Yemen: Triple Terrorist Threat under Iranian Cover

People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)
People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)
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Yemen: Triple Terrorist Threat under Iranian Cover

People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)
People stand next to wreckage at the site of a car bomb attack in Yemen's capital Sanaa June 29, 2015. (Reuters)

The developments in Yemen in recent days have revealed that the terrorist Iran-backed Houthi militias are providing cover for the al-Qaeda and ISIS groups in the war-torn country through Tehran’s direct backing.

The Yemeni Interior Ministry had revealed the arrest of a Houthi terrorist cell that was operating under ISIS and Qaeda guise to destabilize Yemen and target state leaderships. The Yemen military also announced the launch of a wide-scale security operation to crackdown on ISIS and remaining members of al-Qaeda who are present in the western countryside of the southern Taiz province.

This raises the question on whether the Houthis have paved the ground for the spread of terrorism throughout Yemen.

Experience has shown that terrorism and its various affiliates thrive in unstable conditions. This is why, since the Houthi coup of 2014, terrorist organizations in Yemen have sought to take advantage of the poor security on the ground in order to impose their influence in the country.

Experts have, however, pointed to the deep ideological and organizational differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS that have sometimes led to clashes between them. Moreover, Iran also adopts different ideologies than these two groups, so what could possibly bring all three of them together?

Observers of the situation in Yemen would explain that the Houthis are keen on working with ISIS and al-Qaeda in order to ultimately further Iran’s interests in the country.

In an article in the Washington Post last year, Oxford University researcher Elisabeth Kendall details how al-Qaeda was able to bolster its presence in Yemen, saying it “increased its numbers and war chest by staging a massive jailbreak, seizing military hardware and robbing the central bank.”

“The key to al-Qaeda’s success was not direct recruitment. Even at its peak, its core fighters numbered no more than 4,000. Rather, it worked to secure buy-in from key city and tribal leaders and to win passive toleration from local populations,” she explained.

“Unlike the ISIS, al-Qaeda decided on a gradualist approach to governance and struck a local power-sharing deal,” she went on to say.

Yemen is very valuable for al-Qaeda, especially after its greatest competitor, ISIS, suffered severe blows there.

Al-Qaeda realizes that Yemen lies in a strategic location where it could pose a threat to regional and international security. The group could also expand north into other parts of Yemen and even into neighboring Saudi Arabia.

ISIS, meanwhile, did not enjoy a prominent presence in Yemen before the Houthi coup. As the organization suffered blows in Iraq and Syria, many of its fleeing members sought refuge in Yemen, especially in advanced positions that were held by the Houthis. Moreover, defections within al-Qaeda also fell in ISIS’ favor. The group had gained enough ground in 2015 and 2016 to even declare the establishment of alleged “states” in Yemen.

Ultimately, however, ISIS could never compete with al-Qaeda, which wields greater influence in Yemen. Furthermore, a merger between the two groups was never an option. One senior Qaeda member had once said that ISIS’ ideology seemed too “alien” to the group.

On the ground, ISIS failed in winning over the people. It was unable to come up with a specific cultural vision that appeals to the Yemeni people. It also did not take part in development projects in the country and came under criticism from former ISIS members, who had defected from the group to al-Qaeda.

In contrast, al-Qaeda appears more ideologically cohesive than ISIS, which, in turn, posed a greater threat to Yemen through its operations. A sign of this bloody agenda was ISIS’ claiming of 2015 bombings of two Sanaa mosques that left 142 people dead. Al-Qaeda had, at the time, distanced itself from the attacks, saying that ISIS found it easy to shed blood.

Tensions between the rival groups escalated into clashes on the ground, notably in the southern provinces in what was seen as al-Qaeda feeling threatened by ISIS’ infiltration into the area. The group sought to confront its rival and bar it from seeping into a region where it has for years sought to entrench itself.

Again, what could possibly bring together such seemingly different groups under the same umbrella?

The Houthis and al-Qaeda may have ideological differences, but a close reading of United Nations Security Council reports on Yemen since 2014 reveal the ties between slain former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and al-Qaeda. They also implicate the Houthis in planting explosives in Yemeni cities and blaming the attacks on ISIS. This underscores the complicity between the Houthis and al-Qaeda, revealing that they are ultimately two sides of the same coin and that they are both products of Iran. It also demonstrates the double role played by Iran, in that it has forged ties with each of al-Qaeda and the Houthis.

What about ISIS? Is there evidence of Iran’s backing of the group in Yemen?

