Foreign Fighters in Syria: Problem or Part of the Solution?

In this photo released by the Saudi Royal Palace, Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, left, shakes hands with President Donald Trump, center, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Wednesday, May 14, 2025. At right is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.(Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace via AP)
In this photo released by the Saudi Royal Palace, Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, left, shakes hands with President Donald Trump, center, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Wednesday, May 14, 2025. At right is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.(Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace via AP)
TT

Foreign Fighters in Syria: Problem or Part of the Solution?

In this photo released by the Saudi Royal Palace, Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, left, shakes hands with President Donald Trump, center, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Wednesday, May 14, 2025. At right is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.(Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace via AP)
In this photo released by the Saudi Royal Palace, Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, left, shakes hands with President Donald Trump, center, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Wednesday, May 14, 2025. At right is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.(Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace via AP)

US President Donald Trump’s announcement to lift sanctions on Syria came with five conditions, chief among them the demand that “all foreign fighters” leave Syrian territory, a requirement that poses a significant challenge to the new administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

The presence of these fighters, many of whom have been allied for years with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), underscores the complexity of Trump’s demand. These militants played a key role in the conflict against former President Bashar al-Assad, and many in HTS view them as having earned their place on the battlefield through loyalty and sacrifice.

The influx of foreign fighters into Syria began with the formation of the Free Syrian Army in the early days of the uprising. Türkiye’s border soon became a dual gateway, a route of escape for Syrians fleeing war, either settling in Türkiye or continuing toward Europe, and a corridor for hundreds of non-Syrian fighters arriving to join the battle.

Initially, many of these fighters aligned themselves with non-ideological armed groups. But over time, especially between 2012 and 2014, as the regime intensified its use of barrel bombs and heavy weaponry on opposition-held neighborhoods, the foreign fighters gained prominence in what became known as the “revolutionary strongholds,” particularly in Syria’s north.

‘The Migrants’ of the Revolution

Their combat skills and commitment earned them both fear and admiration. In this period, foreign fighters often led the charge in so-called “inghimasi” (commando-style) and suicide operations, which won them significant support among local communities. They were dubbed “al-Muhajireen” - the migrants - a reference both to their origins and their perceived dedication to the Syrian cause.

Following the collapse of the former Syrian regime on December 8, foreign fighter factions such as the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Sham and Ajnad al-Kavkaz (Chechens) emerged as key players within the operations command room led by the HTS.

In his first public remarks on the presence of foreign fighters, Syria’s new president described them as instrumental in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime and said they “deserve to be rewarded.”

Speaking to journalists in mid-January, al-Sharaa said the atrocities committed by the former government had necessitated foreign support, and hinted at the possibility of granting these fighters Syrian citizenship, a suggestion that sparked widespread debate.

Soon after, the new administration took steps that signaled both gratitude and political calculation: several foreign fighters were appointed to senior military posts in the newly restructured Syrian army, with ranks ranging from colonel to brigadier general.

Among the most prominent were Jordanian Abdulrahman Hussein al-Khatib, promoted to brigadier general; Egyptian Alaa Mohamed Abdel Baki; Uyghur militant Abdulaziz Dawood Khodabardi; Tajik national Moulana Tursun Abdulsamad; Turkish fighter Omar Mohamed Jeftchi Mukhtar; Albanian Abdul Bashari Khattab; and Dagestani native Zanor al-Basri Abdelhamid Abdullah, the commander of the “Army of Emigrants and Supporters.”

A Dilemma at the Heart of Syria’s Future

A former HTS commander, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said the al-Sharaa administration is unlikely to oppose the US demand.

“The muhajireen brothers themselves are not clinging to their positions if they stand in the way of the country’s interests,” he said.

Indeed, less than 24 hours after Trump and al-Sharaa met in the Saudi capital, local Syrian outlets began reporting that General Security forces had raided foreign fighter strongholds in rural Idlib.

Asharq Al-Awsat was unable to independently verify the reports, but whether the raids were genuine or simply political theater, analysts say the message was unmistakable: Damascus may be willing to act decisively to secure international recognition and economic relief.

Kareem Mohammed, a current Syrian army commander and former battalion leader in the HTS with direct ties to foreign fighters, told Asharq Al-Awsat from Damascus that these combatants still hold significant sway within the country’s military and security apparatus, as well as among the revolution’s grassroots base.

