Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
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Toufic Sultan: Kamal Jumblatt Was not Impressed by Assad or his Likes

A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).
A meeting between Assad and Jumblatt, attended by Toufic Sultan (left) and Abdullah al-Ahmar (Toufic Sultan File).

After the 1973 war, former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad realized that reclaiming the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights through military means was impossible. His frustration grew when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took a different approach, negotiating to regain the Sinai Peninsula. As a leader from a minority sect, Assad feared a similar path would leave his successor inheriting an Israeli flag in Damascus. With limited options, he turned to Lebanon, a country he had never forgotten was once part of Greater Syria.

Lebanon became Assad’s strategic battleground, defensive shield, and political bargaining chip. His regime never tolerated any attempt to “steal Lebanon” from its grasp, whether the perceived threat came from Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, René Moawad, or Rafik Hariri. Jumblatt’s defiance was particularly intolerable—he was a close ally of Yasser Arafat and resisted Assad’s efforts to dominate Palestinian decision-making.

Toufic Sultan, a key political figure and close associate of Kamal Jumblatt, witnessed these events firsthand. As Jumblatt’s deputy in both the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese National Movement (a coalition supporting Palestinian and leftist causes), Sultan recalls:

“I attended multiple meetings between President Assad, Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, and Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt, always polite yet direct, spoke candidly. In 1976, he established a structured relationship with Assad, who insisted that meetings occur regularly. He frequently told Hikmat Shihabi (Syrian Army Chief of Staff) that these discussions should be ongoing—and they were.”

Jumblatt Refused to Praise Assad

During one visit to Damascus, Jumblatt met with Baath Party leaders, including Abdullah al-Ahmar and Palestinian official Zuheir Mohsen. The meeting, like many in Syria, was likely monitored. At one point, a Syrian Baathist asked Jumblatt why he wouldn’t align with them. Jumblatt dismissed the idea, saying, “Because I don’t form alliances with parties that take orders from external powers.”

Later that day, at a lunch hosted by Assad at the Rawda Palace, a joint statement was released. Sultan recalls:

“I saw Jumblatt take out a pen and start crossing out lines. He had completely removed a passage praising Assad’s so-called ‘Corrective Movement.’ He turned to me and said, ‘We never said this. Why should we?’ He did this in front of Assad, who then instructed his aides to remove the phrase.

On the way back to Beirut, Jumblatt had the car radio tuned in to check if Syrian media had inserted any false statements. I asked him, ‘Would it have hurt to flatter Assad with a couple of words, given our daily dealings with him?’ He firmly replied, ‘I don’t flatter anyone.’

That was the moment I realized I could no longer sustain this relationship. He had erased just two words of praise, but that was enough to collapse everything.”

Jumblatt’s Final Meeting with Assad

Tensions escalated as Jumblatt refused to accept Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. Sultan recalls:

“Hikmat Shihabi called me, urging me to bring Jumblatt to Damascus, even if just to talk about philosophy or agriculture—anything to maintain dialogue. But Jumblatt was firm: it was either full agreement or total opposition. He personally oversaw the placement of mines in Bhamdoun to resist Syrian troops. Even President Anwar Sadat advised him to step back, but he refused.”

Jumblatt repeatedly warned Assad:

“If you enter Lebanon militarily, you’ll give Israel an excuse to intervene. Our conflicts with other Lebanese factions can be settled—win, lose, or compromise—but with Israel, there is no such option.”

Assad ignored the warning. Eleven years later, during a meeting with Lebanese warlord-turned-politician Elie Hobeika, Assad lamented, “Pierre Gemayel lied to me.” A Lebanese minister pointed at Hobeika and said, “He’s Gemayel’s disciple.” Hobeika quickly responded, “I had nothing to do with it.”

The Assassination of Kamal Jumblatt

Sultan did not accompany Jumblatt to his last meeting with Assad, despite his insistence. Yasser Arafat urged Jumblatt to go, but Sultan knew there was no hope of reconciliation. When Jumblatt was delayed in returning, Sultan called Hikmat Shihabi, who responded, “How can it be? The atmosphere was terrible.”

The next morning, newspapers carried optimistic headlines about the meeting. When Sultan visited Jumblatt, he dismissed them: “None of it is true. We couldn’t reach an understanding.”

On March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated.

The Druze community was shaken. The Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese National Movement were thrown into uncertainty. Jumblatt had been not just a Druze leader but also a national and leftist figure.

Forty days later, his son Walid Jumblatt visited Hafez Assad, accompanied by some of his father’s closest aides, including Toufic Sultan. Years later, Walid would recall his mother’s advice:

“A Chinese proverb says, ‘Sit by the riverbank and wait for your enemy’s corpse to float by.’”

Decades later, news came of Bashar al-Assad’s flight from Syria and the arrest of General Ibrahim Huweija, accused of orchestrating Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination.

The Story of the Two Assads and Hariri

Hafez al-Assad controlled Lebanon through local proxies, ensuring no political leader could challenge Syrian influence. When Rafik Hariri became prime minister in 1992, Assad initially viewed him as just another politician. However, Hariri was different—he had vast financial resources and international connections that no Lebanese leader before him possessed.

