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3 ISIS Members Recount to Asharq Al-Awsat their Journey with the Terror Group

ISIS members from Kazakhstan, China, the US, Iraq and Syria held in Irbil jail and interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
ISIS members from Kazakhstan, China, the US, Iraq and Syria held in Irbil jail and interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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3 ISIS Members Recount to Asharq Al-Awsat their Journey with the Terror Group

ISIS members from Kazakhstan, China, the US, Iraq and Syria held in Irbil jail and interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
ISIS members from Kazakhstan, China, the US, Iraq and Syria held in Irbil jail and interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The ISIS terrorist organization has created a series of catastrophes around the world. The tragedies have taken the form of persecuting minorities and massacres in cities near and far. The group has created tragedies in cities that were accused of harboring it and created tragedies when it justified the action of those who wanted to punish those places.

These are strange stories which is why I requested to return once again to the counter-terrorism center in Irbil. Perhaps I may hear new stories other than the ones about the Syrian or Iraqi ISIS member. This time I found a Chinese member of the terror group, a Kazakh and an American.

The Kazakh

I let Koblan Ozak Hassan recount his story with ISIS:

“I was born in 1982 and pursued by studies in the city of Aktau in Kazakhstan. I specialized in oil and chemistry. I am married with three children. I am a Muslim and in my environment, people speak of the conditions of Muslims in the world and what they suffer from in some occasions. We, like everyone else, used to follow the news on social media where we received images on the developments in Iraq, Syria and other places.

“In 2015, I was on a tourist visit to Antalya, Turkey and concluded that living in Turkey would be expensive. At this point, friends studying in Turkey told me that I could live in Syria, explaining that it was cheap and that I could find a job in regions controlled by ISIS. I also had some friends living in Mosul. We communicated through the internet and they encouraged me to live in the so-called Islamic State. They told me that I could work in my domain and earn some money.

“I was told to head to Turkey’s Gazientep where some Arab and Turkish youth were waiting for me. From there, they escorted me and my family to Syria’s Raqqa. I was dropped off at a house and my family was taken to another location.

“A number of men from various nationalities were living where I was staying. We underwent an eight-day Islamic Sharia law training in Raqqa. The training covered prayer, the nullifiers of Islam, jihad and combating the infidels. Afterwards, we were taken to Talafar where we underwent military training. I have long suffered from a back ailment that prevents me from becoming a military fighter.

“I asked to be sent to Mosul where I could meet up with my friends. This led to conflict between the ten newcomers and one of the ISIS officials. All ten of us were then returned to Raqqa where we were put under some form of house arrest. In the end, we were given the option to choose our destination and I was taken by bus to Mosul.

“The Iraqi city was calm and I lived there with my family. ISIS soon forced me however to head to Talafar that same year, meaning 2015. There I met a number of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Dagestanis, Chechens and Turkmen. There were hundreds of them and they either lived with their old or new families. I never heard them question ISIS. Most of them were there for religious reasons and they believed the group’s propaganda.

“I did not find a job in my specialization so I decided to buy horses to sell their meat. In 2017, a bus driver was killed in shelling and I was asked to take his place at a salary of 200 dollars a month.

“This is when I decided it was time for me to run away. We used to hear news of the battles in ISIS. I did not find a real job opportunity and I contacted security agencies in Kazakhstan. They told me that if I wanted to escape, I should bring with me any Kazakh who also wanted out. Based on a recommendation from the Russian consulate in Irbil, I contacted a man called Abou Mohammed al-Ramadani, who guided me on the route I needed to take to turn myself over to the Peshmerga.

“My children and pregnant wife were with me, as well as four women and ten children. It was a dangerous journey and we traversed 20 kilometers by car. It was an area planted with landmines. At one point, we left the car behind and hid in a farm. We knew that we would be killed if we were found. At the end, we walked two kilometers before turning ourselves over to the Peshmerga only 25 days ago.”

Koblan said that he did not take part in the fighting, but he suffered from the airstrikes that targeted the region. He added that he did not witness any of the executions or massacres committed by ISIS. I asked him about his religious position from these practices. He replied: “I do not know enough of Sharia to give a definitive answer.”