“There is no interest for the government in taking negative action against them,” Mohammed said. “They remain popular within the ranks of the new army and the revolutionary heartland.”

Mohammed added that several countries have recently begun raising the issue of foreign fighters as a bargaining chip in their engagement with Syria’s new leadership. But he emphasized the crucial role these militants - referred to by rebels as al-Muhajireen (the migrants) - played from the outset of the uprising.

“These fighters had a decisive impact from the early days of the revolution. Their military expertise stood out in key battles,” he said.

According to Mohammed, the al-Sharaa government is actively working to distance the muhajireen from internal political conflicts and reassign them to their former positions in Idlib. There are also promises of eventual integration into Syrian society and possibly even the granting of citizenship down the line.

The ongoing debate over the presence of foreign fighters in Syria may be based on a misunderstanding, according to extremist group researcher Hossam Jazmati, who says Western powers are not explicitly calling for their expulsion.

“The American and Western demands are not about deporting foreign fighters,” Jazmati told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Rather, they focus on two main conditions: that these individuals do not hold prominent positions in the emerging Syrian state, particularly in the army, security, or government , and that Syrian territory is not used by any of them to launch, prepare for, or train for military operations abroad.”

Jazmati noted that even during Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s control over Idlib in recent years, the group maintained a policy of preventing factions from using Syrian territory as a base for cross-border attacks.

“HTS managed to keep the jihadist movements in check, discouraging any ambitions of launching operations beyond Syria’s borders,” he said.

As the future of foreign fighters in Syria hangs in the balance, allies and commanders aligned with the so-called muhajireen are rejecting any calls for their expulsion or forced repatriation.

“What their brothers and allies refuse is the idea of throwing them out of a country they fought to defend against a brutal regime, or handing them over to their home countries, where prison, or even execution, likely awaits,” said Jazmati.

“Generally speaking, I don’t believe that leaders and fighters in the HTS, or other factions, or even the religious and revolutionary base that admires the muhajireen model, insist on these fighters taking part in building the new state,” he added. “Nor do I think the foreign fighters themselves want that.”

That sentiment is echoed by Abu Hafs al-Turkistani, a former leader in the Turkistan Islamic Party who now heads a battalion within the Syrian army under the Ministry of Defense. His unit, composed mainly of Uyghur fighters, is stationed between Idlib and the Latakia countryside.

“We didn’t come to Syria to kill Syrians,” Turkistani told Asharq Al-Awsat. “We didn’t come here for money or positions. We came to support them, to share their suffering and help them as best we could, and thanks to God, victory was achieved, and we are honored to have taken part in it.”

Turkistani dismissed accusations linking foreign fighters to recent violence in coastal areas or in Sweida as part of a broader media campaign to vilify them. “These are baseless allegations,” he said.

Turkistani insisted that foreign fighters have largely kept to themselves and respected Syrian customs and traditions.

“We never interfered in the lives of Syrians. We’ve lived among them for years and stayed out of their personal affairs. Every nation has its differences, and while we may not agree on everything, we never tried to impose ourselves on their society,” he said.

As for past incidents in Idlib involving foreign fighters, Turkistani acknowledged isolated cases but said they were not repeated and did not reflect a broader pattern of misconduct. “The Syrians know that well,” he added.

Jazmati says Syria’s new leadership could resolve the foreign fighters dilemma by allowing them to stay under clear legal terms, provided they step away from power and military involvement.

“The muhajireen can remain in Syria under officially agreed legal arrangements, as civilians only,” Jazmati told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“They were never here to govern, and should not be placed at the forefront of a state they have no intention of ruling. But they must also pledge not to use Syrian territory to plan or launch jihadist operations in their home countries or elsewhere, as that could cause serious harm. If they refuse, they can leave for a destination of their choice.”

Appointments Stir Controversy

A foreign fighter of Arab nationality, known as Abu Mohammed, told Asharq Al-Awsat that he and others remain committed to the state led by al-Sharaa.

“We will not turn against Sharaa. We never did,” he said. “We avoided factional infighting and always prioritized Syria’s interests, which never clashed with our own. We were ready to die for the lives of Syrians, and now we know how to live under a state we respect and value.”

