Exclusive - 10 Factual Errors Committed by ‘The Spy’ Series on Eli Cohen

Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
TT
20

Exclusive - 10 Factual Errors Committed by ‘The Spy’ Series on Eli Cohen

Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)

Netflix last week released a series about Israeli spy, Eli Cohen, who had infiltrated Syria in the 1960s. The six-episode series sought to glamorize the image of the spy, taking into account only the Israeli version of accounts. The show was after all written and directed by Israeli director Gideon Raff and sought to present Israeli intelligence “heroics” in contrast with corruption and betrayal among the Syrian political class.

The series, starring comedic actor Sacha Baron Cohen, was rife with factual and political errors and omits the Syrian version of the story. Few Syrian accounts exist. One was recounted by Judge Salah al-Dalali, who presided over the court that sentenced Cohen to death. The Mossad spy operated in Syria between 1962 and 1965 when he was arrested and executed.

Syrian writers and historians pointed to ten historical errors committed in “The Spy”:

1- President Amin al-Hafez: The series showed that he met and struck a friendship with Cohen when he served as Syria’s military attache in Argentina. Hafez himself denied the relationship during a television interview in 2001. He explained that he was in Argentina in 1962 long after Cohen had arrived in Damascus. He revealed that he only met Cohen after his arrest in 1965. Claims of the friendship was promoted by Egyptian dailies at the time as part of a campaign against Hafez over a backdrop of political tensions. No document or picture exist to prove the relationship between Hafez and Cohen.

2 - Hafez al-Assad and Amin al-Hafez: Assad was not a lieutenant general as claimed by the series. He was an officer deployed in Egypt. Amin al-Hafez did not come to power after the March 8, 1963 coup in Syria as shown in the series. He was appointed interior minister and then assumed the presidency of the revolutionary command council. He became president on July 27 later that year.

3 - Michel Aflaq: He did not meet with Cohen and did not give him a list of people to invite, including Prime Minister Khaled al-Azm, for a March 8 soiree. Azm had never visited Cohen in his life. Contrary to what the series claimed, Aflaq did not have information about the army’s activity during the March 8 coup.

4 - Abdul Karim Zahreddine: An army chief of staff, he never set foot in Cohen’s house, but his nephew, reservist Maazi, did. Maazi was Cohen’s friend and released from the army on the day of the coup. He later assumed minor positions in public office. He used to meet with Cohen at his house or at the al-Kamal cafe in central Damascus. He was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison in 1965.

5 - Maazi Zahreddine and the front: Maazi escorted Cohen to the Syrian front with Israel in 1962. It was claimed that the spy obtained military intelligence that was vital to the June 5, 1967 defeat during Six-Day War. However, there is a five-year period between the visit and the defeat, raising questions over just how vital the information actually was. Moreover, officers deployed at the front and military positions were repeatedly changed after March 8, 1963 and later in 1966. A western expert revealed earlier this week that Cohen’s mission was not aimed at gathering information about the front, but cracking down on Nazi officers who were staying in Damascus. He was also tasked with following up on the situation of Jews in the Syrian capital.

6 - Deputy defense minister: The series claimed that Cohen was considered for the position of “deputy defense minister”. No such position had existed at the time. It was introduced in 1970. Moreover, such a position is restricted to military figures and no civilian can occupy it.

7 - Ahmed Suweidani: He later became chief of staff. He was not head of Hafez’s security in Argentina. The scene from the series where Cohen secretly enters Hafez’s office and takes photographs of classified documents is pure fiction. The series did get Suweidani’s suspicions against Cohen right. An expert revealed: “He was suspicious of Cohen from day one. He played a central role in exposing and arresting him in 1965.”

8 - Execution: The series showed Damascene Majed Sheikh al-Ard doffing his hat to Cohen out of sorrow and respect the moment he was hanged in al-Marjeh square. A historian said that it is well-known that Sheikh al-Ard was deceived by Cohen. He was one of his victims.

