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Exclusive - Turkey, Qatar and the Return of ISIS to Libya

Militias allied to Libya's GNA fight rival groups in Tripoli in September 2018. (Reuters)
Militias allied to Libya's GNA fight rival groups in Tripoli in September 2018. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Turkey, Qatar and the Return of ISIS to Libya

Militias allied to Libya's GNA fight rival groups in Tripoli in September 2018. (Reuters)
Militias allied to Libya's GNA fight rival groups in Tripoli in September 2018. (Reuters)

Are Turkey and Qatar openly backing terrorists in Libya? And if so, why has the international community remained silent over the issue? Why hasn’t it taken serious action to address the situation and resolve the Libyan crisis once and for all?

As it stands, the Libyan National Army (LNA) is trying to rid the country of terrorism and terrorists. Simultaneously, intense efforts are underway to bring in ISIS members, who have fled Syria and Iraq, into Libyan regions that are controlled by militias. International intelligence agencies have the evidence to prove this.

Turkish meddling

It is no secret that Turkey and Qatar are behind the developments in Libya. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who failed in spreading his Islamist agenda during the so-called Arab Spring, is now attempting to make up for his losses by meddling in Libya. It represents his last hope to revive his illusions. He believes that if extremists succeed in Libya, then their influence may spread to neighboring Tunisia in the west and Egypt in the east. Egypt, he believes, spoiled his plans in recent years when the people revolted in June 2013.

Developments in Libya have exposed Ankara’s supplying of weapons to militias in flagrant violation of the arms embargo imposed on the country since 2011. Intelligence agencies received information in the past two weeks of the arrival of several Ukrainian aircraft to Tripoli from Ankara loaded with weapons for the pro-Government of National Accord (GNA) militias.

The GNA, which has lost its aerial firepower, is in much need of aerial support. It is working tirelessly to bring in drones from Turkey in an attempt to cause as much damage as possible against the LNA. Ankara has so far supplied the GNA with eight attack drones, in violation of the arms embargo.

In addition to weapons, Turkey has sent intelligence agents to support the Tripoli-based militias and terrorist groups, revealed a Libyan military source. The LNA has obtained the names of 19 Turkish officers, whom Ankara has dispatched to Libya to operate the drones.

As for Qatar, militias it supports planted French-made Javelin rockets in LNA weapons storehouses to make it appear as if it was violating the embargo. Doha has also helped the militias purchase advanced weapons from Bulgaria and later smuggled them to Libya.

ISIS return

Are Turkey and Qatar facilitating the return of ISIS to Libya? It is no secret that extremists residing in Qatar, who are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, are active these days in bringing in terrorists from Iraq and Syria to Libya. While Doha exploits its transportation companies to that end, Erdogan has opened up his airports for these terrorists.

Libyan MP Ali al-Saeedi confirmed Turkey’s involvement in transporting terrorists to his country. He stressed that the extremists seek to fight the LNA during its operation against Tripoli.

Moreover, the ISIS affiliate in Libya recently reemerged in the country. The group released a video of Mahmoud al-Baraasi, known as Abu Musab al-Libi, the founder of the ISIS affiliate in Benghazi, vowing to wage attacks against the LNA. The video, which showed dozens of militants pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was likely shot in the southern region of Sabha.

In May, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack on an oilfield in the town of Zillah, some 650 kilometers southeast of the capital Tripoli. The attack was seen as an escalation against LNA-held regions in the South.

Returning to Erdogan, what does he really want from Libya?

He is seeking to make up for his political losses in Turkey and his country’s deteriorating economy. He is set to face even greater challenges should Washington impose sanctions on Ankara over its purchase of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.

Erdogan is ultimately eyeing Libya’s oil and gas reserves to make up for his losses back home.

