Despite 2016 Defeats, Shabaab Returning in Force in Somalia

Security forces stand guard on a destroyed building following a car bomb claimed by al-Shabaab terrorists in the Somali capital Mogadishu, August 30, 2016. (Reuters)
Security forces stand guard on a destroyed building following a car bomb claimed by al-Shabaab terrorists in the Somali capital Mogadishu, August 30, 2016. (Reuters)
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Despite 2016 Defeats, Shabaab Returning in Force in Somalia

Security forces stand guard on a destroyed building following a car bomb claimed by al-Shabaab terrorists in the Somali capital Mogadishu, August 30, 2016. (Reuters)
Security forces stand guard on a destroyed building following a car bomb claimed by al-Shabaab terrorists in the Somali capital Mogadishu, August 30, 2016. (Reuters)

Several factors in 2016 led to a sharp drop in the terrorist activity of Somalia’s al-Shabaab group. This can be credited to regional and international efforts that saw the organization lose the majority of the land it had seized since 2009. Internal disputes within the Shabaab and the defection of some of its members to ISIS also led to its weakness.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) demonstrated an ability to confront the group, especially after it received training and weapons from the United States, Britain and Europe. US airstrikes have also managed to target senior members of the organization.

Despite these losses however, the Shabaab, led by Ahmed Diriye Abou Obeida, have managed to adjust to the new reality and the current balance of power on the ground. It therefore still remains a threat to the Somali government and the fragile stability in each of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. In addition, the Shabaab has started to adopt a new approach, guerrilla warfare, against the African Union and Somali government. A new intelligence body was formed in order to confront this strategy.

As part of its new policies, the Somali terrorist group is being more selective in choosing its targets. The second half of 2017 is witnessing a qualitative shift in the nature of the confrontation that the group is adopting. It is being more accurate in the nature of its targets and the timing of its attacks.

This was demonstrated in the October 15, 2017, Mogadishu attack that left 250 people dead in the worst such assault since 2007.

As part of its policy of centralized strikes and keeping the Somali capital under the “hell” of terrorism, the Shabaab launched an attack against the Nasa-Hablod 2 Hotel on October 28 that left 70 people dead, including some former lawmakers, a senior police officer, state officials and foreign figures. The police announced that the assault was carried out by a suicide bomber and gunmen, who attacked the hotel that is frequented by politicians due to its proximity to the presidential palace.

On October 14, the Shabaab carried out two bombings in Mogadishu, killing some 22 people and injuring several others.

The weak Somali government took urgent measures to confront this threat. On October 29, it sacked the chief of police and head of the national intelligence agency. This showed the extent in which the Shabaab were able to influence the internal Somali scene and the government’s security policy.

Given the above, one can conclude that the victories that the terrorist organization achieved recently are not connected only to destabilizing security and stability, but to the bitter defeats suffered by the army. This in turn created a real political crisis and problems for the government.

The confusion on the internal scene was demonstrated when the Shabaab managed to kill some 100 Somali special forces in an attack on the town of Breiry, which lies 60 kms west of Mogadishu. The attack led to the resignation of Defense Minister Abdirashid Abdullahi Mohamed and Chief of Staff General Ahmed Mohamed Jimale Irfid.

Moreover, and as part of its resurgence in Somalia, the Shabaab seized on August 4 the town of Lego, which lies 130 kms northwest of Mogadishu. This is a region that witnessed almost weekly bloody battles before it was captured by the terrorists, who killed 12 peacekeepers during very fierce confrontations.

The renewed Shabaab push prompted some 50 lawmakers last week to sign a petition, demanding the resignation of President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. The government has meanwhile turned to bolstering regional and international cooperation to confront the terror group. Farmajo recently paid visits to each of Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti to that end.

Somali media on Thursday reported that Ethiopia had deployed more forces, some 1,000 heavily armed soldiers, in the Gedo province. A Somali official in the region said that the deployment was part of Somali-Ethiopian cooperation and a precursor to an imminent attack against Shabaab positions there.

Despite these official Somali efforts and international support, especially American strikes, we can say that the Shabaab has regained much of its power. Its long experience has enabled it to leave battles with African peacekeepers with lesser casualties.

Despite the smaller geographic area that the terror group has been controlling since 2016 and the return of many displaced Somalis back to their homes, divisions between clans, tribes and neighboring countries remain. The poor military armament and equipment of the African peacekeepers also works in the terrorists’ favor. These are all factors that the Shabaab is exploiting to transform Somalia into a real African base for Ayman al-Zawahiri’s organization. This will enable the group to recruit fighters loyal to ISIS.

The new Shabaab policy does not pose a threat to Somalia alone, but it goes beyond the borders to target the stability of the Horn of Africa, Yemen and the Arab Gulf. This therefore demands that regional and international forces offer more support to the Somali government and ensure their own trade and economic interests in the region.

*Khaled Yamout is a visiting political science professor at Mohammed V University in Rabat.



Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
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Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.