He met Cohen in 1962 on board a ship that was sailing from Europe to Beirut. Cohen ingratiated himself to Sheikh al-Ard and entered Syria with him through Lebanon under the alias Kamel Amin Thabet. Sheikh al-Ard helped Cohen rent a furnished apartment on Abu Rummaneh street in Damascus. The expert added: “The relationship between the two men did not go any further because Sheikh al-Ard had no information of use to the spy.” Moreover, he once spoke about his admiration of Adolf Hitler, which immediately caused friction between him and Cohen.

Sheikh al-Ard did not witness Cohen’s execution and did not doff his hat to him. He was in jail, serving a life sentence. He was held in Qalaa prison in Damascus and later transferred to Palmyra prison where he died in his cell reportedly of suicide.

Neither Hafez, not his wife, were present at the execution. Another fabrication is the disgusting storyline about the sexual relationship between Hafez’s wife and Cohen and allegedly with the approval of her husband.

9 - Infiltration of society: The series claimed that Cohen had wormed his way into Syrian society and befriended influential figures. In fact, he only made friends with B and C class figures. He avoided top rank officials out of fear of being exposed. In 2004, Dalali told the writer that Cohen was “just an ordinary spy.” He was buried in a cave by the al-Dimas road. Later his remains were dug up and buried in an undisclosed location.

10 - Abu Rummaneh neighborhood: The series’ depiction of the neighborhood looks more like Talaat square in Cairo. It also claimed that a Russian officer helped detect radio waves, as part of communication with Israel, coming from Cohen's apartment and which led to his discovery. There are four accounts of how he was exposed: by the Russian officer, nearby Indian embassy that detected radio interference, Egyptian intelligence and Suweidani.



How Israel Used Spies, Smuggled Drones and AI to Stun and Hobble Iran 

Flames rise from an oil storage facility after it appeared to have been hit by an Israeli strike in Tehran, Iran, early Sunday, June 15, 2025. (AP)
Flames rise from an oil storage facility after it appeared to have been hit by an Israeli strike in Tehran, Iran, early Sunday, June 15, 2025. (AP)
TT
20

How Israel Used Spies, Smuggled Drones and AI to Stun and Hobble Iran 

Flames rise from an oil storage facility after it appeared to have been hit by an Israeli strike in Tehran, Iran, early Sunday, June 15, 2025. (AP)
Flames rise from an oil storage facility after it appeared to have been hit by an Israeli strike in Tehran, Iran, early Sunday, June 15, 2025. (AP)

Israel stunned and hobbled Iran last week when it pulled off an intelligence and military operation years in the making that struck high-level targets with precision.

Guided by spies and artificial intelligence, the Israeli military unleashed a nighttime fusillade of warplanes and armed drones smuggled into Iran to quickly incapacitate many of its air defenses and missile systems. With greater freedom to fly over Iran, Israel bombarded key nuclear sites and killed top generals and scientists. By the time Iran mustered a response hours later, its ability to retaliate — already weakened by past Israeli strikes — was greatly diminished.

This Associated Press account is based on conversations with 10 current and former Israeli intelligence and military officials, some of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss clandestine operations.

It was not possible to independently verify some of their claims. But the former head of research at Israel's spy agency, the Mossad, confirmed the basic contours of the attack, saying she had inside knowledge of how it was planned and executed.

“This attack is the culmination of years of work by the Mossad to target Iran's nuclear program,” said Sima Shine, the former Mossad research director who is now an analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies.

Israel's element of surprise was enhanced by Iranian officials' apparent assumption that Israel wouldn't attack while talks over its rapidly advancing nuclear program were ongoing with the US.

A sixth round of talks had been planned for last Sunday in Oman, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu activated “Operation Rising Lion” on Friday after his country first notified President Donald Trump.