During the rule of late leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Turkish companies operated in Libya and made billions of dollars in profits. This changed with Gaddafi’s ouster. Ankara managed to establish close ties with the GNA, allowing its companies to again regain a foothold and reap interests. This again came to halt, this time when the LNA launched its operation against Tripoli in April. The army therefore, became a major threat to Turkey’s economic and financial ambitions, pushing it firmly to side with Fayez al-Sarraj’s GNA against the advancing forces.

Any end in sight?

It is obvious that the situation in Libya is complicated, compounded even further by ISIS’ threat. The crisis is now an issue of global security and Europe must step up this time and compensate for the losses that led Libya down its destructive path in the first place. The international community must also take a stand and take decisive positions against Turkey and Qatar’s ambitions.

As for the United States, its stance remains vague, but the administration of Donald Trump is definitely opposed to terrorism. As it stands, however, it is currently distracted by the crisis with Iran.

At any rate, a resolution to the Libyan crisis is unlikely in the near future, which is the best environment for radicals and terrorists to thrive. Will the world therefore, sit idly by as ISIS aspires to open a new bloody chapter, this time on the shores of the Mediterranean?

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What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian Nuclear-linked Site Threatened by Trump?

A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
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What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian Nuclear-linked Site Threatened by Trump?

A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

US President Donald Trump has threatened to attack a site linked to Iran's nuclear program known as Pickaxe Mountain, a fortified facility buried deep underground near one of Tehran's main nuclear sites.

"We're going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to be ready," Trump said in a July 13 interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show.

The threat reflects escalating tensions as Tehran and Washington trade fire in the Gulf, setting back efforts to end the conflict.

Here's what we know about Pickaxe Mountain:

WHERE IS IT?

Pickaxe Mountain is located 220 km (140 miles) south of Tehran and 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Natanz nuclear complex.

The Natanz site, where two of Iran's uranium enrichment plants were located, was bombed during the war started by the United States and Israel on February 28, and during last year's 12-day war.

The tunnel facility under construction at Pickaxe Mountain wasn't targeted in either of those wars, according to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a US-based think-tank focused on nuclear non-proliferation.

The peak rises to some 1,600 meters above sea level. There were two enrichment plants in operation at Natanz - one above and one below ground.

The UN nuclear watchdog has said the above-ground one was destroyed. The other, underground one was likely at least badly damaged.

WHAT'S THE HISTORY OF THE SITE?

The site is ⁠linked to Iran's ⁠nuclear program, which has long caused tension between the West and Iran, which denies seeking an atomic bomb.

Construction of the facility at Pickaxe Mountain began in 2020, according to ISIS, following what Iranian authorities reported at the time as an explosion caused by an act of sabotage at the Natanz facility.

Iran said at the time the Natanz sabotage had caused significant damage that could slow the development of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.

In September that year, Iran's then-nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, said Iran had started building "a more modern, larger and more comprehensive hall in all dimensions in the heart of the mountain near Natanz" for making advanced centrifuges.

Rafael Grossi, the chief of the UN nuclear watchdog, in an ⁠interview with PBS Frontline in March, noted that Iran had previously announced its intention to have nuclear activity at Pickaxe Mountain.

"This was part of their quite systematic intention to put their most sensitive facilities underground," Reuters quoted him as saying.

FILE PHOTO: A satellite view shows tunnel entrances at Pickaxe Mountain, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 30, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

WHAT HAS IRAN BUILT THERE?

ISIS, which has analyzed satellite imagery of the site, says it features two pairs of entrances, which are assumed to lead to one facility estimated to be at least 100 meters under the mountain.

The physical defensive measures consist primarily of a large security perimeter and the extensive hardening of tunnel entrances, ISIS said in a July 14 report.

The pair of eastern tunnel portal entrances have been partially backfilled since the wars to obstruct ground vehicle access but they have not been sealed fully, the ISIS report said.

Sam Lair, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who also reviewed recent satellite imagery of the site, told Reuters that increasing the strength of the tunnel entrances would complicate "targeting with penetrating munitions like bunker busters.”

IS THE SITE FUNCTIONING AND WHAT COULD IT BE USED FOR?

