‘A US Bargaining Chip’ – What Remains of Hamas’ Tunnel Arsenal?

An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
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‘A US Bargaining Chip’ – What Remains of Hamas’ Tunnel Arsenal?

An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)

Hamas has recently stepped up its release of videos showing Israeli captives held in its tunnel network, along with footage of armed fighters emerging from underground to launch attacks against Israeli forces in areas including Beit Hanoun, Al-Tuffah, and Rafah.

A raid claimed by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing, on Wednesday in the vicinity of Al-Zahraa Mosque in the Al-Jneina neighborhood of eastern Rafah, has once again spotlighted the group’s use of tunnels—particularly in Rafah, a city Israeli military sources say is now under their full control.

The reappearance of such scenes, nearly a year and a half into Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, has prompted fresh Israeli acknowledgement that Hamas' tunnel infrastructure remains largely intact despite repeated attempts to destroy it.

In April, Israel’s Channel 12 cited Israeli security sources as saying that just 25% of Hamas tunnels had been neutralized. The figures underscore growing Israeli concerns about the resilience and extent of the subterranean system beneath Gaza.

Due to its clandestine nature, estimates of the tunnel network vary widely.

Palestinian sources describe it as a sprawling maze comprising around 1,300 tunnels, plunging as deep as 70 meters underground and stretching some 500 kilometers. Former Israeli National Security Adviser Jacob Nagel estimated in October 2023 that the tunnels could extend for “thousands of kilometers.”

Engineering Feat Involving Thousands

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the recent reactivation of tunnels by the group’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, is “natural given the ongoing, though limited, military confrontation in some areas.” They added that tunnel use could expand “as the ground offensive intensifies.”

The sources described the tunnels as a “vital military pillar” and claimed Israel has yet to fully understand their structure. “The network is the product of years of engineering work involving thousands of operatives,” one source said.

While acknowledging that parts of the network were hit during the war, the sources said Hamas has since repaired and reused many of the damaged passages.

“Some tunnels remain undetected, even in areas where the Israeli army operated and destroyed nearby routes,” they said.

They also claimed that guards responsible for Israeli hostages have recently used tunnels to move captives again, particularly after they were temporarily housed in above-ground locations during the last ceasefire.

For over a decade, Israel has waged a persistent campaign to detect and destroy Hamas’ underground tunnel network in Gaza, believing it had neutralized the threat after constructing a fortified barrier and sealing known tunnels with expanding foam.

But recent footage and attacks suggest the tunnels remain a key part of Hamas’ war strategy — and a potential bargaining chip in future negotiations.

In the years following the completion of the Gaza border wall, Israel reduced surveillance around the enclave, withdrawing weapons from nearby communities and dismantling several watchtowers, confident that Hamas’ tunnel ambitions had been thwarted.

Yet Palestinian militants used this lull to expand a vast web of underground passages within Gaza. According to sources familiar with the matter, Hamas constructed tunnels for offensive operations, defensive positions, and command-and-control purposes — some designed to shield senior political and military leaders during conflict.

Tunnels as a Bargaining Tool

Palestinian sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that in past truce negotiations, including US-backed efforts, mediators had called on Hamas to relinquish its military infrastructure, including its tunnels, as part of any disarmament framework.

“The tunnels are seen as a dangerous asset that could allow Hamas to launch new offensives, even years down the line,” one source said, adding that the demand to dismantle them was part of broader demilitarization proposals.

While discussions around the tunnels predated their reemergence in recent videos, Hamas’ renewed use of them has shaken Israeli confidence. Despite conducting sweeping operations across Gaza — including extended searches lasting weeks in some areas — Israeli forces now acknowledge that much of the network remains operational.

Before Israel launched its offensive in Gaza in 2023, Hamas had reportedly maintained tunnels for specific purposes — including ones to shelter its leadership. However, over 18 months of war have degraded the group’s infrastructure.

Multiple key figures were killed in tunnel strikes, including Ahmed Al-Ghandour, commander of Hamas’ northern brigade, and Politburo member Rawhi Mushtaha.

Still, tunnel warfare continues. In cities like Khan Younis, Israeli troops returned to areas previously cleared, only to discover new or rebuilt tunnels. Military tactics and engineering efforts to permanently disable the network have so far yielded limited results.

Hamas sources say the group deliberately withheld some tunnels from use during the war to avoid detection by Israeli combat engineers. Should Israel widen its ground operations, they warn, those hidden passages may soon come into play.

 

 



How Much Damage Have Israeli Strikes Caused to Iran’s Nuclear Program?

A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)
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How Much Damage Have Israeli Strikes Caused to Iran’s Nuclear Program?

A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite image shows new vehicle tracks and dirt piles over underground centrifuge facility at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after airstrike in Iran in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. (Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters)

Israel has carried out wide-ranging military strikes on Iran, hitting sites including some of its most important nuclear facilities.

Below is a summary of what is known about the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear program, incorporating data from the last quarterly report by the UN nuclear watchdog on May 31.

OVERVIEW

Iran is enriching uranium to up to 60% purity. This could easily be refined further to the roughly 90% which is weapons grade.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which inspects Iran's nuclear sites including its enrichment plants, says that is of "serious concern" because no other country has enriched to that level without producing nuclear weapons. Western powers say there is no civil justification for enrichment to that level.

