Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
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Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo

In the final episode of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reflected on his encounters with some of the Arab world’s most prominent leaders, offering personal insights and candid recollections.

Moussa described the late Moroccan King Hassan II as “the embodiment of intelligence,” saying that conversing with the monarch required keen attention and careful reading between the lines.

“You’d state your opinion, and he would respond. His words were precise, and if you listened closely, you could discern whether he agreed or disagreed without him needing to say so explicitly,” Moussa said.

He recalled a moment of quiet diplomacy with King Hassan II over the invitation of the Sahrawi delegation to an Arab-African summit in Cairo.

“He told me very clearly, ‘I do not agree at all. Please inform the president that I am uncomfortable with this and do not wish to open unnecessary doors.’”

Moussa said he responded by explaining that Egypt would not be issuing the invitation itself - that would fall to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity - and that the Egyptian president would not officially receive the Sahrawi delegation.

“I told him this would be handled formally and with discretion,” Moussa recounted. “When I said the word ‘formally,’ he repeated it, and I said, ‘Is there anything more significant than formal protocol, Your Majesty?’ He laughed. He didn’t say yes or no, but I understood his position.”

Moussa added that King Hassan reiterated his discomfort but did not object to the arrangement Moussa had outlined.

Turning to other regional figures, Moussa described Jordan’s late King Hussein bin Talal as “a skilled captain navigating turbulent waters,” and characterized the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as “mercurial, a master of maneuvering to evade any form of guardianship.”

He expressed admiration for the diplomatic legacy of the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, and spoke appreciatively of the experience of Iraq’s former foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari.

Away from politics, Moussa shared a personal side, revealing his fondness for the poetry of Al-Mutanabbi and the music of Egyptian composer and singer Mohammed Abdel Wahab.

Moussa praised Jordan’s late King Hussein for his deft political navigation, and said his son, King Abdullah II, has inherited many of those skills in managing the kingdom through difficult times.

“I have great admiration for Jordan and deep affection for its people,” Moussa said.

“King Hussein had an exceptional ability to maneuver through enormous storms, sparing Jordan from many disasters and emerging relatively unscathed. It was a remarkable achievement.”

He said King Abdullah had inherited much of his father’s political instinct.

“I believe King Abdullah learned a lot from him and carries forward that legacy. From the time of King Hussein, Jordan has been a well-organized and orderly society.”

Acknowledging the political and economic challenges the country faces, Moussa noted, “Of course, there are political difficulties and issues like poverty just as in many of our countries but I’m speaking about governance. From the outside, Jordan appears to be managed with an extraordinary level of intelligence despite immense internal, regional, and geopolitical pressures.”

Arafat the Ultimate Wily

Asked whether he missed the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Moussa offered a complex reflection.

“I pray for his soul. He was an extraordinary figure - charismatic, cunning, and unpredictable,” he said. “In Egypt, we’d call someone like that wily - he’d say and not say, appear and disappear, agree and disagree, all at the same time.”

Moussa described Arafat as a mirror of the Palestinian struggle. “Palestinians had to do everything they could for their cause, and that often meant being unpredictable, agile - even cunning. Arafat embodied that.”

He added, “There’s no doubt he was a nationalist. He was never willing to be an agent, submissive, or beholden to any other power. That was one of his greatest traits and perhaps one of his greatest flaws.”

“Arafat didn’t see things in black and white or even in shades of gray. But politics is about handling complexity. Sometimes you need to be decisive and firm, and at other times flexible and adaptive. That’s what politics demands.”

Moussa described Arafat as a master political tactician whose elusive maneuvering often drew fierce criticism, especially in his absence.

“Yes, he faced harsh attacks,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. “The insults often came when he wasn’t present, and he was aware of that.”

Moussa recalled a meeting in Cairo during preparations to resolve the Gaza file, a move that ultimately paved the way for Arafat’s return to Palestinian territory via Gaza.

“It was a positive step that should have been built upon,” he said.

“President [Hosni] Mubarak was very angry at the time. I think he even muttered something, not directly at Arafat, saying, ‘This is kids’ play.’”

Arafat, according to Moussa, was deeply distrustful of the Israelis. “And he was right to be,” he added. “Still, before taking any action, we had to study every angle to ensure things unfolded smoothly.”

Despite the progress, Arafat continued to hedge. “He signed, but with reservations. That frustrated President Mubarak,” Moussa said. “But I managed to convince him that the other side wasn’t exactly above suspicion either.”

Arafat’s position on the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cost him dearly in the Arab world. “He had many enemies, especially after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. That created significant turmoil,” Moussa said.

He noted that insults were not part of traditional Arab diplomacy. “They became more common with the rise of military coups. Suddenly, accusations of treason became routine.”

The Tunis Summit: A Diplomatic Low Point

When asked about the most difficult Arab summit he attended, Moussa pointed to the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, which was postponed at the last minute amid mounting tensions.

“Every summit was difficult, but that one stands out,” he said. “It was a storm of disputes, and I found myself at the center of one.”