Trump, in his July 13 ⁠remarks, said Washington was watching Pickaxe ⁠Mountain closely.

"We see no activity there. They're not doing well with their nuclear situation. Every time we hear about it, we blow it up. So they don't like talking about it. But we'll probably give Pickaxe a shot relatively soon," he said.

ISIS, in its report, said its assessment "is that the facility is not yet operational, but construction continues,” and that it was unclear when it could be operational, based on satellite imagery alone.

"It is also unclear if Iran still plans on installing a large-scale assembly facility, given the destruction of Iran’s centrifuge program, including Iran’s ability to make centrifuge components needed for an assembly plant.

"Nonetheless, if Iran starts to rebuild its centrifuge manufacturing capability, it could plan to install a smaller centrifuge assembly facility in Pickaxe Mountain able to serve a nuclear weapons program," ISIS said.

HOW MIGHT THE SITE BE ATTACKED?

Experts assess the deeply buried complex is beyond the reach of the most powerful bunker buster bombs in the US arsenal.

ISIS said the site "would be more suitable for ground forces to attack or sabotage.”

"However, vulnerabilities may also exist that can be exploited by deep earth penetrating weapons via aerial attacks," it said.

Lair said: “We can infer that there are ongoing activities at Pickaxe Mountain the Iranians wish to continue but are still concerned enough about a potential attack that they are taking steps to bolster their defenses.”

Features

Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
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Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)

Andy Burnham got to the top through a mix of patience and risk-taking.

A decade ago, Burnham abandoned a 20-year climb up the Labour Party ladder in London to head north and run for mayor of Greater Manchester. A month ago, he returned to Parliament by winning a risky special election. On Monday, he will become Britain’s 59th prime minister.

The sudden downfall of Prime Minister Keir Starmer after just two years in office has swept the 56-year-old Burnham into office — unelected and largely untested. He will enter No. 10 Downing St. carrying the heavy weight of expectation, and big questions about how he will shoulder it.

“A whole range of people across the Labour movement and in the country have projected onto Andy Burnham their hopes and their fantasies about how the country should be run and what Labour should stand for and what Andy Burnham stands for,” said Joshi Herrmann, founder of Manchester news site The Mill, who has covered Burnham for years.

“He has got lots of people’s hopes up.”

Burnham has made his name in Manchester, but he was born in Liverpool, and grew up in a commuter village between the rival northwest English cities.

His father worked as a British Telecom engineer and his mother as a receptionist, and he was raised in a close-knit Catholic family.

Burnham and his brothers were the first generation of their family to go to university. And not just any university — Burnham attended Cambridge, one of the country’s oldest and most prestigious institutions.

“He needed a lot of persuading to apply because he felt that as a working-class boy, going off to Cambridge wasn’t for him,” Stephen Harrington, Burnham’s former English teacher at St. Aelred’s Catholic High School, told the BBC. “He didn’t believe in himself. But he did it, and the rest is history.”

Burnham has said he felt out of place at Cambridge, where many of his classmates had gone to posh private schools in the more affluent south of England. But he got a degree in English and met his future wife, Dutch fellow student Marie-France Van Heel, now a marketing executive. The couple married in 2000 and have a son and two daughters.

After graduating, Burnham worked as a journalist at trade magazines before becoming a researcher and adviser to Labour politicians.

Elected to Parliament for the Manchester-area district of Leigh in 2001, he rose through the government ranks under Labour Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. He served in Brown’s Cabinet between 2007 and 2010 as chief secretary to the Treasury, culture secretary and health secretary.

A formative experience came in 2009, when he was heckled at a commemoration of the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster, when 97 Liverpool football fans were crushed to death. Bereaved families had fought for years to overturn a false narrative offered by police that unruly fans had been to blame.

Burnham became a champion for the families and helped push for a new inquest, an apology and a law that imposes a duty of candor on public officials to tell the truth about tragedies whatever the impact on their reputation.