I asked if he believed in the so-called Islamic nature of ISIS’ state which he also avoided to answer, claiming a lack of sufficient religious knowledge on the issue.

The Chinaman

The Chinese member of ISIS asked me not publish his full name “because I will be killed as soon as I return, possibly at the hands of my family.” I will only mention his initials, S.K.K. This is his story:

“I was born in 1988 in Khotan in East Turkestan to a Muslim family and I have four children, the youngest of whom was born in Talafar. I left school after elementary school to work as a farmer with my father. I have three brothers and a sister.

“I don’t know if you are aware of how difficult life is for Muslims in East Turkestan. Wearing the veil is prohibited as is teaching the Qoran to children. Families are not allowed to have more than three children. The Chinese security agencies are not merciful. They believe that Muslim practices are a threat to the current Communist regime. They control everything, from the media to security to the universities. In China, you are not allowed to be different from the official stance of the state. You have to hide your feelings and convictions, but Muslims there also speak about what Muslims in the world have to endure.

“I heard from Muslims there that Turkey was ready to welcome Chinese Muslims like myself. This is why I decided to make the journey with my family. I left Turkestan to Shanghai and then to Laos, then to Thailand. From there I went to Malaysia and later to Kayseri in Turkey. The trip cost me 4,000 dollars and I sought to request asylum in Turkey.

“My savings ran out ten days after I arrived. A person then approached me and told me that he was prepared to give me all the money I wanted if I headed with my family to Syria, where Muslims live under Islamic law.

“The man took me to Gaziantep at the Turkish-Syrian border and I was escorted by other men to Raqqa in February 2016. I stayed at the ISIS center there and the man in charge was called Abou Abdullah. After a few days, they decided to transfer the Turkish-speakers to Talafar. There, I was sent to the al-Wahda area where I stayed for ten days. I then joined the base of Abou Hajar al-Turkestani. I spent 38 days there with some 15 people where we took courses on Sharia. We also received military training on the use of light and heavy machineguns.

“I was then deployed at the Seifeddine Battalion, under Abou al-Zabir al-Turki, which included 50 fighters. I remained at the battalion for a year and a half. I was then sent to the frontlines. Luckily, no battles erupted when I was stationed there. I earned 250 dollars a month during that period.

“One day, they told me to join an offensive on Mosul. I tried to get out of and was consequently imprisoned for four months during which I was tortured.

“I realized that living under ISIS rule was different than what I expected so I started to think about escaping. Twenty days ago, I succeeded in reaching a Peshmerga position with my family and turned myself over.

“I do not want to return to China. I would be grateful if Turkey takes me in. I will be happy if the US or Europe also take me in. Anything but China, because my punishment there will be severe and perhaps fatal. I did not kill. I can safely say that ISIS fooled the world. We believed what was claimed and we paid the price.”

The American

The meeting with the American ISIS member was not completed because the counter-terrorism officials asked me to halt the interview. They explained that publishing his story may help his partners escape. We will suffice in publishing information that will not harm the investigation:

R.K. was born in 1988. He later moved to Trinidad where he pursued Islamic studies. He said that he watched YouTube videos about the developments in Syria.

“I saw a Muslim women with her face covered in blood standing amid the rubble in Syria as she pleaded for help. She asked where all the Muslims were and why they were not running to help their brothers. I was moved by footage of mosques being shelled.

“I had graduated from medical school with my wife. We had one daughter. My wife suggested to me that we head to Syria for two months where could work with humanitarian organizations to help Muslims there. My sister decided to join us. We arrived in Turkey and a man called Tarek, who was later killed, and an ISIS member called Mustapha, helped us enter Syria.

“They took us from Gaziantep to a location in Syria. From there, we were transported on board an ISIS bus to Raqqa. I resided in one location, while my family lived in the women’s quarters. I received bread, lentils, rice and tuna where I was staying.

“After a while, Imam Abou Anas al-Azadi came to teach us about Islam. He taught us a list of who they believed to be infidels. They included the Syrian regime and others and all who operated outside a non-Muslim system.”

After that, the American mentioned a number of names that the concerned officials believed would compromise their investigation. I was therefore asked to stop the interview and I had no choice but to comply.

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Features

Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.

Features

Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.

