Trump’s Iran Strategy Sharpens Power Struggle in Tehran

US President Donald Trump speaks about the Iran deal from the Diplomatic Reception room of the White House in Washington, DC, on October 13, 2017. (AFP PHOTO / Brendan SMIALOWSKI)
US President Donald Trump speaks about the Iran deal from the Diplomatic Reception room of the White House in Washington, DC, on October 13, 2017. (AFP PHOTO / Brendan SMIALOWSKI)
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Trump’s Iran Strategy Sharpens Power Struggle in Tehran

US President Donald Trump speaks about the Iran deal from the Diplomatic Reception room of the White House in Washington, DC, on October 13, 2017. (AFP PHOTO / Brendan SMIALOWSKI)
US President Donald Trump speaks about the Iran deal from the Diplomatic Reception room of the White House in Washington, DC, on October 13, 2017. (AFP PHOTO / Brendan SMIALOWSKI)

London- Although it had been expected for months, US President Donald Trump’s unveiling of his new strategy on Iran seems to have taken the ruling elite in Tehran by surprise, intensifying the power struggle within it.

The radical faction close to “Supreme Guide” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had expected Trump to tear-up the so-called nuclear deal, depriving the rival faction known as Rafsanjani’s orphans led by President Hassan Rouhani, of their main propaganda plank.

That Rouhani is anxious to pretend that the nuke deal remains intact is a sign of his faction’s failure to work out any alternative policy. If he denounces the deal, he would be validating Trump’s claim that Tehran never intended to abide by the rules. Such move would, in turn, persuade the Europeans and perhaps even Russia and China to tone down their support for Tehran against Washington.

“We intend to remain committed to the nuclear deal,” Rouhani said Friday night, “for as long as others continue to respect it.”

That was a strange position since one of those “others”, the US, had already announced it would not abide by the deal as it stands now.

“We hope that others will not follow Trump’s lead,” says Hessameddin Ashna, Rouhani’s chief political adviser. This means that Rafsanjani’s Orphans are determined to stick to the “deal” even when and if the US renders it meaningless.

For the deal to work in favor of Iran it is important that international banks and businesses resume treating the country as a normal partner.

Two years after the nuclear deal was announced, this hasn’t happened. The reason is that companies and banks are not sure that by doing business with Iran they would not risk running into trouble with US rules and regulations. Fear that the sanctions that were suspended under the nuclear deal could be snapped back at any time has prevented Iran from attracting any significant foreign investment.

For the same reason Iran has failed to regain access to world capital markets and banking services. Today, even Iranian embassies abroad are not allowed to open bank accounts and are forced to pay their staff in cash. Tehran is also forced to pay the militant groups it backs, notably Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen with suitcases filled with dollars.

However, Rouhani and his faction, which includes former President Muhammad Khatami, may not be totally unhappy with Trump’s move because the US president singled out the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is controlled by Khamenei, as the main culprit. The Rouhani faction is now harping on the theme that had it not been for the IRGC, the nuclear deal would have borne real fruits for Iran.

However, Trump, according to the daily Kayhan, believed to be a mouthpiece for Khamenei, chose a “more devious method” by not formally denouncing the deal while making it clear the US will intensify sanctions against Iran. This means that “Iran will continue to comply with the deal while the US refuses to abide by its pledges,” the paper says.

The IRGC is clearly happy that, despite months of rumors, Trump did not ask the US Congress to declare it a “terrorist organization”.

According to Kayhan, Trump “dared not” classify the IRGC as “terrorist.” The reason, Kayhan says, was “the stern warning” given by IRGC Commander General Muhammad-Ali Aziz Jaafari.

IRGC spokesman Gen. Massoud Jazayeri has also highlighted IRGC’s message of defiance.

“We intend to intensify our support for suffering peoples fighting for their rights everywhere, most notably in the Middle East,” he said.

The message was further amplified by Quds Corps Commander General Qassem Soleimani. He ended weeks of seclusion with a lightning trip to Iraq after which he posted his “selfies” all over the official media. The message was that he remains very much in business.

The IRGC also tried to dismiss Trump’s order for imposing economic sanctions on the IRGC’s business wing. That business wing, known as the Khatam al-Anbia Conglomerate, controls over 100 companies with a presence in Dubai, Oman, Austria, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

On Saturday, General Ibad-Allah Ibadi, the head of the conglomerate, inaugurated a new steel mill with a fiery speech about the IRGC’s determination to expand its business activities across the globe.

“Despite Trump’s forlorn attempts many around the world are keen to do business with us,” he claimed.

While Khamenei has maintained silence, at least at the time of this writing, spokesmen for the rival factions have tried to minimize the impact of Trump’s dramatic move in different ways.

Rouhani is beating the drums about a promise by French President Emmanuel macron to visit Tehran next year as a sign that Iran can ignore the US and “work with European and other partners.”

Rouhani’s rival in the recent presidential election, Ayatollah Ibrahim Raiisi, however, has called for a “full adoption of Resistance Economy” which means forgoing foreign trade and adopting a North Korean style system of self-sufficiency.

For the time being, the rival factions are jumping and gyrating much like angry cats meaning to spring at each other. Without knowing it, perhaps, under the surface, Trump may have sharpened the power struggle in Tehran.



