Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
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Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo

In the final episode of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reflected on his encounters with some of the Arab world’s most prominent leaders, offering personal insights and candid recollections.

Moussa described the late Moroccan King Hassan II as “the embodiment of intelligence,” saying that conversing with the monarch required keen attention and careful reading between the lines.

“You’d state your opinion, and he would respond. His words were precise, and if you listened closely, you could discern whether he agreed or disagreed without him needing to say so explicitly,” Moussa said.

He recalled a moment of quiet diplomacy with King Hassan II over the invitation of the Sahrawi delegation to an Arab-African summit in Cairo.

“He told me very clearly, ‘I do not agree at all. Please inform the president that I am uncomfortable with this and do not wish to open unnecessary doors.’”

Moussa said he responded by explaining that Egypt would not be issuing the invitation itself - that would fall to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity - and that the Egyptian president would not officially receive the Sahrawi delegation.

“I told him this would be handled formally and with discretion,” Moussa recounted. “When I said the word ‘formally,’ he repeated it, and I said, ‘Is there anything more significant than formal protocol, Your Majesty?’ He laughed. He didn’t say yes or no, but I understood his position.”

Moussa added that King Hassan reiterated his discomfort but did not object to the arrangement Moussa had outlined.

Turning to other regional figures, Moussa described Jordan’s late King Hussein bin Talal as “a skilled captain navigating turbulent waters,” and characterized the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as “mercurial, a master of maneuvering to evade any form of guardianship.”

He expressed admiration for the diplomatic legacy of the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, and spoke appreciatively of the experience of Iraq’s former foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari.

Away from politics, Moussa shared a personal side, revealing his fondness for the poetry of Al-Mutanabbi and the music of Egyptian composer and singer Mohammed Abdel Wahab.

Moussa praised Jordan’s late King Hussein for his deft political navigation, and said his son, King Abdullah II, has inherited many of those skills in managing the kingdom through difficult times.

“I have great admiration for Jordan and deep affection for its people,” Moussa said.

“King Hussein had an exceptional ability to maneuver through enormous storms, sparing Jordan from many disasters and emerging relatively unscathed. It was a remarkable achievement.”

He said King Abdullah had inherited much of his father’s political instinct.

“I believe King Abdullah learned a lot from him and carries forward that legacy. From the time of King Hussein, Jordan has been a well-organized and orderly society.”

Acknowledging the political and economic challenges the country faces, Moussa noted, “Of course, there are political difficulties and issues like poverty just as in many of our countries but I’m speaking about governance. From the outside, Jordan appears to be managed with an extraordinary level of intelligence despite immense internal, regional, and geopolitical pressures.”

Arafat the Ultimate Wily

Asked whether he missed the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Moussa offered a complex reflection.

“I pray for his soul. He was an extraordinary figure - charismatic, cunning, and unpredictable,” he said. “In Egypt, we’d call someone like that wily - he’d say and not say, appear and disappear, agree and disagree, all at the same time.”

Moussa described Arafat as a mirror of the Palestinian struggle. “Palestinians had to do everything they could for their cause, and that often meant being unpredictable, agile - even cunning. Arafat embodied that.”

He added, “There’s no doubt he was a nationalist. He was never willing to be an agent, submissive, or beholden to any other power. That was one of his greatest traits and perhaps one of his greatest flaws.”

“Arafat didn’t see things in black and white or even in shades of gray. But politics is about handling complexity. Sometimes you need to be decisive and firm, and at other times flexible and adaptive. That’s what politics demands.”

Moussa described Arafat as a master political tactician whose elusive maneuvering often drew fierce criticism, especially in his absence.

“Yes, he faced harsh attacks,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. “The insults often came when he wasn’t present, and he was aware of that.”

Moussa recalled a meeting in Cairo during preparations to resolve the Gaza file, a move that ultimately paved the way for Arafat’s return to Palestinian territory via Gaza.

“It was a positive step that should have been built upon,” he said.

“President [Hosni] Mubarak was very angry at the time. I think he even muttered something, not directly at Arafat, saying, ‘This is kids’ play.’”

Arafat, according to Moussa, was deeply distrustful of the Israelis. “And he was right to be,” he added. “Still, before taking any action, we had to study every angle to ensure things unfolded smoothly.”

