Afghan Newspaper Hunts Corruption, but First It Has to Pay the Rent

Zaki Daryabi, the founder of Etilaat e Roz, scrolling through the day’s news one evening at his office in Kabul. Credit Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Zaki Daryabi, the founder of Etilaat e Roz, scrolling through the day’s news one evening at his office in Kabul. Credit Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
TT

Afghan Newspaper Hunts Corruption, but First It Has to Pay the Rent

Zaki Daryabi, the founder of Etilaat e Roz, scrolling through the day’s news one evening at his office in Kabul. Credit Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Zaki Daryabi, the founder of Etilaat e Roz, scrolling through the day’s news one evening at his office in Kabul. Credit Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan — The first time Zaki Daryabi started a small newspaper in Afghanistan, it shut down within months. Mr. Daryabi, who had just graduated from university in Kabul, lost most of the money lent to him by friends to start his business.

But soon after, he restarted the newspaper, Etilaat e Roz. And now, five years later, it has found itself in the middle of some of Afghanistan’s most important national conversations.

The publication remains on financial life support. Mr. Daryabi often finds himself writing desperate grant proposals, asking creditors for a little more patience or amplifying the paper’s online presence on days when he can’t afford the $250 required to publish in print.

At the same time, though, Mr. Daryabi’s journalists churn out investigative reports that stir what has become an increasingly chaotic Afghan democracy, with its warlords and ethnic factions often needing reminders of the rules of the new game and the role of the news media in it.

The growth of the free Afghan news media is one of the biggest achievements since the toppling of the Taliban by an international coalition in 2001.

Under the Taliban, there was only the regime’s state radio and newspaper. Today, there are more than 300 radio and 200 television channels, more than 70 newspapers, and hundreds of magazines across Afghanistan.

The numbers, however, often overshadow the draining work and risks these news organizations take.

Newspapers in particular, most of which have been subsidized by donor funding over the past 15 years, face not just financial worries, but also the nagging question of whether they can really bring about change in a country where power often lies less in the constitutional order and more at the hands of strongmen and their patronage.

Coping with the political pressures, and the financial challenges, is a daily struggle.

For publishers like Mr. Daryabi, newspaper work means living a life of debt, and often making life awkward for loved ones. As his paper has published reports critical of President Ashraf Ghani’s government, Mr. Daryabi’s relationship with his father, a Ghani supporter, has become strained. His father does not understand why his son keeps embarrassing him in front of his friends.

“When I am sometimes thinking about leaving it all, it’s not about myself — it’s about my twins, and their future,” said Mr. Daryabi, the father of twin boys.

Etilaat e Roz operates out of a third-floor apartment in western Kabul, where a team of 10 starts late in the morning and works late into the night. The operation is so small that for major investigations Mr. Daryabi and his chief editor become reporters.

The paper has several distributors, on bicycle, who deliver the 3,000 copies at dawn five days a week. It relies heavily on its colorful online presence, with 300,000 subscribers to its Facebook page.

Advertisements cover only about 30 percent of the paper’s costs. Mr. Daryabi recently obtained a grant from Open Society Foundation for about $50,000, which will cover another 30 percent for the coming year.

There have been weeks when the paper hasn’t printed, simply putting the content online. During one of those stretches last year, Mr. Daryabi admits, he came closest to the lure of political money — accepting a onetime payment of $3,000 from former President Hamid Karzai’s foundation, arranged by one of his editors, who had once worked in the president’s office and told him that the paper was shutting down.

Mr. Daryabi’s team, after much internal debate, accepted the money and put it toward the rent.

The paper has conducted detailed investigations of the family networks that have controlled much of the Afghan state resources, including Mr. Karzai’s family; it devoted an entire issue to how some of these networks joined up in a scheme that took out about $900 million in reckless loans that collapsed the country’s biggest bank.

It has also investigated the sale by Mr. Ghani’s administration of a large section of prime real estate in Kabul at a dirt-cheap price to an election supporter.

Last week, the paper published a series of articles about ethnic favoritism in the presidential palace, a sensitive issue in a country that has long struggled with equality.

