What Message is Hamas Sending by Resuming Rocket Fire on Israel?

Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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What Message is Hamas Sending by Resuming Rocket Fire on Israel?

Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

The launch of 10 rockets by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, toward Israel on Sunday surprised many observers, marking a sharp escalation in rocket fire that had largely been limited to one or two missiles since Israel broke a truce on March 18.

Most recent rocket attacks were believed to have come from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but Sunday’s barrage was claimed by Hamas, signaling a possible shift in the dynamics of the conflict.

According to Israeli claims, the rockets were fired from the al-Zawaida area, north of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. However, field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat the rockets were launched from a different location — one that has rarely been used for such operations.

The recent rocket barrage by Hamas may have carried a deeper strategic message, the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat, suggesting the attack was intended to raise questions within Israel about the group’s ability to access its missile arsenal — or hint at a regained capacity to manufacture rockets.

Hamas sources declined to specify when the rockets used in the latest attack were produced but stressed that the decision to launch was shaped primarily by field conditions and the assessment of fighters and commanders on the ground.

“At times, we aim to send specific political messages,” said a Hamas source, who requested anonymity.

“For example, we want to underline that Israel has failed to defeat the movement and its military wing, despite carrying out assassinations of senior and field-level commanders,” they added.

Hamas has denied that its latest rocket barrage was a direct response to the recent assassinations of senior figures, saying the attack was part of its broader reaction to what it described as “ongoing massacres” committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.

“This was a routine response within the framework of confronting continuous Israeli aggression,” the Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat, rejecting suggestions that the assault was linked to specific events.

The timing of the rocket fire raised eyebrows, coming just hours after a rare protest in Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, where demonstrators chanted against Hamas, condemned the rocket attacks, and demanded an end to the war.

Protesters also called for Hamas to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and stop speaking on behalf of its residents.

Asked whether the barrage was meant to send a message to a restless population, Hamas sources denied any connection.

“The rocket fire had nothing to do with the protest in Jabalia,” one source said, pointing to similar demonstrations in recent weeks that were not followed by rocket launches.

When pressed about the implications of such protests for the group’s future in Gaza, the source said internal discussions had taken place.

“The movement recognizes people’s right to express themselves — but not at the expense of the resistance,” the source said.

“There must be clear national guidelines that prioritize ending the war while preserving the legitimacy of the resistance,” they added.

Gaza Governance

Hamas also pushed back against accusations that it is clinging to power in Gaza, placing blame on rival faction Fatah and Israel for blocking proposals aimed at resolving the territory’s political deadlock.

“Hamas has no issue stepping down from governing Gaza,” a source said. “The real obstacle lies with others who have rejected every proposal laid on the table.”

The source pointed to a proposed community support committee, formed with Egyptian mediation, which was meant to take over governance duties. “We showed maximum flexibility, but neither Fatah nor Israel accepted this mechanism,” the source added.

As for whether stepping down from power could weaken Hamas's influence in Gaza, the source appeared unconcerned. “The movement is confident in its endurance,” the source said.

“Even if Hamas relinquishes control and enters a long-term ceasefire, it will continue to exist and maintain its presence,” they affirmed.

A Fatah delegation had held talks with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty two days ago, focusing primarily on internal Palestinian reconciliation and the future governance of Gaza, as Hamas signaled readiness to hand over administrative responsibilities to a proposed community support committee.

Multiple Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group had informed Egyptian officials of its willingness to allow a minister from the Palestinian Authority’s Ramallah-based government to head the committee, with a deputy from Gaza appointed to assist.

A Hamas delegation is expected to travel to Cairo in the coming days to continue discussions with Egyptian officials on the evolving plans for Gaza’s administration and broader efforts to resolve the internal Palestinian divide.



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times