Despite the progress, Arafat continued to hedge. “He signed, but with reservations. That frustrated President Mubarak,” Moussa said. “But I managed to convince him that the other side wasn’t exactly above suspicion either.”

Arafat’s position on the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cost him dearly in the Arab world. “He had many enemies, especially after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. That created significant turmoil,” Moussa said.

He noted that insults were not part of traditional Arab diplomacy. “They became more common with the rise of military coups. Suddenly, accusations of treason became routine.”

The Tunis Summit: A Diplomatic Low Point

When asked about the most difficult Arab summit he attended, Moussa pointed to the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, which was postponed at the last minute amid mounting tensions.

“Every summit was difficult, but that one stands out,” he said. “It was a storm of disputes, and I found myself at the center of one.”

The controversy erupted after Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab League, agreed to have Arab literature featured as the guest of honor at the Frankfurt Book Fair.

“The request came to me through Ghassan Salamé. He explained the proposal in my office in Cairo. I told him: ‘Tell them I accept.’ As Secretary-General, I had the authority to do so.”

The decision was initially approved by Arab culture ministers. But once it reached foreign ministers, questions arose. “They asked: ‘Is the Secretary-General entitled to make such decisions?’ I told them yes. But if they disagreed, I would present it to the summit.”

The backlash was swift. “It became a major issue, one that escalated quickly. There were other contentious items as well,” Moussa said.

Faced with the mounting discord, then-Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali decided to postpone the summit just as some Arab leaders had already begun arriving.

“It wasn’t an outright cancellation but a deferral,” Moussa explained. “Ben Ali was right. The atmosphere was too tense, with unresolved disputes. It wouldn’t have been productive.”

Tunisian State Minister Habib Ben Yahia informed the delegation of the delay, which left many shocked.

“Later, President Ben Ali summoned me to his office,” Moussa recalled. “He asked for my opinion. I told him I understood the decision, but we had to set a new date. It was late March. I suggested May. He agreed.”

Around the same time, Moussa saw a statement from an Egyptian official offering to host the summit if Tunisia could not. “I told President Ben Ali I would look into the matter and get back to him,” he said.

Moussa has recounted a high-stakes meeting with President Mubarak following the sudden postponement of the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, describing the diplomatic balancing act that followed.

Moussa said that before leaving Tunis for Cairo, he contacted presidential chief of staff Zakaria Azmi and requested an immediate meeting with Mubarak upon arrival. “I was told the president would see me the next morning at 9 a.m.,” he said.

On arrival at the presidential palace, he was informed by a staff member that Mubarak was meeting with Prince Saud and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher.

“I asked him to inform the president I had arrived. He came back and said, ‘The president says to come in.’”

Inside the room, Prince Saud was seated to Mubarak’s right, with Maher next to him. Moussa took the chair facing the president.

“Mubarak asked me directly, ‘What are you going to do about this, Amr?’” Moussa recalled. “I told him, ‘Mr. President, the situation was indeed complicated. Perhaps the decision (to postpone) wasn’t ideal, but there were real difficulties.’”

He explained that the summit had been Tunisia’s turn to host and that he had already spoken with Ben Ali. “I told him we must agree on a new date - May - and that it must be held in Tunis. I said this message should come from you directly.”

Mubarak, Moussa said, responded positively: “You’re right. I feel reassured by this.”

Moussa said Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud, had a look of “relief and joy” when Egypt backed holding the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, following a postponement that had stirred diplomatic tensions.

“It was as if mercy had descended upon him,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Prince Saud was visibly pleased. As secretary-general, I insisted the summit must take place in Tunis. In fact, Prince Saud had come to Cairo for the same reason. He feared that relocating the summit would spark a crisis between Egypt and Tunisia, or even with the Maghreb.”

He added, “I returned to Tunis the following day and informed President Ben Ali that the summit would indeed be held there the next month. We then sat together discussing our mutual admiration for Mohamed Abdel Wahab. He was a great fan and had collected all his recordings.”

On the Fate of Arab Leaders

Asked how he felt when reflecting on the downfall of Arab rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Moussa said:

“May God have mercy on them. They made grave mistakes and failed to see the momentum that was building. That momentum was evident in the discourse around a ‘new Middle East.’ If good governance had existed in those countries, the people would have protected their leaders. But what happened showed the deep need for change.”

