Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)

In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region.

Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak “was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.” He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: “Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.”

The Gaddafi encounter

Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. “When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn’t look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,” Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: “I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?”

Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. “But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.”

Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times.

Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP)

Diplomatic drama in a tent

When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa’s tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. “At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,” Moussa said, “so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.”

Despite Gaddafi’s sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. “He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.”

Gaddafi’s erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. “If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.”

A moment of humor

One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn’t even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. “When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,” Moussa laughed.

Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi’s secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: “You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.” Moussa quipped: “Tell the leader he’s not tearless—he’s payment-less!” Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya’s dues.

Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: “Take it easy, Ali.” That phrase—“Take it easy, Ali”—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. “It revealed Gaddafi’s desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.”

On Hosni Mubarak and the ‘pharaoh’ myth

Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a “pharaoh” as Russians view their “czars,” Moussa was firm: “No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn’t violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn’t revel in bloodshed.”

Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. “Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn’t part of Mubarak’s character to govern through violence. He wasn’t built that way.”

Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP)

The song that stirred controversy

When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang “I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,” it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. “I don’t think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.”

Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa’s name with Mubarak’s. “But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, ‘We’re dancing to this song here!’”

A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein

One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved.

In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. “I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.”

Moussa asked Saddam directly: “Do you possess nuclear weapons?” Saddam answered, “No.” Moussa pressed him again: “Are you absolutely sure?” Saddam repeated, “No.” This made Moussa’s deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. “He probably thought we weren’t going to walk out of there.”

Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: “These people don’t just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?”

Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed.

Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: “Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.”



Iran, Lebanon Bore Brunt of Missiles and Drones Launched During War

 People stand next to a Synagogue, which was damaged in a strike, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, April 7, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
People stand next to a Synagogue, which was damaged in a strike, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, April 7, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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Iran, Lebanon Bore Brunt of Missiles and Drones Launched During War

 People stand next to a Synagogue, which was damaged in a strike, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, April 7, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
People stand next to a Synagogue, which was damaged in a strike, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, April 7, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

Some three-quarters of the airstrikes during the Middle East war targeted sites in Iran or Lebanon, according to an AFP analysis of data from ACLED, a non-profit that tracks political violence worldwide.

At least 7,700 strikes or series of strikes by missiles, drones, rockets or bombs, were recorded by the US-based conflict research group between the start of the war on February 28 up to April 8, when a fragile ceasefire concluded between Tehran and Washington came into effect.

ACLED collected and vetted its data from sources that it considers reliable, such as news reports, social networks, institutions, and other NGOs.

This count, which includes attacks that were intercepted, cannot be considered an exhaustive list from the conflict.

- Iran -

Approximately four out of 10 recorded attacks targeted Iran, mostly attributed to the Israeli military, According to AFP's analysis, in only a third of the cases could the target be identified as military or linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime's ideological army.

A third of the attacks had no identified target. April 6 and 7 -- the two days preceding the ceasefire -- saw the highest number of strikes.

- Lebanon -

Lebanon, where Israel has been conducting a campaign triggered by the Iran-backed movement Hezbollah on March 2 launching an offensive, accounted for a third of the attacks, according to ACLED data as of April 3.

The vast majority were carried out by Israeli forces, while nearly 10 percent were Hezbollah attacks against Israeli positions in the south of Lebanon.

Israel asserts the two-week ceasefire agreed between the United States and Iran does not apply to Lebanon and it has continued to bombard the country.

- Israel -

One in seven attacks targeted Israel, most of which were intercepted. The attacks were in almost equal proportions from Iran and Hezbollah.

- Other countries -

The main countries targeted by Iran were Gulf states, primarily the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. In Iraq, 40 percent of the attacks were against Kurdish groups and 20 percent against US interests.

Qatar and Oman were targeted to a lesser extent.

In Syria, ACLED recorded approximately one hundred incidents, but these were mainly the result of Iranian missiles and drones being intercepted by Israel. Several dozen similar incidents were recorded in the West Bank and Jordan.

In Türkiye, four missile launches were intercepted by NATO to protect its Incirlik airbase, where US troops are stationed.

- Most common targets -

Israel targeted 15 bridges or their approaches in Lebanon and around 20 in Iran.

Attacks against energy infrastructure in Iran were most intense during the second and third weeks of the conflict, as well as during the week of the ceasefire announcement.

Iran's key petrochemical complex at Assalouyeh, already targeted in mid-March, was struck again on April 6 by Israel. Numerous Iranian fuel depots were also hit.

ACLED reported four strikes near Iran's only nuclear power plant, in Bushehr.

Military bases housing US personnel were targeted around 50 times in total, primarily during the first two weeks of the conflict.