For months, Mr. Daryabi’s team and others had reported that Pashtuns made up the circle of people closest to Mr. Ghani’s office, marginalizing other ethnic groups in the most important conversations.

His paper found a document that was a smoking gun of sorts.

A senior employee of Mr. Ghani’s administrative office had shared a memo on an internal Telegram channel, highlighting how members of other ethnicities should be sidelined in favor of Pashtuns. Within minutes, the employee had written in the group again: “wrong channel.”

It was too late. The memo was leaked to the news media, and Mr. Daryabi’s team picked on it, carefully documenting every step of their reporting, and knowing that the authenticity of a document on an explosive issue like ethnic prejudice would be questioned.

The articles set off a week of intense debates across Afghan television channels and newspapers, and particularly on social media, where many lashed out at Mr. Daryabi and his paper.

Daud Noorzai, the new head of Mr. Ghani’s administrative office, insisted that the memo was the work of one individual and did not reflect the deeper thinking of the office he was leading. But that did not ease concerns about rot in the system.

Mr. Ghani, who was in New York for the United Nations General Assembly at the time, ordered his attorney general to conduct an inquiry.

To Mr. Daryabi and his team, Mr. Noorzai’s acknowledgment of the problem and Mr. Ghani’s promise of accountability were a much needed victory during another difficult stretch when they had been contemplating shutting their enterprise down.

“In an environment where being branded and stamped as partisan is so common, we want our newspaper to stand for one thing: a newspaper,” said Khalil Pajhwok, the chief editor. “We are after earning trust as a professional media that doesn’t take sides, and that means we have to do trustworthy work, without censorship, that is factual.”

Mr. Daryabi was raised in a village in Jaghori, an enigma district of sorts that has a robust culture of books and ideas in an otherwise restive Ghazni Province. He is 31, based on the date his father scribbled on the back of the family’s copy of the Quran.

Or he is 28, based on how old the district governor thought he looked when he signed Mr. Daryabi’s ID card and officially registered his age when he began his university studies in Kabul.

As a student of political science, Mr. Daryabi started writing articles for a local newspaper, getting paid about $5 a piece. After graduation, he cobbled together about $16,000 from friends and family to start Etilaat e Roz, which in its first incarnation largely focused on entertainment.

After it closed, Mr. Daryabi, who does not speak much English, was called by a printing house to lead an English paper started primarily to make money from advertisements. Mr. Daryabi took the job on the condition that he could use the company’s resources to restart Etilaat e Roz. They had a deal.

After a year of running two newspapers, he could afford to work full-time on Etilaat e Roz, which now focused on politics.

Mr. Daryabi said that in those days, in 2012, there was more optimism about the country’s future and the media’s role in it.

But the difficult years since — with a messy election that threatened to break the country apart, a violent Taliban onslaught and his paper’s financial issues — have not beaten him down completely, he said.

“The raw material for a democracy is still there,” he said.

(The New York Times)



What Options Does Hezbollah Have in Dealing with Israeli Escalation?

Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

What Options Does Hezbollah Have in Dealing with Israeli Escalation?

Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)

Hezbollah finds itself facing an increasingly difficult equation as Israeli escalation in South Lebanon has widened in recent days. How will the party respond to mounting Israeli strikes without being drawn into a broader confrontation that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be seeking either to postpone Israel’s elections or improve his prospects in them.

At the same time, Hezbollah is facing growing pressure from its support base, which is bearing the brunt of the strikes and demanding a response capable of deterring Tel Aviv. Yet the group’s options appear largely constrained by regional developments, particularly the course of US-Iran negotiations, as well as domestic political calculations in Lebanon.

A response could benefit Netanyahu

Sources familiar with Hezbollah’s position said the Iran-backed party has largely avoided signaling whether it intends to retaliate or continue exercising restraint and adhering unilaterally to the ceasefire agreement.

They told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah is currently focusing on holding the Lebanese authorities responsible for addressing the situation, noting that the group had previously called on the government to engage in dialogue over the expanding Israeli offensive and the failure of negotiations.