However, Jazmati warned that the real challenge lies in undoing the senior military appointments made shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, including three generals and three colonels, all foreign nationals.

“Reversing those promotions and assignments is a political and institutional dilemma,” Jazmati said. “It’s only been three weeks since the regime’s collapse, and these titles carry weight.”

According to confidential information seen by Jazmati, Syrian officials have pledged to halt the appointment of non-Syrians going forward.

But resolving the status of those already promoted remains a sensitive issue, one that may require a compromise that preserves their dignity, rank, and possibly even their current roles.

Efforts to limit the influence of foreign fighters in Syria’s post-Assad era are unlikely to trigger a resurgence of al-Qaeda or ISIS, according Jazmati.

“I don’t see al-Qaeda seeking a revival in Syria after its affiliate, Hurras al-Din, was dismantled,” Jazmati told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“As for ISIS, while its Syrian strategy remains unclear, it could attempt to recruit disaffected individuals, both Syrian and foreign, who are frustrated by the new government’s policies. Other smaller groups may also emerge, especially those that believe the current leadership is straying from their interpretation of Islamic law.”

Fragmented Landscape of Foreign Fighters

Not all foreign fighters in Syria fall along a single ideological spectrum. Divisions among them have existed since the early days of their arrival, influenced by how they were recruited and the routes they took to join the war.

Some were brought in through structured recruitment networks. These fighters were often contacted online, vetted, and then smuggled into Syria through well-organized channels. Others arrived independently, relying on human smugglers and covering their own travel costs, usually via Türkiye on tourist visas.

By mid-2013, as the rebel scene in Syria splintered, foreign fighters mostly gravitated toward jihadist factions, especially Jabhat al-Nusra. A smaller number joined so-called “moderate” groups such as Liwa al-Tawhid in Aleppo.

Ideological Rifts and Realignment

As rivalries over ideology and influence deepened, most foreign fighters shifted between groups, particularly after Jabhat al-Nusra’s break from ISIS. The split followed its former leader Ahmad al-Sharaa’s refusal to pledge allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, instead aligning with former al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri.

That move sparked further defections, with some foreign fighters rejecting al-Zawahiri’s authority and joining ISIS.

Clashes between the factions ensued, eventually leading to the rise of independent groups like Jund al-Aqsa, founded by Abu Abdul Aziz al-Qatari, a jihadist of Palestinian origin born in Iraq.

Other units formed along national lines, including Uyghur, Uzbek, and Chechen battalions.

By mid-2014, the rise of ISIS across western Iraq and into Syria’s Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, parts of Hasakah, and the Aleppo and Idlib countryside intensified rivalries among jihadist factions.

ISIS declared other foreign-led groups apostates, even as many maintained ties with Jabhat al-Nusra and adopted a position of neutrality in the escalating infighting.

Factions like the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Sham, Ajnad al-Kavkaz, and Ansar al-Tawhid, as well as remnants of Jund al-Aqsa, survived through Assad’s fall, opting for autonomy or quiet alliance with the HTS.

The Syrianization of the Fight

Between 2014 and 2018, HTS, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (al-Sharaa), systematically sidelined foreign fighters, removing them from leadership roles and the media spotlight.

Many were arrested or expelled, especially those affiliated with hardline factions such as Hurras al-Din, or those resistant to HTS’s pivot toward local governance.

The shift was both strategic and ideological.

Syrians increasingly resented the dominance of foreign leaders within the group, while international actors, particularly Türkiye, raised concerns about HTS’s associations with transnational jihadism.

Foreign fighters were often seen preaching al-Qaeda-style rhetoric and resisting cooperation with the Turkish military,which they denounced due to its NATO membership.

Al-Sharaa responded by launching a sweeping reform within HTS, marginalizing extremists regardless of nationality.

He rebranded the movement’s mission from global jihad to Syrian nationalism, using phrases like “Thawrat Ahl al-Sham” (“the revolution of the people of the Levant”) to underscore local priorities.

Many foreign fighters aligned with this vision, describing themselves as “supporters” rather than leaders of Syria’s future, as HTS moved to integrate them into the new nationalist framework.

Al-Sharaa’s project of “Syrianizing” the battle and its fighters aimed to distance the group from its jihadist roots and bring it closer to the political mainstream.