Praise for Arab Diplomacy

Moussa also spoke highly of several Arab foreign ministers he worked with, saying many were “exceptional professionals who conducted themselves with integrity.”

He singled out Prince Saud as “an extraordinary figure - wise, respected, and trusted deeply by King Abdullah. The king would rely on his assessments and act accordingly.”

“We had a strong mutual respect,” he added. “His support was critical in rallying Arab momentum behind the Palestinian cause, Arab League reform, and the League’s renewed dynamism. He defended our positions - including when I led Arab reconciliation efforts in Beirut. European diplomats would tell me how Prince Saud described me as a unified Arab voice. He stood by me at the UN and attended regional summits - from Latin America to the Arab world - whenever I called on him.”

Moussa also praised Zebari, Iraq’s former foreign minister, calling him “a Kurdish minister who often sounded more Arab than many Arabs.”

“He clearly articulated Arab interests and was always ready to step in diplomatically to defuse tensions - whether between ministers or between ministers and the secretary-general. He was a thoroughly positive presence,” Moussa said.

He also acknowledged the contributions of Tunisia's Habib Ben Yahia, Kuwait's Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Qatar's Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Oman's Yusuf bin Alawi, and Jordan's Nasser Judeh and Ayman Safadi, noting their professionalism and dedication to Arab unity.

Moussa recalls working with dozens of Arab foreign ministers over the years, singling out those who left a lasting impression. Among them was Tunisia’s Habib Ben Yahia, who also served as defense minister. “A well-balanced figure and a strong advocate for the Arab position,” Moussa said.

But one man, he noted, stood apart: Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s former foreign minister and prime minister, who later became Emir. “He had a unique ability to read the room. Before tensions escalated, he would call for consultations or suspend a meeting, preventing crises before they erupted. Without his timely interventions, some meetings would have ended in chaos,” Moussa said. “His leadership as Emir was undeniably impactful.”

Another key figure was Qatar’s Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. “You could write pages about his intelligence and agility,” said Moussa. “He knew how to secure gains for Qatar, but also understood when to share benefits to avoid backlash. He was very smart.”

Moussa said he and Hamad maintained a candid relationship. “He would say openly: I’ll support this, but not that. There was honesty, not empty talk. Saud Al Faisal appreciated dealing with him as well. The three of us - me, Saud, and Hamad - spoke frankly.”

From Oman, Yousuf bin Alawi stood out for his quiet but disruptive style. “He would remain silent during discussions, then intervene at the end to overturn consensus if he didn’t agree. I could often predict when he’d shut something down,” said Moussa. “We were aware of his capabilities.”

On Jordan, Moussa said the kingdom produced several sharp, effective foreign ministers. “Abdel Ilah Al-Khatib was one of the good ones, followed by Nasser Judeh. The current minister, Ayman Safadi, is excellent - clear, reliable, and valuable in Arab diplomacy.”

The Arab Peace Initiative

Asked whether it was difficult to pass the Arab Peace Initiative at the 2002 Beirut Summit, Moussa replied, “Not at all. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia backed it. It was hard to reject anything he supported.”

He recalled how Libya’s then-foreign minister, Ali Treki, was instructed to oppose the initiative. “But King Abdullah summoned him and said: There is no objection. Treki responded: Understood. He was a clever man. Rather than oppose it outright, we allowed it to pass unanimously, then expressed our reservations separately. That’s how diplomacy works.”

On Global Diplomacy

Moussa also reflected on his ties with international counterparts. “I had many friends. Hubert Védrine of France comes to mind immediately. We worked together often. James Baker had stature and presence, though I could criticize him too. Britain’s Jack Straw was important.

Germany’s Green Party foreign minister also played a key role. Some had real weight and strong political theories.”

Of Russia’s long-serving foreign minister, Moussa said: “I’ve known Sergei Lavrov for years, and he remains approachable. He is perhaps less reserved than many of his Western counterparts, warm and skilled at building relationships. He is among the world’s most important foreign ministers.”

He also spoke about his interactions with Henry Kissinger.

“We spoke often, especially about the Palestinian issue. In his later years, he was still listening, processing thoughts, even if less involved in the Middle East. He would hear perspectives from Egyptians and others critical of Israel’s conduct and America’s unconditional support. He understood that, though he wasn’t deeply engaged in his final 10 to 15 years.”

