Exclusive - Potential Structures of New Lebanese Government

Protesters re-install a cardboard fist labeled ‘Revolution’ in Martyrs’ Square after a previous one was burned down by unknown vandals in downtown Beirut, Lebanon, November 22, 2019. (AP)
Protesters re-install a cardboard fist labeled ‘Revolution’ in Martyrs’ Square after a previous one was burned down by unknown vandals in downtown Beirut, Lebanon, November 22, 2019. (AP)
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Exclusive - Potential Structures of New Lebanese Government

Protesters re-install a cardboard fist labeled ‘Revolution’ in Martyrs’ Square after a previous one was burned down by unknown vandals in downtown Beirut, Lebanon, November 22, 2019. (AP)
Protesters re-install a cardboard fist labeled ‘Revolution’ in Martyrs’ Square after a previous one was burned down by unknown vandals in downtown Beirut, Lebanon, November 22, 2019. (AP)

Nearly a month after the resignation of Saad Hariri as prime minister, Lebanese officials are still debating the appointment of his replacement and the formation of a new government, demonstrating just how out of touch they are with protesters. The longer they take to appoint a new premier, the worse socio-economic conditions become.

Already grappling with an economic crisis, Lebanon has slid even deeper into turmoil since protests erupted against the ruling elite last month, fueled by anger over the corruption of the sectarian politicians who have dominated Lebanon for years.

The protests led Hariri to quit as prime minister on October 29, toppling a coalition government that included the Hezbollah party. President Michel Aoun has yet to call for binding parliamentary consultations to name his replacement, drawing the criticism of rivals and ire of protesters.

The following are potential government scenarios that may take shape:

- Ongoing stalling with no appointed PM: Aoun’s political camp may exploit a constitutional loophole that does not bind the president to call for consultations within a specific timeframe. This will allow him the time to seek more potential candidates and to demonstrate that he was firmly in control of the state and preserving the “dignity” of the Free Patriotic Movement and its leader against the protesters. The stalling tactic allows the FPM to blame the political impasse and deteriorating economy on its rivals. It will also lower expectations and avoid appearing as though the FPM had succumbed to the protester demands. The stalling will deflate the demonstrators and create unease and exasperation that will ultimately lead forces to make do with whatever government that can ensure that life returns to “normal”.

- Hariri forms a government of independents: Such a scenario may “embarrass” the revolt because it will eliminate the sympathy of the Sunnis with the rallies should Hariri’s appointment be met with rejection. Prime ministers in Lebanon must be Sunni. The premiership was already dealt a blow when Hariri was forced to resign, while the president – a Maronite Christian – and parliament speaker – a Shiite – have only been dealt “metaphorical” blows.

Moreover, Hariri’s formation of a government of independent figures raises more questions than answers: How will it set economic policies? How will the powers react if the bank owners refuse to take on the brunt of salvaging the situation? What will Lebanon’s stance be towards regional disputes which the country was dragged into due to the policies of Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil and Hezbollah? Most importantly, will the new government be able to rid itself of clientelism and cronyism that have plagued the country for decades?

The Aoun-Hezbollah alliance still rejects a government of independents, claiming it will tighten the noose around the party. Hezbollah has offered unrealistic proposals to tackle the economic crisis, such as turning to China, while the FPM, which is headed by Bassil, has made farcical allegations that the revolt has adopted its demands of combating corruption.

- Government of independents without Hariri: This scenario meets the demand of the protesters to keep the current corrupt sectarian political class out of the new cabinet. This ultimately makes the demand the most difficult to achieve given the presence of the current balance of power. The parties in power will make it very difficult for independent figures to avoid political dictates. Moreover, the balance of power inside the cabinet itself will also be vague. What economic policies will they adopt? What about their political and sectarian views? One must also wonder what sort of international backing will such a government receive. Could it succeed in convincing it and Arab countries that it is serious about wanting to achieve real change and economic, judicial and political reform in Lebanon? This government must also be wary of Hezbollah and its international backers as they attempt to evade western sanctions and use Lebanon as a smuggling portal.

- Government of technocrat and political figures headed by Hariri: Hezbollah and its supporters have been demanding such a cabinet, saying it was the best solution to the current impasse. This government would include party representatives, excluding the Lebanese Forces and possibly Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Jumblatt. Hezbollah and its allies would take advantage of Hariri being appointed as premier. The government would also include figures that rightfully came to light or who exploited the revolt under the guise of the civil society. This new government would pick up where its predecessor left off and resume clientelism and repeat same empty promises to the international community in return for aid packages. The international community and Arab world will not support such a government, which should it be established, will further increase Lebanon’s isolation.

The materialization of such a scenario hinges on the success of attempts to tarnish the image of the revolt and claim that it will fail in achieving its goals.

- One-sided government: Hariri will not be considered to head such a cabinet, which would be formed of Hezbollah and its allies. Technically, Hezbollah and its FPM allies have enough lawmakers to form such a government. However, it would bring disaster to the economy and no one wants to be held responsible for that. It could also lead to more fragmentation among the FPM ranks and the supporters of Hezbollah and the Amal movement. As of yet, there is no reason why officials would resort to forming to such a cabinet. Threats to do so have been dismissed as political and media intimidation. The last time a one-sided government was formed was in 2011 under Najib Miqati and it was met with massive failure.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.