The controversy erupted after Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab League, agreed to have Arab literature featured as the guest of honor at the Frankfurt Book Fair.

“The request came to me through Ghassan Salamé. He explained the proposal in my office in Cairo. I told him: ‘Tell them I accept.’ As Secretary-General, I had the authority to do so.”

The decision was initially approved by Arab culture ministers. But once it reached foreign ministers, questions arose. “They asked: ‘Is the Secretary-General entitled to make such decisions?’ I told them yes. But if they disagreed, I would present it to the summit.”

The backlash was swift. “It became a major issue, one that escalated quickly. There were other contentious items as well,” Moussa said.

Faced with the mounting discord, then-Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali decided to postpone the summit just as some Arab leaders had already begun arriving.

“It wasn’t an outright cancellation but a deferral,” Moussa explained. “Ben Ali was right. The atmosphere was too tense, with unresolved disputes. It wouldn’t have been productive.”

Tunisian State Minister Habib Ben Yahia informed the delegation of the delay, which left many shocked.

“Later, President Ben Ali summoned me to his office,” Moussa recalled. “He asked for my opinion. I told him I understood the decision, but we had to set a new date. It was late March. I suggested May. He agreed.”

Around the same time, Moussa saw a statement from an Egyptian official offering to host the summit if Tunisia could not. “I told President Ben Ali I would look into the matter and get back to him,” he said.

Moussa has recounted a high-stakes meeting with President Mubarak following the sudden postponement of the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, describing the diplomatic balancing act that followed.

Moussa said that before leaving Tunis for Cairo, he contacted presidential chief of staff Zakaria Azmi and requested an immediate meeting with Mubarak upon arrival. “I was told the president would see me the next morning at 9 a.m.,” he said.

On arrival at the presidential palace, he was informed by a staff member that Mubarak was meeting with Prince Saud and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher.

“I asked him to inform the president I had arrived. He came back and said, ‘The president says to come in.’”

Inside the room, Prince Saud was seated to Mubarak’s right, with Maher next to him. Moussa took the chair facing the president.

“Mubarak asked me directly, ‘What are you going to do about this, Amr?’” Moussa recalled. “I told him, ‘Mr. President, the situation was indeed complicated. Perhaps the decision (to postpone) wasn’t ideal, but there were real difficulties.’”

He explained that the summit had been Tunisia’s turn to host and that he had already spoken with Ben Ali. “I told him we must agree on a new date - May - and that it must be held in Tunis. I said this message should come from you directly.”

Mubarak, Moussa said, responded positively: “You’re right. I feel reassured by this.”

Moussa said Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud, had a look of “relief and joy” when Egypt backed holding the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, following a postponement that had stirred diplomatic tensions.

“It was as if mercy had descended upon him,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Prince Saud was visibly pleased. As secretary-general, I insisted the summit must take place in Tunis. In fact, Prince Saud had come to Cairo for the same reason. He feared that relocating the summit would spark a crisis between Egypt and Tunisia, or even with the Maghreb.”

He added, “I returned to Tunis the following day and informed President Ben Ali that the summit would indeed be held there the next month. We then sat together discussing our mutual admiration for Mohamed Abdel Wahab. He was a great fan and had collected all his recordings.”

On the Fate of Arab Leaders

Asked how he felt when reflecting on the downfall of Arab rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Moussa said:

“May God have mercy on them. They made grave mistakes and failed to see the momentum that was building. That momentum was evident in the discourse around a ‘new Middle East.’ If good governance had existed in those countries, the people would have protected their leaders. But what happened showed the deep need for change.”

Praise for Arab Diplomacy

Moussa also spoke highly of several Arab foreign ministers he worked with, saying many were “exceptional professionals who conducted themselves with integrity.”

He singled out Prince Saud as “an extraordinary figure - wise, respected, and trusted deeply by King Abdullah. The king would rely on his assessments and act accordingly.”

“We had a strong mutual respect,” he added. “His support was critical in rallying Arab momentum behind the Palestinian cause, Arab League reform, and the League’s renewed dynamism. He defended our positions - including when I led Arab reconciliation efforts in Beirut. European diplomats would tell me how Prince Saud described me as a unified Arab voice. He stood by me at the UN and attended regional summits - from Latin America to the Arab world - whenever I called on him.”

Moussa also praised Zebari, Iraq’s former foreign minister, calling him “a Kurdish minister who often sounded more Arab than many Arabs.”

“He clearly articulated Arab interests and was always ready to step in diplomatically to defuse tensions - whether between ministers or between ministers and the secretary-general. He was a thoroughly positive presence,” Moussa said.

He also acknowledged the contributions of Tunisia's Habib Ben Yahia, Kuwait's Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Qatar's Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Oman's Yusuf bin Alawi, and Jordan's Nasser Judeh and Ayman Safadi, noting their professionalism and dedication to Arab unity.

Moussa recalls working with dozens of Arab foreign ministers over the years, singling out those who left a lasting impression. Among them was Tunisia’s Habib Ben Yahia, who also served as defense minister. “A well-balanced figure and a strong advocate for the Arab position,” Moussa said.

