tech entrepreneur and son of American immigrants established himself as a leading figure in the nationalist right and settler movement, but has since presented himself as a secular centrist.

Bennett caused a stir in 2021 by forming a diverse coalition government spanning the Israeli political spectrum, with the unprecedented support of an Arab party.

It brought an end to Netanyahu's 12 uninterrupted years in power, but Bennett's government only lasted a year.

Israeli commentators believe he can attract right-wing voters who are disappointed with Netanyahu but do not want to move leftward.

Despite his fierce criticism of him, Bennett has voiced openness to including Netanyahu in an opposition-led coalition government.

Member of the Beyachad political alliance, leader of the opposition Yair Lapid (C) reacts during an anti-government rally in Tel Aviv, Israel, 24 October 2026. Israel will hold its national legislative election to choose the 120 members of the 26th Knesset on 27 October 2026. (EPA)

- Yair Lapid: The former TV journalist -

Once a star television journalist, Yair Lapid, 62, swiftly established himself as one of Netanyahu's main opponents when he founded the centrist Yesh Atid party in 2012.

Lapid has served as finance and foreign minister and briefly took over as prime minister in 2022 as part of a power-sharing deal with Bennett, with whom he is again allied.

An avowed secularist, Lapid has the polish of a TV star and is ever-present on social media, routinely taking Netanyahu to task with biting commentary.

But few observers see him winning on his own as he struggles to win voters beyond his core base of urban and secular Israelis.

24 October 2026, Israel, Tel Aviv: Yisrael Beytenu party leader Avigdor Lieberman arrives surrounded by security personnel during a rally at Hostages Square to demand the establishment of an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks and the events leading up to them, ahead of Israel's parliamentary election on October 27. (dpa)

- Avigdor Lieberman: The secular nationalist -

Born in Soviet Moldova in 1958, Avigdor Lieberman moved to Israel in the late 1970s and is a veteran of the political scene, taking a hardline nationalist stance on national security while staying staunchly secular.

The founder of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, Lieberman initially relied on the Russian-speaking electorate before gradually broadening his base.

He was once a close Netanyahu associate, with some crediting Lieberman with helping engineer the premier's razor-thin upset victory in 1996 that first brought him to power.

Lieberman now regularly criticizes Netanyahu in heated terms, calling him a failure on security.

Lieberman is one of the few politicians to have headed three of Israel's key ministries -- foreign, defense and finance.

Mansour Abbas, head of Israel's conservative Islamic Raam party, speaks during an interview with AFP in Nazareth, in northern Israel, on October 21, 2026. (AFP)

- Mansour Abbas: The potential kingmaker -

Arab-Israeli party leader Mansour Abbas is seeking to mobilize his community, which makes up 20 percent of the population, to prevent Netanyahu's return to power.

Abbas's Raam became the first Arab party to join an Israeli government in Bennett's 2021 coalition and he could again be a kingmaker if the opposition agrees to rely on his lawmakers to oust Netanyahu.

In a recent interview with AFP, the former dentist vowed to bring out voters to replace Netanyahu's "racist, fascist right-wing government".

Netanyahu has tried to tarnish Jewish opposition leaders by constantly raising the specter that they would team up with Abbas, whose roots are in political Islam.

Seeking to broaden support, Abbas has taken the unprecedented step of tapping an Israeli Jew, former police official Yoav Segalovitz, as a candidate on his party's slate.

Yair Golan (C), leader of The Democrats party, marches with protesters from Rabin Square to the Hostages Square, during an anti-government demonstration demanding the formation of a state commission of inquiry into Hamas' 2023 October attacks, in Tel Aviv on October 24, 2026, ahead of Israel's legislative election. (AFP)

- Yair Golan: The remaining liberal -

After years of Israel shifting to the right, Yair Golan's party The Democrats represents what remains of the mainstream left, including remnants of the Labour Party that led Israel without interruption for the country's first three decades.

Golan is the only major Israeli political leader who still explicitly backs a two-state solution with the Palestinians.

He is also liberal on social issues, calling for public transportation to run on the Jewish Sabbath.

A former senior military officer, Golan volunteered to return to duty immediately when Hamas attacked on October 7, 2023, picking up a gun and within hours personally rescuing people in his car.