US-Iran: More Than Four Decades of Enmity

A person holds a placard representing a US flag, with an image of Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on a billboard in the background, on the day of a ceremony marking 40 days since Ali Khamenei was killed in Israeli and US strikes, in Tehran, Iran, April 9, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A person holds a placard representing a US flag, with an image of Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on a billboard in the background, on the day of a ceremony marking 40 days since Ali Khamenei was killed in Israeli and US strikes, in Tehran, Iran, April 9, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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US-Iran: More Than Four Decades of Enmity

A person holds a placard representing a US flag, with an image of Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on a billboard in the background, on the day of a ceremony marking 40 days since Ali Khamenei was killed in Israeli and US strikes, in Tehran, Iran, April 9, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A person holds a placard representing a US flag, with an image of Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on a billboard in the background, on the day of a ceremony marking 40 days since Ali Khamenei was killed in Israeli and US strikes, in Tehran, Iran, April 9, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

The United States and Iran have been sworn enemies since the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran.

On Saturday, the arch-foes are set to hold talks in Islamabad to end more than a month of war in the Middle East, as a fragile ceasefire holds despite deep mutual mistrust.

- 1979: Hostage crisis -

On November 4, 1979, student activists demanding the extradition of Iran's deposed monarch -- Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was undergoing medical treatment in the US -- take staff hostage at the US embassy in Tehran.

The move comes seven months after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Some 52 hostages are held for 444 days.

In April 1980, Washington breaks off diplomatic relations with Iran and imposes restrictions on commerce and travel. Nine months later, the last hostages are released.

- 2002: 'Axis of evil' -

On April 30, 1995, US president Bill Clinton announces a complete ban on trade and investment with Iran, accusing it of supporting terrorism.

The US cites Iran's backing of regional armed groups including Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Foreign companies that invest in Iran's oil and gas sector are targeted.

On January 29, 2002, US president George W. Bush says Iran, Iraq and North Korea belong to a terror-supporting "axis of evil".

In April 2019, the US designates Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, the ideological arm of its military, a "terrorist organization".

- 2018: US walks out of nuclear deal -

In the early 2000s, revelations of undeclared nuclear sites in Iran spark fears Tehran is trying to make nuclear weapons, claims it denies.

A 2011 report by the UN nuclear watchdog IAEA, collating "broadly credible" intelligence, says that Iran "carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device" until at least 2003.

In 2005, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ends a freeze on uranium enrichment. Tehran insists its nuclear program is solely for civilian purposes.

A decade later, an accord with six world powers -- China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States -- on Iran's nuclear program is reached in Vienna.

It gives Tehran relief from crippling economic sanctions in exchange for guarantees that it will not make an atomic bomb. The deal is endorsed by the United Nations.

US President Donald Trump pulls out of the pact in 2018, reinstating sanctions on Iran and companies with ties to it.

A year later Iran starts to backtrack on some of its commitments under the deal.

Diplomatic efforts fail to bear fruit. UN sanctions are reimposed on September 28, 2025. The accord lapses in October.

- 2020: Top general killed -

On January 3, 2020, the US kills top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad.

Trump says Soleimani had been planning an "imminent" attack on US diplomats and forces in Iraq.

Iran retaliates with missile strikes on bases in Iraq hosting American forces.

- 2025: Nuclear sites bombed -

During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, the US strikes three major Iranian nuclear sites on June 21, 2025.

Trump says the sites have been "obliterated", but the true extent of the damage is not known.

- February 2026: Khamenei killed -

Trump threatens to strike Iran in response to its deadly crackdown on a massive protest movement that began in late December 2025, though the focus of his threats soon shifts to Tehran's nuclear program.

He sends a US "armada" to the region. The two countries resume indirect talks under Omani mediation in early February 2026.

On February 28, the US and Israel launch coordinated strikes killing supreme leader Ali Khamenei and hitting Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure.

Tehran vows to avenge Khamenei's death, launching waves of missiles at its Gulf neighbors hosting US forces and effectively closing the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world's crude flows.

- April 2026: high-level talks amid shaky truce -

The US and Iran reach a fragile two-week ceasefire at the start of April, with thousands killed and displaced, and the global economy severely disrupted after over a month of war.

Top delegations from the two countries are to meet on Saturday in Islamabad, Pakistan, which brokered the truce.

The teams led by US Vice President JD Vance and Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf express mutual distrust, and remain at odds on key demands.

The ceasefire is set to expire April 22 unless the talks reach an agreement.