From Literature to Music: A Personal Side

Moussa reflected on the books and music that shaped him. “As a boy, I loved reading. A Tale of Two Cities taught us about life and language. Teachers were cultured and aimed to raise our standards. I also read How to Stop Worrying and Start Living, a translated self-help book. I came to believe worry is actually a useful habit. If you don’t worry, you’ll stumble.”

Asked about poetry, Moussa didn’t hesitate. “Al-Mutanabbi, of course. I still read his work. Also Ahmed Shawqi, and to a lesser extent Nizar Qabbani. Al-Mutanabbi was always relevant. Former Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham never traveled without his Diwan (collection). When he was troubled, he’d read aloud from it. And Jean Obeid from Lebanon was deeply versed in Arabic literature—we had long, enriching conversations. It was a joy to listen to or recite Al-Mutanabbi.”

Moussa also shared his enduring love for classic Arabic music. “I adored Mohamed Abdel Wahab’s songs from an early age, especially his historical, non-commercial works. Magnificent. I also listen to Umm Kulthum, Fairuz, and folk legends like Sabah Fakhri. That’s real Arab artistry, music with meaning. Abdel Wahab and Umm Kulthum excelled at that, while Qabbani specialized in love. But when it came to national pride, faith, philosophy, and memory, those two giants delivered.”

On Egypt, the Presidency, and Regret

Does he hold any grudges against Egypt? “Not at all. My disappointment is for Egypt, not with it. The country could have been in a vastly different place, if not for 70 years without good governance.”

Did losing the 2012 presidential election leave a scar? “Not in the slightest,” Moussa said. “In fact, I may have thanked God. Before the vote, I realized the Muslim Brotherhood would win, but withdrawing wasn’t an option. When I lost, I held a press conference attended by 100 foreign journalists. Imagine how many would’ve come had I won. I congratulated the victors and called for democracy to prevail.”

He contrasted his response with that of other candidates. “Some went to Tahrir Square and claimed the results were false. That was not my approach. I offered my best wishes and hoped democracy would guide Egypt forward. I hold no bitterness, at least none that I can recall.”



Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
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Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)

Iran and the United States are in discussions to extend ‌their ceasefire so as to start negotiations on issues including Tehran's nuclear program, where Washington insists Iran must not be able to make a nuclear weapon.

While much of Iran's uranium enrichment infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged when Israel and the US bombed it in June, a large part of the highly enriched uranium it amassed is thought to have survived. That is the biggest US concern ahead of nuclear talks.

On Friday Trump said in a social media post that Iran must agree that the enriched uranium buried underground after earlier US strikes be "unearthed" and destroyed in coordination with Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog.

WHAT IS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM?

One of two fissile materials, along with plutonium, with which one can make the core of a nuclear bomb. While plutonium is usually extracted from the spent fuel of a nuclear reactor, requiring large and highly visible infrastructure, uranium can be enriched using centrifuges that have a much smaller footprint. Two of Iran's three enrichment sites that are known to have been operating when Israel and the ‌US attacked in ‌June were underground. The above-ground one was clearly destroyed.

Uranium is highly enriched when it ‌has ⁠reached 20% purity, and ⁠weapons-grade as of around 90%.

Modern reactors generally use fuel enriched to up to 5%, but some use fuel enriched to higher levels. The ones that power US nuclear submarines reportedly use fuel enriched beyond 90%.

HOW MUCH DOES IRAN HAVE?

Iran has not informed the UN nuclear watchdog of the fate of its enriched uranium since the June attacks or let its inspectors return to the sites where it was stored.

The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates Iran had these amounts when the first Israeli bombs fell on June 13:

- 440.9 kg enriched to up to 60%

- 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%

- 6,024.4 kg enriched to ⁠up to 5%

- 2,391.1 kg enriched to up to 2%

According to an IAEA yardstick, ‌the amount at 60% is enough, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear weapons. ‌The 20% stock would be enough for one and the 5% could produce 12. How much has survived is unclear. IAEA chief ‌Rafael Grossi has said his agency believes "a bit more than 200 kg" of the 60% stock is stored at a ‌tunnel complex in Isfahan that appears to have been largely unharmed by the June attacks. Some was also at the Natanz nuclear site, he said.