After Labour lost power in 2010, Burnham ran for leadership of the party that year and in 2015, losing both times. He quit Parliament in 2017, a low ebb for Labour nationally, to run for mayor of Greater Manchester.

Being mayor played to his strengths: an ability to bring people together, a sharp eye for opportunities and a wide streak of pragmatism. His approach became known as “Manchesterism,” a brand of business-friendly socialism that aims to harness private and public money to invest in areas like transport, housing and infrastructure.

Manchester was a former manufacturing powerhouse — known as the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution — that had been hollowed out as British industry crumbled. During his tenure the city boomed, with skyscrapers blooming on vacant post-industrial sites. Burnham won praise for taking a piecemeal public transport system under public control and improving it.

He shed suit and tie for jeans and dark T-shirts, spoke about his love for Oasis, The Smiths and New Order and spent spare time playing football or spinning 1990s tunes during DJ battles.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, he harangued Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson over what he called a “London-centric” approach to the crisis that was punishing northern cities. That’s when he gained the nickname King of the North, a “Game of Thrones”-inspired nod both to his championing of his home region and his political ambition.

He has said he saw his work in central government as “unfinished business,” and got his chance when Starmer was pushed to resign by Labour colleagues alarmed at the party’s unpopularity.

But Burnham still needed a seat in Parliament. A Labour lawmaker agreed to resign, triggering a special election for the Manchester-area district of Makerfield. Burnham trounced the candidate from anti-immigration party Reform UK, cementing his credentials as a winner.

In the subsequent contest to replace Starmer as Labour leader, he was the only candidate.

He’s promising to restore hope Now he says he will deliver “a new politics based on unity and hope” and “an economy that works for everybody,” no matter where they live. A key plank is giving regional leaders more powers, and he plans to move part of the prime minister’s office to a “No. 10 North” in Manchester.

Herrmann said Burnham has clear strengths, especially an ability to tell a persuasive story and a sense of empathy that many politicians lack.

He added that the incoming prime minister has “a set of principles about trying to make the country fairer, trying to bring people out of poverty, that he really does believe in.”

Critics claim Burnham’s politics are vague on key points, such as where the money will come from to pay for his pledges. He will face many of the same political and economic challenges that stymied Starmer, including a sluggish economy, overstretched public services and a cost-of-living squeeze. He has little experience of foreign policy issues, from the Ukraine war to dealing with US President Donald Trump.

And running a country of 70 million is a lot different from overseeing a region of 3 million.

But Sacha Lord, a Manchester music entrepreneur who served as Burnham’s nighttime economy adviser, said the politician has a steely side that will help him rise to the occasion.

“He’s not scared of locking horns with people,” Lord said. “Everybody thinks Andy’s this nice, cheeky-chappy guy. But trust me, when he wants something ... he tends to get it.”

Features

How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
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How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)

Yemen’s leadership viewed an Iranian aircraft’s attempt to land at Sanaa airport last Monday as more than an aviation incident that could be overlooked to avoid further escalation.

It saw the attempted landing as a direct challenge to state sovereignty and an effort to impose a new political and military reality outside the country’s legitimate institutions at a time of unprecedented regional tension.

Unlike in previous crises, the government responded through a coordinated mix of calculated military action, organized political measures, and legal and diplomatic efforts. It also sought to avoid a wider confrontation that it believed Tehran wanted in order to turn Yemen once again into an arena for regional conflict.

From the first hours of the crisis, Yemen’s leadership emphasized a central message: defending sovereignty does not conflict with pursuing peace, and the state can enforce the law without abandoning its responsibility to protect civilians or preserve the prospects of a political settlement.

The targeting of Sanaa airport’s runway to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing was therefore the final step in a long series of political and legal measures that preceded the use of force.

The government said it had exhausted all official channels to operate the airport and had offered alternatives to ensure the continuation of civilian flights via Yemenia Airways, the national carrier legally authorized to operate them.

What distinguished the government’s handling of the crisis was that it did not merely respond to the incident but also sought to shape the political narrative surrounding it.