Iran Revolutionary Guards Officers Reject Iraqi Calls to Halt Attacks

A man gestures with picture of Iran's slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei next to Iranian and Iraqi flags from a atop a truck during celebrations welcoming the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran in Baghdad's central Tahrir Square on April 8, 2026.(AFP)
A man gestures with picture of Iran's slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei next to Iranian and Iraqi flags from a atop a truck during celebrations welcoming the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran in Baghdad's central Tahrir Square on April 8, 2026.(AFP)
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Iran Revolutionary Guards Officers Reject Iraqi Calls to Halt Attacks

A man gestures with picture of Iran's slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei next to Iranian and Iraqi flags from a atop a truck during celebrations welcoming the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran in Baghdad's central Tahrir Square on April 8, 2026.(AFP)
A man gestures with picture of Iran's slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei next to Iranian and Iraqi flags from a atop a truck during celebrations welcoming the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran in Baghdad's central Tahrir Square on April 8, 2026.(AFP)

Iraqi sources said officers from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, who oversee armed factions in Iraq, have rebuffed attempts by Shiite politicians to halt attacks inside the country.

Since the outbreak of the US-Iran war, they have effectively acted as a “shadow military supervisor” in Baghdad, maintaining a “pressure front” against Washington and preparing for a breakdown in negotiations.

Asharq Al-Awsat reported on March 24 that officers from the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the Revolutionary Guards, had deployed to Iraq to run attrition operations and set up an alternative operation room.

According to the sources, Quds Force officers have moved between Iraqi cities to oversee attacks, help factions develop locally made drone munitions, and provide missile-related expertise, with targets updated continuously.

Daily target lists

One source said Revolutionary Guards officers provided Iraqi armed groups with daily lists of targets, munitions volumes, and strike timing.

They oversaw the deployment of specialized cells installing drone launch platforms and surveillance units in safe houses at new locations, avoiding coordinates previously tracked by US aircraft before and during the war.

By the fourth week of the war, one source said, the structure of the “resistance” in Iraq had shifted. Core factions moved to a new model built on semi-independent networks that are difficult to dismantle.

A person close to the factions described a system that distributes roles across specialized field cells operating flexibly in complex security environments.

Iraqi sources said the Revolutionary Guards engineered faction networks to ensure plausible deniability through layered structures that provide deterrence and ambiguity.

Some cells were tasked with cross-border attacks targeting interests in neighboring Arab states, as the indirect confrontation widened across overlapping regional arenas.

An unidentified strike hit a house in Khor al-Zubair in Basra, about 150 km from Kuwait, destroying a radar and a launch platform. Members of a cell, including a commander from Kataib Hezbollah, were killed along with two others.

The Revolutionary Guards denied carrying out attacks on Gulf Arab states on Thursday, but “is capable of using Iraqi groups to carry out this task,” a source close to the factions said.

In the final week of the war, before a temporary ceasefire, Iranian officers ordered the redeployment of faction units that had withdrawn from Nineveh and Kirkuk, telling them to retake positions ceded to other forces under US strikes, revealed the sources.

Revolutionary Guards officer does not answer calls

Two figures from the ruling Coordination Framework and the Iraqi government said leaders of four Shiite parties had held talks in recent weeks with Iranian officials inside Iraq to press for a halt to attacks on US interests, but were ignored.

One influential Quds Force officer in Baghdad “does not answer calls from Iraqi politicians, even allies within the Coordination Framework,” the sources said, adding that he communicates only with operational commanders in armed factions.

The contacts reflect attempts to contain escalation and prevent Iraq from sliding into a broader conflict, as pressure mounts on the government to rein in armed groups. But “local political will is diminishing to an unprecedented level,” an Iraqi official said.

Security officials have voiced frustration over what they described as the “growing dominance” of officers from the Revolutionary Guards.

A senior Iraqi official, speaking at a private security meeting, said: “How is it possible that we cannot stop this man? Who is this ‘Abu so-and-so’? Why can’t we arrest him, or at least stop these attacks?”

Leaders within the Coordination Framework said the issue may largely stem from poor communication, noting that Iranian officials rely on strict security protocols.

‘Military supervisor’

Figures within the Coordination Framework said field officers linked to the Revolutionary Guards are effectively becoming a “military supervisor” running a conflict front with the US from inside Iraq, regardless of Iraqi considerations.

They said Iran’s refusal to halt attacks signals it sees little hope in talks with Washington and that the “front is ready to ignite”.

Iraqi officials said the situation underscores the scale of the challenge facing security institutions in areas beyond the state’s direct control.

The US State Department said Iraqi militias receive government financial, operational, and political cover, and that authorities have failed to curb them or limit their attacks, according to a statement issued on Thursday.

Politicians within the Coordination Framework said the conduct of Revolutionary Guards officers reflects Iran’s intent to keep Iraq as a pressure front against the United States as the Pakistan-mediated negotiation kick off.

But they warned that this risks pushing Iraq’s political system toward chaos, accelerating its regional isolation.