Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
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Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)

When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met US President Donald Trump in Riyadh on May 14, the encounter marked a striking departure from Syria’s political norm, and one that sent ripples of surprise through both allies and adversaries.

While many Syrians expressed enthusiasm over the unexpected meeting, the reaction was far from unanimous.

For extremist circles, the image of al-Sharaa seated beside a US president, long portrayed in their rhetoric as the embodiment of a hostile international order, triggered deep unease and, in some cases, fury.

The backlash was swift and fragmented. Although not centrally coordinated, it was visible across encrypted Telegram channels - the platform of choice for many extremist groups - as well as in private gatherings and scattered posts on the social media platform X.

Reactions ranged from suspicion and ideological denunciation to outright accusations of apostasy. The criticism largely targeted al-Sharaa’s growing openness to the West, particularly Israel, and debated the legitimacy of such outreach under Islamic law.

Despite the noise, these objections appear to carry little political weight inside Syria’s emerging state institutions. Analysts and insiders say the dissent does not reflect the views of the security and military apparatus that has taken shape following the collapse of the former regime.

At the heart of this new order is a coalition of former factions, notably those once aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which now forms the backbone of Syria’s restructured army and civil institutions. These groups have largely rallied around al-Sharaa, endorsing his foreign policy moves and viewing his leadership as best suited for steering the country through a fragile transition.

The new Syrian army, drawn from multiple factions that once formed the joint operations room which toppled the Assad government in Damascus, has since consolidated under state command.

Most of its components now back al-Sharaa, even as he pushes for diplomatic normalization, including tentative overtures to Israel - a shift they see as necessary for post-conflict stability.

While Syria’s new institutions rally around al-Sharaa’s push for reconciliation and international engagement, a defiant voice has emerged from outside the state structure - one that rejects his overtures and threatens to reignite instability.

The group calling itself Saraya Ansar al-Sunna has so far been the only actor to publicly oppose al-Sharaa’s trajectory. Shrouded in secrecy, the group is among the newest armed movements to surface following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Its presence remains confined to encrypted Telegram channels, where it has adopted a hardline tone steeped in religious denunciation and threats of violence. It has yet to establish a visible presence on the ground or disclose a clear organizational identity.

In a recent statement circulated online, the group vowed to escalate attacks across Syrian provinces and in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli - where it previously claimed activity.

The message marked a sharp warning from a faction that, despite its limited footprint, could stir trouble through lone-wolf operations, a method favored in such ideological circles.

Saraya Ansar al-Sunna first claimed responsibility for an attack in February in the village of Arzeh in Hama province, which killed more than ten civilians.

The group’s founding statement framed the assault as part of a campaign of “sectarian revenge” targeting Alawites and Shiites, whom it referred to using derogatory sectarian terms. The communiqué also described the group as “decentralized” and reliant on autonomous cells with no identifiable leadership or headquarters.

Although Syria’s Interior Ministry declined to provide details on the group, officials confirmed they are closely monitoring its activity – a sign that authorities consider the threat credible, despite the group's lack of formal structure.

Who are Saraya Ansar al-Sunna?

Sources in northern Syria told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has claimed responsibility for a series of assassinations in rural Hama and Homs, targeting Alawite civilians.

The group framed the killings as “retribution” against alleged Assad loyalists, or “shabiha”, whom they accuse the state of failing to prosecute. The sources said growing frustration over the lack of transitional justice has fueled accusations that the state is delivering “selective justice,” a phrase increasingly used to mock what some see as a stalled reconciliation process.

Despite fiery rhetoric and threats, the shadowy group has yet to establish a tangible presence on the ground.

So far, its activities remain confined to anonymous, closed Telegram channels, where it disseminates sharply worded statements steeped in religious condemnation and anti-government sentiment.

According to sources familiar with extremist activity in central Syria, the group relies entirely on text-based messaging and has shown no visual evidence of leadership or organized operations.

Two names have emerged frequently in connection with the group: “Abu Aisha al-Shami” and “Abu al-Fath al-Shami” - likely pseudonyms. Both are believed to be former members of Hurras al-Din, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. Intelligence suggests they have since reemerged in small clandestine cells operating quietly in parts of rural Homs and Hama.