On the surface, Tehran had launched a religious edict to combat ISIS, but in reality, it has benefited the most from the group’s emergence in the region. Iran, which has not ceased its verbal condemnation of the group, has never fought it on the ground. In turn, ISIS, which openly claims enmity to Shiites, avoids attacking Iranian interests, confirming that the two sides have common goals.

Iranian-American researcher at Harvard University, Dr. Majid Rafizadeh revealed that Tehran had used ISIS to bolster its regional power. He explained that it had used the emergence of the group in Syria and Iraq to justify the presence of its militias in these countries. Iran will not actually act on its claims that it wants to eliminate ISIS because it is in its interest for the terrorist group to remain. Some observers have even described ISIS as Iran’s Trojan Horse.

Returning to Yemen, does the evil of alliance of the Houthis, Iran and ISIS appear to be gaining ground against the international coalition? The Arab coalition has scored major victories against the terrorist militias. It has also managed to capture 85 percent of regions that were on the verge of falling in Houthi clutches.



Syria’s Al-Qusayr Celebrates Eid al-Fitr without Hezbollah for First Time in Years

People perform Eid Al-Fitr prayers in Al-Qusayr. (Sami Volunteer Team)
People perform Eid Al-Fitr prayers in Al-Qusayr. (Sami Volunteer Team)
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Syria’s Al-Qusayr Celebrates Eid al-Fitr without Hezbollah for First Time in Years

People perform Eid Al-Fitr prayers in Al-Qusayr. (Sami Volunteer Team)
People perform Eid Al-Fitr prayers in Al-Qusayr. (Sami Volunteer Team)

Amid the devastation, thousands of residents of Syria’s Al-Qusayr performed Eid Al-Fitr prayers in the northern district square—the site where the city’s first protest against President Bashar al-Assad’s rule erupted in 2011.

For the first time in Al-Qusayr’s history, Eid prayers were held in a public square. It was also the first mass gathering of residents in an open space in 13 years, following a war that destroyed 70% of the city, displaced its people, and led to its capture by Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces.

Al-Qusayr, a region located near the Lebanese border, was once Hezbollah’s most significant stronghold in Syria. The group withdrew after the fall of the Syrian regime in December, but its loyalists and affiliated locals remained, along with residents of several border villages that have seen sporadic clashes in recent months.

The most intense fighting occurred in February, when Syrian forces launched a military operation that pushed them into Lebanese territory and deployed troops to seal off illegal border crossings.

Tensions flared again two weeks ago after Syrian soldiers were killed in the border region, triggering an exchange of artillery fire between the two sides.

The clashes left casualties on both ends and forced the displacement of border village residents before a ceasefire was reached with the Lebanese army.

The agreement included the closure of four illegal crossings in an effort to curb the smuggling of weapons and drugs, a trade that has flourished over the past decade under the former regime.

As soon as the regime fell, refugees from Al-Qusayr living in Lebanese camps began returning to their hometown. Hundreds arrived to find their homes completely destroyed, forcing them to set up tents beside the ruins while they rebuilt or searched for alternative housing.

The residents of Al-Qusayr resumed their communal Eid traditions after Ramadan. (Sami Volunteer Team)

The large turnout for Eid prayers underscored the scale of the return.

Journalist Ahmed al-Qasir, who recently came back, estimated that about 65% of those displaced have now returned. Before the uprising, Al-Qusayr had a population of around 150,000, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Shahin, 30, who returned in 2018, described the city as a wasteland at the time, despite some 20,000 people having already come back.

“Hezbollah, regime militias, and smugglers controlled the area. There were no real markets, just small shops. Everything was in ruins—schools, clinics, hospitals,” he said.

Residents had to travel 30 kilometers to Homs for basic necessities, enduring regime checkpoints that extorted money along the way.

With the fall of Assad’s regime and Hezbollah’s withdrawal, life in Al-Qusayr has slowly begun to return to normal. Since the start of Ramadan, markets have reopened despite widespread destruction, poverty, and hardship.

On the eve of Eid, the city’s streets buzzed with late-night shopping, Shahin noted.

“Al-Qusayr is finally regaining its role as the region’s commercial hub,” he said.

According to a survey by the Sami Volunteer Team, more than 30,000 refugees returned to Al-Qusayr and its countryside within the first month of the regime’s collapse.

That number is believed to have doubled over the past four months, and team organizers expect it to rise further once the school year ends.

Zaid Harba, a member of the 40-person volunteer group, said most returnees came from refugee camps in Lebanon, while fewer arrived from displacement camps in northern Syria.

Many families there are waiting for the academic year to conclude before arranging their return.