Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
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Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo

In the final episode of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reflected on his encounters with some of the Arab world’s most prominent leaders, offering personal insights and candid recollections.

Moussa described the late Moroccan King Hassan II as “the embodiment of intelligence,” saying that conversing with the monarch required keen attention and careful reading between the lines.

“You’d state your opinion, and he would respond. His words were precise, and if you listened closely, you could discern whether he agreed or disagreed without him needing to say so explicitly,” Moussa said.

He recalled a moment of quiet diplomacy with King Hassan II over the invitation of the Sahrawi delegation to an Arab-African summit in Cairo.

“He told me very clearly, ‘I do not agree at all. Please inform the president that I am uncomfortable with this and do not wish to open unnecessary doors.’”

Moussa said he responded by explaining that Egypt would not be issuing the invitation itself - that would fall to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity - and that the Egyptian president would not officially receive the Sahrawi delegation.

“I told him this would be handled formally and with discretion,” Moussa recounted. “When I said the word ‘formally,’ he repeated it, and I said, ‘Is there anything more significant than formal protocol, Your Majesty?’ He laughed. He didn’t say yes or no, but I understood his position.”

Moussa added that King Hassan reiterated his discomfort but did not object to the arrangement Moussa had outlined.

Turning to other regional figures, Moussa described Jordan’s late King Hussein bin Talal as “a skilled captain navigating turbulent waters,” and characterized the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as “mercurial, a master of maneuvering to evade any form of guardianship.”

He expressed admiration for the diplomatic legacy of the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, and spoke appreciatively of the experience of Iraq’s former foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari.

Away from politics, Moussa shared a personal side, revealing his fondness for the poetry of Al-Mutanabbi and the music of Egyptian composer and singer Mohammed Abdel Wahab.

Moussa praised Jordan’s late King Hussein for his deft political navigation, and said his son, King Abdullah II, has inherited many of those skills in managing the kingdom through difficult times.

“I have great admiration for Jordan and deep affection for its people,” Moussa said.

“King Hussein had an exceptional ability to maneuver through enormous storms, sparing Jordan from many disasters and emerging relatively unscathed. It was a remarkable achievement.”

He said King Abdullah had inherited much of his father’s political instinct.

“I believe King Abdullah learned a lot from him and carries forward that legacy. From the time of King Hussein, Jordan has been a well-organized and orderly society.”

Acknowledging the political and economic challenges the country faces, Moussa noted, “Of course, there are political difficulties and issues like poverty just as in many of our countries but I’m speaking about governance. From the outside, Jordan appears to be managed with an extraordinary level of intelligence despite immense internal, regional, and geopolitical pressures.”

Arafat the Ultimate Wily

Asked whether he missed the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Moussa offered a complex reflection.

“I pray for his soul. He was an extraordinary figure - charismatic, cunning, and unpredictable,” he said. “In Egypt, we’d call someone like that wily - he’d say and not say, appear and disappear, agree and disagree, all at the same time.”

Moussa described Arafat as a mirror of the Palestinian struggle. “Palestinians had to do everything they could for their cause, and that often meant being unpredictable, agile - even cunning. Arafat embodied that.”

He added, “There’s no doubt he was a nationalist. He was never willing to be an agent, submissive, or beholden to any other power. That was one of his greatest traits and perhaps one of his greatest flaws.”

“Arafat didn’t see things in black and white or even in shades of gray. But politics is about handling complexity. Sometimes you need to be decisive and firm, and at other times flexible and adaptive. That’s what politics demands.”

Moussa described Arafat as a master political tactician whose elusive maneuvering often drew fierce criticism, especially in his absence.

“Yes, he faced harsh attacks,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. “The insults often came when he wasn’t present, and he was aware of that.”

Moussa recalled a meeting in Cairo during preparations to resolve the Gaza file, a move that ultimately paved the way for Arafat’s return to Palestinian territory via Gaza.

“It was a positive step that should have been built upon,” he said.

“President [Hosni] Mubarak was very angry at the time. I think he even muttered something, not directly at Arafat, saying, ‘This is kids’ play.’”

Arafat, according to Moussa, was deeply distrustful of the Israelis. “And he was right to be,” he added. “Still, before taking any action, we had to study every angle to ensure things unfolded smoothly.”

Despite the progress, Arafat continued to hedge. “He signed, but with reservations. That frustrated President Mubarak,” Moussa said. “But I managed to convince him that the other side wasn’t exactly above suspicion either.”

Arafat’s position on the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cost him dearly in the Arab world. “He had many enemies, especially after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. That created significant turmoil,” Moussa said.

He noted that insults were not part of traditional Arab diplomacy. “They became more common with the rise of military coups. Suddenly, accusations of treason became routine.”

The Tunis Summit: A Diplomatic Low Point

When asked about the most difficult Arab summit he attended, Moussa pointed to the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, which was postponed at the last minute amid mounting tensions.

“Every summit was difficult, but that one stands out,” he said. “It was a storm of disputes, and I found myself at the center of one.”