In one statement posted on a Telegram channel, Abu al-Fath al-Shami - introduced as the group's “religious authority” - launched a scathing attack on President Ahmad al-Sharaa, accusing him of apostasy and betrayal.

His message, couched in harsh ideological language, cast the new Syrian government not merely as a political adversary but as a theological enemy - a marked escalation in tone.

Still, the group has so far refrained from direct armed confrontation with the Syrian state. Instead, it appears to be focused on retaliatory attacks against what it calls the “social incubators” of the former regime - a reference to Alawite civilian communities historically aligned with Bashar al-Assad.

This approach, emphasizing ideological hostility over direct conflict, reflects a broader, long-standing rift within the extremist landscape in Syria.

It mirrors the old divide between al-Qaeda’s traditionalist wing and the more localized, pragmatic faction led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Sharaa. Though this internal split had faded from prominence, al-Sharaa’s high-profile meeting with Trump in Riyadh appears to have reignited it, sparking renewed debate among radical ideologues.

Prominent extremist figures have stepped up criticism of al-Sharaa, accusing him of betraying ideological principles in pursuit of political gains, particularly following his unprecedented outreach to the US and Israel.

Among the loudest voices was Khaled Abu Qatada al-Ansari, a former senior figure in Hurras al-Din, who denounced the Syrian state as “treasonous” and accused it of deviating from the “true path.”

His comments were echoed by Samer al-Ali, also known as Abu Ubaida, a former religious authority in Jabhat al-Nusra, who charged al-Sharaa with abandoning the core tenets of the original project for political pragmatism.

Outside Syria, criticism followed a similar pattern. Abu Abdullah al-Shami, a well-known ideologue based in Iraq, described al-Sharaa’s foreign policy pivot as a “fundamental betrayal of doctrine.”

Meanwhile, a stark split emerged among veteran thinkers: cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi reaffirmed his staunch opposition to al-Sharaa, framing his overtures to Washington and Israel as a departure from religious “constants.”

In contrast, Abu Qatada struck a more nuanced tone, suggesting that such shifts might be necessary in the post-Assad era to safeguard the revolution’s gains.

The debate underscores a widening rift between two ideological camps - one branding al-Sharaa an apostate, the other viewing his actions as a pragmatic response to evolving realities and branding him as the “man of the moment.”

No Organized Opposition Within the State

Despite the heated rhetoric, former military commander Adham Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is no significant extremist bloc within Syria’s government or its security institutions challenging al-Sharaa’s policies.

“This is the policy of a state, not just one man - even if al-Sharaa is the architect,” he said.

“While there is still public and religious discomfort around peace with Israel, it's no longer as emotionally charged as it once was. Over time, these sentiments may coalesce into various forms of opposition, but they won’t be exclusively religious – they could be nationalist or political as well.”

He added that even radical factions, especially foreign fighters who once resisted integration, are now gradually shifting their focus.

“Most of them are moving toward reintegration, prioritizing daily life and stability. They may not fully endorse the new government, but they’re adapting - I’ve seen this happen in multiple cases,” Abdulrahman said.

Extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are attempting to exploit discontent within Syria’s shifting political landscape, but analysts say al-Sharaa’s government – forged through years of conflict – is proving far from vulnerable.

“ISIS is actively seeking to regroup and recruit from disillusioned or marginalized segments, relying on its familiar slogans,” said former military commander Adham Abdulrahman.

“But this new government, born from an authentic organizational experience and equipped with deep security and military know-how, is not an easy target.”

Diverging Currents in HTS

According to Ahmad Sultan, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, internal divisions are emerging within the HTS, the backbone of the new Syrian state.

“Some factions within HTS still cling to hardline ideology and remain visibly frustrated with al-Sharaa’s policy shifts,” Sultan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “They lack a coherent vision for governance beyond regime collapse and still regard any contact with perceived enemies as tantamount to apostasy.”

By contrast, other elements within HTS advocate a more pragmatic approach. “They view political openness as a tactical necessity for this phase,” Sultan said. “al-Sharaa’s administration is walking a fine line between these factions to preserve cohesion amid Syria’s complex reality.”

Sultan emphasized that the pro-al-Sharaa bloc remains dominant. “The opposition within HTS doesn’t represent the majority. The leading current supports Sharaa and wields greater power,” he said.