WHY THE CONCERN? US concern has been focused on the 60% material because that would be easiest and thus quickest to make a bomb with. Washington wants it gone. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

As the enrichment level of uranium increases, it becomes exponentially easier to enrich ‌further. Getting from 60% to 90% is easier than getting from unenriched to 5%.

President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of a nuclear deal between Iran and ⁠major powers that kept Tehran ⁠at a far greater distance from being able to produce an atom bomb than it is at now. The US withdrawal in 2018 caused the deal to unravel, and Iran quickly expanded its atomic program.

Under that 2015 deal, Iran did not enrich beyond 3.67%.

Even at 90%, however, it takes more steps to produce the core of a bomb. When it is enriched, the uranium is in gas form. It must then be turned into metal for use in a weapon.

CAN YOU MOVE IT?

Yes. Iran moved enriched material between sites under IAEA monitoring before the June attacks.

Under the 2015 deal and a precursor to it, Iran's stocks of uranium enriched to up to 20% were diluted or turned into reactor fuel plates and shipped out of the country.

Moving nuclear material like highly enriched uranium internationally is a sensitive but relatively routine procedure.

"It requires some precaution but it can be moved," Grossi told PBS in March when asked about the 60% material.

WILL IRAN GIVE IT UP? Iran's supreme leader has issued a directive that the 60% material should not be sent abroad, two senior Iranian sources said last week.

Iranian sources say Tehran might agree to send half of it to a third country, receiving uranium enriched to 5% in return, and dilute the other half inside Iran.


Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

 Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
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Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

 Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)

Repeated Israeli strikes on the medieval Beaufort Castle and its surroundings east of Nabatieh have revived debate over one of southern Lebanon’s most sensitive sites due to its elevated position overlooking Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon.

For decades, the Crusader fortress was a commanding military position and a battlefield etched into Israeli and Lebanese memory. Now, as fighting escalates in the south, it is back at the center of events. Military assessments say its battlefield value remains, despite major changes in warfare over recent decades.

The renewed focus on Beaufort Castle comes as Israel intensifies strikes around the site and the heights overlooking Nabatieh. The attacks have raised fresh questions about the military value of a position that has remained present in major confrontations in southern Lebanon since Israel's 1982 invasion.

Heritage landmark

Beaufort Castle, known in Arabic as Qalaat al-Shaqif, is one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent historical and heritage landmarks, and among the most important Crusader castles in the Levant.

The Crusaders named it Beaufort, meaning “beautiful fortress.” It later fell to Salaheddine after a long siege. The Crusaders then retook it for a period, and the Knights Templar inhabited it, before the Mamluks, led by Sultan al-Zahir Baybars, seized it in 1268.

Smoke rises from Beaufort Castle following strikes, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 27, 2026. (Reuters)

Although the Romans first built initial fortifications at the strategic site, the Crusaders greatly expanded it and built most of its existing structures.

Since 2024, the castle has held “enhanced protection” status under the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Lebanon's Arnoun municipality said in a statement.

The municipality warned that repeated Israeli strikes could damage the castle and urged Lebanese authorities and relevant international organizations to act to protect the landmark and prevent further harm.

Battlefield advantage

Claiming the castle has long been seen as a battlefield advantage. In the 1970s, it came under heavy Israeli airstrikes after the Palestine Liberation Organization used it as a position to fire at Israel. In 1982, it was the scene of one of the fiercest battles between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies. Israel occupied it until 2000.

Retired Brigadier General Bassam Yassine said Beaufort Castle’s importance today is little different from the value that made it a focus of battles since the 1982 invasion. The site, he said, remains one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent commanding military positions.

“Beaufort Castle has been present in all wars and battles with Israel from 1982 until today because of its strategic location,” Yassine told Asharq Al-Awsat, saying it offers a commanding view over wide areas of southern Lebanon and northern occupied Palestine.

“Beaufort Castle overlooks the settlement of Metula, which is less than four kilometers away. It overlooks the area between the Litani and Zahrani rivers and is considered the highest hill in this sector,” he said.

The site gives whoever controls it a major military advantage, Yassine said.

“From Beaufort Castle, one can observe Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, where the Israeli army is present today. That is why it cannot leave it outside its control if it wants to remain in the area where it is deployed,” he said.

Yassine said this importance is not new. Before Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it controlled hills and heights around the area, including Beaufort Castle, to secure battlefield superiority and maintain observation over its surroundings.