The controversy erupted after Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab League, agreed to have Arab literature featured as the guest of honor at the Frankfurt Book Fair.

“The request came to me through Ghassan Salamé. He explained the proposal in my office in Cairo. I told him: ‘Tell them I accept.’ As Secretary-General, I had the authority to do so.”

The decision was initially approved by Arab culture ministers. But once it reached foreign ministers, questions arose. “They asked: ‘Is the Secretary-General entitled to make such decisions?’ I told them yes. But if they disagreed, I would present it to the summit.”

The backlash was swift. “It became a major issue, one that escalated quickly. There were other contentious items as well,” Moussa said.

Faced with the mounting discord, then-Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali decided to postpone the summit just as some Arab leaders had already begun arriving.

“It wasn’t an outright cancellation but a deferral,” Moussa explained. “Ben Ali was right. The atmosphere was too tense, with unresolved disputes. It wouldn’t have been productive.”

Tunisian State Minister Habib Ben Yahia informed the delegation of the delay, which left many shocked.

“Later, President Ben Ali summoned me to his office,” Moussa recalled. “He asked for my opinion. I told him I understood the decision, but we had to set a new date. It was late March. I suggested May. He agreed.”

Around the same time, Moussa saw a statement from an Egyptian official offering to host the summit if Tunisia could not. “I told President Ben Ali I would look into the matter and get back to him,” he said.

Moussa has recounted a high-stakes meeting with President Mubarak following the sudden postponement of the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, describing the diplomatic balancing act that followed.

Moussa said that before leaving Tunis for Cairo, he contacted presidential chief of staff Zakaria Azmi and requested an immediate meeting with Mubarak upon arrival. “I was told the president would see me the next morning at 9 a.m.,” he said.

On arrival at the presidential palace, he was informed by a staff member that Mubarak was meeting with Prince Saud and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher.

“I asked him to inform the president I had arrived. He came back and said, ‘The president says to come in.’”

Inside the room, Prince Saud was seated to Mubarak’s right, with Maher next to him. Moussa took the chair facing the president.

“Mubarak asked me directly, ‘What are you going to do about this, Amr?’” Moussa recalled. “I told him, ‘Mr. President, the situation was indeed complicated. Perhaps the decision (to postpone) wasn’t ideal, but there were real difficulties.’”

He explained that the summit had been Tunisia’s turn to host and that he had already spoken with Ben Ali. “I told him we must agree on a new date - May - and that it must be held in Tunis. I said this message should come from you directly.”

Mubarak, Moussa said, responded positively: “You’re right. I feel reassured by this.”

Moussa said Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud, had a look of “relief and joy” when Egypt backed holding the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, following a postponement that had stirred diplomatic tensions.

“It was as if mercy had descended upon him,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Prince Saud was visibly pleased. As secretary-general, I insisted the summit must take place in Tunis. In fact, Prince Saud had come to Cairo for the same reason. He feared that relocating the summit would spark a crisis between Egypt and Tunisia, or even with the Maghreb.”

He added, “I returned to Tunis the following day and informed President Ben Ali that the summit would indeed be held there the next month. We then sat together discussing our mutual admiration for Mohamed Abdel Wahab. He was a great fan and had collected all his recordings.”

On the Fate of Arab Leaders

Asked how he felt when reflecting on the downfall of Arab rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Moussa said:

“May God have mercy on them. They made grave mistakes and failed to see the momentum that was building. That momentum was evident in the discourse around a ‘new Middle East.’ If good governance had existed in those countries, the people would have protected their leaders. But what happened showed the deep need for change.”

Praise for Arab Diplomacy

Moussa also spoke highly of several Arab foreign ministers he worked with, saying many were “exceptional professionals who conducted themselves with integrity.”

He singled out Prince Saud as “an extraordinary figure - wise, respected, and trusted deeply by King Abdullah. The king would rely on his assessments and act accordingly.”

“We had a strong mutual respect,” he added. “His support was critical in rallying Arab momentum behind the Palestinian cause, Arab League reform, and the League’s renewed dynamism. He defended our positions - including when I led Arab reconciliation efforts in Beirut. European diplomats would tell me how Prince Saud described me as a unified Arab voice. He stood by me at the UN and attended regional summits - from Latin America to the Arab world - whenever I called on him.”

Moussa also praised Zebari, Iraq’s former foreign minister, calling him “a Kurdish minister who often sounded more Arab than many Arabs.”

“He clearly articulated Arab interests and was always ready to step in diplomatically to defuse tensions - whether between ministers or between ministers and the secretary-general. He was a thoroughly positive presence,” Moussa said.

He also acknowledged the contributions of Tunisia's Habib Ben Yahia, Kuwait's Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Qatar's Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Oman's Yusuf bin Alawi, and Jordan's Nasser Judeh and Ayman Safadi, noting their professionalism and dedication to Arab unity.