“The administration has made it clear that it won’t align with anti-engagement elements, though it may seek to pacify them to avoid destabilization - especially as al-Sharaa’s international legitimacy hinges on curbing extremism.”

Fears of Splits, Push for Consolidation

The researcher warned that any significant rift within HTS - the central pillar of the state - could destabilize the entire administration and potentially spark internal conflict.

“Al-Sharaa’s government is preparing to tackle critical files: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, the presence of foreign fighters, border control, and consolidating central authority,” Sultan explained. “To do that, it must neutralize ultra-hardline elements within.”

He added that al-Sharaa is relying on practical methods to prevent extremist drift inside his administration, including religious education and theological persuasion aimed at preserving unity.

“Some clerics close to al-Sharaa command real influence among hardline circles,” Sultan said. “If tensions escalate, these figures could play a key role in diffusing conflict through religious argumentation and appeals to collective responsibility.”

Al-Sharaa is prepared to take tough measures - including arrests and even eliminations - against hardline elements within the state who reject moderation and persist in incitement.

“Containment through religious dialogue is the preferred option,” said Sultan.

“But when that fails, the alternative may be surgical removal of factions that prove resistant to integration.”

Sultan warned that the government will not tolerate extremist mindsets if they shift toward agitation and destabilization. “If a radical current chooses confrontation, al-Sharaa will not hesitate to resort to decisive tools, including imprisonment or targeted action,” he said.

Strained Popular Base

Despite the state’s assertive posture, some observers caution that the strategy carries risks, particularly if it alienates the broader revolutionary base that once fueled Syria’s rebellion.

“The Syrian landscape remains fluid and unpredictable,” said Mohamed Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander within an Islamist faction. “If the government wants long-term stability, it cannot afford to lose the core support of former revolutionaries.”

Al-Shami, who remains closely connected to Islamic movements, drew a clear line between constructive dissent and extremist rhetoric.

“Takfir- branding others as apostates - is the weapon of extremists and ISIS sympathizers. It’s unacceptable to many of us within the Islamist current,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He stressed that criticism of al-Sharaa’s government should be expressed through informed, balanced discourse.

“There is no such thing as ‘legitimate chaos.’ Sharia is the standard by which actions are judged. Disagreements must be addressed scientifically and socially, not through disorder.”

Al-Shami also warned that hardline rhetoric by extremist groups risks influencing disillusioned youth and fueling radicalization in Syria’s fragile post-war landscape.

“There is concern that some enthusiastic or overly zealous youth may be swayed by extremist narratives,” al-Shami told Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that “those with experience and awareness are working to contain these tendencies, which only aggravate problems rather than solve them.”

He also cautioned that ISIS remains a looming threat, capable of exploiting simmering discontent in Salafi circles and drawing in defectors from factions opposed to Syria’s new leadership under al-Sharaa.

“ISIS thrives in environments where ignorance and extremism take root,” he said.

“The group could recruit from those who once fought under revolutionary banners, only to find themselves later disillusioned with a political reality that doesn’t match the slogans they lived by,” explained al-Shami.

As al-Sharaa’s administration pushes ahead with normalization and international outreach, including controversial overtures to former foes, observers say the ability to manage backlash from former allies and militant hardliners will be key to preserving security and cohesion.



Iran's Postponed War: Who Holds the Power to Ignite It?

A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
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Iran's Postponed War: Who Holds the Power to Ignite It?

A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)

With Israel preparing for possible military strikes against Iran, and Washington showing restraint ahead of the US midterm elections, questions are mounting over whether the region is experiencing a temporary pause dictated by electoral calculations or a final opportunity for a political settlement.

While one strategic affairs expert expects a major confrontation by the end of November, two others downplay the influence of election results on decisions by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, arguing that strategic considerations will ultimately prove decisive.

The question in Washington and Tel Aviv is no longer simply whether war with Iran will resume, but when, on what scale and with what objectives.

Reports that Israel prepared a large-scale bombing campaign against Iranian targets before postponing it following Trump's objections have revived a sensitive question: Is the war awaiting the conclusion of the US and Israeli elections, or does its postponement reflect deeper disagreements over the merits of escalation?

