Exclusive - Russia, Turkey, US Allies Divide the Spoils of the Syria War

A Nusra Front fighter stands in an olive tree field in the southern countryside of Idlib. (Reuters)
A Nusra Front fighter stands in an olive tree field in the southern countryside of Idlib. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Russia, Turkey, US Allies Divide the Spoils of the Syria War

A Nusra Front fighter stands in an olive tree field in the southern countryside of Idlib. (Reuters)
A Nusra Front fighter stands in an olive tree field in the southern countryside of Idlib. (Reuters)

The prolongation of the war in Syria has left the country’s economy in tatters as local and foreign powers vie for control of its resources.

From the early days of the war, Syria’s oil and gas fields, the majority of which lie in the northeast, eastern and central parts of the country, were a primary target for opposition groups. The extremist ISIS and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham groups later set their sights on them, as did Kurdish groups.

After eight years of war, an economic survey of Syria showed that the regime, which used to control the country and its resources with an iron grip, has lost the majority of oil and gas fields. Syria’s phosphate mines, agricultural wealth and olive oil production have also fallen prey to local and foreign powers.

Oil
International reports estimate that Syria enjoys a reserve of 2 billion barrels of oil. Media reports said that the regime stopped producing light crude oil in 2012 and heavy oil in 2013.

Before the war, Syria produced some 385,000 barrels per day. The regime’s Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Ali Ghanem said that currently it can produce 20,000 bpd. The International Energy Agency had previously reported that pre-war Syria consumed some 240,000 to 250,000 barrels of oil per day.

As the regime continued to recapture territories, it restored control over small oil and gas fields in central Syria. These include the Shaar, al-Hayl, Arak, Hayan and al-Mahr regions in Palmyra. The US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to control the oil and gas fields in eastern and northeastern Syria.

An SDF field source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the areas the Kurds control in northern and northeastern Syria comprise nearly 30 percent of the country’s territory. The forces have captured some 1,000 wells, some of which are in good condition and can produce oil with ease. Production at others has come to a halt due to a lack of means.

The autonomous Kurdish authority is overseeing production in these areas, said the source.

It did not disclose the size of production, but refining processes, it revealed, are meeting the local market needs, as well as the needs of neighboring Syrian areas. It did not specify whether the oil was being sent to liberated or regime-held regions.

Economists had in the past speculated that the regime was buying oil from the Kurds because they were selling it at a much lower price than the international market.

In addition, the source said that diesel fuel was being sold in Kurdish regions at 35, 50 and 60 pounds per liter. The regime was charging 180 pounds per liter in areas under its control. Before the eruption of the war, the cost stood at 7 pounds.

Gas
One of the largest gas fields, the Conoco field, lies in the eastern Deir Ezzour region under SDF control. It can produce some 10 million cubic meters of natural gas per day.

Two years ago, the regime’s Petroleum and Energy Resources Ministry said that before the war, Syria produced 21 million cubic meters of gas per day, but as of 2017 it could only muster 8.7 million cubic meters. Ghanem recently declared that the production has now risen to 16.5 million cubic meters per day.

His claims are, however, refuted by the frequent complaints in regime-held regions of the shortage of domestic gas. Long queues of people lining up to receive their daily gas canister are a regular sight in the capital, as well as the west coast and northern Aleppo region.

Local media estimated that prior to the war, Syrians consumed 3,000 to 3,500 tons of gas per day, bringing the total to 900,000 tons per year. Syria imported some 500,000 tons of this gas.

Before the war, a 9-kilogram gas canister cost 250 pounds. Now it stands at 2,700 pounds. During times of heightened crisis, the figure jumped to 7,500 pounds.

Phosphates
Syria was a major exporter of phosphates, ranking fifth globally before the eruption of the war. It boasted a reserve of 2 billion tons.

Phosphates is seen as a prized goal by regime allies Russia and Iran to compensate for the prices they paid for their involvement in the war. They have both competed for control over the reserves.

The Palmyra region enjoys the greatest reserves and it has fallen under the control of various powers and factions that have been vying to seize this wealth. It fell under the hands of ISIS, then the regime and its foreign militia allies that are overseen by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. They seized control of the phosphate mines in 2015, but by 2017 the regime finally wrested control of the area and Russia appears to have emerged on top of all other competing powers.

An agreement had been reached by the regime and Iran for Tehran to invest in the mines, but Damascus stalled in meeting its pledges and it signed a deal with Moscow in 2017, which drove Iran out of the picture. No sooner had the deal been signed, that Russia began exclusively investing in the phosphate wealth, informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat

Olive oil
Prior to the war, Syria ranked first among Arab countries and third globally in olive and olive oil production, said the International Monetary Fund. Syria was estimated to boast some 100 million olive trees that could produce 1.2 million tons of olives. As the war dragged on, the production collapsed, with official figures saying that it dropped 300 percent.

Syria’s olive wealth is centered mainly in the northwestern Idlib province, which is controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and pro-Turkey armed extremist factions. Olive production is also high in Aleppo, which is divided between SDF and pro-Turkey groups.

As the pound collapsed to the dollar with the eruption of the war, the cost of oil olive gradually rose from 190 to nearly 2,500 pounds.



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.