But one man, he noted, stood apart: Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s former foreign minister and prime minister, who later became Emir. “He had a unique ability to read the room. Before tensions escalated, he would call for consultations or suspend a meeting, preventing crises before they erupted. Without his timely interventions, some meetings would have ended in chaos,” Moussa said. “His leadership as Emir was undeniably impactful.”

Another key figure was Qatar’s Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. “You could write pages about his intelligence and agility,” said Moussa. “He knew how to secure gains for Qatar, but also understood when to share benefits to avoid backlash. He was very smart.”

Moussa said he and Hamad maintained a candid relationship. “He would say openly: I’ll support this, but not that. There was honesty, not empty talk. Saud Al Faisal appreciated dealing with him as well. The three of us - me, Saud, and Hamad - spoke frankly.”

From Oman, Yousuf bin Alawi stood out for his quiet but disruptive style. “He would remain silent during discussions, then intervene at the end to overturn consensus if he didn’t agree. I could often predict when he’d shut something down,” said Moussa. “We were aware of his capabilities.”

On Jordan, Moussa said the kingdom produced several sharp, effective foreign ministers. “Abdel Ilah Al-Khatib was one of the good ones, followed by Nasser Judeh. The current minister, Ayman Safadi, is excellent - clear, reliable, and valuable in Arab diplomacy.”

The Arab Peace Initiative

Asked whether it was difficult to pass the Arab Peace Initiative at the 2002 Beirut Summit, Moussa replied, “Not at all. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia backed it. It was hard to reject anything he supported.”

He recalled how Libya’s then-foreign minister, Ali Treki, was instructed to oppose the initiative. “But King Abdullah summoned him and said: There is no objection. Treki responded: Understood. He was a clever man. Rather than oppose it outright, we allowed it to pass unanimously, then expressed our reservations separately. That’s how diplomacy works.”

On Global Diplomacy

Moussa also reflected on his ties with international counterparts. “I had many friends. Hubert Védrine of France comes to mind immediately. We worked together often. James Baker had stature and presence, though I could criticize him too. Britain’s Jack Straw was important.

Germany’s Green Party foreign minister also played a key role. Some had real weight and strong political theories.”

Of Russia’s long-serving foreign minister, Moussa said: “I’ve known Sergei Lavrov for years, and he remains approachable. He is perhaps less reserved than many of his Western counterparts, warm and skilled at building relationships. He is among the world’s most important foreign ministers.”

He also spoke about his interactions with Henry Kissinger.

“We spoke often, especially about the Palestinian issue. In his later years, he was still listening, processing thoughts, even if less involved in the Middle East. He would hear perspectives from Egyptians and others critical of Israel’s conduct and America’s unconditional support. He understood that, though he wasn’t deeply engaged in his final 10 to 15 years.”

From Literature to Music: A Personal Side

Moussa reflected on the books and music that shaped him. “As a boy, I loved reading. A Tale of Two Cities taught us about life and language. Teachers were cultured and aimed to raise our standards. I also read How to Stop Worrying and Start Living, a translated self-help book. I came to believe worry is actually a useful habit. If you don’t worry, you’ll stumble.”

Asked about poetry, Moussa didn’t hesitate. “Al-Mutanabbi, of course. I still read his work. Also Ahmed Shawqi, and to a lesser extent Nizar Qabbani. Al-Mutanabbi was always relevant. Former Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham never traveled without his Diwan (collection). When he was troubled, he’d read aloud from it. And Jean Obeid from Lebanon was deeply versed in Arabic literature—we had long, enriching conversations. It was a joy to listen to or recite Al-Mutanabbi.”

Moussa also shared his enduring love for classic Arabic music. “I adored Mohamed Abdel Wahab’s songs from an early age, especially his historical, non-commercial works. Magnificent. I also listen to Umm Kulthum, Fairuz, and folk legends like Sabah Fakhri. That’s real Arab artistry, music with meaning. Abdel Wahab and Umm Kulthum excelled at that, while Qabbani specialized in love. But when it came to national pride, faith, philosophy, and memory, those two giants delivered.”

On Egypt, the Presidency, and Regret

Does he hold any grudges against Egypt? “Not at all. My disappointment is for Egypt, not with it. The country could have been in a vastly different place, if not for 70 years without good governance.”

Did losing the 2012 presidential election leave a scar? “Not in the slightest,” Moussa said. “In fact, I may have thanked God. Before the vote, I realized the Muslim Brotherhood would win, but withdrawing wasn’t an option. When I lost, I held a press conference attended by 100 foreign journalists. Imagine how many would’ve come had I won. I congratulated the victors and called for democracy to prevail.”

He contrasted his response with that of other candidates. “Some went to Tahrir Square and claimed the results were false. That was not my approach. I offered my best wishes and hoped democracy would guide Egypt forward. I hold no bitterness, at least none that I can recall.”



From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
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From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.


Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.


The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
TT

The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.