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons. It points to its right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including enrichment, as a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel, which is not a party to the NPT, is the only country in the Middle East widely believed to have nuclear weapons. Israel does not deny or confirm that.

HEART OF THE PROGRAM: URANIUM ENRICHMENT

Iran had three operating uranium enrichment plants when Israel began its attacks:

* The Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz (power supply hit)

A vast underground facility designed to house 50,0000 centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium.

There has long been speculation among military experts about whether Israeli airstrikes could destroy the facility given that it is several floors underground.

There are about 17,000 centrifuges installed there, of which around 13,500 were operating at last count, enriching uranium to up to 5%.

Electricity infrastructure at Natanz was destroyed, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi told the UN Security Council on Friday, specifically an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, emergency power supply and back-up generators.

While there was no indication of a physical attack on the underground hall containing the FEP, "the loss of power ... may have damaged the centrifuges there", he said.

Grossi has cited unspecified "information available to the IAEA". While Iran has provided the agency with some information, the IAEA generally makes extensive use of satellite imagery.

* The Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz (destroyed)

The smallest and, being above-ground, the softest target of the three enrichment plants. Long a research and development center, it used fewer centrifuges than the other plants, often connected in smaller clusters of machines known as cascades.

It did, however, have two interconnected, full-size cascades of up to 164 advanced centrifuges each, enriching uranium to up to 60%. Apart from that, there were only up to 201 centrifuges operating at the PFEP enriching to up to 2%.

Most of the research and development work attributed to the PFEP had recently been moved underground to the FEP, where more than 1,000 of its advanced centrifuges were enriching to up to 5%.

The PFEP was destroyed in the Israeli attack, Grossi said.

* The Fordo Fuel Enrichment Plant (no visible damage)

Iran's most deeply buried enrichment site, dug into a mountain, suffered no visible damage, Grossi reiterated on Monday.

While it has only about 2,000 centrifuges in operation, it produces the vast majority of Iran's uranium enriched to up to 60%, using roughly the same number of centrifuges as the PFEP did, because it feeds uranium enriched to up to 20% into those cascades compared to 5% at the PFEP.

Fordo therefore produced 166.6 kg of uranium enriched to up to 60% in the most recent quarter. According to an IAEA yardstick, that is enough in principle, if enriched further, for just under four nuclear weapons, compared to the PFEP's 19.2 kg, less than half a bomb's worth.

OTHER FACILITIES

Israeli strikes damaged four buildings at the nuclear complex at Isfahan, the IAEA has said, including the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) and facilities where work on uranium metal was conducted.

While it has other uses, mastering uranium metal technology is an important step in making the core of a nuclear weapon. If Iran were to try to make a nuclear weapon, it would need to take weapons-grade uranium and turn it into uranium metal.

Uranium conversion is the process by which "yellowcake" uranium is turned into uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for centrifuges, so that it can be enriched. If the UCF is out of use, Iran will eventually run out of uranium to enrich unless it finds an outside source of uranium hexafluoride.

SCIENTISTS

At least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Israeli attacks since Friday, including in car bombs, two sources said on Sunday.

Israel's armed forces named nine of them on Saturday, saying they "played a central part of the progress toward nuclear weapons" and that "their elimination represents a significant blow to the Iranian regime's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction". That assertion could not immediately be verified.

Western powers have often said Iran's nuclear advances provide it with an "irreversible knowledge gain", suggesting that while losing experts or facilities may slow progress, the advances are permanent.

URANIUM STOCKPILE

Iran has a large stock of uranium enriched to different levels.

As of May 17, Iran was estimated to have enough uranium enriched to up to 60% for it to make nine nuclear weapons, according to an IAEA yardstick.

At lower enrichment levels it has enough for more bombs, though it would take more effort: enough enriched to up to 20% for two more, and enough enriched to up to 5% for 11 more.

Much of Iran's most highly enriched uranium stockpile is stored at Isfahan under IAEA seal, officials have said. The IAEA does not report where it is stored, nor has it said whether it was affected by the strikes.

OPEN QUESTIONS

* How will Iran respond?

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told state TV on Saturday Iran would take measures to protect nuclear materials and equipment that would not be notified to the IAEA and it would no longer cooperate with the IAEA as before.

Lawmakers are also preparing a bill that could prompt Iran to pull out of the NPT, following in the footsteps of North Korea, which announced its withdrawal in 2003 and went on to test nuclear weapons.

The IAEA does not know how many centrifuges Iran has outside its enrichment plants. Any further reduction in cooperation with the IAEA could increase speculation that it will or has set up a secret enrichment plant using some of that supply.

Existing centrifuge cascades can also be reconfigured to enrich to a different purity level within a week, officials have said.

* What is the status of the uranium stock?

If Iran can no longer convert, its existing stock of uranium hexafluoride and enriched uranium becomes even more important.

* How bad is the damage?

The IAEA has not yet been able to carry out inspections to assess the damage there in detail.

* Will there be more attacks?

Soon after the attacks started on Friday, US President Donald Trump urged Iran to make a deal with the United States to impose fresh restrictions on its nuclear program "before there is nothing left". Talks scheduled for June 15 were called off.