These questions are gaining urgency as elections approach in both countries. Assessments by three American experts reveal differing expectations about military developments and political calculations, but converge on one central point: Election results alone will not determine the outcome of the confrontation.

US President Donald Trump greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he arrives at the West Wing of the White House in Washington, DC on September 29, 2025. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)

A War Awaiting Its Moment

The Financial Times reported Wednesday that Netanyahu had instructed the Israeli military to prepare a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, initially scheduled for October 10, before the operation was canceled after Trump objected to resuming military action ahead of the US elections.

According to the newspaper, the plan included strikes on nuclear facilities, civilian infrastructure and sites associated with the Iranian regime.

Israeli officials also presented US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with a list of targets based on new intelligence during his unannounced visit to Israel on Monday.

Axios had previously reported that the Pentagon requested the completion of preparations for extensive military operations without setting a date for their execution.

The outlet cited officials as saying that Hegseth and US military commanders in the region were pushing for renewed strikes, while most of Trump's advisers favored continuing sanctions and economic pressure.

These developments suggest that the disagreement concerns the timing and necessity of military force more than the ultimate objectives.

Washington wants to secure Iranian concessions on Tehran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, while Israel fears that continued negotiations could allow Iran to rebuild its military capabilities.

Scenarios for Escalation

Offering a more pessimistic assessment, Farzin Nadimi, an expert on Iranian military and security affairs at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Asharq Al-Awsat that all indicators point toward a major military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran, and potentially other regional countries, by the end of November.

Nadimi did not rule out the possibility that intensive diplomatic efforts could prevent escalation, but considered the chances of success extremely slim.

He outlined a scenario beginning with a renewed wave of strikes targeting senior leaders and command-and-control centers, followed by attacks on nuclear and missile facilities and air defense systems, eventually escalating into a comprehensive bombing campaign against Iranian military and security installations.

Whether the campaign would expand to infrastructure, oil and gas facilities, and petrochemical plants would depend on the nature of Iran's response, he said.

Nadimi warned that Tehran might make a more determined effort this time to sink US warships and shoot down manned aircraft, while also deploying longer-range, medium-range ballistic missiles.

He raised an even more dangerous possibility: a ground incursion into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia from Iraq, carried out by Shiite factions linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces.

This remains a hypothetical scenario proposed by the researcher, rather than confirmed evidence of an Iranian plan to carry out such an operation.

At the same time, Nadimi ruled out a US ground invasion of Iran, suggesting that the next confrontation would more closely resemble the previous 39-day war.

Washington's Calculations

Brian Katulis, a foreign policy and regional affairs expert at the Middle East Institute, downplayed the significance of election results in determining the course of the war.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US midterm elections were unlikely to substantially affect decisions by the Trump administration or Israel regarding Iran, because the threats posed by Tehran would remain the primary factor shaping their next steps.

Katulis noted that Trump is experiencing his weakest political position across his two presidential terms, amid declining approval ratings and the possibility that Republicans could lose seats in Congress.

In his view, however, that does not mean the election results will constrain the president's ability to take military action, given the executive branch's broad national security powers relative to those of Congress.

Katulis identified two more consequential factors in the administration's calculations.

The first is a shortage of certain types of ammunition and military equipment following the previous phase of the war, which has left US forces more exposed in the region and elsewhere. The second is the economic cost of another confrontation.

These concerns are particularly significant amid continuing tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets, as renewed operations against Iranian facilities could cause further disruptions to oil supplies.

As for Israel, Katulis argued that disagreements among political leaders tend to diminish when the perceived Iranian threat is at issue.

Beyond the Ballot Box

Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, went further, dismissing the possibility that the elections would fundamentally change the political dynamics governing decisions about war.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Trump would remain the ultimate decision-maker regardless of developments in Congress.

Indeed, Rubin suggested that Trump might feel greater freedom to make military decisions after the elections, given that he would not face another presidential election.

In Israel, Rubin argued that widespread opposition to Netanyahu does not necessarily translate into comparable divisions over Iran.

In his assessment, there is broad agreement among Israeli candidates on both the right and left regarding the nature of the threats posed by Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.

