Lebanon’s Brain Drain: 'I'm Never Coming Back'

People are pictured inside the terminal at Beirut International Airport Beirut, on January 27, 2020. (Photo by ANWAR AMRO / AFP)
People are pictured inside the terminal at Beirut International Airport Beirut, on January 27, 2020. (Photo by ANWAR AMRO / AFP)
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Lebanon’s Brain Drain: 'I'm Never Coming Back'

People are pictured inside the terminal at Beirut International Airport Beirut, on January 27, 2020. (Photo by ANWAR AMRO / AFP)
People are pictured inside the terminal at Beirut International Airport Beirut, on January 27, 2020. (Photo by ANWAR AMRO / AFP)

When Lebanon's protests erupted in October, thousands found a renewed commitment to their homeland and vowed to fix a country that has long fed its best and brightest to the diaspora.

Then the economy unraveled.

Students and young professionals who had mobilized en masse to demand better opportunities in their home country started filling in immigration forms and applying to universities abroad, Agence France Presse reported.

Mothers on bustling protest squares who had been complaining about their children living far away have since seen even more leave.

With no clear path out of Lebanon's worst economic crisis in decades, the will to remain has petered out and many are now scrambling for the exit.

"I'm leaving and I'm never coming back," said Youssef Nassar, a 29-year-old cinematographer who has booked a one-way ticket to Canada for next month.

"Nothing is going right in this country for me to stay here,” he told AFP.

Lebanon is suffering its worst economic crisis since the 1975-1990 civil war and everyone is feeling the heat. Scores of companies have closed, salaries have been slashed, and unemployment rates are skyrocketing.

Inflation doubled between October and November, according to Lebanon's Blominvest Bank, while the Lebanese pound has plunged by a third against the dollar in the parallel exchange market.

Nassar criticized the political class for failing to chart a way out of the crisis.

"I have developed a hate for this country," he said.

Nassar used to make a decent earning every month from shooting photo and video campaigns for fashion brands, advertising agencies and even English rock artist Steven Wilson. 

But since Lebanon's economic crisis accelerated with the start of anti-government protests in October, with banks temporarily closing and later severely limiting withdrawals, he has only been booked once.

Seven of his clients, including a high-profile member of the Lebanese parliament, have so far failed to pay the $25,000 they collectively owe him for previous projects.

"I want to work on my career and my future," said Nassar, who holds a Canadian passport. "I'm not willing to wait forever for the country to get better."

He is not the only one seeking better chances abroad.

Information International, an independent Lebanon-based research body, estimates that the number of Lebanese who left the country and did not return in 2019 jumped by 42 percent on the previous year.

Google searches from within Lebanon for the term "immigration" hit a five-year peak between November and December, according to Google Trends.

The last time the search term was that popular was right after Lebanon's 2006 war with Israel.

Immigration lawyers, for their part, say business is booming.

"Demand is up by at least 75 percent," said one immigration lawyer who asked not to be named to protect his business.

He said he is currently processing 25 applications.

Most are to Canada, which along with Australia is among the most popular destinations for Lebanese emigrants due to their demand for highly skilled people, the lawyer said. 

The bulk of his clients are educated youths and young professionals working in pharmaceuticals, information technology and finance.

"They are leaving because of the economic and political situation," he told AFP.

Decades of conflict, sluggish growth and corruption have prompted many Lebanese to emigrate -- a fact touted by Lebanese officials who boast the success of the country's expatriates.

Although there are no official figures, Lebanon's diaspora is estimated to be more than double the size of its domestic population of four million.

This chronic exodus has drawn the ire of demonstrators, who accuse politicians they view as corrupt of hijacking the country and forcing its people out.

"I had been thinking about leaving ever since I was 16 years old," said Fatima, an architect by training who is now 28.

"When the revolution started, that was the very first time I ever felt like I belonged, the very first time I ever felt that Lebanon's flag meant something to me."

But last month, Fatima lost a high-paying job at an international NGO after donors cut funding due to the crisis.

"This is when everything changed for me," she told AFP.

She found an immigration lawyer and is in the process of applying to emigrate to Canada -- something she is determined to complete.

"I'm tired of fighting all the time," she said.

"I don't think I will be failing my country if I leave," she added.

"I will be failing it if I stay and get more depressed and do nothing."



Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
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Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)

What’s the most dangerous mission someone could take on? A meeting between Saddam Hussein’s envoy and Osama bin Laden in Sudan. US intelligence under President George W. Bush soon found out about it.

This meeting became a key justification used by Washington to invade Iraq, taking advantage of the post-9/11 atmosphere in the US after al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, attacked New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

In truth, there was no reason for bin Laden to influence Saddam Hussein’s future. The two men came from very different worlds. Saddam was the president of a major country in the region, not a faction leader.

He belonged to a secular party, choosing a Christian, Tariq Aziz, as foreign minister—a rare decision in the Middle East. Saddam also wasn’t known for playing along in decisions where he wasn’t in control.

But the decision to meet in Khartoum still cost Saddam, even though the meeting was a failure. A former Iraqi intelligence officer said US forces later seized a document showing that the Iraqi envoy advised against working with bin Laden, advice that was followed.

The 1990s in Sudan were extremely risky. During this time, President Omar al-Bashir’s regime made three major blunders: hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, sheltering international fugitive Carlos the Jackal, and involving Ali Osman Taha, the regime’s second-in-command, in an assassination attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

A rare photo shows Omar al-Bashir and Osama bin Laden in Sudan.

Bin Laden didn’t dwell much on the events in Khartoum in August 1994, when French commandos arrested Carlos and took him to France, where he still sits in prison.

Moreover, the al-Qaeda leader couldn’t foresee Sudan’s regime forcing him out of the country.