When Hafez al-Assad died, his son Bashar inherited not only power but also the same anxiety about Hariri. He feared Hariri was gradually pulling Lebanon out of Syria’s orbit with international support. On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri was assassinated. Though suspicion immediately fell on the Syrian regime, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon later convicted members of Hezbollah in absentia.

Sultan recalls Hariri’s initial dealings with Hafez al-Assad:

“Hariri built a relationship with Assad, who invited him to Damascus. Hariri and his wife, Nazik, arrived from Paris with gifts. Assad hosted them for dinner and even prepared a place for them to stay overnight. However, Hariri surprised him by saying, ‘I will return tonight.’ Assad asked, ‘How?’ Hariri replied, ‘My plane is like a house; it has a bedroom.’”

Hariri had allies within the Syrian regime, including Abdel Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shihabi. However, Bashar Assad’s inner circle—especially his sister Bushra—strongly opposed him.

“There was an anti-Hariri faction in Syria that had a significant influence on Lebanese politics. But Hariri always found ways to overcome obstacles. Even Rustum Ghazaleh, Syria’s intelligence chief in Lebanon, received financial incentives.”

Warnings of Assassination

Sultan recalls that Hariri was warned multiple times about threats to his life.

“On the Friday before his assassination, a prominent Lebanese figure told me, ‘Hariri and Walid Jumblatt are on a kill list.’ When I relayed this to Hariri, he dismissed it, saying he had guarantees. But as events proved, those guarantees were meaningless.”

Sultan also describes a tense encounter between Hariri and Bashar Assad:

“You, Walid [Jumblatt], and your man Chirac want to bring in a president? I will crush the country over your heads!”

Hariri believed that US assurances would protect him. His assassination proved otherwise.

Bashar Assad: “Weak and Lacking Judgment”

Sultan criticizes Bashar Assad’s leadership:

“It is well known that Bashar is politically weak. Had he been more strategic, he would have realized that UN Resolution 1559 was serious. Instead, he acted recklessly. Syria feared Hariri because he could unite Lebanon’s most powerful factions. They thought eliminating him would solve the problem within 48 hours. Instead, they ignited a crisis that changed Lebanon forever.”

Sultan expressed his regret that the Lebanese had squandered many opportunities, often choosing to concede to external forces rather than compromise with their fellow countrymen. He stated that had an understanding been reached between Kamal Jumblatt and Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese could have spared themselves much suffering. They missed opportunities at other critical junctures as well.

Sultan voiced his hope that the state-building project would see a serious revival with the election of General Joseph Aoun as President and the formation of a government led by Nawaf Salam.

He speaks with the wisdom of those who have witnessed the weaknesses and sensitivities of Lebanon’s political structure. His words carry a sense of nostalgia for the days when Beirut was a key meeting point for Lebanese, Arabs, and the international community. As he approaches his nineties, Sultan still holds on to some hope that the Lebanese have learned from their experiences and will work together to build a state governed by the rule of law, where dialogue is driven by reason rather than power struggles.



Israeli Soldiers, Ex-Detainees Reveal Israel’s Use of Palestinians as Human Shields in Gaza Is Widespread

This photo provided by Breaking the Silence, a whistleblower group of former Israeli soldiers, shows two soldiers behind Palestinian detainees being sent into a Gaza City-area house to clear it in 2024. (Breaking the Silence via AP)
This photo provided by Breaking the Silence, a whistleblower group of former Israeli soldiers, shows two soldiers behind Palestinian detainees being sent into a Gaza City-area house to clear it in 2024. (Breaking the Silence via AP)
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Israeli Soldiers, Ex-Detainees Reveal Israel’s Use of Palestinians as Human Shields in Gaza Is Widespread

This photo provided by Breaking the Silence, a whistleblower group of former Israeli soldiers, shows two soldiers behind Palestinian detainees being sent into a Gaza City-area house to clear it in 2024. (Breaking the Silence via AP)
This photo provided by Breaking the Silence, a whistleblower group of former Israeli soldiers, shows two soldiers behind Palestinian detainees being sent into a Gaza City-area house to clear it in 2024. (Breaking the Silence via AP)

The only times the Palestinian man wasn't bound or blindfolded, he said, was when he was used by Israeli soldiers as their human shield.

Dressed in army fatigues with a camera fixed to his forehead, Ayman Abu Hamadan was forced into houses in the Gaza Strip to make sure they were clear of bombs and gunmen, he said. When one unit finished with him, he was passed to the next.

"They beat me and told me: ‘You have no other option; do this or we'll kill you,'" the 36-year-old told The Associated Press, describing the 2 1/2 weeks he was held last summer by the Israeli military in northern Gaza.

Orders often came from the top, and at times nearly every platoon used a Palestinian to clear locations, said an Israeli officer, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal.

Several Palestinians and soldiers told the AP that Israeli troops are systematically forcing Palestinians to act as human shields in Gaza, sending them into buildings and tunnels to check for explosives or fighters. The dangerous practice has become ubiquitous during 19 months of war, they said.

