Moroccan ISIS Commander: We Killed Italian Father Paolo Dall'oglio

ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.
ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.
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Moroccan ISIS Commander: We Killed Italian Father Paolo Dall'oglio

ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.
ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

September of 2013 A.A. turned his back to his home just off the coast of the Mediterranean in the Moroccan capital Rabat, and headed to Raqqa, arguably the hottest zone of the Syrian conflict. Rising within ISIS ranks, A.A. eventually became a “leader” in the extremist group.

He aspired to thrive under a self-proclaimed “caliphate,” that was until he found himself locked up in a top-security prison north of the country belonging to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Born in Rabat in 1982, A.A. holds a technology certificate and had opened a private company to sell electronic devices.

No one in his family knew when he made up his mind and traveled to Syria.

Speaking to an Asharq Al-Awsat at the SDF headquarters in the northern Raqqa, he explained how footage showing the events of the Syrian civil war stirred his feelings, eventually building up to his decision to join the fight.

He denied however ever being involved with ultra-hardline Islamist groups in Morocco—but said that the woes of the Syrian civil war became the center of discussions of his family members, and everyone initially thought he intended to travel to aid displaced people and refugees in makeshift camps.

In the summer of 2013, he established a line of communications with extremists over social media networks, and received an in with al-Qaeda. Members of the group presented him with a route to travel and gave him exclusive contact information to link up with him upon his arrival.

Later in September, A.A. flew to Istanbul, Turkey, from where he took a bus to the city of Gaziantep near the Syrian border.

"I called the trafficker, who was informed about my arrival. He sneaked me across the border with Syria, and dropped me off at a meeting point where I was received by members of the organization who then took me to a reception.”

The next day, he joined a group of newcomers who were sent to Idlib, northwestern Syria, where he stayed for some 60 days. During this period, he attended an educational course and received arms and combat arts training.

He contacted his family to inform them that he was in Syria and had joined Qaeda’s offshoot Al-Nusra Front.

"My father did not tolerate the news and hung up his conversation with me. My mother was a bit more calm. She asked me to stay in touch with them, and tried to persuade me into going back on my decision."

Two months after A.A. arriving to Syria, disputes between ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Al-Nusra Front, headed by Abou Muhammad al-Julani, escalated and the two sides parted ways.

Many foreign and Arab fighters preferred to join al-Baghdadi, A.A. included.

"Al-Julani was harsh with the foreign fighters and deployed them in city outskirts—Al-Nusra was in disarray and confusion with no apparent goal, while ISIS on the other hand declared that his goal to establish an alleged caliphate.”

After ISIS secured its control of the city of Raqqa in January 2014, A.A. was appointed commander of the northern border. He was responsible for the land strip between the town of Ras al-Ayn and its border gate with Turkey.

He said that his multilingual skills had earned him the position.

"It was because I could speak English, French and Spanish in addition to my mother tongue Arabic. I was then dubbed Abou Mansour."

He pointed out that until the end of 2013, the number of foreign arrivals to Syria did not exceed 150 per month.

“After I took office, and as of 2014, an average rate of about 300 foreigners came in daily wishing to fight among the organization’s ranks.”

ISIS members set up a special registry bureau dedicated to noting down the names, nationality and date of entry of foreign recruits.

On the case of the disappearance and murder of the Italian Christian priest Father Paolo Dall'oglio, who visited Raqqa in July 2013, he confirmed that ISIS militants killed him days after keeping him locked up.

"In the summer of 2014, a year after the incident, a Vatican-linked association contacted ISIS via intermediaries in Turkey and asked to interview us on the border between Syria and Turkey, to unveil the fate of Father Paolo and an Italian journalist who had gone missing,” said A.A.

“I in turn delivered the request to the commander-in-chief of Abou Muhammed al-Iraqi who warned not to ask about Father Paolo and refused to meet the association for an interview. ISIS leaders told me that Abou Luqman al-Raqqawi (an ISIS member) had executed the Christian priest. "

Commenting on the nationalities that joined the organization, A.A. said that the majority of fighters came in from Chechnya, Georgia and former Soviet republics.

As for combatants joining from Arab countries, Tunisia registered the highest share, followed by Morocco, then Algeria, Egypt and Libya.

Two years after the so-called "caliphate" was declared in the areas under ISIS control, many towns were gradually lost on the outskirts of Raqqa, most notably Tal Abyad and Ein Issa. The terror group was completely driven out from its Raqqa stronghold in October, 2017.

"A ‘caliphate’ without historic capitals means nothing, a ‘caliphate’ without control over Damascus or Baghdad is incomplete," A.A. said.

The organization staged mass executions, beheadings, rapes, abductions, ethnic cleansing, stoning and other barbaric practices in Raqqa and other cities it controlled.

ISIS was keen on using modern techniques to broadcast its atrocities through live footage posted on the Internet to spread terror among people.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.