Southeast Asia: The New Terrorist Destination

Government troops waged a four-month battle against ISIS in the city of Marawi, Philippines. (Reuters)
Government troops waged a four-month battle against ISIS in the city of Marawi, Philippines. (Reuters)
TT
20

Southeast Asia: The New Terrorist Destination

Government troops waged a four-month battle against ISIS in the city of Marawi, Philippines. (Reuters)
Government troops waged a four-month battle against ISIS in the city of Marawi, Philippines. (Reuters)

It seems that Southeast Asia may be the new destination of terrorists, who have suffered a series of defeats in Iraq and Syria. The leaders of these organizations have indeed started to transfer what remains of their funds and members to several of the region’s countries.

The first question we should ask is whether Southeast Asia is the only option available to ISIS and other extremist groups or are there other destinations that can become the base for their resurgent terror attacks around the world?

Africa definitely remains the second choice to become a base for terror training camps and the recruitment of new ISIS and al-Qaida members. The ground there, however, does not seem ready to receive these terrorists due to various factors that we will not get into.

Southeast Asia however enjoys the geographic and demographic elements that make it an exemplary choice that would compensate these two organizations the losses they have suffered in the Middle East.

Attractive region for terror

An in-depth exploration reveals that there are several factors that make Southeast Asia a suitable environment for future terrorism. The first of these factors is the high population density of the majority of these countries, especially Indonesia that has a population of 260 million. There, ISIS can easily win over thousands of sympathizers and gain new recruits.

The geography there is rife with tens of thousands of small islands that act as fortresses and caches for fugitive terrorists.

This is compounded by a lack of security coordination between Southeast Asian countries, which is in contrast to the coordination between extremist groups there, most notably those in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Furthermore, the poverty in those countries makes it easy for extremists to lure recruits with the promise of financial rewards. Racial and sectarian discrimination suffered by the Muslim youth also make them easy prey for terrorist recruitment and brainwashing.

The Philippines and Hapilon’s death

The clashes between the Philippine military and ISIS in the city of Marawi have drawn attention to the rise of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. The Philippine defense minister announced in October that ISIS chief in Southeast Asia and Abou Sayyaf group leader Isnilon Hapilon was killed in the clashes. He was blacklisted by the United States as one of its most wanted terrorists.

The four-month Marawi battle, where ISIS seized four neighborhoods, highlighted fears that the group would seek to establish a regional base south of the archipelago, reported Agence France Presse.

How did ISIS infiltrate Catholic-majority Philippines and not other predominantly Muslim Middle Eastern or Asian countries?

A report by the Stratfor American geopolitical intelligence platform examines how ISIS inspired Hapilon to unite in 2014 the ranks of extremist organizations in the region under the ISIS banner. Stratfor said these organizations as a blend of local criminal gangs operating under the guise of “jihad”. Hapilon and other extremist leaders in the Philippines gained in the meantime recognition by operating under the ISIS name and adopting its tactics.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Philippines’ southern Mindanao island is its strategic location on the marine border with Indonesia and Malaysia. This makes it a prime destination for Indonesian and Malaysian extremist fugitives.

The Rohingya crisis and Asian terror

One of the most important questions that is being raised recently is whether the arrival of extremists in Southeast Asia is connected to the suffering Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims are enduring at the hands of the Buddhist government.

We have definitely detected serious ISIS, Qaida and other extremist attempts to portray the developments in Myanmar as a war against Islam and Muslims. They have all come to agree that Myanmar will become the scene of the major battle, said Jay Solomon of the Washington Institute for Near East policy.

This was demonstrated in a statement released in September by the Qaida higher command that called on all “jihadist brothers in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and the Philippines to head to Myanmar to aid our Muslim brothers.” It urged them to “make the necessary preparations, including training and the like, to resist this oppression and injustice.”

In a separate statement, Qaida’s Shura council declared that Buddhists had occupied Rakhine state from where Islam was spread to Burma some 200 years ago. Buddhists then changed Burma’s name to Myanmar where its Muslim population was oppressed.

Does this mean that Qaida is more present in Myanmar than ISIS?

In order to properly read the Southeast Asian extremist scene, we must address the security and political developments there and the rise of fundamentalism.

As the Rohingya crisis escalated, Buddhists and their embassies throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia came under attack. In September, molotov bottles were thrown at the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. This prompted police in Pakistan to bolster security around Myanmar diplomatic missions in Islamabad.

In Bangladesh, officials said that they have not yet witnessed the arrival of foreign fighters to support the Rohingya, but they have confirmed that the threat is very high.

The above all means that “jihadist” groups have learned how to exploit civil wars and social unrest to spread their roots and raise the number of their recruits.

The crisis has reached such a dire point that a senior Bangladeshi official declared that the situation in Myanmar is a “man-made disaster.”

Qaida returns to the fray

The most disturbing analyses of the developments in Southeast Asia said that the situation has gone beyond ISIS and instead brought al-Qaida back into the picture.

Several security, counter-terrorism and intelligence officials in the region stated that various Qaida branches in the islands surrounding Myanmar had in recent years trained Rohingya on “jihad”.

The Qaida problem here is greater than the Rohingya crisis. It is seeking to regain from ISIS the top spot as the most dangerous extremist group. But why is Southeast Asia such an important strategic target for it?

The area has never been free of pro-Qaida groups and it still retains sleeper cells that can play a very dangerous role should they be ordered to act. In addition, Qaida knows that the United States has a historic military presence in Southeast Asia, which makes their positions strategic targets. Furthermore, observers will notice that Southeast Asia is a main passage for the world’s oil trade, making it another Qaida target.