Rubin also pointed to a striking possibility: Another Israeli prime minister might be able to act more effectively than Netanyahu because some objections from members of Congress, diplomats and foreign ministers are directed more at Netanyahu personally than at Israel itself.

Consequently, Netanyahu's electoral defeat would not necessarily reduce the likelihood of confrontation, just as Republican losses in Congress would not automatically give lawmakers the power to prevent Trump from resuming military operations.

Ultimately, the elections appear more likely to influence the timing of a confrontation than to determine its objectives.

Trump's decision to postpone military action does not mean the military option has been abandoned, just as Israel's preparations do not mean that a final decision to go to war has been made.

Negotiations remain the alternative path, despite continuing disagreements over nuclear concessions and the conditions for ending the war.

The conclusion of the elections could remove one reason for postponement, but it would not eliminate the military, economic and political obstacles.

The central question remains whether Washington will use its military preparations to secure a negotiated settlement or view the failure of diplomacy as justification for resuming the war.

In either case, Trump's decision, rather than election results alone, will be the most influential factor in determining the direction of the crisis.


What's Holding Up Washington's $14 bn Arms Sale to Taiwan?

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
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What's Holding Up Washington's $14 bn Arms Sale to Taiwan?

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File

Taiwan has been waiting months for US President Donald Trump to approve a $14 billion sale of weapons and equipment, which the island democracy would use to fend off a potential Chinese attack.

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has sold many billions of dollars' worth of arms to Taiwan, most recently in December when it approved a record $11.1 billion package, said AFP.

China opposes American military support for Taiwan, which Beijing claims is part of its territory and has threatened to seize with force.

Trump, who last month hailed his "great friendship" with Chinese President Xi Jinping, has resisted US political pressure, including from Republican lawmakers, to give the green light for the current arms package.

AFP takes a look at what's in it and why it's being held up:

- Why is Taiwan buying US arms? -

Taiwan is spending huge sums upgrading its defense capabilities and expanding its domestic weapons production capacity, but it still needs US arms to deter China.

Since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, the United States has stuck to its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide weapons to Taiwan for its defense.

But Trump said in May that US arms sales to Taiwan could be a bargaining chip with China, setting off alarm bells across the world.

Taipei has reminded Trump of US commitments, and US officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio have insisted American policy on Taiwan has not changed.

The sale would signal US support for Taiwan and send a message to Beijing that if it launched an attack, it would not face "Taiwan alone", said Wang Ting-yu, a senior lawmaker in President Lai Ching-te's Democratic Progressive Party.

- What's in the package? -

Taiwan is developing a multi-layered air defense system, known as the T-Dome, that it hopes could counter a potential Chinese attack.

Patriot missiles, an automated command and control system and a 360-degree air defense radar system are seen as critical components of this system and are among the items in the $14 billion package.

"Together these systems can strengthen the resilience of Taiwan's strategic air defenses," said Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at the Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Money for the weapons system is expected to come from a $25 billion defense spending bill passed by Taiwan's parliament in May after months of political wrangling.

- Why has it been delayed? -

Trump and Xi met in Beijing in May -- the first of four expected meetings for 2026 -- as the rival leaders sought to ease trade tensions between their countries.

Xi issued a blunt warning to Trump that missteps on Taiwan could push the US and China into "conflict".

A record $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan could threaten the US-China trade truce.

"I'm going to make a determination. I'm going to see," Trump said after the summit in response to a question about whether he would go ahead with arms sales to Taiwan.

Rubio said in June that the proposed package was "under review", while officials said in May they were assessing whether American weapons stockpiles were sufficient for its Iran operations.

A US official said recently that the chances of the package being split into smaller chunks "have gone way up".

Some Taiwanese officials have said they do not care if the US bundles the arms into a single package or multiple -- they just want the weapons.

"Militarily... Taiwan is racing against time," said the analyst Su.

"Acquiring weapons is not like ordering at a drive-through. Production, delivery and training all take time before the systems can enter service and become effective."


Israel's Election May Change Its Leader, But Not Iran War Policy

21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
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Israel's Election May Change Its Leader, But Not Iran War Policy

21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa

Israel's election next week may change its leader, but not its strategy: Iran will remain its chief adversary, military force will continue to be its preferred tool and Palestinian statehood a distant prospect, regional policymakers and analysts say.