Now as president, al-Sharaa faces a new test: can he extend this project of ideological reform and integration under a national flag, while appeasing international stakeholders demanding limits on foreign fighters?

Observers say success will depend on his ability to restructure without alienating the fighters who once formed the backbone of the armed opposition.

The challenge lies in balancing their role in Syria’s recent history with the imperatives of diplomacy, reconstruction, and future security.

Whether Sharaa’s past efforts at moderation and localization can evolve into a credible state policy remains to be seen but with pressure mounting from both allies and adversaries, the answer may define the country’s next chapter.



Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium by Force Would Be Risky and Complex, Experts Say

 This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
TT

Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium by Force Would Be Risky and Complex, Experts Say

 This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)

Should the US decide to send in military forces to secure Iran’s uranium stockpile, it would be a complex, risky and lengthy operation, fraught with radiation and chemical dangers, according to experts and former government officials.

US President Donald Trump has offered shifting reasons for the war in Iran but has consistently said a primary objective is ensuring the country will "never have a nuclear weapon." Less clear is how far he is willing to go to seize Iran’s nuclear material.

Given the risks of inserting as many as 1,000 specially trained forces into a war zone to remove the stockpile, another option would be a negotiated settlement with Iran that would allow the material to be surrendered and secured without using force.

Iran has 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium that is enriched up to 60% purity, a short, technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog agency.

That stockpile could allow Iran to build as many as 10 nuclear bombs, should it decide to weaponize its program, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told The Associated Press last year. He added it doesn’t mean Iran has such a weapon.

Iran long has insisted its program is peaceful, but the IAEA and Western nations say Tehran had an organized nuclear weapons program up until 2003.

Nuclear material is probably stored in tunnels

IAEA inspectors have not been able to verify the near weapons-grade uranium since June 2025, when Israeli and American strikes greatly weakened Iran’s air defenses, military leadership and nuclear program. The lack of inspections has made it difficult to know exactly where it is located.

Grossi has said that the IAEA believes a stockpile of roughly 200 kilograms (about 440 pounds) of highly enriched uranium is stored in tunnels at Iran’s nuclear complex outside of Isfahan. The site was mainly known for producing the uranium gas that is fed into centrifuges to be spun and purified.

Additional quantities are believed to be at the Natanz nuclear site and lesser amounts may be stored at a facility in Fordo, he has said.

It's unclear whether additional quantities could be elsewhere.

US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told a House hearing March 19 that the US intelligence community has "high confidence" that it knows the location of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Radiation and chemical risks

Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium fits into canisters each weighing about 50 kilograms (110 pounds) when full. The material is in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas. Estimates on the number of canisters range from 26 to about twice that number, depending on how full each cylinder is.

The canisters carrying the highly enriched uranium are "pretty robust" and are designed for storage and transport, said David Albright, a former nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq and founder of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

But he warned that "safety issues become paramount" should the canisters be damaged — for example, due to airstrikes — allowing moisture to get inside.

In such a scenario, there would be a hazard from fluorine, a highly toxic chemical that is corrosive to skin, eyes and lungs. Anyone entering the tunnels seeking to retrieve the canisters "would have to wear hazmat suits," Albright said.

It also would be necessary to maintain distance between the various canisters in order to avoid a self-sustaining critical nuclear reaction that would lead to "a large amount of radiation," he said.

To avoid such a radiological accident, the canisters would have to be placed in containers that create space between them during transport, he said.

Albright said that the preferred option for dealing with the uranium would be to remove it from Iran in special military planes and then "downblend" it — mix it with lower-enriched materials to bring it to levels suitable for civilian use.

Downblending the material inside Iran probably is not feasible, given that the infrastructure needed for the process may not be intact due to the war, he added.

Darya Dolzikova, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, agreed.

Downblending the material inside Iran is "probably not the most likely option just because it’s a very complicated and long process that requires specialized equipment," she said.

Risks for ground forces

Securing Iran's nuclear material with ground troops would be a "very complex and high-risk military operation," said Christine E. Wormuth, who was secretary of the Army under former US President Joe Biden.

That's because the material is probably at multiple sites and the undertaking would "probably take casualties," added Wormuth, now president and CEO of the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The scale and scope of an operation at Isfahan alone would easily require 1,000 military personnel, she said.