This prompted the American Foreign Affairs magazine to ask if Qaida will make a return to the scene.

It essentially said that the US was too preoccupied with defeating ISIS to notice that al-Qaida was regrouping. Observers in the report wondered if it will achieve its goal of once again being labeled as the most dangerous terrorist group. Some stated however that the US and other countries were effective in their war against terrorism, giving them reason to believe that al-Qaida was in real and constant decline.

Upcoming terror

It is certain that Southeast Asia may be confronted with a threat that is worse than al-Qaida and ISIS. Foreign Affairs said that the organization is different than what it was a decade ago and Southeast Asia may witness the rise of al-Qaida under a new form, one which brings together ISIS’ orphans who are longing to avenge their humiliating losses in the Middle East.

Their arrival in Southeast Asia is connected to stability and political unrest and extremist radical ideology will never be eliminated as long as social injustice remains and conflicts and wars in Asia, Africa and the Middle East rage on.



Conflicting Visions for Gaza’s ‘Day After’ Amid a Complex Reality

Palestinians bid farewell to a relative killed in an Israeli airstrike outside the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza Strip, on Saturday (AFP)
Palestinians bid farewell to a relative killed in an Israeli airstrike outside the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza Strip, on Saturday (AFP)
TT
20

Conflicting Visions for Gaza’s ‘Day After’ Amid a Complex Reality

Palestinians bid farewell to a relative killed in an Israeli airstrike outside the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza Strip, on Saturday (AFP)
Palestinians bid farewell to a relative killed in an Israeli airstrike outside the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia, northern Gaza Strip, on Saturday (AFP)

As discussions over the future of Gaza continue, the conflicting visions among key players make reaching a consensus increasingly difficult. The phrase “it’s complicated,” used by US envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to justify Israel’s continuation of the war, summarizes the deep divisions among stakeholders.

Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s devastating war on Gaza, international efforts to define the “day after” scenario have remained unresolved.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to allow either the Palestinian Authority (PA) or Hamas to govern Gaza. Meanwhile, former US President Donald Trump envisions turning Gaza into the “Riviera of the Middle East”—without the PA, Hamas, or even Palestinians themselves. Arab states are considering an independent committee to manage Gaza, while the PA insists on taking sole control. Hamas, on the other hand, has proposed a support committee to oversee governance. The result is a landscape where no party shares a unified vision for post-war Gaza.

A senior Palestinian official emphasized that the PA and Arab states are relying on the US to take a firm stance and impose a solution on Israel. “There is no agreement yet. The issue must still be settled,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. The official stressed that a binding US position, along with Arab and international support, is necessary for any effective governance plan.

While Trump and Netanyahu have outlined different visions for Gaza, behind the scenes, the US is engaged in discussions about post-war governance. Yet, Netanyahu has repeatedly avoided addressing this issue, preferring to focus on military operations. Israeli writer Avi Shilon argued in Yedioth Ahronoth that Netanyahu is prolonging the war to evade making a tough decision about Gaza’s future.

Both Witkoff and Shilon believe Hamas intends to maintain its presence in Gaza. While Witkoff insists that Hamas’ continued rule is unacceptable to Trump’s administration, he hinted that the group could participate politically if it disarms.

Witkoff also suggested that negotiations might provide a path forward, arguing that Hamas is not as ideologically rigid as some claim.

This approach aligns with US efforts to engage Hamas indirectly, recognizing that Israel has been unable to decisively eliminate the group. Shilon noted that Israel’s demand to end Hamas’ rule is justified in principle but impractical in reality.

“Israel cannot force Hamas to surrender. A group willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of its people and endure Gaza’s destruction has no incentive to return hostages if all we offer is their removal from power,” he wrote, adding that the US has come to the same realization.

Hamas responded swiftly to Witkoff’s remarks, with spokesperson Abdel Latif al-Qanoua stating that some of these proposals are under discussion with mediators. He affirmed that Hamas is open to governance arrangements in Gaza, provided they have broad consensus. “We approved the formation of a societal support committee in Gaza that does not include Hamas. We have no ambitions to govern Gaza; what matters to us is national consensus, and we are committed to its outcomes,” he said.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty previously outlined a comprehensive reconstruction plan for Gaza, including training Palestinian security forces in Egypt and Jordan before their deployment to the Strip. A Hamas official confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the group genuinely does not seek to govern Gaza, but it insists that governance arrangements be Palestinian-led, without US or Israeli dictates. “Our weapons are not up for discussion unless it leads to a Palestinian state,” the official emphasized.

The PA and Fatah have also entered the debate, calling on Hamas to relinquish control of Gaza. Fatah spokesperson Munther al-Hayek urged Hamas to step aside, warning that the upcoming period could be “even more severe” for Gaza’s civilians.

A lingering question remains: Will the October 7 attack ultimately bring Palestinians closer to statehood, or will it destroy their aspirations?

Thirty-two years after the Oslo Accords—when US sponsorship, international backing, and a strong PA seemed to pave the way for peace—Israel’s refusal to conclude negotiations has kept Palestinians in a cycle of talks, conflicts, and political paralysis. Over time, Israel’s approach has weakened the PA and, whether intentionally or not, bolstered Hamas’ influence—leading to the devastating events of October 7.

As the region contemplates Gaza’s future, the unresolved question remains: What lessons have Washington and Tel Aviv learned, and what do they truly want?