Netanyahu has for years said neutralizing Iran's nuclear program was vital for Israel's security, and Israel had previously taken steps to set back Iran's ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade. But Netanyahu said a more aggressive attack proved necessary, as Iran kept advancing its enrichment program despite US diplomatic efforts and warnings from UN watchdogs.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly called for Israel's destruction. Iran's political leaders say their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, though it was the only country without the bomb to enrich uranium close to weapons-grade levels.

Smuggling drones into Iran

The Mossad and the military worked together for at least three years to lay the operational groundwork, according to a former intelligence officer who said he had knowledge of the attack. This person spoke on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the subject.

The attack built off knowledge Israel gained during a wave of airstrikes last October, which “highlighted the weakness of Iranian air defenses,” said Naysan Rafati, an Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group.

To further diminish Iranian air defenses and missile systems at the start of last week's attack, Mossad agents had smuggled precision weapons into Iran that were prepositioned to strike from close range, according to two current security officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the missions. Those weapons included small, armed drones, which agents snuck into the country in vehicles, according to the former intelligence officer.

Mossad agents stationed weapons close to Iranian surface-to-air missile sites, Shine said. The agency works with a mix of people, both locals and Israelis, she said.

Using AI and human intelligence to select targets

To analyze information it gathered, Israel used the latest artificial-intelligence, or AI, technology, said an intelligence officer involved with selecting individuals and sites to target. He said AI was used to help Israelis quickly sift through troves of data they had obtained.

That effort began last October according to the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media; it was one month before Netanyahu said he had ordered the attack plans.

An investigation by The Associated Press earlier this year uncovered that the Israeli military uses US-made AI models in war to sift through intelligence and intercept communications to learn the movements of its enemies. It's been used in the wars with Hamas in Gaza and with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The intelligence officer involved in identifying the possible targets said options were first put into various groups, such as leadership, military, civilian and infrastructure. Targets were chosen if they were determined to be a threat to Israel, such as being deeply associated with Iran's Revolutionary Guard, the paramilitary force that controls Iran's ballistic missiles.

The officer was tasked with putting together a list of Iranian generals, including details on where they worked and spent their free time.

Among the high-level military officials killed since Friday's attack were Gen. Hossein Salami, the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, and Gen. Mohammed Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces.

In addition to AI, the Mossad relied on spies to identify top nuclear scientists and members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, according to one security official. At least eight members of the Guard, including the head of its missile program, were killed in a single Israeli strike on an underground bunker.

Targeting Iranian vehicles

Another facet of the attack was to strike Iranian vehicles used to transport and launch missiles.

Shine said the strategy was similar to a Ukrainian operation earlier this month in Russia. In that operation, nearly a third of Moscow's strategic bomber fleet was destroyed or damaged with cheaply made drones snuck into Russian territory, according to Ukrainian officials.

In an interview with Iranian state-run television, the country's police chief, Gen. Ahmadreza Radan, said “several vehicles carrying mini-drones and some tactical drones have been discovered.” He added: “a number of traitors are trying to engage the country's air defense by flying some mini-drones.”

How far back does this go?

The Mossad is believed to have carried out numerous covert attacks on the Iranian nuclear program over the years, including cyberattacks and the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists. But it rarely acknowledges such operations.

In the 2000s, Iranian centrifuges used for enriching uranium were destroyed by the so-called Stuxnet computer virus, believed to be an Israeli and American creation.

In 2018, Israel stole an archive of Iranian nuclear research that included tens of thousands of pages of records, said Yossi Kuperwasser, a retired general and former military intelligence researcher who now directs the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

In July 2024, Israel killed a senior leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, with a bomb in a bedroom of a government guesthouse in Tehran.

Israel's blistering attack last week on the heart of Iran's nuclear and military structure didn't come out of nowhere, said retired Israeli Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi, who heads the Israel Defense and Security Forum think tank.

It was the result of “Israeli intelligence working extensively for years in Iran and establishing a very strong robust presence,” he said.