In response to these allegations, Israel's military says it strictly prohibits using civilians as shields, a practice it has long accused Hamas of using in Gaza. Israeli officials blame the fighters for the civilian death toll in its offensive that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians.

In a statement to the AP, the military said it also bans otherwise coercing civilians to participate in operations, and "all such orders are routinely emphasized to the forces."

The military said it's investigating several cases alleging that Palestinians were involved in missions, but wouldn't provide details. It didn't answer questions about the reach of the practice or any orders from commanding officers.

The AP spoke with seven Palestinians who described being used as shields in Gaza and the occupied West Bank and with two members of Israel's military who said they engaged in the practice, which is prohibited by international law. Rights groups are ringing the alarm, saying it's become standard procedure increasingly used in the war.

"These are not isolated accounts; they point to a systemic failure and a horrifying moral collapse," said Nadav Weiman, executive director of Breaking the Silence, a whistleblower group of former Israeli soldiers that has collected testimonies about the practice from within the military. "Israel rightly condemns Hamas for using civilians as human shields, but our own soldiers describe doing the very same."

Abu Hamadan said he was detained in August after being separated from his family, and soldiers told him he'd help with a "special mission." He was forced, for 17 days, to search houses and inspect every hole in the ground for tunnels, he said.

Soldiers stood behind him and, once it was clear, entered the buildings to damage or destroy them, he said. He spent each night bound in a dark room, only to wake up and do it again.

This photo provided by Breaking the Silence, a whistleblower group of former Israeli soldiers, shows two detainees used as human shields being held inside a house in the Gaza City area in 2024. (Breaking the Silence via AP)

The use of human shields ‘caught on like fire’

Rights groups say Israel has used Palestinians as shields in Gaza and the West Bank for decades. The Supreme Court outlawed the practice in 2005. But the groups continued to document violations.

Still, experts say this war is the first time in decades the practice and the debate around it has been so widespread.

The two Israeli soldiers who spoke to the AP and a third who provided testimony to Breaking the Silence said commanders were aware of the use of human shields and tolerated it, with some giving orders to do so. Some said it was referred to as the "mosquito protocol" and that Palestinians were also referred to as "wasps" and other dehumanizing terms.

The soldiers, who said they're no longer serving in Gaza, said the practice sped up operations, saved ammunition, and spared combat dogs from injury or death.

The soldiers said they first became aware human shields were being used shortly after the war erupted on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel, and that it became widespread by the middle of 2024. Orders to "bring a mosquito" often came via radio, they said — shorthand everyone understood. Soldiers acted on commanding officers' orders, according to the officer who spoke to the AP.

He said that by the end of his nine months in Gaza, every infantry unit used a Palestinian to clear houses before entering.

"Once this idea was initiated, it caught on like fire in a field," the 26-year-old said. "People saw how effective and easy it was."

He described a 2024 planning meeting where a brigade commander presented to the division commander a slide reading "get a mosquito" and a suggestion they might "just catch one off the streets."

The officer wrote two incident reports to the brigade commander detailing the use of human shields, reports that would have been escalated to the division chief, he said. The military said it had no comment when asked whether it received them.

One report documented the accidental killing of a Palestinian, he said troops didn't realize another unit was using him as a shield and shot him as he ran into a house. The officer recommended the Palestinians be dressed in army clothes to avoid misidentification.

He said he knew of at least one other Palestinian who died while used as a shield; he passed out in a tunnel.

Troops unsuccessfully pushed back, a sergeant says

Convincing soldiers to operate lawfully when they see their enemy using questionable practices is difficult, said Michael Schmitt, a distinguished professor of international law at the US Military Academy at West Point. Israeli officials and other observers say Hamas uses civilians as shields as it embeds itself in communities, hiding fighters in hospitals and schools.

"It’s really a heavy lift to look at your own soldiers and say you have to comply," Schmitt said.

One soldier told the AP his unit tried to refuse to use human shields in mid-2024 but were told they had no choice, with a high-ranking officer saying they shouldn’t worry about international humanitarian law.

The sergeant, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal, said the troops used a 16-year-old and a 30-year-old for a few days.

The boy shook constantly, he said, and both repeated "Rafah, Rafah" — Gaza’s southernmost city, where more than 1 million Palestinians had fled from fighting elsewhere at that point in the war.

It seemed they were begging to be freed, the sergeant said.

‘I have children’

Masoud Abu Saeed said he was used as a shield for two weeks in March 2024 in the southern city of Khan Younis.

"This is extremely dangerous," he recounted telling a soldier. "I have children and want to reunite with them."

The 36-year-old said he was forced into houses, buildings and a hospital to dig up suspected tunnels and clear areas. He said he wore a first-responder vest for easy identification, carrying a phone, hammer and chain cutters.

During one operation, he bumped into his brother, used as a shield by another unit, he said.

They hugged. "I thought Israel's army had executed him," he said.

Palestinians also report being used as shields in the West Bank.

Hazar Estity said soldiers took her Jenin refugee camp home in November, forcing her to film inside several apartments and clear them before troops entered.

She said she pleaded to return to her 21-month-old son, but soldiers didn't listen.

"I was most afraid that they would kill me," she said. "And that I wouldn’t see my son again."