Destroyed buildings are pictured in the village of Kfar Kila in southern Lebanon as seen from across the border in the Upper Galilee region of northern Israel on May 29, 2026, with the Crusader-period Beaufort Castle pictured in Lebanon in the background. (AFP)

Asked which sectors the castle exposes, he said: “It directly overlooks Yohmor al-Shaqif, eastern Zawtar, western Zawtar, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. All these areas are exposed from the castle.”

“It also protects forces on the Yohmor and Zawtar axes, and provides cover for troops deployed in Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, and across this entire sector,” he added.

Yassine said the castle’s military value also lies in its defensive terrain.

“If any resistance force managed to infiltrate the castle and possess anti-armor missiles there, it would become very difficult to remove it from the site or destroy it because of the geography of the location,” he explained.

He said Israel had faced that problem before, during the period of Palestinian armed presence in the south.

“The Israelis tried many times to destroy the castle during the Palestinian period, but they did not succeed because of its geography,” he said.

Yassine said the site includes old historical passages and tunnels.

“The castle has tunnels that reach the Litani River below. They have existed since the Crusader era and are not newly built tunnels, which gives the site additional defensive value,” he said.

Control of the castle does not mean control of the area

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Bahaa Halal said Beaufort Castle is one of southern Lebanon’s most important military and geopolitical sites because of its strategic location.

“Israeli military doctrine views Beaufort Castle as a key point for achieving visual and intelligence superiority, which forms part of fire superiority, as it allows the monitoring of movements between south and north of the Litani, the tracking of routes toward the western Bekaa and Iqlim al-Tuffah, as well as monitoring the operational environment of attack drones and FPV aircraft,” Halal told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Any “resistance force that is able to deploy freely around Beaufort Castle gains a tactical advantage in missile maneuvering, managing ambushes and concealing combat infrastructure inside the mountainous terrain,” he added, making the area a constant Israeli security concern.

“Israel can theoretically reach the surroundings of Beaufort Castle through air cover, prior destruction and special forces. But there is a major difference between reaching the area and maintaining stable control,” he remarked.

Holding it, he said, would require secure supply lines, fire control over the castle’s surroundings, preventing flanking moves and ambushes, and ensuring permanent superiority in observation.

Such conditions are difficult to secure in an area geographically connected to Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar, Iqlim al-Tuffah and the valleys leading to the Litani, he stressed.


US and Iran Standoff at Sea: A Test of ‘Who Will Blink First’

A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)
A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US and Iran Standoff at Sea: A Test of ‘Who Will Blink First’

A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)
A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)

Naval blockades, military history has shown, require patience. That is not the leading attribute of the officials in Washington.

“So when President Trump imposed a blockade of Iranian ports in April, the quick result he was looking for — a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic — was not in the cards. Wearing down an enemy with a blockade can take months or years, military experts say, and certainly not weeks,” reported the New York Times on Friday.

“Iran, with thousands of miles of land borders with seven neighbors, and a trade lifeline to its ally Russia across the Caspian Sea, had alternatives. The standoff persisted.”

“It’s difficult to rapidly bring an adversary to its knees with a blockade,” said Michael Connell, a specialist on the Iranian military at the Center for Naval Analyses in Virginia. “It’s the kind of thing that works well over time but it’s not a quick solution.”

Now, as the United States appears closer to a peace agreement with Iran, dropping the American blockade and reopening the strait are among the top priorities. If a deal can be reached, it would end one of the more unique naval standoffs in modern times: a tense stalemate that is neither peace nor raging conflict, between two mismatched adversaries who have exercised their leverage at sea.

It has featured an increasingly familiar pattern of conflict in an era of technological disruption — the ability of Iran’s speedboats, drones, mines and missiles to hold off America’s arsenal of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with advanced fighter jets and populations the size of small towns.

The stalemate at sea has also underscored an old imperative of war. Swift victory without gaining and controlling territory on land is difficult to accomplish. A naval standoff is an attempt at economic and commercial strangulation on the water — seemingly bloodless but with hidden costs and risks for both sides, reported the NYT.

Indeed, Adm. Brad Cooper, the leader of US Central Command, which directs military operations in the Middle East, emphasized the value of economic pressure in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last week. There had been “zero trade” in or out of Iranian ports, he said, “squeezing Iran economically and creating powerful leverage for the ongoing negotiations.”