The regime, however, had no option but to reduce the risks. Bashir dismissed top security officials and decided to expel the “Arab Afghans.”

One day, Bashir and his deputy informed Hassan al-Turabi that bin Laden’s departure had been arranged. They then visited bin Laden, and a military plane flew him to Afghanistan.

The Taliban then gave bin Laden a safe haven, though Mullah Omar never imagined this would lead to his regime's downfall. In the late 1990s, questions about bin Laden were common when speaking with Sudanese officials.

In an interview, Bashir said that bin Laden came to Sudan after the Afghan war to invest in roads, airports, and agriculture—industries his family had been involved in for a long time.

According to Bashir’s statements, bin Laden didn’t have followers or networks in Sudan, just a small group of close aides who stayed out of the public eye.

But the US had made him a global threat, seeing him everywhere, even after he left Sudan, despite knowing he lived in isolation in a distant country.

While Bashir downplayed it, he had met bin Laden several times during his stay in Khartoum, and it's unlikely he was unaware of the ties between bin Laden and Sudanese security officials.

Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi reaffirmed Bashir’s claims of bin Laden having been building roads and airports.

“He wasn’t involved in public or intellectual circles and stayed out of the media. We talked about Afghanistan, and I shared our concerns that after the Soviets left, the fighters would be skilled in destruction but not in building a stable society, much like the French Revolution,” said al-Turabi at the time.

“I told him (bin Laden) Kabul fell before they were ready to establish a Muslim society as they envisioned,” added al-Turabi.

When asked who pushed for Osama bin Laden’s exit from Sudan, he said: “It was the British, acting on behalf of the Americans.”

“Saudi Arabia didn’t apply direct pressure—they’re always polite. Bin Laden felt his presence was straining relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which have very close ties. With about half a million Sudanese working in Saudi Arabia, none were expelled. Bin Laden didn’t want to harm that relationship,” he explained.

Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, entering a dangerous new phase. Soon after, the Taliban took over and welcomed him. Within two years, bombings at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led Washington to blame bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden’s home in Sudan. (Asharq Al-Awsat file)

The accusation was repeated after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. Bin Laden made statements suggesting he was at war with the US, but no one expected him to bring the fight to American soil on September 11, 2001.

When President Bush justified the Iraq invasion, he listed allegations against Saddam, including weapons of mass destruction, repression, and mass graves.

The most controversial claim was that Saddam’s regime was cooperating with al-Qaeda. However, the US administration did not provide evidence for this claim, and no concrete proof of a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was presented.

Curiosity about the contact between Saddam and bin Laden had journalists setting out to find more information.

While answers couldn’t be obtained from Saddam’s opponents or his former colleagues, insights from Iraqi intelligence were available.

Salim al-Jumaili, head of the American Affairs Division in Iraqi intelligence, who was involved in the initial outreach to bin Laden, agreed to talk.

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, marked by a security agreement that limited interference and intelligence activities.

Saddam praised Saudi Arabia and King Fahd for their support during the Iran-Iraq War. According to a former Iraqi official, King Fahd tried hard to resolve the situation and return to negotiations after the invasion, but Saddam had gone too far.

The invasion led to the collapse of the security agreement. As news spread about Iraqi opposition groups contacting Saudi Arabia, Iraqi intelligence suggested canceling the agreement, but Saddam refused.

When reports about these contacts continued, Saddam demanded monthly updates.

Eventually, he believed Saudi Arabia was backing efforts to overthrow him and ordered intelligence to “act strongly to undermine the American military presence in Saudi Arabia.”

“When the president issues such an order, all security agencies must try to fulfill it. At that time, I managed the Syria division and had connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, specifically Adnan Okla’s group,” said al-Jumaili.

“Adnan’s brother, Abdul Malik, told us that the Brotherhood had links with bin Laden and could deliver our message. I met Abdul Malik in Baghdad, and he agreed to help. I gave him a message saying we shared a goal of removing US forces from the region and were open to cooperation. We provided about $10,000 for travel expenses,” he revealed.

“The contact returned after a month or so and reported that bin Laden’s stance was very rigid. Bin Laden said the Iraqi regime was infidel and responsible for the presence of US forces in the region, and he was not interested in meeting or cooperating with us. This was in the early 1990s, before al-Qaeda’s actions escalated to the level of September 11.”

“I also heard from Farouk Hijazi, head of external operations, that bin Laden gave a similar response through another channel,” added al-Jumaili.

Al-Jumaili later discovered that Farouk Hijazi had visited Khartoum and met with bin Laden, arranged by al-Turabi.

“Hijazi informed the president that no cooperation with al-Qaeda took place. This is what Bush referred to when he mentioned the president sending an envoy to bin Laden. Bush likely knew there was no real cooperation but didn't mention it to justify the invasion,” al-Jumaili said.

Hassan al-Turabi. (AFP)

Another source, who requested anonymity, said bin Laden showed some flexibility regarding the Iraqi regime during his meeting with Hijazi.

Bin Laden “requested that if there were to be any cooperation, his camps be set up outside Iraqi control and that he have freedom in choosing targets and timing.”

Saddam, after learning of this, was told by Hijazi that cooperating with bin Laden would be complex and risky. Saddam then decided to end the matter entirely.

The consequences of that risky meeting are clear.

Saddam was executed, and Hijazi, who had fled to Syria, was captured at the Syrian-Iraqi border and also executed. Years later, US forces tracked down and killed bin Laden in Pakistan.

Cities sometimes take dangerous risks beyond their means and end up facing harsh realities.

Khartoum paid the price for harboring wanted figures and was punished before it could address the damage.

Some believe that under Bashir, Khartoum aimed to become a center of anti-Western activity, while al-Turabi wanted it to be a hub for political Islam, like Khomeini’s Iran. Both men pushed Sudan beyond its limits.