Given that tunnel entrances are probably buried under rubble, it would be necessary for helicopters to fly in heavy equipment, such as excavators, and US forces might even have to build an airstrip nearby to land all the equipment and troops, Wormuth said.

She said special forces, including perhaps the 75th Ranger Regiment, would have to work "in tandem" with nuclear experts who would look underground for the canisters, adding that the special forces would likely set up a security perimeter in case of potential attacks.

Wormuth said the Nuclear Disablement Teams under the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command would be one possible unit that could be employed in such an operation.

"The Iranians have thought this through, I’m sure, and are going to try to make it as difficult as possible to do this in an expeditious way," she said. "So I would imagine it will be a pretty painstaking effort to go underground, get oriented, try to discern ... which ones are the real canisters, which ones may be decoys, to try to avoid booby traps."

A negotiated solution

The best option would be "to have an agreement with the (Iranian) government to remove all of that material," said Scott Roecker, former director of the Office of Nuclear Material Removal at the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency within the US Department of Energy.

A similar mission occurred in 1994 when the US, in partnership with the government of Kazakhstan, secretly transported 600 kilograms (about 1,322 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium from the former Soviet republic in an operation dubbed "Project Sapphire." The material was left over from the USSR's nuclear program.

Roecker, now vice president for the Nuclear Materials Security Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said the Department of Energy's Mobile Packaging Unit was built from the experience in Kazakhstan. It has safely removed nuclear material from several countries, including from Georgia in 1998 and from Iraq in 2004, 2007 and 2008.

The unit consists of technical experts and specialized equipment that can be deployed anywhere to safely remove nuclear material, and Roecker said it would be ideally positioned to remove the uranium under a negotiated deal with Iran. Tehran remains suspicious of Washington, which under Trump withdrew from a nuclear agreement and has twice attacked during high-level negotiations.

Under a negotiated solution, IAEA inspectors also could be part of a mission. "We are considering these options, of course," the IAEA's Grossi said March 22 on CBS' "Face the Nation" when asked about such a scenario.

Iran has "a contractual obligation to allow inspectors in," he added. "Of course, there’s common sense. Nothing can happen while bombs are falling."


Lebanese Displaced by War Fill Beirut’s Streets, Upending City Life

 Members of a family who fled Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon warm themselves by a bonfire next to tents used as shelters in Beirut, Lebanon, Tuesday, March 31, 2026. (AP)
Members of a family who fled Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon warm themselves by a bonfire next to tents used as shelters in Beirut, Lebanon, Tuesday, March 31, 2026. (AP)
TT

Lebanese Displaced by War Fill Beirut’s Streets, Upending City Life

 Members of a family who fled Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon warm themselves by a bonfire next to tents used as shelters in Beirut, Lebanon, Tuesday, March 31, 2026. (AP)
Members of a family who fled Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon warm themselves by a bonfire next to tents used as shelters in Beirut, Lebanon, Tuesday, March 31, 2026. (AP)

Beirut is bursting.

It's been a month since Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel after the US-Israeli attack on its patron, Iran, triggering Israeli bombardment of Lebanon and a ground invasion. Since then, more than 1 million people from southern and eastern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs have fled. Many have crammed into the ever-tighter spaces of the country's capital where the bombs have not yet fallen.

Israel's attacks and evacuation orders — unprecedented in scope, covering what humanitarian agencies estimate to be 15% of this tiny country — have emptied villages in south Lebanon and pushed almost the entire population of the southern suburbs into Beirut, shifting the city's center of gravity, reshaping its geography and stirring fears about its future.

A huge tent encampment has sprouted up in the grassy field between a yacht club and nightlife venue, transforming the Beirut waterfront. Some families squat in storefronts, live in mosques and sleep in the cars they drove here, double- and triple-parking convoys on thoroughfares. Others huddle in tents pulled together from sheets of tarp along the curving coastal corniche or around Horsh Beirut, a park of pine trees on the outskirts of an area of the southern suburbs known as Dahieh.

"It's horrid because we feel this tension, that we're not wanted here," said Nour Hussein, who settled at the waterfront in early March after fleeing the first Israeli airstrikes on Dahieh. She watched a stream of well-to-do joggers navigate a maze of tents and soiled mattresses, her three youngest children clambering onto her lap.