Features

Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
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Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)

Tehran stands to gain billions of dollars from a 60-day reprieve from US sanctions announced on Monday, but unwinding more than four decades of restrictions poses legal, political and commercial challenges that could take years.

At issue is whether an interim US deal with Iran can translate into lasting economic relief, given the complexity of dismantling a sanctions regime that spans US law, international measures and private-sector risk concerns.

The United Nations, the US and the European Union have imposed sanctions and trade embargoes and have frozen assets since the late 1970s over Iran's nuclear program, human rights violations and support for armed groups around the region.

Under a 14-point memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran last week, Washington is to start abolishing all types of sanctions using a schedule to be forged in a final deal within 60 days, a period that can be extended.

On Monday, the US Treasury issued a temporary general license allowing the production, delivery and sale of crude oil and petrochemical and petroleum products of Iranian origin through August 21.

Removing the remaining sanctions - if it happens - would represent a stark change in US policy toward the Middle East, which has long focused on curbing ‌Iran's influence and ‌using financial pressure to weaken its theocratic government.

It would also be difficult, requiring executive action for some measures, approval ‌by ⁠Congress for others ⁠and close coordination with the UN and other countries that have imposed their own sanctions. Companies, wary after decades of restrictions, could also blunt the impact.

"You have this tangled nest of sanctions, and it's not just executive orders, it's congressional sanctions," said Juan Zarate, deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under former President George W. Bush.

CONGRESS IS SKEPTICAL

Washington first sanctioned Iran in 1979, after revolutionary students seized the US embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage.

Since then, Congress has passed half a dozen sanctions laws and presidents have issued executive orders over Iran's nuclear program and its support for groups the US deems terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis.

Since early 2025, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on more than 1,000 people, vessels and aircraft, according to Treasury data.

Delisting thousands of entities designated for ⁠sanctions would take OFAC at least a year, said Jeremy Paner, a partner at law firm Hughes Hubbard & Reed ‌and a former US sanctions official.

President Donald Trump can rescind executive orders issued on Iran, but some ‌measures - including sanctions on Hamas and Hezbollah - are mandated by law and will have to be removed or amended by Congress, where the interim deal has already sparked sharp ‌public criticism from his fellow Republican lawmakers.

Undoing 40 years of sanctions would be difficult, added Matt Zweig, managing director of policy at FDD ‌Action, the lobbying arm of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

"Any attempt to comprehensively remove layer upon layer of sanctions will be like peeling back an onion - exposing the administration - not just to legal complexities but political risks," said Zweig, a former aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The license issued on Monday could be worth up to $3 billion for Iran over two months, by some estimates.

That could swell to "at least tens of billions of dollars" if made permanent, erasing a discount on Iranian oil, allowing Tehran to ‌sell to additional buyers beyond China, and increasing exports, said Edward Fishman, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. China now buys about 90% of Iranian oil, despite the sanctions.

The new license is broader than ⁠the one issued in March, calling for ⁠inclusion of not just oil and petroleum products, but also banking, insurance and transportation related to the oil trade, giving Tehran quicker access to its revenues.

"There are a number of thorny issues involved," said Stephanie Connor, a former OFAC official now a partner with law firm Holland & Knight, adding that lifting sanctions could mean funds flowing to groups the US considers a threat.

"Are we really going to let money start flowing to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps?" she asked, referring to the powerful paramilitary force that the US has designated a foreign terrorist organization.

WARY COMPANIES

Banks, oil firms and insurers will face evolving regulations, tougher due diligence and exposure to sanctions-evasion risks tied to Iran links with countries such as China, North Korea and Russia. They also remain subject to separate sanctions from Britain, the UN, the EU and others.

"We've kind of beaten the markets up with the risk of doing business with or through Iran, so you can't just flip a switch and say, 'Oh, now it's okay to do business with Iran,'" Zarate said.

Companies that deal with Iran would still face lawsuits from victims of attacks, who can sue investors and companies for aiding designated groups under the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which aides say is unlikely to be repealed.

Given such risks, companies may steer clear of working with Iran to escape legal and reputational risk as long as the Iranian government remains in power, said Brett Erickson, principal with Obsidian Risk Advisors.

"We're not going to see massive multi-billion-dollar commitments until things are far more cemented and politically stable," he said. "There's just a long way to go."