Gilbert Lazard: French Linguist who Lived in Persian Poetry

Linguist Gilbert Lazard.
Linguist Gilbert Lazard.
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Gilbert Lazard: French Linguist who Lived in Persian Poetry

Linguist Gilbert Lazard.
Linguist Gilbert Lazard.

“Every man has three homes,” the linguist Gilbert Lazard liked to say. “One home is the city or village where you are born, and another is where fate has landed you in. The third and truest home, however, is poetry.”

With that definition, Lazard, who has just died aged 98, was a Parisian by birth and a Frenchman by nationality, while his third home was Persian poetry which he first encountered through a less than accurate translation of some of Omar Khayyam’s rubaiyat.

In the post-war years when Lazard was looking for “an exciting future” little did he expect to find it in what he called “the Persian past.” And that time European scholarship, in such fields as linguistics and literature, was divided into two camps: the Philhelens, who looked to ancient Greece, and the Persophiles, who favored ancient Iran. Khayyam helped Lazrad choose the pro-Persia camp, a sympathy that was soon to be strengthened with a number of personal friendships, among them that of Sadegh Hedayat, arguably the founder of modern Persian novel, who lived in Paris in exile. Other Iranian friends included the scholar Shahid Nura’i and Fereydon Hoveyda, later to become a prominent diplomat under the Shah.

By the 1950s, the Persophiles had become a major force in France’s academic circles. There was Roman Ghirshman, a Russian-born archaeologist who devoted his life to studying Iran’s pre-Islamic history through a number of on-site projects. There was the Syrian-born Emile (born Ezra) Benveniste, arguably the most important expert on the Indo-Iranian family of languages of his generation. There was also Charles-Henri de Fouchecour, who played a key role in shaping what became modern linguistics with focus on the Indo-European languages.

The French Persophiles were in stiff competition with their British counterparts organized in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. There was, however, an important difference between the two groups. The British saw Iran and all things Iranian as something that belonged to the distant past, a collection of majestic, but dead relics. The French on the other hand regarded Iranology as a dynamic discipline that connects the past to the present and even the future. It was with that conviction that Lazard wouldn’t limit himself to translating classical Persian poets, notably Rudaki and Khayyam. He also translated modern Persian literature, notably two of Hedayat’s novels the satirical “Haji Agha” and the surrealistic “Three drops of Blood.”

The Iranian branch of the Indo-European languages consists of 18 languages some of which, like Parthian and Tati, have all but disappeared. Others like Soghdian survive in remote mountains of Central Asia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Others like modern Persian, Kurdish in three slightly different versions, Pushtun, Baluchi, Ossetian and Taleshi have survived and, in some cases, prospered beyond what one might have expected a century ago.

Lazard was at home with almost all those languages, often via their poetry.

His chief concern, however, was to try and find out what the past could do about the present. It was in that spirit that he undertook an almost heroic task by studying the poetic meters of the Parthian, a language that ceased to exist almost 1,500 years ago. You can imagine he surprise that some of Iran’s poets expressed when Lazard showed that the Parthian meters had somehow influenced the prosody of both Arabic and post-Islamic Persian poetry.

As a Professor of Iranian Studies at the prestigious Parisian Sorbonne University, Lazard for almost two decades helped train two generations of Iranologists from all over the world. From the 1960s onwards his classes also attracted many students from Iran itself, as well as Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asian republics where Iranian languages had a home.

Not content with lectures and research papers, Lazard also spent years on compiling a French-Persian dictionary, which many linguists still regard as a major contribution. Another of Lazard’s daring ventures produced a grammar of the Persian language which some of Iran’s own master linguists, notably Abdol-Azim Qarib, praised as a work of high scholarship.