Moussa recalls working with dozens of Arab foreign ministers over the years, singling out those who left a lasting impression. Among them was Tunisia’s Habib Ben Yahia, who also served as defense minister. “A well-balanced figure and a strong advocate for the Arab position,” Moussa said.

But one man, he noted, stood apart: Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s former foreign minister and prime minister, who later became Emir. “He had a unique ability to read the room. Before tensions escalated, he would call for consultations or suspend a meeting, preventing crises before they erupted. Without his timely interventions, some meetings would have ended in chaos,” Moussa said. “His leadership as Emir was undeniably impactful.”

Another key figure was Qatar’s Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. “You could write pages about his intelligence and agility,” said Moussa. “He knew how to secure gains for Qatar, but also understood when to share benefits to avoid backlash. He was very smart.”

Moussa said he and Hamad maintained a candid relationship. “He would say openly: I’ll support this, but not that. There was honesty, not empty talk. Saud Al Faisal appreciated dealing with him as well. The three of us - me, Saud, and Hamad - spoke frankly.”

From Oman, Yousuf bin Alawi stood out for his quiet but disruptive style. “He would remain silent during discussions, then intervene at the end to overturn consensus if he didn’t agree. I could often predict when he’d shut something down,” said Moussa. “We were aware of his capabilities.”

On Jordan, Moussa said the kingdom produced several sharp, effective foreign ministers. “Abdel Ilah Al-Khatib was one of the good ones, followed by Nasser Judeh. The current minister, Ayman Safadi, is excellent - clear, reliable, and valuable in Arab diplomacy.”

The Arab Peace Initiative

Asked whether it was difficult to pass the Arab Peace Initiative at the 2002 Beirut Summit, Moussa replied, “Not at all. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia backed it. It was hard to reject anything he supported.”

He recalled how Libya’s then-foreign minister, Ali Treki, was instructed to oppose the initiative. “But King Abdullah summoned him and said: There is no objection. Treki responded: Understood. He was a clever man. Rather than oppose it outright, we allowed it to pass unanimously, then expressed our reservations separately. That’s how diplomacy works.”

On Global Diplomacy

Moussa also reflected on his ties with international counterparts. “I had many friends. Hubert Védrine of France comes to mind immediately. We worked together often. James Baker had stature and presence, though I could criticize him too. Britain’s Jack Straw was important.

Germany’s Green Party foreign minister also played a key role. Some had real weight and strong political theories.”

Of Russia’s long-serving foreign minister, Moussa said: “I’ve known Sergei Lavrov for years, and he remains approachable. He is perhaps less reserved than many of his Western counterparts, warm and skilled at building relationships. He is among the world’s most important foreign ministers.”

He also spoke about his interactions with Henry Kissinger.

“We spoke often, especially about the Palestinian issue. In his later years, he was still listening, processing thoughts, even if less involved in the Middle East. He would hear perspectives from Egyptians and others critical of Israel’s conduct and America’s unconditional support. He understood that, though he wasn’t deeply engaged in his final 10 to 15 years.”

From Literature to Music: A Personal Side

Moussa reflected on the books and music that shaped him. “As a boy, I loved reading. A Tale of Two Cities taught us about life and language. Teachers were cultured and aimed to raise our standards. I also read How to Stop Worrying and Start Living, a translated self-help book. I came to believe worry is actually a useful habit. If you don’t worry, you’ll stumble.”

Asked about poetry, Moussa didn’t hesitate. “Al-Mutanabbi, of course. I still read his work. Also Ahmed Shawqi, and to a lesser extent Nizar Qabbani. Al-Mutanabbi was always relevant. Former Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham never traveled without his Diwan (collection). When he was troubled, he’d read aloud from it. And Jean Obeid from Lebanon was deeply versed in Arabic literature—we had long, enriching conversations. It was a joy to listen to or recite Al-Mutanabbi.”

Moussa also shared his enduring love for classic Arabic music. “I adored Mohamed Abdel Wahab’s songs from an early age, especially his historical, non-commercial works. Magnificent. I also listen to Umm Kulthum, Fairuz, and folk legends like Sabah Fakhri. That’s real Arab artistry, music with meaning. Abdel Wahab and Umm Kulthum excelled at that, while Qabbani specialized in love. But when it came to national pride, faith, philosophy, and memory, those two giants delivered.”

On Egypt, the Presidency, and Regret

Does he hold any grudges against Egypt? “Not at all. My disappointment is for Egypt, not with it. The country could have been in a vastly different place, if not for 70 years without good governance.”

Did losing the 2012 presidential election leave a scar? “Not in the slightest,” Moussa said. “In fact, I may have thanked God. Before the vote, I realized the Muslim Brotherhood would win, but withdrawing wasn’t an option. When I lost, I held a press conference attended by 100 foreign journalists. Imagine how many would’ve come had I won. I congratulated the victors and called for democracy to prevail.”

He contrasted his response with that of other candidates. “Some went to Tahrir Square and claimed the results were false. That was not my approach. I offered my best wishes and hoped democracy would guide Egypt forward. I hold no bitterness, at least none that I can recall.”



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.