‘A US Bargaining Chip’ – What Remains of Hamas’ Tunnel Arsenal?

An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
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‘A US Bargaining Chip’ – What Remains of Hamas’ Tunnel Arsenal?

An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)

Hamas has recently stepped up its release of videos showing Israeli captives held in its tunnel network, along with footage of armed fighters emerging from underground to launch attacks against Israeli forces in areas including Beit Hanoun, Al-Tuffah, and Rafah.

A raid claimed by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing, on Wednesday in the vicinity of Al-Zahraa Mosque in the Al-Jneina neighborhood of eastern Rafah, has once again spotlighted the group’s use of tunnels—particularly in Rafah, a city Israeli military sources say is now under their full control.

The reappearance of such scenes, nearly a year and a half into Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, has prompted fresh Israeli acknowledgement that Hamas' tunnel infrastructure remains largely intact despite repeated attempts to destroy it.

In April, Israel’s Channel 12 cited Israeli security sources as saying that just 25% of Hamas tunnels had been neutralized. The figures underscore growing Israeli concerns about the resilience and extent of the subterranean system beneath Gaza.

Due to its clandestine nature, estimates of the tunnel network vary widely.

Palestinian sources describe it as a sprawling maze comprising around 1,300 tunnels, plunging as deep as 70 meters underground and stretching some 500 kilometers. Former Israeli National Security Adviser Jacob Nagel estimated in October 2023 that the tunnels could extend for “thousands of kilometers.”

Engineering Feat Involving Thousands

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the recent reactivation of tunnels by the group’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, is “natural given the ongoing, though limited, military confrontation in some areas.” They added that tunnel use could expand “as the ground offensive intensifies.”

The sources described the tunnels as a “vital military pillar” and claimed Israel has yet to fully understand their structure. “The network is the product of years of engineering work involving thousands of operatives,” one source said.

While acknowledging that parts of the network were hit during the war, the sources said Hamas has since repaired and reused many of the damaged passages.

“Some tunnels remain undetected, even in areas where the Israeli army operated and destroyed nearby routes,” they said.

They also claimed that guards responsible for Israeli hostages have recently used tunnels to move captives again, particularly after they were temporarily housed in above-ground locations during the last ceasefire.

For over a decade, Israel has waged a persistent campaign to detect and destroy Hamas’ underground tunnel network in Gaza, believing it had neutralized the threat after constructing a fortified barrier and sealing known tunnels with expanding foam.

But recent footage and attacks suggest the tunnels remain a key part of Hamas’ war strategy — and a potential bargaining chip in future negotiations.

In the years following the completion of the Gaza border wall, Israel reduced surveillance around the enclave, withdrawing weapons from nearby communities and dismantling several watchtowers, confident that Hamas’ tunnel ambitions had been thwarted.

Yet Palestinian militants used this lull to expand a vast web of underground passages within Gaza. According to sources familiar with the matter, Hamas constructed tunnels for offensive operations, defensive positions, and command-and-control purposes — some designed to shield senior political and military leaders during conflict.

Tunnels as a Bargaining Tool

Palestinian sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that in past truce negotiations, including US-backed efforts, mediators had called on Hamas to relinquish its military infrastructure, including its tunnels, as part of any disarmament framework.

“The tunnels are seen as a dangerous asset that could allow Hamas to launch new offensives, even years down the line,” one source said, adding that the demand to dismantle them was part of broader demilitarization proposals.

While discussions around the tunnels predated their reemergence in recent videos, Hamas’ renewed use of them has shaken Israeli confidence. Despite conducting sweeping operations across Gaza — including extended searches lasting weeks in some areas — Israeli forces now acknowledge that much of the network remains operational.

Before Israel launched its offensive in Gaza in 2023, Hamas had reportedly maintained tunnels for specific purposes — including ones to shelter its leadership. However, over 18 months of war have degraded the group’s infrastructure.

Multiple key figures were killed in tunnel strikes, including Ahmed Al-Ghandour, commander of Hamas’ northern brigade, and Politburo member Rawhi Mushtaha.

Still, tunnel warfare continues. In cities like Khan Younis, Israeli troops returned to areas previously cleared, only to discover new or rebuilt tunnels. Military tactics and engineering efforts to permanently disable the network have so far yielded limited results.

Hamas sources say the group deliberately withheld some tunnels from use during the war to avoid detection by Israeli combat engineers. Should Israel widen its ground operations, they warn, those hidden passages may soon come into play.

 

 



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times