Never shying away from scholarly dispute, Lazrad launched a debate on the origins of what linguists call “modern Persian” that is to say the language that has been in use in Iran, Afghanistan, parts of Central Asia and the Caucasus since the 7th century AD. The oldest Persian poem, believed to be a piece written by Abul-Hofs Soghdi, is dated to almost 1,100 years ago. That makes “modern Persian” one of the only two Indo-European languages in which texts written 11 centuries ago are still accessible to present-day speakers (The other language is Icelandic). Because Soghdi hailed from Central Asia, or the Greater Khorassan, some scholars believe that “modern Persian”, known to linguists as Pahlavi or Farsi-Dari, originated in a region between the Caspian Sea and China. However, other scholars insist that “modern Persian” developed in the southern province of Parsa (Fars) which was the stronghold of the Sassanid Dynasty. Favoring the Khorasani theory, Lazrad spent years trying to establish that “modern Persian” had its origins not in southern Iran, but to the northeast of present-day Iran.

Thanks to mutual friends, notably Maxime Rodinson, an eminent Isalmologist, and Fereydon Hoveyda, I met Lazrad in Paris on a number of occasions in the 1970s and 1980s. One recurring theme in our informal discussions was the concept of “the Persianate”, originally launched by the German Iranologist Anne-Marie Schimmel to describe the vast region where Iranian, specially literature, music and architecture, had a presence dating back to more than two millennia.

“Germans always like to conceptualize things in geopolitical terms,” Lazard once commented. “For me, however, language and literature have no boundaries, especially Persian with the universal message of its poetry.”



How Far Will He Go? Trump’s Options for US Action Against Iran

An Iranian woman walks next to an anti-US mural in Tehran, Iran, 29 January 2026. (EPA)
An Iranian woman walks next to an anti-US mural in Tehran, Iran, 29 January 2026. (EPA)
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How Far Will He Go? Trump’s Options for US Action Against Iran

An Iranian woman walks next to an anti-US mural in Tehran, Iran, 29 January 2026. (EPA)
An Iranian woman walks next to an anti-US mural in Tehran, Iran, 29 January 2026. (EPA)

US President Donald Trump has threatened military action against Iran over its crackdown on protesters, while still for now appearing to leave the door open for negotiations over the country’s controversial nuclear program.

But should Trump, after weeks of American threats and counter-threats from Tehran, finally decide to order military action after already sending a US aircraft carrier to the region, he faces another dilemma over what form the intervention should take.

Such action could replicate American strikes during Israel's June war against the country, enforce economic strangulation by targeting the energy sector or amount to a bid to replace the theocratic system under supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

- Venezuela economic pressure scenario

Trump's relatively cautious stance so far has sparked speculation he could target Iranian energy infrastructure and squeeze its oil exports, mimicking a strategy Washington used over Venezuela.

This policy earlier this month led to the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, with Trump then working with the remnants of his former administration.

The US naval group in Middle East waters could look to block "dark fleet vessels" carrying Iranian oil and put pressure on Iran's oil exports, said Farzan Sabet, managing researcher of the Sanctions and Sustainable Peace Hub at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

"And that pressure can be gradual, similar to what we saw in Venezuela. It could play out over days, weeks, months, it's hard to foresee, but possibly longer," he said, while acknowledging that Trump was playing "his cards very close to his chest".

The naval group, repeatedly described as an "armada" by Trump, consists of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its more than 80 aircraft, as well as its escort of three destroyers, equipped with anti-missile capabilities and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

- Strikes on military and IRGC targets

If Trump decides on a course of military action, prime targets would be bases of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its youth militia, the Basij, which are accused by rights groups of taking a frontline role in the deadly crackdown on the protests that according to rights groups left thousands dead.

Using Tomahawk missiles and combat aircraft, the United States could strike positions of the Basij and the IRGC forces, "particularly those forces that participated and continue to participate in targeting Iranian protesters", said independent military researcher Eva J. Koulouriotis.

She said US intelligence, helped by Israel's Mossad spy agency, has "a clear picture" of those forces and their location nationwide.

"Such a strike would serve as a direct warning to the Iranian regime," she said.

During its June war against Tehran, Israel showed its deep intelligence penetration of Iran by killing senior security officials including the IRGC's chief and the armed forces chief of staff in targeted strikes based on location intelligence.