From the outset, official statements stressed that the dispute was not over the operation of Sanaa airport or citizens’ ability to travel. It concerned an attempt to seize one of the state’s most important sovereign powers: control over its airspace and international ports of entry.

The Yemeni leadership repeatedly said the problem was not the aircraft itself, but the operation of international flights without the approval of the legitimate authorities, in violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and UN Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

The government also said it had proposed practical solutions before the escalation, including transporting the Houthi delegation from Tehran aboard an aircraft chartered by Yemenia Airways.

It said the group rejected the offer, strengthening the government’s argument before the international community that it had resorted to force only after exhausting other options.

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi said the priority was to protect civilian lives and public property and avoid widening the confrontation in a way that would serve Iran’s goal of drawing Yemen into regional conflicts.

The message was intended to reassure the public and show that the military decision remained subject to careful political calculations rather than emotional reactions.

The government’s continuous meetings and the formation of a national crisis-management team also reflected a shift toward a unified approach combining military, political, diplomatic and media efforts.

This gave the official response greater coherence than in previous crises.

Domestic, International Support

Observers say the Yemeni government also succeeded in turning the crisis from a confrontation between itself and the Houthis into an issue concerning respect for the sovereignty of a UN member state.

Domestically, the House of Representatives, the Shura Council, the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission and the National Bloc of Political Parties and Components quickly declared their full support for the measures taken by the PLC.

They described the incident as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty rather than merely a political dispute.

The significance of this alignment was that it came from official institutions and political parties affiliated with the legitimate authorities, giving the leadership political cover against attempts to portray it as lacking internal consensus in its handling of the crisis.

Internationally, Yemen’s diplomatic efforts appeared to have preceded the UN Security Council meeting, after the government succeeded in persuading several major powers to adopt positions close to its account of the incident.

The United States described the Iranian landing as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty and linked it to the possible transfer of military experts and equipment to the Houthis, saying this would breach Security Council resolutions.

Britain said any flights conducted without the approval of the legitimate government constituted a violation of international law and called for an investigation through UN mechanisms.

France went further, linking the incident to what it described as Iran’s destabilizing conduct in the region.

It renewed its call for an end to the transfer of military equipment to the Houthis while reaffirming its support for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty.

Although the United Nations maintained its traditional call for de-escalation, it also stressed the need to respect Yemen’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, giving the government additional political support in defending its position.

Multiple Messages

The legitimate Yemeni authorities’ handling of the Iranian aircraft crisis can be seen as an attempt to deliver three parallel messages.

The first was directed at Iran: Yemen was no longer an open arena where new realities could be imposed through air traffic or sovereign ports of entry, and any attempt to bypass state institutions would face practical measures, even as the government remained committed to peace.

The second message was aimed at the Houthis: using civilian suffering or Sanaa airport as political leverage would not lead to recognition of authorities operating in parallel to the state.

The government would not allow sovereign powers to be established outside its institutions.

The third message had an international dimension.

The government called on the Security Council to move from condemnation to deterrence by strictly enforcing sanctions and council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2140 and 2216.

It said continued tolerance of violations would encourage their repetition.

Despite the political and diplomatic gains achieved by the legitimate authorities, however, the crisis has not ended in practical terms.

It remains tied to the international community’s ability to translate condemnation into measures that prevent similar incidents and ensure respect for the Yemeni state’s sovereignty over all land, sea and air entry points.

The continuing efforts of UN envoy Hans Grundberg, alongside international positions supporting de-escalation, also reflect growing recognition that preserving the fragile truce requires addressing the roots of the crisis.

These include ending the Houthi coup and preventing humanitarian issues and sovereign ports of entry from being used as tools of conflict.

For the Yemeni government, observers say, the crisis was more a political test than a military one.

Through its response, it sought to establish a new equation: defending sovereignty does not contradict the pursuit of peace, and the state can combine restraint with resolve while respecting international law and asserting its authority.