That is because the strategic assumptions underpinning Israeli policy were hardened by the October 7, 2023, attacks on southern Israeli communities by Palestinian group Hamas and by the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

If anything, Israel could toughen its security policy, the analysts said, as victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the backing of far-right coalition partners could embolden him to step up the war with Iran, tighten Israel's grip on the occupied West Bank and push diplomacy further to the margins.

Israel's security doctrine now rests on three pillars: breaking Iran, holding buffer zones beyond its borders and using force to deter enemies.

The real divide is one of degree rather than direction — how aggressively Israel fights its wars, how far it expands Jewish settlements in the West Bank and whether any leader opts for diplomacy, the analysts said.

From Tehran to Riyadh, Tuesday's election is not seen as a potential turning point but as a test of whether the Middle East is settling into a long confrontation, where wars ‌ebb and flow while ‌the underlying conflicts are unresolved.

"If Netanyahu is elected, he'll do whatever he thinks he wants to do," said Aviv ‌Bushinsky, a ⁠former adviser to Netanyahu. "Expansion ⁠of the settlements will continue. The wars against Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah will continue."

"What you see now is what you'll see after the election, maybe even more aggressively," he said. "As long as Iran is in such a situation, it's a waste of time talking about Palestine.”

Netanyahu said on Sunday that Israel must prioritize “prevention and offence over containment and defense”, including pre-emptive strikes to thwart emerging threats, while establishing Israel as a regional power and maximizing its independence in armaments.

WHY THE COURSE IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE

The election pits Netanyahu's right-wing Likud and its ultranationalist allies against an opposition led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar party. Palestinian analyst Ghassan al-Khatib sees no prospect of a fundamental shift in policy towards the Palestinians, with Israeli political parties competing to project harder-line positions as public opinion moves further to the right.

“The substance of the policy remains the same: No to a Palestinian state and yes to further ⁠settlement expansion. On this, they are all in agreement,” he said.

A government led by Netanyahu's opponents might seek to repair ‌Israel's international standing by curbing some settler violence or pursuing settlement expansion with less fanfare. But such changes would ‌be a shift in style rather than substance, al-Khatib said.

In response to Reuters questions on Iran and the West Bank, a State Department spokesperson said Washington would continue to pressure Tehran "as long ‌as Iran devotes its energy revenues to financing attacks on our allies, supporting terrorism around the world, and pursuing other destabilizing actions, we will use all the tools ‌at our disposal to hold the regime accountable."

The spokesperson also said the  United States did not support Israel annexing the West Bank.

"A stable West Bank keeps Israel secure and is in line with this administration’s goal to achieve peace in the region," they said.

Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center said Israel's security establishment and much of its political class share a common strategic outlook, centered on confronting Iran, maintaining "forward defense" and preserving military deterrence, reducing the scope for big policy shifts.

Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, who has conducted research in the West Bank, said ‌growing settler violence, mounting Palestinian frustration and the absence of a "political horizon" had created combustible conditions, where even a minor trigger could spark a wider uprising.

'VENOMOUS OCTOPUS'

Some regional policymakers ask whether Israel's confrontation with Iran has become the organizing ⁠principle of Middle East security, regardless of who ⁠wins the election.

US President Donald Trump's praise of Netanyahu as a "great warrior prime minister" has reinforced expectations that the Israeli leader will try to finish the campaign against Tehran if he retains power.

Netanyahu has made clear his ambitions extend beyond containing Iran to toppling its clerical rulers.

"There is only one way to remove this threat once and for all: overthrow the regime in Iran," he said at a military officer graduation ceremony on Wednesday, adding it was his directive to the military, Mossad and other security agencies.

“Completing the task means toppling the terrorist regime in Iran, the head of the venomous octopus,” he said in another speech this week.

But military and political analysts question whether anything short of a US-Israeli ground invasion would force Tehran to abandon what it views as its core security interests in what it sees as an existential fight. After surviving months of war, Iran may be betting it can outlast its opponents while continuing to exert pressure through regional allies.

"This is a quagmire," Young said. "The Iranians can outlast Trump."

Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have been weakened, but the broader network of Iran-aligned groups has survived and the conflict could strengthen Tehran's determination to pursue a nuclear deterrent, the analysts said.