Mistrust and Fear: The Complex Story behind Strained Syria-Lebanon Relations

People carry Syrian flags of the opposition as they celebrate the ouster of the Assad regime in Damascus, in Tripoli, northern Lebanon, 08 December 2024. (EPA)
People carry Syrian flags of the opposition as they celebrate the ouster of the Assad regime in Damascus, in Tripoli, northern Lebanon, 08 December 2024. (EPA)
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Mistrust and Fear: The Complex Story behind Strained Syria-Lebanon Relations

People carry Syrian flags of the opposition as they celebrate the ouster of the Assad regime in Damascus, in Tripoli, northern Lebanon, 08 December 2024. (EPA)
People carry Syrian flags of the opposition as they celebrate the ouster of the Assad regime in Damascus, in Tripoli, northern Lebanon, 08 December 2024. (EPA)

A lot has happened in just a year on both sides of the Lebanon-Syria border. A lightning offensive by opposition factions in Syria toppled longtime autocrat Bashar Assad and brought a new government in place in Damascus.

In Lebanon, a bruising war with Israel dealt a serious blow to Hezbollah — the Iran-backed and Assad-allied Shiite Lebanese militant group that had until recently been a powerful force in the Middle East — and a US-negotiated deal has brought a fragile ceasefire.

Still, even after the fall of the 54-year Assad family rule, relations between Beirut and Damascus remain tense — as they have been for decades past, with Syria long failing to treat its smaller neighbor as a sovereign nation.

Recent skirmishes along the border have killed and wounded several people, both fighters and civilians, including a four-year-old Lebanese girl, The Associated Press said.

Beirut and Damascus have somewhat coordinated on border security, but attempts to reset political relations have been slow. Despite visits to Syria by two heads of Lebanon's government, no Syrian official has visited Lebanon.

Here is what's behind the complicated relations.

A coldness that goes way back

Many Syrians have resented Hezbollah for wading into Syria's civil war in defense of Assad's government. Assad's fall sent them home, but many Lebanese now fear cross-border attacks by Syria's militants.

There are new restrictions on Lebanese entering Syria, and Lebanon has maintained tough restrictions on Syrians entering Lebanon.

The Lebanese also fear that Damascus could try to bring Lebanon under a new Syrian tutelage.

Syrians have long seen Lebanon as a staging ground for anti-Syria activities, including hosting opposition figures before Hafez Assad — Bashar Assad's father — ascended to power in a bloodless 1970 coup.

In 1976, Assad senior sent his troops to Lebanon, allegedly to bring peace as Lebanon was hurtling into a civil war that lasted until 1990. Once that ended, Syrian forces remained in Lebanon for another 15 years.

A signature of the Assad family rule, Syria's dreaded security agents disappeared and tortured dissidents to keep the country under their control. They did the same in Lebanon.

“Syrians feel that Lebanon is the main gateway for conspiracies against them,” says Lebanese political analyst Ali Hamadeh.

Turbulent times

It took until 2008 for the two countries to agree to open diplomatic missions, marking Syria's first official recognition of Lebanon as an independent state since it gained independence from France in 1943.

The move came after the 2005 truck-bombing assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri that many blamed on Damascus. Two months later, Syria pulled its troops out of Lebanon under international pressure, ending 29 years of near-complete domination of its neighbor.

When Syria’s own civil war erupted in 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrians fled across the border, making crisis-hit Lebanon the host of the highest per capita population of refugees in the world. Once in Lebanon, the refugees complained about discrimination, including curfews for Syrian citizens in some areas.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, rushed thousands of its fighters into Syria in 2013 to shore up Assad, worried that its supply lines from Iran could dry up.

And as much as the Lebanese are divided over their country’s internal politics, Syria's war divided them further into those supporting Assad's government and those opposing it.

Distrust and deadlock

A key obstacle to warming relations has been the fate of about 2,000 Syrians in Lebanese prisons, including some 800 held over attacks and shootings, many without trial. Damascus is asking Beirut to hand them over to continue their prison terms in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials say Beirut won't release any attackers and that each must be studied and resolved separately.

In July, family members of the detainees rallied along a border crossing, demanding their relatives be freed. The protest came amid reports that Syrian troops could deploy foreign fighters in Lebanon, which Damascus officials denied.

Another obstacle is Lebanon’s demand that Syrian refugees go back home now that Assad is gone. About 716,000 Syrian refugees are registered with the UN refugee agency, while hundreds of thousands more are unregistered in Lebanon, which has a population of about 5 million.

Syria is also demanding the return of billions of dollars worth of deposits of Syrians trapped in Lebanese banks since Lebanon's historic financial meltdown in 2019.

The worst post-Assad border skirmishes came in mid-March, when Syrian authorities said Hezbollah members crossed the border and kidnapped and killed three Syrian soldiers. The Lebanese government and army said the clash was between smugglers and that Hezbollah wasn't involved.

Days later, Lebanese and Syrian defense ministers flew to Saudi Arabia and signed an agreement on border demarcation and boosting their coordination.

In July, rumors spread in Lebanon, claiming the northern city of Tripoli would be given to Syria in return for Syria giving up the Golan Heights to Israel. And though officials dismissed the rumors, they illustrate the level of distrust between the neighbors.

Beirut was also angered by Syria's appointment this year of a Lebanese army officer — Abdullah Shehadeh, who defected in 2014 from Lebanon to join Syrian insurgents — as the head of security in Syria’s central province of Homs that borders northeastern Lebanon.

In Syria, few were aware of Shehadeh’s real name — he was simply known by his nom de guerre, Abu Youssef the Lebanese. Syrian security officials confirmed the appointment.

What's ahead

Analysts say an important step would be for the two neighbors to work jointly to boost security against cross-border smuggling. A US-backed plan that was recently adopted by the Lebanese government calls for moving toward full demarcation of the border.

Radwan Ziadeh, a senior fellow at the Arab Center in Washington, says the best way forward would be for Syria and Lebanon to address each problem between them individually — not as a package deal.

That way, tensions would be reduced gradually, he said and downplayed recent comments by prominent Syrian anti-Assad figures who claimed Lebanon is part of Syria and should return to it.

“These are individual voices that do not represent the Syrian state,” Zaideh said.