Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed

Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)
Hosni Mubarak was able to manage the difficult relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi. (AFP)

In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region.

Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak “was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.” He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: “Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.”

The Gaddafi encounter

Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. “When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn’t look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,” Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: “I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?”

Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt’s ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. “But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.”

Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times.

Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP)

Diplomatic drama in a tent

When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa’s tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. “At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,” Moussa said, “so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.”

Despite Gaddafi’s sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. “He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.”

Gaddafi’s erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. “If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.”

A moment of humor

One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn’t even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. “When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,” Moussa laughed.

Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi’s secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: “You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.” Moussa quipped: “Tell the leader he’s not tearless—he’s payment-less!” Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya’s dues.

Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: “Take it easy, Ali.” That phrase—“Take it easy, Ali”—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. “It revealed Gaddafi’s desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.”

On Hosni Mubarak and the ‘pharaoh’ myth

Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a “pharaoh” as Russians view their “czars,” Moussa was firm: “No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn’t violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn’t revel in bloodshed.”

Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. “Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn’t part of Mubarak’s character to govern through violence. He wasn’t built that way.”

Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP)

The song that stirred controversy

When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang “I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,” it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. “I don’t think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.”

Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa’s name with Mubarak’s. “But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, ‘We’re dancing to this song here!’”

A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein

One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved.

In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. “I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.”

Moussa asked Saddam directly: “Do you possess nuclear weapons?” Saddam answered, “No.” Moussa pressed him again: “Are you absolutely sure?” Saddam repeated, “No.” This made Moussa’s deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. “He probably thought we weren’t going to walk out of there.”

Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: “These people don’t just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?”

Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed.

Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: “Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.”



From India-Pakistan to Iran and Ukraine, a New Era of Escalation

The Iron Dome, the Israeli air defense system, intercepts missiles fired from Iran, over Tel Aviv, Israel, 17 June 2025. (EPA)
The Iron Dome, the Israeli air defense system, intercepts missiles fired from Iran, over Tel Aviv, Israel, 17 June 2025. (EPA)
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From India-Pakistan to Iran and Ukraine, a New Era of Escalation

The Iron Dome, the Israeli air defense system, intercepts missiles fired from Iran, over Tel Aviv, Israel, 17 June 2025. (EPA)
The Iron Dome, the Israeli air defense system, intercepts missiles fired from Iran, over Tel Aviv, Israel, 17 June 2025. (EPA)

By Peter Apps

As India’s defense chief attended an international security conference in Singapore in May, soon after India and Pakistan fought what many in South Asia now dub “the four-day war”, he had a simple message: Both sides expect to do it all again.

It was a stark and perhaps counterintuitive conclusion: the four-day military exchange, primarily through missiles and drones, appears to have been among the most serious in history between nuclear-armed nations.

Indeed, reports from both sides suggest it took a direct intervention from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to halt an escalating exchange of drones and rockets.

Speaking to a Reuters colleague in Singapore, however, Indian Chief of Defense Staff General Anil Chauhan denied either nation had come close to the “nuclear threshold”, describing a “lot of messaging” from both sides.

“A new space for conventional operations has been created and I think that is the new norm,” he said, vowing that New Delhi would continue to respond militarily to any militant attacks on India suspected to have originated from Pakistan.

How stable that "space" might be and how great the risk of escalation for now remains unclear. However, there have been several dramatic examples of escalation in several already volatile global stand-offs over the past two months.

As well as the “four-day” war between India and Pakistan last month, recent weeks have witnessed what is now referred to in Israel and Iran as their “12-day war”. It ended this week with a US-brokered ceasefire after Washington joined the fray with massive air strikes on Tehran’s underground nuclear sites.

Despite years of confrontation, Israel and Iran had not struck each other’s territory directly until last year, while successive US administrations have held back from similar steps.

As events in Ukraine have shown, conflict between major nations can become normalized at speed – whether that means “just” an exchange of drones and missiles, or a more existential battle.

More concerning still, such conflicts appear to have become more serious throughout the current decade, with plenty of room for further escalation.

This month, that included an audacious set of Ukrainian-organized drone strikes on long-range bomber bases deep inside Russian territory, destroying multiple aircraft which, as well as striking Ukraine, have also been responsible for carrying the Kremlin’s nuclear deterrent.

All of that is a far cry from the original Cold War, in which it was often assumed that any serious military clash – particularly involving nuclear forces or the nations that possessed them – might rapidly escalate beyond the point of no return. But it does bring with it new risks of escalation.

Simmering in the background, meanwhile, is the largest and most dangerous confrontation of them all - that between the US and China, with US officials saying Beijing has instructed its military to be prepared to move against Taiwan from 2027, potentially sparking a hugely wider conflict.

As US President Donald Trump headed to Europe this week for the annual NATO summit, just after bombing Iran, it was clear his administration hopes such a potent show of force might be enough to deter Beijing in particular from pushing its luck.

“American deterrence is back,” US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told a Pentagon press briefing the morning after the air strikes took place.

Iran’s initial response of drones and missiles fired at a US air base in Qatar – with forewarning to the US that the fusillade was coming – appeared deliberately moderate to avoid further escalation.

