Exclusive - Arabs in Kirkuk Refuse Peshmerga Return

A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter in the southwest of Kirkuk. (Reuters)
A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter in the southwest of Kirkuk. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Arabs in Kirkuk Refuse Peshmerga Return

A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter in the southwest of Kirkuk. (Reuters)
A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter in the southwest of Kirkuk. (Reuters)

Arab forces in Kirkuk have expressed their rejection to the return of Kurdish Peshmerga and Asayish forces to the oil-rich province and other disputes regions.

They called on the Kurdish and Iraqi forces that were victorious in the May parliamentary elections against dragging Kikruk into their political negotiations that are aimed at forming the largest bloc at the legislature.

Spokesman of the Arab Council in Kirkuk Hatem al-Taei stressed that it opposes the return of the Peshmerga.

The council represents the vast majority of the Arab political and social forces in the province.

Taei told Asharq Al-Awsat that the legal explanation of the “disputed regions” means that only federal forces are allowed to deploy there.

These forces bring together all components of society without exception, he stressed.

“Our problem, as Arabs in Kirkuk, does not lie with the Kurds or Kurdish political forces, but with the powers that control the security and military forces that have seized Kirkuk,” he added.

“We suffered under the rule of these forces throughout the duration of the war against ISIS,” he revealed. “They committed many many violations against our regions and their Arab residents.”

He accused the Kurdish forces of arresting the youth and destroying 116 Arab villages in Kirkuk without any justified reason simply because they “lie within the borders of regions the forces wanted to claim as their own through bloodshed.”

“It would be difficult to predict the Arab reaction in Kirkuk should the return of the Kurdish forces be allowed there. The Arabs are very bitter about the past experience,” he warned.

The Turkmen forces in Kirkuk also appeared reluctant to accept the return of the Peshmerga.

Spokesman for the Turkmen Decision Party Mahdi Bozok told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Turkmen will accept the Kurdish forces’ return only if they are controlled by the federal authorities, meaning they should receive direct orders from the Iraqi government.

He called for reconciliation between all segments of Kirkuk society and that the Turkmen be included in negotiations over the fate of the province.

“There can be no stability in Kirkuk without the Turkmen,” he declared.

The management of the province must take place between all forces that are present there, he stressed.

The Peshmerge are part of the Iraqi defense system and the constitution stipulates that such a system is exclusively subject to the federal authorities, he went on to say.

On the other side of the divide, Kurdish parties voiced their rejection of the Arab and Turkmen stances on the Peshmerga, dismissing them as political statements aimed at achieving political gains at the expense of the province.

None of their claims have constitutional or legal bases, they added.

Leading member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Khaled Shwani accused the Arab and Turkmen powers of putting their interests above those of the residents of Kirkuk.

He cited the Iraqi constitution that stipulates that the security of regions that are disputed between Baghdad and Erbil be jointly controlled by federal and Peshmerga forces.

The constitution says that the federal forces must include all members of society, he stated.

The current forces deployed in Kirkuk only represent one segment of the local society, which is why the Peshmerga must take part in security duties there, he added.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.