In a "harsh but measured strike", the United States could target "operations command and senior officers involved in mass killings carried out by the Iranian regime", she said.

- Massive strikes and regime change bid -

Iran's theocratic system has been in place since the 1979 revolution led by Khomeini that ousted the largely pro-Western shah.

Relations with the United States were cut in the wake of the hostage siege of the US embassy in Tehran that began that year and have remained severed ever since.

Under Khomeini, the revolution survived the war with Iraq in the 1980s. Since Khamenei took over in 1989, he has managed to keep the system in place despite economic sanctions and repeated protests.

As well as the so-called "armada", Washington already has a heavy deployment of military resources in the region with dozens of aircraft deployed at the air bases of Al Udeid in Qatar and Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates.

"The American objective is to destabilize the regime," said David Khalfa, co-founder of the Atlantic Middle East Forum (AMEF) think-tank.

"So there is really a strategy that will aim to paralyze it, to disrupt the chain of command" marked by the physical "elimination" of Khamenei, his close advisors and senior IRGC generals, he added.

But he said: "The regime is still relatively solid and resilient, it will not be an easy task", especially as "the Guards have anticipated this scenario".

Sabet said it would appear for now that Washington "would prefer something limited, where they can continue the process of weakening the system while minimizing the country's desire -- and to some extent its ability, but mostly its desire -- to carry out larger-scale retaliation".


Deal or Strike: Is Military Action Against Iran Drawing Closer?

Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)
Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)
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Deal or Strike: Is Military Action Against Iran Drawing Closer?

Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)
Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)

Despite reports of mediation and back-channel exchanges between Washington and Tehran, what is being described as “negotiations” so far looks more like a bid to keep tensions from boiling over than a diplomatic process.

Signals emerging from Western officials and media indicate the two sides have yet to engage in direct, substantive talks, with the dispute over the very terms of entry itself carrying a political message.

US President Donald Trump’s administration is pressing for an agreement that encompasses Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional influence. At the same time, Tehran insists that any dialogue be confined strictly to the nuclear file.

That gap has reinforced suspicions in Tehran that Trump’s offer of a deal is little more than a tactical feint, masking serious preparations for military action. This scenario would echo the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.

As Trump sharpens his rhetoric, the stalemate revives a central question: Is diplomacy becoming a pretext for war, or a narrowing window to avert it?

A different escalation

The key difference this time lies in the scale and nature of the military posture.

It is not a mere show of force, but a combined offensive-defensive package signaling readiness for multiple scenarios, following the arrival of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its strike group in the US Central Command area of operations, enabling support for strikes or protection of allies against retaliatory attacks.

This has been accompanied by strengthened air defenses, including Patriot and THAAD systems, as well as air drills focused on deployment, operations, and sortie generation under challenging conditions, according to US Central Command.

Such a pattern is typically associated with raising readiness for potential reciprocal responses.

At the same time, Washington is aware that any operation against Iran would not be a “precision operation” like what occurred in Venezuela, where the US previously amassed large forces in the Caribbean in a campaign that ended with the arrest of President Nicolas Maduro in early January 2026.

Iran’s geography is more complex, and its missile capabilities and layered defenses make a “decisive strike” more complicated, even if the US enjoys overwhelming superiority.

Trump’s options

Earlier leaks pointed to the end of this month as a possible date for a US strike, though this remains unconfirmed publicly.

The danger in circulating such reports lies in the political-military dynamic they create. When a force of this size is mobilized, internal and external pressure on the White House grows to justify the cost by achieving some result, even if limited.

At the same time, the leaks may be part of psychological warfare aimed at forcing Tehran to make concessions before the window for de-escalation “closes.”

Accordingly, the practical rule is that absent a clear political decision, the scenario remains open to three graduated possibilities: a limited strike to impose new rules of engagement; a broader campaign targeting nuclear and missile infrastructure and security nodes; or continued military pressure as a negotiating lever without opening fire.

According to the Financial Times, Trump’s options, should he decide to carry out military action, range from a limited punitive strike targeting missile sites, drones, or facilities linked to the Revolutionary Guard, aimed at raising the cost of Iranian refusal without seeking regime change.