The sources see no indication so far that Hezbollah may make a military response. They argue that one objective of Israel’s widening offensive is to provoke Hezbollah and Iran into retaliating and trigger a broader war, which could benefit Netanyahu electorally or help him postpone the polls.

Limited ability to confront Israel

Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, took a different view, saying Hezbollah has no options left because its military power has collapsed, particularly after its decision to hand over Ali al-Taher — “a symbol of its pride” — to Israel rather than surrender it to the Lebanese army.

“Hezbollah lacks the ability not only to fight Israel, but even to provoke it,” Khashan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It sent two drones, and we saw the results.”

The academic believes the party’s current priority is to retain its weapons domestically after its military role in confronting Israel has effectively ended, although Hezbollah “insists on living in denial.”

He expects Israeli escalation to continue ahead of the heated elections, saying it will not be confined to Lebanon but could extend to the West Bank, Gaza and southern Syria, amid continued threats of strikes against Iran.

“As for America’s ability to pressure Israel, it appears limited,” Khashan noted, saying this means an expansion of Israeli operations into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley cannot be ruled out.

Three options for Hezbollah

Retired Lebanese army Brig. Gen. Mounir Shehadeh offered a different assessment, identifying three options available to Hezbollah.

“The first is a broad, direct military response,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. “This is the option that could give Israel the pretext it is seeking to expand its target list, take the escalation deeper into Lebanon and perhaps strike Lebanese infrastructure. It is therefore a high-cost option.”

The second is to refrain entirely from responding. That also carries a price because Israel could interpret it as evidence that it can impose new realities without paying a cost, particularly following the escalation over Ali al-Taher and the continuing strikes, he explained.

The third option is a calibrated, limited response. “In my view, this is the most logical option if the group decides to respond,” Shehadeh said.

Such action would seek to establish the principle that “aggression carries a cost” without triggering an all-out confrontation, he went on to say. Hezbollah could simultaneously maintain a policy of ambiguity by declining to claim every operation, particularly if it wanted to preserve room for political maneuver.

Shehadeh said Hezbollah may be facing a more complicated calculation: whether to respond to Israel now or wait until the direction of US-Iran negotiations becomes clearer.

Waiting for the outcome of those talks would not necessarily mean surrendering or remaining passive, he noted. Instead, Hezbollah could defer a major response while keeping the option of limited retaliation open, since a broad confrontation at this stage could benefit Israel more than the party and give it an opportunity to widen the war before the regional picture becomes clearer.

Shehadeh expects Hezbollah to avoid, in the near term, initiating a major response that could trigger an all-out war. At the same time, the group cannot indefinitely tolerate continued Israeli escalation without responding.

He stressed that the most realistic scenario is to contain the escalation, monitor developments on the ground, take into account the US-Iran diplomatic track and keep open the option of a limited, carefully calibrated response if Israel crosses certain lines.


Iran's Hormuz Leverage Wanes as US Economic Squeeze Bites

Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
TT

Iran's Hormuz Leverage Wanes as US Economic Squeeze Bites

Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)

Six months after a conflict that rattled markets and pushed the region to the brink of a wider war, the tide may be turning against Iran as Washington unleashes an unprecedented economic offensive to achieve what military force could not.

After years of surviving sanctions, Tehran is now confronting one of the harshest squeezes in the regime's history, according to Iranian insiders and regional sources cited by Reuters.

A US naval blockade and tougher sanctions are curbing oil exports, ‌restricting access to foreign currency and exposing growing strains in the economy.

The campaign has led US and regional officials to wager that mounting economic pressure can force Tehran to allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about a fifth of global oil and LNG supplies.

Their bet rests on a simple calculation: Iran is suffering more economic damage than it is inflicting. Efforts to choke off oil exports have cut state revenues, while attempts to disrupt shipping through Hormuz have not triggered the global economic shock Tehran hoped would force Washington to compromise. Energy markets have adjusted and alternative supplies have continued to flow.