Iran can also inflict economic pain. Because the world economy relies on a global supply chain, it means that Iran’s blocking of exports like fertilizer, helium and most importantly oil and gas has been felt worldwide.

“It has become a contest of wills, to see who blinks first,” Connell said.

A blockade is an act of war under international law; escalation, purposeful or not, is always a risk. That point was driven home on Wednesday when Iran launched four one-way attack drones over the Strait of Hormuz and the US military conducted airstrikes against a drone ground-control station in the port city of Bandar Abbas. It was the second time in three days that American forces conducted strikes in southern Iran, including against Iranian boats trying to emplace mines.

Vessels anchored at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)

The war at sea also imposes burdens. For Iran, the constriction of goods flowing in and out of the country puts enormous pressure on an economy that was reeling even before the war began — despite the alternative paths it has for trade.

“For the United States, sending ships to patrol waters far from home not only is expensive, but also risks overtaxing the ships and the crews. The USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, for instance, limped home this month after a grueling 10 months in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the Red Sea, demonstrating how wear and tear can impose costs on a superpower overextending itself,” said the report.

“The US Navy can do some phenomenal things for a phenomenal amount of time,” said Mike Franken, a retired vice admiral who served as commodore of a destroyer squadron. “Around the edges things get tattered, and we’ve been at a very high op tempo.”

There are also strategic opportunities lost. The ships used to blockade Iran, and the sailors that operate them, cannot be used for other missions. Trump’s recent trip to China served as a reminder that East Asia remains a region of strategic significance, with allies like South Korea, Japan and especially Taiwan relying at least to some extent on a US naval deterrent.

Finally, having two adversaries in static tension creates the risk of accidental escalation, through a misreading of circumstances caused by anxiety, confusion or a lapse in concentration.

The US Central Command said this week it had redirected 111 commercial vessels and disabled four ships bound for Iranian ports thus far. Iranian forces have attacked American guided-missile destroyers crossing the Strait of Hormuz with missiles, drones and small boats. Central Command said the American warships successfully fended off the attack. Iran has also fired on ships from other countries trying to pass through the strait, causing some damage.

The United States has some two dozen warships involved in the blockade, which includes two aircraft carriers, the USS George H.W. Bush and the USS Abraham Lincoln, as well as guided-missile destroyers, amphibious ships, littoral combat ships and minesweepers, and refueling and supply ships to keep them provisioned and combat ready.

One precedent for the current stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz is the so-called Tanker War of the 1980s, when the war between Iran and Iraq spilled into the Gulf. Though the United States was not one of the combatants, it was drawn into the fray as it began to escort civilian oil tankers through the strait.

If the current standoff continues, the tactic has direct costs in terms of keeping ships in the region supplied with food, fuel and ammunition. There’s also the need to keep drones, helicopters, fighters and surveillance planes in the air. Sailors, Marines and airmen receive imminent danger pay.

For sailors, the combination of long stretches of dullness punctuated by moments of stress and tension can be a grind. “A blockade is a very boring thing to do,” said Andrew Lambert, professor of naval history in the department of war studies at King’s College. “You’re just hanging around waiting for something to happen.”

“There is a ripple effect from keeping large numbers of assets on station for protracted periods of time,” said James R. Holmes, chair of maritime strategy at the Naval War College.

He cited the USS Gerald R. Ford and its long deployment and posited that the carrier could encounter unexpected engineering problems when undergoing maintenance. While at sea, the ship endured mechanical problems with the gear that launches and recovers warplanes on the flight deck. A major fire destroyed the sleeping area for hundreds of sailors. There were also complaints about food shortages and delays in receiving mail that led to a decline in morale.

It will be difficult for the United States to reopen trade through the strait without coming to terms with Iran, Holmes said. “All Iran needs to keep its chokehold on the Strait is enough of its mosquito fleet, including shore-based missiles and drones, to keep shipping firms and insurers jittery,” he said. “And seldom if ever does a military campaign fully disarm an antagonist short of regime change.”

Lambert, the King’s College professor, said costs will mount as the standoff persists. “Because nothing particularly violent is happening on a large scale, the temptation to let it roll on is a real problem,” he said.

* Nicholas Kulish and John Ismay for the New York Times