Another option would expand the target bank to include nuclear facilities that are being hardened and rebuilt, particularly after Western talk of Iranian attempts to resume work at deeper underground sites.

There is also a set of non-traditional pressure options, such as tightening a maritime blockade or striking state infrastructure as a political message.

These options carry higher risks, as they raise the likelihood of retaliation outside established rules of engagement.

The decisive issue, however, is the “endgame.”

The US administration itself implicitly acknowledges that removing the regime's head does not guarantee its collapse, and that the question of “who comes next” has no ready answer.

This explains repeated warnings in assessments leaked to the media and in statements by US officials that the regime is weaker than ever, but that a decisive blow is not guaranteed.

How might Iran respond?

Tehran has warned in advance that any attack would mark the start of a war, and that retaliation could extend to Israel, particularly Tel Aviv, as well as anyone who supports the aggressor.

Operationally, Iran has a ladder of response, starting with strikes on US bases in the region using missiles or drones, moving through the activation of regional proxies, and culminating in threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the scenario with the most severe global impact.

The latter possibility may be among the main reasons regional states have sought to avoid war and continue diplomatic efforts while stressing neutrality.

This stance could increase US logistical demands in any large-scale operation and heighten reliance on distant naval platforms.

Markets, however, have already issued an early warning. Oil prices have risen for three consecutive sessions amid fears of supply disruptions, with Brent crude nearing the $ 70-a-barrel threshold and a rise in the geopolitical risk premium, while gold has climbed as a safe-haven asset.

If a strike does occur, the potential fallout would be threefold. Economically, a spike in oil prices, pressure on shipping and insurance, and volatility in Gulf markets. Security-wise, an expansion of theaters of engagement to include Iraq, Syria, the Gulf, and Israel, with heightened risks of miscalculation.

Politically, a narrowing of prospects for any near-term negotiations, or conversely, a limited strike used to force talks under harsher terms.


Unmentioned but Present, Trump is a Common Denominator in Efforts to Strengthen Asia-Europe Ties

US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon
US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon
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Unmentioned but Present, Trump is a Common Denominator in Efforts to Strengthen Asia-Europe Ties

US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon
US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon

Stability. Consistency. Ever-changing complexity.

With language like that, deployed in separate meetings in three Asian capitals this week, government leaders forged closer ties driven in part by a figure halfway around the world: the president of the United States. And much of the time, they didn't even mention Donald Trump's name.

IN BEIJING: The UK and Chinese leaders called Thursday for a “long-term, stable, and comprehensive strategic partnership” between their two countries. The important words are long-term and stable. The two countries committed a decade ago to building a comprehensive strategic partnership but progress has been halting at best.

IN HANOI: About 1,100 kilometers (700 miles) to the south, Vietnam and the European Union used the same phrasing on the same day. They upgraded ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The agreement places Vietnam on the same diplomatic footing with the EU as the United States, China and Russia.

IN NEW DELHI: Two days earlier, the EU and India reached a major free trade accord that had been mired in negotiations for years. It covers everything from textiles to medicines and will bring down India's high tariffs on European wine and cars.

Trump was not the only factor behind the agreements, but his shaking up of the global order is worrying friends and foes and driving them closer. From a purely economic perspective, his import tariffs have sent countries seeking new markets to reduce their dependency on the American consumer.

More broadly, all the agreements have been accompanied by words from the leaders referring to the uncertainty that Trump has introduced to global affairs, though mostly without mentioning his name. The systems they have relied on to manage the world since the end of the Cold War and, in some cases since World War II, appear at risk.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer called for working with China on global stability “during challenging times for the world." Chinese leader Xi Jinping described the international situation as “complex and ever-changing.” In New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the partnership with the EU “will strengthen stability in the international system” at a time of ”turmoil in the global order.”

European Council President António Costa summed up the sentiment Thursday in the Vietnamese capital: “At a moment when the international rules-based order is under threat from multiple sides, we need to stand side by side as reliable and predictable partners.”