Whether the pressure will force concessions remains unclear, the regional sources said. Tehran has failed to impose the costs it hoped would break Washington's resolve but has shown little sign of abandoning demands for sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and recognition of its security role in Hormuz.

Still, a new formula for resolving the standoff is now under discussion between mediators and Iran, the sources said.

Can Tehran outlast the squeeze?

Three senior Iranian sources acknowledged that Washington's campaign is becoming increasingly difficult to withstand. The latest measures have sharply restricted Tehran's ability to access foreign currency, import goods and tap global financing networks that have helped keep the economy afloat.

Iranian leaders fear a worsening economy, marked by surging prices, weaker trade and pressure on household incomes, could reignite nationwide unrest that has repeatedly challenged Tehran.

Shortages of key imports, including fuel and wheat, are becoming an increasing concern, officials said.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the strategy as a “one-two punch” combining the blockade with “the toughest sanctions in history.”

“It is going to work in Iran and we are going to collapse this regime,” he told CNBC.

For some US, Israeli and regional officials, such ‌strains strengthen ⁠hopes that economic pressure could eventually carry political consequences inside Iran by triggering unrest, widening rifts within the leadership and weakening its grip on power.

Others remain skeptical that economic and military coercion will produce a political rupture, pointing to decades of failed efforts to destabilize the regime and Tehran's willingness to suppress dissent. They argue Iran's rulers may again prove more resilient than their adversaries expect.

Resilience test

Dennis Ross, a former US negotiator, said Washington may be interpreting Iran's economic distress as evidence of strategic success when the reality is more complicated. Tehran remains determined to demonstrate it can control Hormuz, but appears to be calibrating its use of force while keeping further escalation in reserve.

The Revolutionary Guards may believe Iran can absorb the economic pain and outlast the pressure rather than compromise, ⁠Ross said.

“The Iranians have consistently surprised us in terms of their resiliency,” he added, saying he doubted economic and military pressure alone would force a retreat. Hardliners, he said, may believe they can endure and ultimately secure what they want.

Resilience may depend as much on public tolerance as Tehran's ability to absorb economic hardship, said Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

“Of course, the economic squeeze raises the risk of public unrest, but for now, a wartime mentality appears to have a significant hold ⁠over the population,” said Ozcelik. “Foreign military intervention, civilian casualties and the perception of a wider civilization confrontation with a US-led order are sustaining a degree of 'Iran-first' patriotic support, tolerance or simply patience with the regime.”

The result is a more stubborn impasse than Washington may have anticipated. Economic pressure is deepening the pain, but Tehran's powerful Revolutionary Guards may see endurance, backed by the threat of escalation, as leverage rather than a reason to concede.

The key question is not whether Iran is ⁠hurting, but whether it is hurting enough to compromise before either side slips toward another confrontation, the regional sources said.

Ross said the clearest path to a deal may lie in the dispute over shipping fees through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could abandon any demand for a toll while retaining the right to charge for legitimate navigational, security or environmental services, he said.

Such an arrangement could give both sides a claim to victory, allowing Tehran to step back without appearing to capitulate.

“If you could announce that the Strait were reopened,” Ross said, “I think Trump would do a deal.”


China's Memories of Mao Fade to Nostalgia 50 Years after His Death

The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP
The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP
TT

China's Memories of Mao Fade to Nostalgia 50 Years after His Death

The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP
The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village". Pedro PARDO / AFP

The crimson flags on Nanjie village's "East is Red" Square hang limp in the sweltering summer heat as a trickle of tourists take photos with a towering statue of Chairman Mao Zedong, still gleaming white almost 50 years after he died.

The Great Helmsman, who died September 9 1976, is still very much a fixture in central Henan province's Nanjie -- often dubbed "China's last Maoist village", said AFP.

Nostalgia for Mao's egalitarian ideals is growing in China as memories of his turbulent rule fade and the country grapples with a slowing economy and inequality.

Mao, who led the 1949 communist revolution against the ruling nationalists, ushered in an era of collectivized ownership he argued would drive industry and unite the country, but his drastic policies are also blamed by historians for mass starvation and millions of deaths.