"We don’t want to be here," she said. "We have nothing here and nowhere to go."

Experts say this displacement is unprecedented

Waves of displacement have upended this city before, most recently during the 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war. But experts struggle to recall such a dramatic exodus — about 20% of the country’s population, according to government statements — hitting Beirut so fast.

"The scale and intensity of this is just unprecedented," said Dalal Harb, the spokesperson for the United Nations refugee agency in Lebanon. She said the figure of 1 million displaced is almost certainly an undercount because it misses anyone who has not formally registered as displaced with the Ministry of Social Affairs.

The government has converted hundreds of public schools into shelters and pitched tents for displaced families beneath the bleachers of the city's main sports stadium. Charities have scrambled to help, with one refashioning an abandoned slaughterhouse destroyed in Beirut's 2020 port explosion into a dormitory for almost 1,000 displaced people.

But urban researchers note a staggering number of people on the streets compared with past conflicts, making it difficult for ordinary residents to block out the war and the misery it has wrought.

"This is relatively new, that you have so many people spending time in these open spaces, who are very vulnerable, living in very precarious conditions," said Mona Harb, a professor of urban studies at the American University of Beirut. "You have to confront this visually when you’re coming and going to work, to school ... and there are strong, mixed feelings associated with this presence that’s unregulated."

Families say they’ve struggled to find space at government-run shelters in Beirut and would rather brave the elements than travel north to cities where they might find better accommodations but where they have no relatives or connections.

"The further away we go, the more we'll lose hope about finding our way back," said Hawraa Balha, 42, when asked why her family of four was squeezing into the small car they drove from the devastated southern border village of Duhaira rather than sleeping in an available shelter further north. "We don't want to move again."

Residents of the suburbs of Dahieh have largely opted to remain in Beirut. That way, every so often, they can retrieve belongings and check whether their homes are still standing, albeit in furtive dashes under the threat of bombardment. Hussein said her kids grew so desperate for a shower after nearly a month without a bathroom that they rushed home to wash up last week despite the incessant buzz of Israeli drones.

Lebanon's sectarian balance is at risk

The prospect of hundreds of thousands of Shiites on the move has inflamed Lebanese sensitivities about the country’s fragile sectarian balance. Ever since its bloody 15-year civil war, Lebanon has relied on a power-sharing agreement to accommodate the interests of Christians, Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims, the country's largest religious groups, which make up roughly equal shares of the population.

"It's generating anxieties in Beirut, where the bulk of the displacement is, that this may cause a significant transformation in the demographic balance within the country, or within certain spaces and cities," said Maha Yahya, director of the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Center.

Each day that passes, more tents appear at the waterfront settlement. Children have started to complain of skin rashes. Heavy rainfall recently flooded the grassy lot and seeped into tents, leaving a trail of soggy clothes and sore throats. A fight broke out last week as volunteers arrived to distribute donations.

"We're not used to living like this — we had a house, we had normal lives," said Lina Shamis, 51, warming herself by a fire at the foot of a billboard advertising luxury watches. She, her three adult daughters and their small children set up camp here after heeding Israeli evacuation orders for Dahieh in a panic, carrying almost nothing with them.

"Now the kids are out of school and hungry, and our neighborhood is gone," she said. "All I feel is despair."

With Israel thrusting deeper into Lebanon and threatening to seize Lebanese territory as far as the Litani, a river 20 miles (30 kilometers) north of the Israeli border, the situation of displaced people in Beirut "will be even worse than what we’re seeing now," warned Harb, from the UN refugee agency.

"The needs will continue to increase," she said. "It's an imminent humanitarian catastrophe."


Siege of Balad Base May Prelude ‘Doomsday’ Scenario in Iraq

A US military handout image shows the Balad Air Base in Iraq in 2011.
A US military handout image shows the Balad Air Base in Iraq in 2011.
TT

Siege of Balad Base May Prelude ‘Doomsday’ Scenario in Iraq

A US military handout image shows the Balad Air Base in Iraq in 2011.
A US military handout image shows the Balad Air Base in Iraq in 2011.

An American contractor responsible for operating Iraq’s F-16 fighter jets has withdrawn its staff from an Iraqi air base after attacks by Iran-aligned factions, leaving Baghdad racing to find replacements before its most advanced aircraft risks becoming “scrap,” officials and sources said.

