Ehud Barak’s New Book Reveals Intelligence Operations in Arab Countries

Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. (AFP)
Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. (AFP)
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Ehud Barak’s New Book Reveals Intelligence Operations in Arab Countries

Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. (AFP)
Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. (AFP)

Ehud Barak’s New Book Reveals Intelligence Operations, Assassination Plots in Arab Countries

Israel’s former Prime Minister Ehud Barak recently finished his autobiography in which he revealed several Israeli intelligence and assassination operations, as part of his military activity in several Arab countries.

Some of those operations have remained under wraps for over 50 years and are now revealed in his book, “My Country, My Life: Fighting for Israel, Searching for Peace.”

Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu, the ministerial committee that reviews books by former senior officials allowed their former colleague to go ahead with publishing his memoir.

Sources revealed that the book discusses the story of Israel’s most secret intelligence-gathering operations, which laid the ground for victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 and could possibly have prevented its defeat in the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

In one of Barak’s personal stories, he recalled leading his first operations deep in Syria and Egypt as one of the first officers of the Sayeret Matkal commandos.

The authorization for the first operation came in August 1963, when Barak was ordered to plan and command an incursion of a five-man team into the Golan Heights to wire-tap a Syrian army communications line.

In his book, Barak gives the first detailed account of the operation that led to a historic and strategic breakthrough for Israeli intelligence. Each member carried an Uzi gun and two grenades, and then crossed the border after nightfall north of Kibbutz Dan.

They had orders to return by 1:15 A.M., but on the way they had to move passed three sleeping Syrian soldiers and the Banias River, which was deeper and wider than expected at the spot Barak had chosen to cross. When the order came over the radio to return, he told his men to switch it off.

Once they installed the device at the top of a telephone pole, they returned to Israeli territory undetected, but three hours late. They were greeted at the border by the Military Intelligence chief, Meir Amit.

The intelligence that would be gathered by the planted devices would be a key factor less than four years later when Israeli forces captured the Golan Heights in the last 36 hours of the Six-Day War.

However, the Syrian front wasn’t Israel’s main concern in the 1960s. Egypt boasted the largest Arab army and a president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was determined to unify the Arab world against Israel.

Tapping into the communications of the Egyptian army deep in Sinai would take a much larger and more powerful device, not one that could be carried on the backs of commandos. At the time, the Israeli Air Force received its first large transport helicopters, Sikorsky S-58s, and it was decided that Barak would lead the Sayeret Matkal’s first major helicopter-borne mission.

“Even now,” he writes, “most of the details of how we planned to tap into the Egyptians’ communications remain classified.”

He still gives a good deal of new details, including the fact that geologists were consulted to help work out the best locations to hide the tapping devices from Egyptian desert scouts.

Barak did not mention how the device was connected to the Egyptian communication line and hidden in early 1964, but he does reveal that all five men made sure it was installed before they had to get back.

This was Barak’s first mission that was approved by the new Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, and would be followed by similar operations.

Early 1970, the third secret operation to install listening devices took place. Barak stated that this operation needed larger helicopters and included diversionary attacks on Egyptian installations to hide the true mission.

The helicopters flew over the Suez Canal and installing and hiding the device was much more difficult than expected. The team nearly aborted midway, but the generals radioed that they had more time and the work was completed.

“For the first time since we’d captured Sinai, Israel was again receiving real-time communications from inside Egypt,” Barak wrote.

These devices and others installed were called the "special sources" that Israel used sparingly to minimize the risk of detection.



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.