While the ruling Chinese Communist Party maintains Mao was a revolutionary hero, it publicly acknowledged after his death that his devastating Cultural Revolution was a "grave mistake" -- a verdict upheld by subsequent leaders.

In Nanjie, countless murals of the former Chinese leader are plastered around the village.

Residents still live under Maoist principles of shared ownership, while the rest of the country moved on from that economic model.

"I still revere him very much," Xie Kaiyue, a 22-year-old local university student, said of Mao, who died almost three decades before she was born.

"I think young people in the village and, actually, myself, aren't as strong-spirited as in the past... People were purer," she said.

Nearby, electric carts whisked visitors past uniform apartment blocks plastered with socialist slogans as guides explained how cooperative ownership in local enterprises funds free housing for residents.

- Party line -

Around 500 kilometers (310 miles) north, in the mountain village of Dazhai in Shanxi province, once promoted by Mao as a national model after locals terraformed its arid hills into irrigated fields, tourists reminisce about an era when the Great Helmsman dominated political and social life.

"(People) didn't have enough to eat or to wear," Li, a 64-year-old tourist from Xi'an, said of his childhood.

"But... the whole country was full of vigor, and there was a spirit of struggling with heaven, earth, and people to change every aspect of China," the retiree said.

"Of course I miss it."

Now, Dazhai is overflowing with shops selling items that support Mao's personality cult -- posters, playing cards, and crockery emblazoned with his image, and the "Little Red Book" of his quotations.

Still, references to dark chapters of his decades in absolute power are tightly censored in public discourse.

The decade-long episode instigated by Mao in 1966 saw intellectuals brutally targeted as "class enemies" and schools shuttered, setting China back for years in education and development.

Private property and land were collectivized, while economic management pushed the country to the Great Famine, which the government says killed around 15 million people, while historians estimate around 20-43 million.

In one museum, text mentioning the Cultural Revolution had been crudely scraped off signage.

"Everything you see in the public domain... is the party line. No one is allowed to deviate from this," said scholar Xu Chenggang, who was targeted as a child in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution because his father was labelled a "rightist".

Mao's face is printed on banknotes, his portrait overlooks Tiananmen Square, and his body is preserved in a mausoleum.

Every year new movies and TV shows dramatizing Mao's life beam the message of his great deeds to public.

Public discussion has been squeezed further under current leader Xi Jinping, who warns against "historical nihilism", or narratives contradicting the party's own.

"The Communist Party told people there were mistakes, but what's the meaning of 'mistake'? No one knows," Xu said.

- 'Great figure' -

The sanitized history has left space for romanticized interpretations among youths frustrated by long working hours and intense competition in education and the job market.

In December, a viral video series on Bilibili -- a platform popular with those under 30 -- argued that the 2017 movie 'Youth', which follows young performers in a military dance troupe during the 1970s, was a subtle ode to the Cultural Revolution.

The videos, which praised Mao and blamed capitalist elites for crushing the movement, were removed after gaining over 35 million views in less than a week.

"Today, there is more of a sense that the Cultural Revolution was a period of idealism, where society was fired by ideals and not by the relentless pursuit of money and material goods," said to Kerry Brown, head of the Lau China Institute in London and author of a recent book on Mao.

"This is, of course, a total fabrication," he said.

Many also credit Mao with laying the foundation for China to become a modern, technologically advanced nation, said Mobo Gao, professor of Chinese studies at Adelaide University.

"They ask, where did (today's China) come from? It came from the establishment of the PRC," said Gao, who lived through the Mao era in rural Jiangxi province.

"Who was the one who really established the PRC? It must be Mao."

In Shijiazhuang, an industrial city of seven million northeast of Dazhai, 20-year-old Wang Zhihao and his classmates posed with a giant Mao statue opposite the municipal government.

"We admire and revere Chairman Mao very much. He is a great figure," Wang said, as the sound of elderly residents singing songs praising the Communist Party drifted over from the nearby square.

"He led the founding of New China."