Addressing senators at their confirmation hearing on Tuesday, America’s next top commanders in Europe and the Middle East were unanimous in their comments that the US strikes against Iran would strengthen Washington's hand when it came to handling Moscow and Beijing.

Chinese media commentary was more mixed. Han Peng, head of state-run China Media Group's North American operations, said the US had shown weakness to the world by not wanting to get dragged into the Iran conflict due to its “strategic contraction”.

Other social media posts talked of how vulnerable Iran looked, with nationalist commentator Hu Xijn warning: "If one day we have to get involved in a war, we must be the best at it."

LONG ARM OF AMERICA

On that front, the spectacle of multiple US B-2 bombers battering Iran’s deepest-buried nuclear bunkers - having flown all the way from the US mainland apparently undetected - will not have gone unnoticed in Moscow or Beijing.

Nor will Trump’s not so subtle implications that unless Iran backed down, similar weapons might be used to kill its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or other senior figures, wherever they might hide.

None of America’s adversaries have the ability to strike without warning in that way against hardened, deepened targets, and the B-2 – now being replaced by the more advanced B-21 – has no foreign equal.

Both are designed to penetrate highly sophisticated air defenses, although how well they would perform against cutting-edge Russian or Chinese systems would only be revealed in an actual conflict.

China’s effort at building something similar, the H-2, has been trailed in Chinese media for years – and US officials say Beijing is striving hard to make it work.

Both China and Russia have fifth-generation fighters with some stealth abilities, but none have the range or carrying capacity to target the deepest Western leadership or weapons bunkers with conventional munitions.

As a result, any Chinese or Russian long-range strikes – whether conventional or nuclear – would have to be launched with missiles that could be detected in advance.

Even without launching such weapons, however, nuclear powers have their own tools to deliver threats.

An analysis of the India-Pakistan “four-day war” in May done by the Stimson Center suggested that as Indian strikes became more serious on the third day of the war, Pakistan might have taken similar, deliberately visible steps to ready its nuclear arsenal to grab US attention and help conclude the conflict.

Indian newspapers have reported that a desperate Pakistan did indeed put pressure on the US to encourage India to stop, as damage to its forces was becoming increasingly serious, and threatening the government.

Pakistan denies that – but one of its most senior officers was keen to stress that any repeat of India’s strikes would bring atomic risk.

"Nothing happened this time," said the chairman of the Pakistani joint chiefs, General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, also speaking to Reuters at the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore. "But you can't rule out any strategic miscalculation at any time."

For now, both sides have pulled back troops from the border – while India appears determined to use longer term strategies to undermine its neighbor, including withdrawing from a treaty controlling the water supplies of the Indus River, which Indian Prime Minister Modi said he now intends to dam. Pakistani officials have warned that could be another act of war.

DRONES AND DETERRENCE

Making sure Iran never obtains the leverage of a working atomic bomb, of course, was a key point of the US and Israeli air strikes. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed that the dangers of a government so hostile to Israel obtaining such a weapon would always be intolerable.

For years, government and private sector analysts had predicted Iran might respond to an assault on its nuclear facilities with attacks by its proxies across the Middle East, including on Israel from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, as well as using thousands of missiles, drones and attack craft to block international oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.

In reality, the threat of an overwhelming US military response – and hints of an accompanying switch of US policy to outright regime change or decapitation in Iran, coupled with the Israeli military success against Hezbollah and Hamas, appear to have forced Tehran to largely stand down.

What that means longer term is another question.

Flying to the Netherlands on Tuesday for the NATO summit, Trump appeared to be offering Iran under its current Shi'ite Muslim clerical rulers a future as a “major trading nation” providing they abandoned their atomic program.

The Trump administration is also talking up the success of its Operation ROUGH RIDER against the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen.

Vice Admiral Bradley Cooper, selected as the new head of US Central Command, told senators the US military had bombed the Houthis for 50 days before a deal was struck in which the Houthis agreed to stop attacking US and other international shipping in the Red Sea.

But Cooper also noted that like other militant groups in the Middle East, the Houthis were becoming increasingly successful in building underground bases out of the reach of smaller US weapons, as well as using unmanned systems to sometimes overwhelm their enemies.

“The nature and character of warfare is changing before our very eyes,” he said.

Behind the scenes and sometimes in public, US and allied officials say they are still assessing the implications of the success of Ukraine and Israel in infiltrating large numbers of short-range drones into Russia and Iran respectively for two spectacular attacks in recent weeks.

According to Ukrainian officials, the drones were smuggled into Russia hidden inside prefabricated buildings on the back of trucks, with the Russian drivers unaware of what they were carrying until the drones were launched.

Israel’s use of drones on the first day of its campaign against Iran is even more unsettling for Western nations wondering what such an attack might look like.

Its drones were smuggled into Iran and in some cases assembled in secret there to strike multiple senior Iranian leaders and officials in their homes as they slept in the small hours of the morning on the first day of the campaign.

As they met in The Hague this week for their annual summit, NATO officials and commanders will have considered what they must do to build their own defenses to ensure they do not prove vulnerable to a similar attack.

Judging by reports in the Chinese press, military officials there are now working on the same.