The attacks cap years of what sources describe as “infiltration and espionage attempts” targeting US technology acquired by Iraq about a decade ago, culminating in what they called a “doomsday scenario” to seize Iraqi military assets.

The Iraqi government had tried to persuade staff from V2X to remain at Balad Air Base despite repeated strikes. A senior Iraqi official said that although the attacks caused no major damage, “the company’s employees insisted on leaving for their own safety.”

According to a foreign contractor, security personnel and employees, the evacuation followed an intense wave of drone attacks and was carried out during a temporary truce to secure what one source described as a “high-risk flight.”

Since the outbreak of war involving the US-Israeli war on Iran, the Balad Air Base has come under attack from three directions, most of which failed to cause significant damage, sources said.

During the first term of President Donald Trump, Iran-aligned groups forced a previous American contractor to leave the same base after the US strike that killed Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.

Dozens of staff from Sallyport were reported to have departed after deadly attacks.

The pattern now appears to be repeating with V2X during Trump’s second term, but in a broader regional war.

Drone attacks strain operations

The first attack in the current escalation occurred on March 2, the third day of the war. Subsequent strikes followed a pattern, often between midnight and early dawn, sometimes involving paired drones.

Local residents filmed smoke rising near the base. A nearby farmer told Asharq Al-Awsat that most drones fell within or just outside the perimeter, close to the security fence.

A security source said around 10 attacks were recorded in the first month of the war, causing no casualties or damage, including to the F-16 fleet.

But the attacks disrupted daily operations. “We had to stay in fortified rooms for hours,” one contractor said, adding that foreign staff feared a repeat of the 2012 US consulate attack in Libya.

Iraqi staff downplayed the threat, saying operations continued as normal.

Evacuation under truce

Baghdad’s efforts to retain the American team failed. The official said the logistical support program for the F-16s was essential to keeping Iraq’s fighter squadron operational, but the staff chose to leave.

Sources said dozens of foreign personnel were evacuated overnight aboard a military C-130 aircraft to a neighboring country, in coordination with the US military. The operation was timed with a brief truce in the final week of March.

Some advisers had already withdrawn in late February, citing early warnings of rising risks.

V2X did not respond to requests for comment. A New York Stock Exchange filing shows its contract was renewed in June 2025 with an initial value of $118 million.

The base now lacks a specialized team to operate Iraq’s F-16s, and the government lacks the funds to maintain them, the Iraqi official said.

Aircraft at risk

Retired Colonel Salam Asaad said the aircraft would likely become inoperable without American expertise. “Local crews lack the experience to manage such a strategic system,” he said.

He added that the jets delivered to Iraq had been modified, with the United States removing some systems and not equipping them with long-range missiles.

Even during the war against ISIS, Iraqi F-16s relied on coalition aircraft to strike targets, he said.

Although the US Central Command has pointed to improved Iraqi self-sufficiency in recent years, the combination of technical dependence and sustained attacks has exposed vulnerabilities.

The attacks on Balad are part of a broader campaign since early March targeting US and Iraqi facilities. A source close to armed factions said the initial goal was to pressure US forces, but “when they withdrew, the targets expanded.”

The source said Iran’s Revolutionary Guards sought to isolate adversaries from the F-16 fleet and prevent its use during the conflict.

A former Iraqi official involved in procurement said Iran-aligned groups had long shown a strong interest in the aircraft, suggesting Tehran was uneasy with Iraq possessing such capabilities because it would view it as a threat.

‘Doomsday scenario’

An Iraqi official said a prolonged intelligence struggle had taken place between the US and Iranian sides over access to the aircraft’s systems, with armed groups repeatedly attempting to gather sensitive information.

Figures within Iraq’s ruling pro-Iran Coordination Framework warned of a potential “coup against what remains of the state.”

One figure said that after the war, factions could move toward a “doomsday scenario,” consolidating control over state military assets with political backing and institutional presence.

On March 30, head of the IRGC’s Quds Force Esmail Qaani said the “resistance’s joint operations room” had contributed to shaping a new regional order.

A former Iraqi official said earlier attempts by armed groups to penetrate military infrastructure had failed, but could now be seen as “a long rehearsal,” with Iraq being exposed to the Iranians during the war.